


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LECTURES
ON
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY,

BY

E. DODGE.

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CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

PROLEGOMENA.

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION.

AXIOMS AND POSTULATES.—The testimony of consciousness is valid; *first*, for its present susceptibilities and capacities and operations: *second*, for the reality of its contents.

The laws of thought are authoritative in their own sphere—the sphere of construction, or of determinate conceptions. Here human thought is distinctly formulative.

The rational intuitions are authoritative in their own sphere—the sphere of receptivity, or that of indeterminate and unformulated thought. In mathematical intuitions, however, the thought has a determinate form, as these intuitions pertain to relations alone. They belong exclusively to the formal sciences of quantity and of number.

All difficulties are capable of either a positive or a negative solution: positive, when the facts of life or the laws of thought enable us to master them: negative, when it can be shown that the subject in which they inhere transcends the reason or necessarily eludes our analysis or positively transcends our experience.

Mysteries occur whenever the Infinite presents itself to our comprehension, or whenever the Infinite or Finite cross each other. They form, however, apart from the excrescences of human thought, the attractions and not the difficulties of religion.

Reason and faith can never conflict, for the first is simply the faculty of cognition, while the second is the spiritual synthetic capacity of the person. Faith thus gathers into a higher union the elements of intelligence, sensibility and will. They differ, too, in

the fact that one is constructive while the other is simply receptive in its nature. They touch each other in the intuitions. We refer these last to faith when we trust them, and thus name the principles of belief. We refer them to the reason when we merely apprehend them, and so call them self-evident truths. Reason and faith act and react on each other. Faith gains in clearness and purity by the action of the intelligence, and the intelligence gains in insight and depth by the power of faith.

The truths of science, whatever may be the subject of the science, namely, Nature, Man, Art, Criticism, are to be accepted.

The speculations of scientific men have no special value over the speculations of metaphysicians. They have no authority whatever.

Reason admits its own limitations. It affirms the existence of that which it cannot comprehend. Its antinomies are only apparent. For they pertain to either the opposite aspects of the same verity, or a mere contrast of what transcends and what contradicts the laws of definite thought.

Dogmatic statements are to be regarded neither as merely provisional nor as final in character. They are simply historical growths. The old forms are to be abandoned as soon as the new ones have proved their legitimacy by showing that they are the natural outcomes of the Christian consciousness.

DEFINITIONS.—The word religion is borrowed from the Latin *religio*. This term is derived, according to Cicero, from *relegere*, "to read again," thus denoting self-reflection; according to others, "to bind again," indicating supreme obligation. The older theologians generally define religion as a "*modus deum cognoscendi et collendi*." This definition has a practical but a scientific value. Kant held that religion was the acknowledgment of all our duties as divine commands. He absorbed religion in morality. The Mystics always reversed this order and made religion absorb morality. Hegel's idea of religion may be expressed thus: the identity of God's consciousness of himself with man's consciousness of God. This is an exaggerated statement of a profound truth; viz: that religion is a life communion in which man is more receptive than active. Schleiermacher gives the following definition: A sense of absolute dependence on God. This has gained a wide acceptance among theologians. It is, however, partial, in that it makes religion too

passive, excluding, as it does, the free self-determination of the soul. Religion is not alone a supreme submission to God, but the free choice of God as one's supreme good. The two must go together. The sinking of the will in God is alone real freedom. Besides, religion is not merely feeling, but the blending of thought, sensibility and will in character, action and life. Hengstenberg defines it thus: The life of God in the soul of man. It is a great truth given in rhetorical language. Drey defines religion as the life of man determined by his original consciousness of God. This definition directs our attention to the significant fact that man, as man, has a religious nature and destination. These last two definitions are faulty, also, in that they both limit religion to man. But angels must have a religion since they are moral and rational beings.

In any definition of religion, we are to consider its two-fold aspects. Subjectively considered, religion is the inner communion of God with his rational creatures. Here, however, the communion is mutual, else it would not be real; only in this communion, the agency of God precedes in order of thought the agency of man. Naturally the impartation comes before the reception, though as a natural fact, they blend together in one life movement. Objectively considered, religion is the revelation of God as interpreted and formulated by inspired or uninspired men. Whenever the inward principle is colored and directed by a false interpretation of the facts revealed, then we have superstition. Religion embraces both piety and morality. In the first the soul is dominantly receptive, and in the second it is dominantly active. Again, in the first the soul moves toward God, while in the second it moves toward man. Still each movement, in its purity and fullness, involves, and must involve, the other.

Christianity is the reunion, on a higher plain of life, of God with man. It presupposes a break between them, and reunites them in Christ, and proffers to individual souls more than a restoration to the lost favor of God—a higher and fuller fellowship to be perfected hereafter. The Christian religion, objectively considered, are the special facts that centre in and group about the Christ of history and of the church, and also the special facts that centre in and group about his second coming, as these facts are interpreted by inspired men and apprehended by the Christian consciousness.

Revelation is the presentation of God to the human soul. It consists of objective media; either historical facts, or outward symbols. These latter are the signs and pledges of transcendent realities. When the term revelation refers to an inward impartation of the truth or an inward illumination, it is synonymous with the word inspiration. This revelation, as given in nature and in history, is the foundation of natural religion: as given in the supernatural facts of Providence, it is the basis of revealed religion. The latter must involve the former.

Religion as an inward power has its seat in the personal affections, because these are the springs of the higher life of the soul, and religion must start from the depths of that life. It involves also right knowledge and leads to right action. Too exclusive prominence given to the affections in religion leads, in profound natures, to a quiet but sublime mysticism; in weak natures, to an idle sentimentalism; in active temperaments, to fanaticism. Too exclusive prominence given to knowledge in religion leads to a dead orthodoxy. Too exclusive prominence given to action in religion leads to a cold legalism or mere formalism, or to both united. The Mystic lives in his religious impressions. The sense of the divine blots out the sense of his individuality, and he loses himself in the mazes of religious Pantheism. The Intellectualist deals with his concepts alone. The sign and the symbol take the place of the spirit and the substance of the truth. The Formalist concerns himself only with the letter of the law as it affects morals or worship. The Rationalist puts his reason in the place of his faith and makes it perform all the spiritual functions of faith.

A doctrine is a fact of revelation in its worth and significance, or in its relations and bearings on human duty and destiny. It is not a rational principle of religion, however true or lofty that principle may be. The fact is always the soul of the doctrine. The fact may be the supreme one of the Incarnation, or some one of the minor facts which depend upon the person and life of our Lord. Thus the doctrine may relate to the continued presence and agency of Christ in the souls of men, or it may pertain to the glories of a future life, since that life is the result of Christ's presence in the world.

A dogma is a doctrine as authoritatively defined, and Dogmatics

is a systematic treatment of the several dogmas as accepted by the church. It thus denotes Church theology rather than Christian theology, though many use it in the latter sense.

CORRUCTIONS.—These depend on the gifts of nature, on the results of education and on the graces of the Spirit. If nature has not done her part, there can be no foundation for the theological character. Where the inheritance has been ample and rich, there educational advantages are less needed. But it is a maxim that education will do the most for those who have the most brains. Besides, it is not to be overlooked that culture can be less easily disposed with in a free church, where individualism is dominant, than in a communion where freedom of thought is subordinated to ecclesiastical authority or to traditional creeds. But whatever view may be taken of the value of education, all must agree that, without the presence of the Spirit of God, no man, whatever be his genius or his culture, can become a Christian theologian.

Natural qualifications are the following: a broad and open soul, clearness and depth of vision, a constructive power and a clear and well balanced judgment. Of course, these presuppose more or less of an educative process either in or out of the schools; yet the basis of all of them is laid in man at his birth. We are not, however, to expect that all of these traits of character will exist in an equal degree or in a full measure, in any student of theology. It is only insisted that all should, to some extent, possess each and every one of these qualifications.

In his education, the student should, if possible, possess the general culture of the college. Whether he gains that culture in the school or out of it is altogether immaterial. It must be said, however, that education under a living teacher, in the midst of a living community of students, is far more effective and far richer in its results than any isolated self-education can possibly be. Besides the preparatory discipline of the college, the student of theology does need the special and positive attainments which can best be secured in a seminary devoted to theological studies. The responsibilities of the pastor and preacher are too great to be lightly assumed, and their work is too absorbing to afford much time for side studies. Besides, the demands of the age are greater to-day than ever before; and these demands necessitate an educa-

ted ministry. The religious teacher must so far have mastered the original language of the Bible as not to be absolutely dependent upon any translations, and to be able to use the works of those Biblical critics whose criticisms depend on the original Hebrew or Greek.

He must also be able, in scientific studies, to distinguish facts from speculations; and in historical investigations, to weigh evidence and to trace the divine plan in human history. He must also be competent to form his own system of psychology and to know when philosophy passes beyond the boundaries of human thought. He needs thus to be a thinker so self-poised that even his favorite ideals may not fascinate and mislead him.

The spiritual enlightenment from without and above alone can secure the right moral qualifications. This alone will save us from a rationalistic spirit, with its dryness, narrowness and superficiality; from a contempt for the great names which have preceded us and thus from the very spirit of heresy itself; from indifference on the one hand, as on the other from individual or party prejudices. The Spirit of God will secure humility of heart, a childlike love of truth, a spiritual discernment, and will beget in us a serious sense of our responsibility both for our opinions and for their open and deliberate avowal.

While it is true that every man's individuality will give special direction to his studies, yet it is also true that the compass of Christian theology is so wide that every man's intellectual tendencies may be fully gratified. No one can indeed become a complete master of theology. It is enough if he appropriates as much of the truth as can be made to touch his own inner mental and spiritual life.

Christian theology is the systematic treatment of the Christian religion. It has its records, which necessitate Exegetical theology; its successive facts, which demand Historical theology; its doctrines, which require Dogmatic theology; its antagonisms to error, which lead to Polemic theology; its defences against doubt, which require Apologetic theology; its speculative ideas, which make imperative Philosophical theology; its aims and its goal, which again necessitate Practical theology. Thus Christian theology is the unfolding of divine methods in the Christian relig-

ion, rather than the exposition of a science rounded and complete. A purely scientific construction of the religion of Christ is impossible. For the religion of Christ is yet to be unfolded in a new cycle of the supernatural, and, even as now given, many of the verities of this religion absolutely transcend human thought. Nor can we term it the philosophy of the Christian faith, because Christianity is realistic rather than idealistic in character.

Sources.—We must draw our materials for theology from nature, from the soul, from human history, and, above all, from the Holy Scriptures.

First, from nature. This is recognized in the nineteenth Psalm and in Rom. 1:19, 20; and is implied throughout the prophetic and the apostolic writings. The laws of nature, that is, the forces of nature in their modes of action and interaction, give us God's method of procedure. The various natural sciences give us his more secret ways and methods. In fact, we go to nature for our illustrations of the natural attributes of God.

Second, from the soul. (*a.*) From its constitution. The soul is formed in the image of God. We are to look to the soul as giving us the best idea of God we can form, however inadequate that idea may be. (*b.*) From moral intuitions and the life experiences of the soul. Paul frequently falls back on the universal and necessary convictions of the human soul. His phrase, "God forbid," is an appeal to these intuitions. When the Apostle declares that the Gentiles are a law unto themselves, he refers to their instinctive moral judgments or to the results of their life-experiences.

Third, from human history. Civil history reveals God's general providence. His very abandonment of the heathen nations was and is a revelation of his wrath. The history of nations, as well as of individuals, is rich in religious instruction. In fact, Social Science is a handmaid to theology. Sacred history, or the history of the Kingdom of God, reveals God's special providence.

Here we have to notice somewhat at length the general Christian consciousness—the believing apprehension by God's children in all ages, of the great truths of Christianity—the mind and the heart of the kingdom of God as they grow in breadth and clearness through the succeeding ages. The testimony of this conscious-

ness has a value far above the judgments and speculative statements of any individual thinker whatever. In order to be an authority in religion, this consciousness must, in any specific aspect in which we have to consider it, have been legitimately formed. To this formation the following things are essential: It must first move in the sphere of faith, and not in that of science or speculation. Second, there must be no interference by any power whatever with the free exercise of individual thought and the free expression of individual hopes and fears and needs and aspirations. The individual forces must be free, in order that the great resultant force may be authoritative. It makes a radical difference whether the individual soul is a mere echo, or a free response. In the third place, this consciousness must flow from the apostolic consciousness of the Scriptures. There must be a continuity between its expressions and the statements which we find in Christ's teachings and in the teachings of those who stood nearest to Him.

In interpreting this general consciousness, we are to rely on the doxologies, hymns of prayer and praise, and the great confessions and creeds of Christendom. We need, however, to eliminate from these latter the alloy of human speculation and the tenets which have been forced upon the church by the authority of popes and councils.

Fourth, from the Holy Scriptures. The Old Testament was given to the Jews. Whatever was local or personal or national, was temporary and is not binding on us; though not without its moral value. Whatever was addressed to the patriarchs or to the Jews as men, is of present binding authority. Whatever was addressed to them as the chiefs of a nation or as members of a community, is of no present binding force.

The New Testament was written primarily for individuals and communities belonging to the apostolic age. These were, however, representatives, in the broadest sense, of the universal church, or of the whole human family. Local or personal matters are only incidentally alluded to, and when this is the case they have no bearing on ourselves. As a rule, the Jews and Gentiles are everywhere addressed either as the creatures of God or as his children by adoption. The spirit of universality is everywhere dominant.

The acts of apostolic men in their official capacity constitute an example for us, that is binding on us in like or similar circumstances. It is not, however, absolutely imperative, because it may have been determined in part by the character of the age in which they lived.

The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the final court of appeal in all religious questions. They are, however, to be interpreted as they address the religious consciousness. The early churches enjoyed an inspired oral gospel and a tradition kept alive by apostolic preaching. But the inadequacy of such an exceptional tradition soon revealed itself, and was the occasion of the writing of the New Testament. The necessity of the Written Word, shown in the creative period of the church, justifies the Protestant principle that the Bible alone is the only safe standard of faith and practice. That the Scriptures bear the notes of sufficiency and perspicuity, so far as all vital questions are concerned, is now accepted as the common belief of all Protestant churches. The evidences upon which this belief rests, are; *first*, that any other view would be inconsistent with the very idea of a revelation; *second*, that it would seem to reflect on the character of God himself; *third*, there are no intimations in the records that on any question of faith there was need of an interpreter. In fact, the intimations are the very opposite of this. *Fourth*, the actual differences between bodies in Christendom are in the non-essentials of religion. If there are exceptions to this generic statement, they are insignificant in character.

It is ever to be remembered that the Protestant confessions were never more than a rule of doctrine, while the Scriptures alone remain forever the norm of faith. The first have been a guide to the theologian, the second, a guide to the believer. The first could be corrected and supplimented, while the second remain fixed as constituting the pure Word of God.

We are to exclude both from our belief and from our opinions, whatever is strictly Anti-Scriptural; viz, whatever is opposed to its dominant spirit, to its formal statements, and to any legitimate inference from its facts, principles and precepts. But we may hold to what does not conflict with them, but to them, only as opinions and not as a part of our positive faith. All such opinions are extra Scriptural.

OBJECTS. *First.* The aim of Christian Theology is to gather materials from all the sources above indicated. It is important that the theologian have correct principles of interpretation. We give a summary of the more important ones: *First.* Take the simple grammatical sense; (a) as given in the Lexicon; (b.) as fixed by the context; (c.) as illustrated by verbal or real parallel passages; (d.) as seen in the light of the standpoint occupied by the writer or speaker; (e.) as addressed to the religious consciousness exclusively, and not at all to the scientific apprehension or the speculative intelligence. *Second.* Use the direct passage for the strongest single proof-text; and the indirect passage as the subordinate single proof-text. *Third.* Weigh passages as well as number parallel passages, and rely on the general drift of Scriptural teaching for any doctrine whatever. *Fourth.* Seek for an honest interpretation of what we may term anti-proof-texts. *Fifth.* Apply special rules for whatever is peculiar in the language of Scripture: (a.) The symbol and the type may have the same predicates as the person or thing symbolized or typified; and in fact they may in the popular language of the Scriptures be identified. (b.) Prophecy is peculiar in its structure. The prophet was not a soothsayer, nor did he deal with the future simply as such. He was an interpreter of the mind and thought of God. He revealed the moral order in Providence, rather than the chronological order. It belonged to him to unfold the purposes of Jehovah as those purposes depended on the divine justice or the divine compassion. He always took his departure from his surroundings—always looked at the future through the atmosphere which was about him. The immediate object of his vision is ever the near future. This near future is a type of like cycles or periods which may fill up all human history. The near future thus points to and tends toward the great finality. It is often, in fact, looked at in the light of that finality. In fact, it is bound up and identified with the grand consummation—the ultimate triumph of the Kingdom of God.

Second. The Theologian should aim to formulate every doctrine. For this purpose, he must translate the popular language of the Scriptures into the scientific language of modern life. He is to avoid purely traditional formulas as suited to another age than to his own. His statements, however, must cover the essential ele-

ments embodied in the ancient symbols of faith. He is to present the doctrine, as far as possible, free from all misapprehension on the one side and from all misrepresentation on the other. His aim is not to construct an empirical science; but to find and follow as far as possible all the divine methods revealed in the natural and supernatural economies of the universe. A theology which professes to give us a rounded and complete system is thereby radically false.

Third. He is to systematize these statements. In fact, both processes must go on together. For no doctrine can be adequately formulated except in its relations to other doctrines, and these relations cannot be apprehended except as they are bound together by some regnant central principle.

Fourth. He must justify his general results so as to remove all the disturbing difficulties of the believer, and so as to defend Christianity against the objections of both the skeptic and the heretic.

RELATIONS.—Theology is not one of the sciences; but is the goal and the crown of them all, in so far as they all address the religious consciousness. Philosophy, in its most comprehensive sense, is also the goal of the sciences; but only in so far as these address the intellectual consciousness alone. In this view, however, the supernatural must be included in human history as one of the sciences. Thus every form of knowledge contributes to a clearer and wider apprehension of the divine character and government.

But still Theology does hold special relations to certain studies.

First, to Physiology and to Psychology. The view we take of the mutual relations of the body and the soul; of the conscious and the unconscious activities of the mind; of its energies and its susceptibilities; and, above all, of the freedom of the human will, will do much to predetermine our theological conceptions. A familiarity with the main facts and a mastery of the principles of these co-ordinated sciences, are essential to a student of theology. They have not only a theoretic but a practical importance. The religious teacher cannot be the counselor and guide of his people without a clear understanding of the general action and reaction of the soul on the body and the body on the soul.

Second, to Metaphysics. We are not to carry the spirit of specu-

lation into our theological studies. For Christianity does not address the intellect alone or chiefly; but the whole nature of man, and preeminently his fontal and central affections. Besides, Christianity is a fact of history, and not a group of conceptions or a bundle of abstract principles. What may *seem* to be speculations should in reality be clear and settled convictions. It remains true, however, that Metaphysics brings before us the great problems of the age—problems which re-appear in theological investigations, and which must be examined from a purely theological point of view. It is to be noted, too, that the study of metaphysics gives both breadth and subtlety to the mind—qualities which are indispensable to the theologian.

Third, to Logic. The one law of Logic is consistency of thought. The predicates of the Infinite—even though the Infinite, *as such*, can have none—must be harmonious one with another. The proper sphere of Logic is that of the known, and its proper elements are distinct idens—definite conceptions. Thus the theologian can not, in the name of logic and by virtue of its laws, move from the Infinite to the Finite and *vice versa*. We need thus to study logic in order to know how far it can help us, and just where the human soul may transcend its limits.

Fourth, to the science of Criticism. Criticism has its laws and its principles, which are imperative in their own proper sphere. As the study of theology presupposes an acquaintance with the Scriptures, so a knowledge of the principles of Criticism is an essential preliminary to theological study itself. We are to accept the results of critical investigation, whatever those results may be. A reverent study of the record of religion by the critic is of the first importance. For in the sacred record, if anywhere, we are to find a trustworthy account of the doings and sayings of our Lord and of his immediate apostles. We are never, however, to confound religion with its record, even though that record be authoritative.

Fifth, to the Natural Sciences. Very many points of theology touch scientific questions. We cannot adequately master these points except as we master the principles of nature. We are, however, to remember two things; *first*, that Christianity, and so theology, deals preeminently with the spiritual world; *second*, that

facts of nature have a religious as well as a scientific meaning. They are related to the universal truths as well as to the special group of facts with which they are more immediately connected, and in correlation with which, they form some one of the special sciences.

Sirth, to Human History. As Christianity is a historical religion, as it forms, and must form, a society of its own—a kingdom of heaven and earth, so it never can be adequately understood except as a history. The historical point of view is as essential as the logical point of observation. In fact, revelation itself has a history and a development, and so makes special claims upon the attention of the theological student. More than this is true, as Christianity is a life, so what is Christian must accord with what is profoundly human. And the study of history is the study of human life.

METHODS.—The general method will appear in the leading divisions of Christian Theology. These will at once reveal the leading idea of the system and the main point of view from which the whole subject is to be considered. There can be no doubt but what the Scriptural conception of Christ must be taken as the governing principle in every scientific exposition of the religion founded by himself. This view does not require us to treat of Christ first in the order of topics, but only to make Him the centre of the theological system. The order of treatment will thus be regulated by what naturally precedes and naturally follows his historical appearance. The earlier portions will thus converge towards Christ as the later portions will diverge from him, but only again to converge in increasing splendor in his final coming. Under this view, the relative importance of the several doctrines are to be determined by their nearness to, or remoteness from, the person and work of Christ. Such a method has been determined Christo-centric. The leading divisions of Christian Theology have been variously given by different theologians. The most common one is essentially the following: The Doctrine of God—the Doctrine of Man—the Doctrine of Salvation. Here Christ is presented as the goal of revelation. But He is also, by virtue of his higher nature and pre-incarnate life, the starting-point and the very principle of all revelation, both in nature and in human history. Others follow a division suggested by the mode of the Divine

Existence as triune. Here we have: The Doctrine of the Father—the Doctrine of the Son—the Doctrine of the Spirit. This division might answer, if the object of theology were simply to unfold our idea of the triune nature; and not rather to present God chiefly in his broad relations to human duty and human destiny. Hase divides his system into two parts: *First*, Ontology; *second*, Christology. The value of such a division would depend very much on the subordinate divisions of Ontology itself; and it would be better to treat this whole division as an introduction, and so resolve Theology, as Andrew Fuller aimed to do, into Christology. The most objectionable division is that based on the idea of a covenant. The different economies were designated as *ante legem*, *sub lege* and *post legem*, and we have the terms Covenant of Work and Covenant of Grace. Here a figurative expression is treated as a technical, scientific term.

For convenience we prefer the common division: namely, Theology, Christology Anthropology, Pneumatology, Eschatology, The Church, Christian Ethics.

We are to follow the analytic method when the subject requires it, as in all cases where the facts are given and we are required to interpret them. But, on the other hand, the synthetic method is not only legitimate, but necessary, when we start from self-evident truths and reach, by a logical process, our conclusions. The processes of induction and deduction are equally valid, for they are complements and counterparts of each other.

The dominant spirit of the theologian should be philosophical, rather than polemical. His aim should be to build up broadly and surely the one system of truth, rather than to demolish the various conflicting systems of error. There are, however, exceptional cases, as when certain errors become aggressive and disturb the Christian consciousness of the age. But again, the Christian theologian must not only be able to refute error; but also to account for its origin, its growth, and its hold on individuals and on communities. He must be able to do more than this, in apprehending and appropriating the truth which underlies and keeps alive those systems of error which have held for centuries the masses of mankind. And least of all is he to be an Eclectic, for Eclecticism has no place in Theology or Philosophy. It belongs to him to seek for

the more radical principle which, as it underlies, so also it reconciles the surface which opposing schools in theology have wrought out.

The attitude of the theologian is not that of an advocate; but rather that of a witness and a judge. His aim is not to defend the views of any denomination; but to realize the truth in his own consciousness, and to state it broadly and as clearly as possible—in short, to indicate the great lines along which the divine mind has revealed itself. The principle of authority and that of liberty are both sacred, and both are to be held inviolable. The authority is found in the Scriptures as they address the religious consciousness, and the liberty is found in the individual soul as it is enlightened by the Spirit of God.

LITERATURE. In the apologetic or creative epoch of the church, Christian writers had neither the incentive nor the leisure to prepare systematic treatises on Christian doctrine. The questions of the age were those of religion, and not of theology. Their work was to preach and to defend the Christian religion, and not to formulate its doctrines. Origen (186-253), the great critic and exegete of this period, is the only one who wrote a work that approaches the idea of a doctrinal treatise. We have only a few fragments of the original and a partisan translation by Rufinus. It was entitled in Latin *De Principiis*. We have it in four books: 1st, of God and nature; 2nd, of Creation, of the Mosaic and of the Christian Laws, and of the Incarnation; 3d, of the Temptation; 4th, of the Future Life. Origen assumed that Christianity was the only true Philosophy, and thus sought to give it a rational explanation. He accepted as fundamental whatever was held by apostolic churches, in contradistinction to individual believers or teachers. Still he held that the apostles gave only the basis of faith and left it to others to build thereon a system of Christian Philosophy. Origen was acute, profound and daring in his speculations. His name is associated with the dogmas of the Preexistence of the Soul and of the Final Restoration of Souls to God. This last idea, however, was with the Alexandrian Teacher a mere series of moral renewals and falls *ad infinitum*.

In the polemic or transitional period of the church, the Fathers were busy with the great heresies concerning the Person of Christ and the depravity and dependence of man. Here, too, we meet

with few systematic treatises. Athanasius (300-373) was the champion of the divinity of our Lord, as Augustine (353-430) was for the absolute necessity for the grace of God. Though both exercised a commanding influence over the church, yet neither wrote any systematic treatise on theology. The Greek Father was inferior in affluence and breadth of thought to the great leader of the Latin Church. The Bishop of Hippo might have been in form, as he was in substance, the founder of Scholasticism, had he lived after the great controversies of the church had been settled. Even as it was, it was his great experience, and not his polemics, that determined his doctrinal views. On the whole, his work entitled, *The City of God*, best presents his theological views on the great religious questions of his age. John of Damascus (†near 754) has given us the first work which bears a scientific character entitled, *An Accurate Exhibition of the Orthodox Faith*. This had given him the title of the Father of Systematic Theology. The work has for its basis numerous quotations from all the Greek Fathers of note, with comments of his own. In his comments he availed himself largely of Aristotelian Philosophy. He was thus in his general method the precursor of Peter of Lombardy. Like the Eastern teachers, and in striking contrast with Augustine, he insisted strongly on the doctrine of Free Will. The work is of value in its treatment of the Christological problems of the church. We may here remark that in the earlier periods of the church there was more intellectual activity in the East than in the West; while in the later periods this was quite reversed.

In the scholastic or formative period of theology, we meet with elaborate theological systems. The natural tendency to systematize, which grew up in the cloisters, was greatly strengthened by the Aristotelian logic. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, (1033-1109) wrote two famous dogmatic treatises. One of them, entitled, *Cur Deus Homo* gave the first scientific statement to the Church dogma of Satisfaction. It was an epoch-making work. The second, entitled, *Proslogion Dei Existentia*, gave the ontological proof of the existence of God. It is still a classic in the field of theological literature. Peter of Lombard (†1160) prepared the text-book of the middle ages, entitled, *Libri sententiarum*. It maintained its place as the manual of instruction in the cathedral

schools for three centuries. He supported his propositions by quotations from the principal Fathers; hence the title of the book. Thomas Aquinas, (1227-1274) the foremost of all scholastics, will, in his general method, answer for them all. His great work is entitled, *Summa Theologica*. It is divided into three parts. The divisions, however, have no headings, but the purpose of each and their connections are indicated by a separate prologue. Each part is divided into a very large number of questions which simply state the general subject of discussion. Each question is again divided into moral articles, and each of these articles presents, in the form of an inquiry, some specific topic for consideration. Under each article the objections to the orthodox view are first presented, then the reply is stated in a brief and dogmatic form and the conclusion given. Lastly, this conclusion is explained and defended at length. The general order of subjects marked by the prologues may be given thus: *First*, God—his nature and his works; *Second*, Man—his capacities and virtues as given by nature and by grace; *Third*, Christ—the media of his agency, and the seven sacraments. Aquinas was a Realist in Philosophy, and a disciple of Augustine in Theology. In both of these respects he differed from Duns Scotus, and that difference has never been settled by the Catholic Church. Since the Reformation the treatise of Thomas Aquinas has been a reference book in the higher schools of the Catholic Church. Succeeding scholastics prepared elaborate commentaries on this book.

The Scholastics were distinguished by profundity as well as subtlety of thought. Where the Church had pronounced its decisions, there they acted as mere advocates; but where the Church had not authoritatively defined doctrine, there they indulged in the boldest speculations of the most frivolous fancies.

We may here allude to the Mystics only to correct the view that they were the forerunners of the Reformation. They were such, but simply in exalting the inner life above the ritual of the Church, but were not at all so in their pantheistic tendencies nor in their weak apprehensions of the guilt of sin. The Protestant notion of justification by faith has but little place in their writing. The Mystic could not well be a system-maker without denying the fundamental principle of his faith.

In the confessional period of Theology we find divergent tendencies.

A. The Modern Catholic Church. Melchior Canus (1523-1560) was a Spanish Theologian and an opponent of the Jesuits. His work, *Loci Theologici*, is confined chiefly to the discussion of the sources of Theology. These with him are the Scriptures and the traditions. Molina (1535-1600) was a pupil of Fonseca (the Portuguese Aristotle), from whom he accepted the dogma of *Scientia Media*. His work was entitled, *Liberi Arbitrii Congratiae Donis Divina Praescientia Providentia Predestinationis et Re Probationis Concordia*. No modern work so divided the Catholic clergy as this; the Dominicans attacked it, and the Jesuits defended it. The controversy was finally forbidden by Clement the VIII. who tolerated both parties. Suarez (1548-1617) was the foremost Catholic Theologian of his age. His writings were voluminous, filling twenty-two large folios. He was a defender of the doctrine of Molina. He spent his chief force, however, in his treatment of the Aristotelian Philosophy and in his system of Scholastic Theology. He was, like members of the Jesuit Order, ultramontane in opinion, claiming for the pope, coercive power over kings.

Bellarmine (1542-1621), a man of genius and learning, was the ablest controversialist of the Seventeenth Century, a Jesuit and Cardinal Archbishop of Capua. His chief work was *De Controversiis Christianae Fidei*. He was fair to his opponents, but Anti-Gallican—placing the pope above the general council.

Petavius (1583-1652) was for twenty-two years Professor of Positive Theology in the Jesuit school in Paris. His work on Theology is very highly prized by the Protestants themselves. He is noted as advocating the view that the anti-Nicene Fathers were strongly tinctured with Arianism. In which, however, he was controverted by Bull. His great work, *De Theologicis Dogmatibus* contains an exposition of Christian dogmas as grounded on historical studies. He was familiar with the sources of the history of doctrines, and made valuable contributions to theological learning. His motto was *Nova quaerant alii nil nisi prisca peto*. Bossuet (1627-1704) was famous both as a defender of the Gallican Church, and as a polemic against the extreme pretensions of the Papacy. His great work, however, was the *History of the Variations of Protestantism*.

B. Melancthon (1497-1560) was the leader of Lutheranism after the death of the great reformer. He modified his views so as to approach Calvin in his notion of the sacraments; but also to recede further from him in his view of the doctrines of grace than Luther himself had done. His *Loci Communes* was the first system of evangelical Protestant theology. It passed through fifty editions in his lifetime, and was during the sixteenth century generally accepted as the model of Lutheran dogmatics; but yet was inferior in depth and logical power to the "*Institutes*" of John Calvin. Huter (1563-1616) wrote a compendium of theology in order to bring out Lutheranism in its purity, from the defections of Melancthon. In honor of this theologian, Hase has entitled his recent manual, *Huterus Re Redivivus*. He wrote this to indicate how Huter would, in his opinion, now defend orthodoxy, if he could return to the earth with the experience of another world. Gorhard (1582-1627) was learned in scholastic as well as patristic lore, and was remarkable for his fullness of thought and his precision of ideas. He was the most eminent Lutheran theologian of the seventeenth century. He is justly famous for his two great works. The first, entitled *Doctrina Catholica et Evangelica*, is a defense of Evangelical doctrines by quotations from Roman Catholic writers. The second, called *Loci Theologici*, is an exhaustive presentation, in a scientific form, of the Christian faith as held by the Lutherans. He was twenty years in his preparations. A recent edition has been issued in Germany. Calixt (1586-1656) was famous for favoring a union of all the churches of the Reformation on principles common to all. This epitome of theology was divided into three heads: *First*, the object—the good of man; *second*, the subject—God in nature and his works; *third*, the means—Redemption, the Word and the Sacraments. He was bitterly opposed to Calov (1612-1686) whose morning prayer was *Domine imple me odio hæreticorum*. Quenstedt's (1617-1688) chief work is divided into two parts. The first is didactic, in which he gives the causes, effects, definitions, attributes and adjuncts of the articles of faith. The second is polemic, in which he gives the state of the religious controversies of the past up to his time. It is scholastic in its methods, but moderate in its tone. He reflects the opinions of his countrymen, and has been called the book-keeper of Lutheran

theology. Hollaz (1648-1713) wrote an *Examen Theologicum*, which retained the first place in Lutheran theology for half a century. It rested on the other works of Gerhard and Calov. Though wanting in its originality, it was marked by great clearness in its definitions and in its arrangement. Buddaeus' (1667-1729) chief dogmatic work was *Institutiones Theologicae Dogmaticae*. His learning covered a very wide domain in law, philosophy and theology. He was candid, liberal, but deficient in logical power.

C. Calvin (1509-1564) was the theologian of the Reformation. He prepared his first edition of the *Institutes* in his twenty-sixth year—a work remarkable for the elegance of its Latin style, and for its general ability. His commentaries are still consulted by the learned. Francis Turretin (1623-1687) was the ablest in the Genevan School of Theology. His work is perhaps too scholastic in its spirit and its method. Pictet (1655-1724) taught also at Geneva. His *Theologia Christiana* is marked by great learning and moderation. He is, however, inferior to F. Turretin in subtlety of thought, as in his Calvinism he is less pronounced. Gomar (1563-1609) belonged to the Dutch School of Theologians. He was famous as the chief opponent of Arminius, and as one of the leaders of opinion at the Synod of Dort. He was a supra-lapsarian in his views, and would not allow the expression that the atonement was sufficient for all. His chief dogmatic work was entitled *Disputationes Theologicae*, and was given in thirty-nine loci. Coccejus (1603-1669), though living and laboring in Holland, inaugurated a method of his own—a method both historical and Biblical. He conceived of God's relation to his people as a covenant: *First*, a covenant with Adam in his state of innocency—a covenant of works; *second*, a covenant with Adam after the fall—a covenant of grace. This last has three stages:—(a) that of a Promise; (b) that of the Law; (c) that of the Gospel. His two dogmatic works were *De Fœdere et Testamento* and *Summa Theologicae*. The method of Coccejus was largely accepted by his contemporaries in his own church, and has had very wide influence among the reformed churches in England and America. In spite of his fancies, the Biblical character of his theology must ever challenge our profound respect. Amyrant (1596-1662) was professor in the French school at Saumur. He was the father of moderate Calvinism. It is

a noteworthy fact that the spread of his views was not owing to his genius or to the eminence of his school, but, apparently, to their inherent truthfulness.

D. James Arminius (1560-1609), a Dutch theologian, gave a definite statement to a form of doctrine which has been called from him Arminianism. He was a man of great learning and ability. His *Theologia Christiana* approaches nearer moderate Calvinism than any of his successors. His followers, in 1610, presented a remonstrance against the intolerance with which they were treated, and hence were called Remonstrants. Their starting point is the freedom and responsibility of man. Episcopius (1583-1643) was the pupil of Arminius, and the successor of his Calvinistic rival, Gomar. He was the real leader of his party in the Netherlands. He undervalued the importance of doctrine, not regarding even a belief in the divinity of our Lord as essential to salvation. His liberality brought upon him the charge of socinianism. His *Institutiones Theologicae*, though unfinished, show great clearness and learning. Curcellæus (1586-1659) left his *Institutio Religionis Christianae* incomplete. Like other leading Remonstrants, he was a man of large culture, tolerant spirit and rationalistic tendencies. In many of his opinions he was an Arian. Limborch, also of Holland (1633-1712), distinguished himself by his clearness of judgment and general learning.

E. The Episcopal Church of England during the Reformation received its first great doctrinal impulse from the leaders of the Reformed communion. Crammer invited Melanethon, Bulinger, and Calvin to assist him in drawing up the Thirty-nine Articles. He placed Bucor in the Divinity chair at Cambridge and Martyr in that of Oxford. The prevailing current of opinion has, however, become Arminian; and this change of theological tone has led churchmen to insist that the Seventeenth Article must receive an anti-Calvinistic interpretation. The *Institutes* of Episcopius were generally in the hands of the students of Divinity in both of the English universities. Hooker (1553-1600) wrote his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, which was in its doctrinal portions a real contribution to theology. Pearson (1612-1686) wrote a learned commentary on the Apostolic Creed or Symbol. He is regarded by his own church as in every respect the greatest theologian of his times. Bull

(1634-1710) wrote ten very able works in Latin; one entitled *Defensio Fidei Nicæne*. In this he maintained, *First*, the pre-existence of the Son; *second*, his consubstantiality; *third*, his entity; *fourth*, his subordination. And he also maintained, in the same work: *First*, that the Spirit was not an energy, but a person; *second*, that it was consubstantial with the Father and the Son; *third*, that it was coeternal with them; *fourth*, that it proceeded from the Father by the Son. His *Judicium Ecclesiae Catholicae* was written against Episcopius and the Remonstrants. Its aim was to show, from the opinions of the Early Fathers, that it was essential to salvation to believe in the divine Sonship of our Lord. Bossuet wondered how the author could remain Protestant. Bull was a man of solid learning and made real contributions to the history of Christian doctrine. Samuel Clark (1673-1729) was engaged in the Trinitarian controversy. He sought a midway position between the Arian and orthodox theories. His treatise on the apriori for the existence of God is still of value. Waterland (1683-1749) followed Bull in support of the Trinity. The latter treated this subject historically and practically. The former treated it scripturally and rationally, aiming to state the doctrine as a truth equally removed from Arian and Sabellian difficulties.

The dissenters as well as the churchmen of England were inferior as theologians to their continental brethren. Owen, (1716-1683) called by the Puritans the Prince of Divines, was beyond all doubt the ablest of the Calvinistic theologians. He was learned, subtle, and logical in his style and method. Bunyan, (1628-1683) though destitute of learning, was yet a man of supreme genius. His writings are marked by a wealth of religious thought, and their profoundly evangelical character. Ridgeley (1667-1734) wrote a treatise entitled Body of Divinity. It is founded on the larger catechism of the Assembly. Gill (1697-1771) wrote a learned commentary on the Old and New Testament and also a treatise on Divinity. He was highly Calvinistic in the tone of his theology. John Wesley (1703-1791) was the founder of Methodism, though Fletcher, a contemporary, was its theologian. They were Arminian in sentiment, but with a profounder religious life than we find among the Remonstrants. Andrew Fuller (1754-1815) revolutionized, by his theological writings, the denomination to which he

belonged. His Calvinism was far more moderate than that of either Bunyan or Gill. He is clear, logical and fresh in his thinking, without, however, learning or depth of insight.

F. Laelius Socinus (1525-1562,) from whom the Socinian school takes its name, was learned in the languages, but lacked depth as a thinker and boldness as a reformer. His nephew Faustus (1539-1604) was the chief defender and propagator of Socinianism. He enjoyed the favor of the Medici at Florence some twelve years, and was a scholar of wide culture. He subsequently made himself leader of the Polish Ann-Baptists. His chief work was *Summa Religionis Christianae*. John Crell (1590-1633) wrote an answer to Grotius' famous work, *De Satisfactione Christi*: but his great work was entitled *De Deo Ejusque Attributis*. His idea of God was the same as that of Duns Scotus—absolute will. It was on this basis he sought to set aside the idea of the necessity of the atonement. Socinianism shows that it is as difficult to shelve as to solve the mysteries of the atonement. He was the head of the Socinian school at Cracow. The Socinians were noted only for their scholarship and critical ability.

G. The Free Critical period dates from the beginning of the last century. Knapp (1753-1825) has been called the last of the Orthodox Theologians. He stood quite alone at Halle. His work in Christian Theology is distinguished by learning and general ability, but is undecided in its doctrinal tone. We have an English translation of it. It was Schleiermacher (1768-1834) who broke the spell of rationalism. He opened the way for what has been called the "Mediation Theology" of Germany. His leading idea is that religion is a matter of direct consciousness—of immediate feeling, and so independent of speculation. Union with Christ is the salient point in his theology. Bretschneider (1776-1848) was a Rational Supernaturalist. His two dogmatic works are: (a) a systematic development of theology as grounded on the Confessions of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, as supported by the chief works of their theologians; (b) a manual of the dogmatics of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. He held to churchly ideas, keeping himself aloof from speculative and prehistoric tendencies. He was clear, cold and conservative.

H. American Theologians.—The Edwardian school was found-

ed by Jonathan Edwards (1703-1756). He wrote on all the great questions which agitated the church in his day. His essays "*On the Freedom of the Will*," "*On the Nature of Virtue*," and "*On Original Sin*" are still authorities on the subjects on which they treat. He was profoundly speculative, uniting in himself the mystic and the logician. Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803) gave a turn to Calvinism which has since borne his name. He insisted on disinterested benevolence, and went so far as to declare that one must be willing to be damned in order to be saved. He was the forerunner of Emmons, in that he insisted that prior to all acts of the soul, there was no moral character. Jonathan Edwards the younger (1745-1801) was inferior to his father in original genius; but still an able theologian. Bellamy (1719-1790) was also a zealous disciple of Edwards. Emmons (1745-1840) was remarkable for his independence. He elaborated the famous "Exercise System." The governing idea of this system is, that all sin consists in sinning; that is, that there is no such thing as a sinful state. He insisted that every exercise of a moral nature was perfectly good or utterly wrong. He went beyond Calvin in his notion of the Sovereignty of God. His logical power was the source of both his strength and his weakness—strength in giving clearness to his views, and weakness in leading him to apply logic to regions beyond definite thought. Dwight (1752-1817) rejected the Exercise of Emmons, and denied the divine causality in the sinful action of men. He elaborated more fully, and in more moderate spirit than others, the Edwardian system. The late Dr. Woods of Andover may be regarded as having closed this school of Theology. His work is without special value.

The Princeton School differs from the school of Edwards in giving greater prominence to the doctrines of Imputation and of Federal Headship, in opposition to his idea of Natural Headship. It also rejects the Edwardian distinction between the natural and the moral ability of the sinner. Dr. Hodge of Princeton is the best representative of this school. His late work is clear and full. It is valuable for its references to the current speculations of the day. It lacks, however, both freedom and freshness of thought; and virtually belongs, not to the present, but to the past. Thornwell was superior to Hodge in acuteness and penetration, but inferior

to him in theological learning. Breckenridge has written two volumes entitled "Christianity Objectively Considered" and "Christianity Subjectively Considered." Both are prolix, and display more vigor of will than of intellect. Baird in his work of "Elohim Revealed" takes the Edwardian view of the leadership of Adam.

The New-Haven School. N. W. Taylor was its founder. He opposed the system of Hopkins in several points; namely, in its ideas of efficiency, of disinterested benevolence, and of sin as the necessary means of the greatest good; but agreed with Hopkins and Emmons that all sin is found in acts of the soul. Its dominant idea was the moral government of God. Fanning in his lectures on Systematic Theology exalts the free will of the creature. The logical element here reveals both its strength and its weakness as a constitutive principle in Theology.

J. Recent Theologians. Nitsch wrote in the spirit of Schleiermacher his system of Christian doctrine. Twisten belongs to the same school. His valuable treatise on *dogmatics* remains incomplete. Both represent Liberal Orthodoxy in Germany. Ebrard and Martensen are still more positive in their Orthodoxy. The theological work of the latter has been translated into English, and is a treatise of great value. The Catholic Theology of recent times deserves notice. Perrone, Rector and Professor in a Jesuit college of Rome, was a nominalist as he was an extremest in his opinions. His *Prelectiones Theologicae* are in large octavo volumes. The first treats of the evidences of Revelation; second, of the Church; third, of the Scriptures; fourth, of the Lord and his attributes; fifth, of Creation, to which is added his famous tract on the Immaculate Conception; sixth, of Incarnation; seventh, of Grace; eight and ninth, of the Sacraments. His method resembles the scholastics of the Middle Ages. He is clear, profound and churchly, but also acute and learned. Knoll's *Institutiones Theologicae Theoreticae* is written in a more simple and clear style than the other works of Knoll. The most recent dogmatic work, now in course of publication, is that by Tranyllin, a Jesuit teacher in a college at Rome. Each of his volumes is a complete treatise of itself. He is very full in his treatment and very able and learned.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE ETHNIC RELIGIONS

Hellenism is a corruption of the inward revelation more than of the outward and objective revelation. The worshiper and interpreter had his sense of a supreme spiritual being weakened by his moral depravity. He not only departed from the few simple ideas and rites of the primeval faith, but he generated from his own soul forms of worship suited to his tastes and his means. The sense of some supernatural power is quite consistent with a low moral condition and a feeble intellectual development. The Polytheism which gradually sprung up from the worship of nature could only merge into Pantheism of an idealistic and materialistic tendency. It could not well, by a natural process, pass into a spiritual monotheism. We notice everywhere this religious decline.

This decline is marked by the origin and growth of both Polytheism and idolatry. Polytheism evidently had two stages in its history—the nominal and the actual. In the first the soul accepts the forces of nature as the attributes of the supreme Being or as the special manifestation of his presence. As the worshiper lives more and more in the life of nature rather than in the life of the spirit, so he attaches himself more and more exclusively to these forces which touch more immediately his hopes and his fears. In thus separating the forces from the source from which they spring he passes on to the second stage in his development where Polytheism becomes his fixed and settled form of belief.

Idolatry witnesses to the fact that even the forces of nature did not adequately represent the Presence that was behind them. Thus the idol was at first but a sign and symbol of something infinitely greater than all the forces of nature put together. By a natural process like that we have noticed above, the worship of God through the symbol became the worship of the symbol itself. Representative idolatry gives place to actual idolatry. In this way we are able to explain the idolatrous practices of the Jews. The distinction that we have here drawn is confirmed by the fact that in the East the idol is consecrated by the laying on of hands of the priest, and it is not until this consecration has taken place that it can have an object of worship.

The contrast between Christianity and the religions of heathendom is broad and profound. The one is historical in its character, while the others are ontological in their age and growth. The one is the coming fulfillment of the primeval revelations, while the other is a marked decline and falling away. Christianity has a unity both ideal and real—ideal as seen in its system of doctrines and morals; real as seen in the perfect character and life of its founder. The Ethnic religions have no positive unity whatever, but are masses of mingled truth and error held together by the civil government or the national sentiment. The one gathers its adherents from out of human society and founds a kingdom of God separate from the world, while all the others grow up in and with the national life and move along its currents. The one so interprets the problems of nature and of history as to be able to utilize all the results of scientific research or philosophical speculation, while all the others have so misconceived the cosmos as to break down before the progress of human enlightenment. In short, the one is supernatural in its character, while the other is purely natural. The one is the religion of hope; the other, of despair.

But the resemblances between the two are no less striking. The same great problems in heathendom as in Christendom are forced on the attention of mankind, and so some of the great dogmas of all religions have approached each other. Thus we have the dogma of God, of sin, of retribution, of sacrifice. The moral ideals of Christianity are profoundly human because originating by one who personally realized them in his perfect human character and life. Now in so far as the Ethnic nations retained their humanity and advanced in culture just so far their moral conceptions must have approached those of Jesus of Nazareth. Besides, their cravings and their needs gave birth to their sacred books, to their oracles, to their priests and to their prophets; their temples with their sacrifices and their ritual of worship; their great tragic sports and their foremost philosophers both Platonic and Stoic—all these forces of nature and life were but preparations for the Gospel of Redemption.

Three general characteristics of the Ethnic religions are largely modified by race peculiarities. Among the Eastern Asiatic nations the Chinese holds the first rank. His religious instinct was weak.

He is the child of and so naturally worshiped nature. His worship was, however, like his character, utilitarian. He paid homage to his ancestors and looked up to his emperor as his great high priest and father of the nation to which he belonged. In all this family and state worship he seems to have regard alone to the stability of society.

In India we meet with Brahminism and its offshoot Buddhism. The first is pantheistic in its philosophy and the other atheistic. Such at least is the dominant drifting of the two systems. According to the first, the soul is absorbed into the Infinite; according to the second, it returns to nothingness. The first shows its aristocratic spirit in its doctrine of caste distinction. The second is democratic in holding the equality of all men. The ritual of the Brahmins is severe, while Buddhism is mild throughout. Both exalts the Infinite at the expense of the Finite. Both profoundly believe in the misery of man, but neither hold clearly and distinctly to the guilt of sin. Beautiful as are many of the Indian sentiments they are but sentiments without being realized by any of their sages or priests. Thus the broad contrast still remains between the realism of Christianity and the mere idealism of the old Indian faith.

The Western Asiatic peoples exhibited marked peculiarities. The old Persians and Egyptians were profoundly religious nations. The first held to the idea of a fall and a restoration, and between the epochs marked by these great events, they believed a conflict between the principle of evil and that of good was ever going on. The second held to the idea of a future state of retribution in which all souls were to be rewarded or punished according to their respective characters while on earth.

The Graeco-Roman world exalted the Finite at the expense of the Infinite. Here a sense of the beautiful had awakened the moral and religious instinct. The only real worship was that of art. In the oriental world philosophy supported mythology, while in the occidental world philosophy finally proved fatal to the popular myths and superstitions. It could not maintain itself against the enlightenment which came from Greek schools and Greek literature. Religion lacked all regenerative power, nor could it be reformed.

THE COMPARATIVE BELIEFS OF CHRISTENDOM.

First. The Greek Church. This great church of the East is the Romish Church arrested and modified by its social and civil relations. This arrest and modification were caused by its break with the life and the culture of the West, and by its subordination to the needs of both the Russian and Turkish governments. Rome aimed to sway the states in which it was dominant and often made good its purpose, while the Greek church, broken into independent religious communions, could only maintain a servile and degraded existence. Its doctrinal ideas thus failed of reaching a full development. We see this in the incompleteness of its Trinitarian formula where the filioque was left out. We see it, also, in the fact that the dogma of the infallibility of the church never culminates in the infallibility of any one of the patriarchs. Its unity is so weak that it never can have, as Rome has, one and the same ecclesiastic language for the word of God and for divine worship. Even the principle of celibacy is very partially carried out, for the lower clergy are allowed to marry if they do so before ordination. In closely uniting communion with baptism they follow the more ancient custom of the church as they also do in retaining the form of immersion. Thus while in her tendencies she is one which the Church of Rome, yet her departures from the Gospel are less marked and manifold. Her very separation from Rome, with the antagonism it engendered, was in this last respect her protection. We must add, in the intelligence of her clergy and laity she is to-day far behind the Roman Catholic Church.

Second. The Roman Catholic Church. She builds her faith on the Scriptures and on tradition as found in the church, and as both are interpreted by the church. The Church is thus made the sole depositor of the Christian Faith. That faith is explicit when defined and implicit when unformulated. As the consciousness of the church is awakened and developed by the growing necessities of the times so it can give an increasing clearness and fullness to that faith which its very life involves. Thus new definitions have been given by councils under the sanction of the pope, and may hereafter be given by the pope alone speaking *ex Cathedra* to the entire church without any council whatever.

The central dogma in the Catholic system of doctrine is the

sacrifice of the mass. In the eucharist the sacrifice of our Lord is actually contained, and its supreme efficacy for the living and the dead is under the direction of the officiating priest. The central dogma in the government of the church is the sovereignty of the pope.

A further statement of the Romish belief is best presented in its contrast with the common Protestant Faith.

Third. Protestant Communions. The Protestant Aphorism is that where the Spirit of God is there is the church, while Rome affirms that only where we find the church do we find the Spirit of God. The opposition between these great branches of Christendom is radical and sweeping. In the one case the unity is inward and spiritual, in the other case it is determined by the very organization of the church itself. Protestants hold to the Scriptures alone as they are interpreted by the individual soul. The Catholics deny the right of private judgment and insist on supplementing the written Word by tradition. The one holds to the sufficiency and prespicuity of the Bible on matters that are essential while the other holds that without the unwritten word the revelation of God is left incomplete; and that without the church as an interpreter of both, mankind would drift on a sea of uncertainty. The Protestants look to Christ alone as the head of the church, and allow no one to represent his spiritual presence and authority. The Catholics have the Vicar of Christ in the pope, who speaking *ex Cathedra* on matters of faith and morals, is infallible. According to the Protestant faith every soul must first join Christ and then the church: according to the Catholic faith every soul must first be united to the church in order to gain a share in Christ. The former exalts man as an individual and humbles him as a sinner; but the latter degrades him as an individual and exalts him as a sinner. The Protestant's higher law is the conscience of the individual, while the higher law of the Romanist is the decision of the supreme pontif. In the one communion the believer may exercise his private judgment, but must be saved by faith. In the other communion the believer is not competent to exercise such a judgment, but yet his good works are in part the ground of his salvation. The one receives his pardon directly from God, the other is absolved by the priest. The one can, at best, but discharge the duties of life;

while the other can acquire merit by works of supreme self-denial --works of supererogation. The Protestant has only one Mediator; while the Romanist has a host of subordinate ones in saints, in angels, and above all, in the Virgin Mary. The one believes in an immediate heaven for all the faithful, secured by the grace of God alone. The other, that only saints made perfect by good works or purified by the pains of purgatory and helped in that state by the church on earth and in heaven can enjoy the vision of God.

But Protestantism has its great historical branches.

A. The Lutheran and Reformed Communions. As these were first developed with a relative independence one of the other, we may best view them in their leading contrasts.

Lutheranism sprung from the spirit and genius of the first Reformer and grew up from the life of the people whom he represented. It thus crystalized in one mould and thus secured a unity both of faith and of usage. The Lutheran church was thus a Sinaic institution. The Reformed communion sprung up from many centres among many nationalities. Calvin was only one, though the chief one, among the leaders of these churches. They were planted among widely different nations and so had no one formal creed so generally accepted as the Lutheran Confession of Augsburg.

Lutheranism was always more churchly than the Calvinistic communions. The Lutherans hold to the great confessions of the ancient church and admit whatever tradition hands down to them which is not opposed to the Scriptures. The Reformed, however, allow that only to be authoritative which has the clear sanction of the Scriptures, no matter what support it may receive from the ancient creeds and councils. These opposing opinions among this branch of Protestantism revealed themselves in different schools of theology which in the other branch into independent denominations. Thus we have among the Lutherans the Pietists, the Rationalists and the Supernaturalists, as well as the Unionists and their opponents. And thus, too, we have in the Reformed communion the Congregationalists of this country, the Independents of England, the Presbyterians of America, and the Free, as well as the Established Church of Scotland.

The governing tendencies of these two great communions are obvious. The Lutheran Church diverges chiefly from the legalism of Rome; the Reformed breaks mainly with her ritualism. The Lutherans exalt the idea of the community of life; the Calvinists the idea of the worth of the individual soul. With the Lutherans Divine love is the regnant attribute of God; while with the Reformed the governing perfection of God is the Divine holiness. Thus the one communion holds that justification is an act of grace; while the other holds that it is an act of justice. The church of Luther lays stress on the universalism of grace; while the churches which follow Calvin lay emphasis on the particularism of grace. The mystical element is dominant in the life of the former; while the ethical spirit and the mercenary spirit rule in the life of the latter.

B. The Episcopal Church. The English Episcopal Church is a section of the Romish church as reformed in the sixteenth century. But this reformation was determined by the political necessities of the crown as well as by the convictions of the people. Under the cover of the court party the leaven of Romanism still remained, while under the impulse of a free spiritual movement the evangelical principles of the Reformation gained a permanent foot-hold. These two opposing tendencies have always existed in the bosom of the Establishment, and have been inherited by the Episcopal Church of this country.

It is an actual fact that this church is divided as no other is by opposing schools of theology. We have, first, the High Church party whose affinities to Rome are marked and decisive; second, the Low Church party whose sympathies with evangelical principles are clear and pronounced; third, the Broad Church party whose tendencies are both churchly and nationalistic. This last party would identify the church with the national life. The principle of comprehension is, in their view, to govern the organization of the church, and the church as thus organized should be a state establishment. They are learned and liberal, though their liberalism is too often born of religious independence. The Low church men are superior to them in moral earnestness, but far below them in the breadth of their intellectual sympathies. The idea of worship is dominant among all parties in the Episcopal Church. The

liturgy stands before the sermon and the present ritual seems to be regarded as fixed and final. A conservative spirit and an æsthetic sense pervade the entire communion.

C. The Methodist Communion. It does not concern us here to note the different branches of this great Christian body. Methodism sprung from the religious life and zeal of John Wesley. It was only when he found that he could not carry out his reforms within the Episcopal church that he organized his movement into an independent communion. Two great elements are united in the Methodist Church. The first is the power of a central organization. This secures unity and gives direction to the forces within its pale. Methodism makes the church a great educational instrumentality as we see in the school which it establishes, and still more clearly in the trials to which it subjects individual souls on their entering into its folds. The second is the power of individual character and life. That this has a large scope in the freedom from a rigid liturgy in participation in social worship and in missionary efforts of itinerant preachers cannot be denied. Whether these two principles can be thus had together, each helping the other remains for the coming century to decide.

The doctrinal faith of the great body of the Methodist Church is Arminian. They insist on the freedom of the will, on the universality of grace, and on the possibility of the salvation of each and every man. They give, however, special prominence to the work of the Spirit in sanctification and insist that a perfection of character is attainable in this life.

D. The Baptist Communion. The Baptists claim to carry out the two radical principles of Protestantism in a more thorough manner than their brethren of other churches. They insist on the Scriptures alone as a standard of faith and the right of private judgment in their interpretation.

As the special distinguishing result of the application of these principles they present the worth and dignity of the individual soul as the chief dogma of their faith. In brief, individualism is the ruling idea which distinguishes them from all other communions. Christ forms his church by attracting individual souls. And souls in their free independent choice of him are the units and the only units in the kingdom of God. No one can be received

into this society of Jesus except by his own choice and his own faith. Neither the belief of the parent, nor the belief of the church, nor the belief of any other sponsor can answer for a single soul. Baptism is the symbolic expression of this supreme individual choice—this governing personal faith. It is the only adequate expression for so radical a life determination. It alone voices in a symbolic act the idea of death to sin and the idea of rising to a new life of holiness. The form cannot be changed without changing the expression. In the two ordinances we have a creed given by Christ himself and given in a form that may be fixed forever. Every company of believers thus drawn together constitute an independent church, with all the rights and privileges that can belong to the kingdom of God. And all such churches have no other bond of union but an inward spiritual one and no other head but Jesus Christ himself.

Denominationalism. No church can fairly put forth exclusive claims to the fullness of Christian truth. It would be difficult for any one communion to maintain that it is in this respect superior to any other. It is enough for any branch of Christendom to justify its existence on the ground that its testimony to the great truths of the Gospel was needed by the world. No denomination exists for itself. It is only a means to an end and that end is the bringing back a lost world to God.

PART FIRST.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

CHAPTER I.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

SECTION FIRST.

THE IDEA OF GOD.

By the term God we designate the most perfect Being conceivable. This conception is always present in our thought of Him, and must be accepted as regulative of that thought. If the soul doubts the perfection of his character, in any relation or to any degree, it thereby doubts the reality of his existence altogether. But to content ourselves with the development of the contents of this general conception would land us in mere religious idealism. Besides, the notion of perfection varies with our intellectual and moral culture. It is safe to affirm that God cannot be defined either metaphysically, by giving the elements which make up his character, since the fact of life escapes analysis, preeminently if it be divine life; or logically, by classifying, since the best description would fall infinitely short of the reality.

In the history of Philosophy we meet with still other conceptions of the Supreme Being. We may here briefly mention the leading ones. He is termed Cause, or First Cause. But this designation excludes freedom both from God and from man. God is the Final Cause, as well as the First Cause. Yet there is no doubt that the changes in the world without and the great spiritual world within do force upon the soul the idea of God as Cause. He has been termed Substance with two attributes, Thought and Extension. Here the analysis is incomplete, in that it leaves Force out of account. For Extension without Force indicates only empty space.

Again, Thought without Will is uncreative—unpotential. The definition breaks down the distinction between God and the creature. It is too purely Pantheistic. The definition is, however, true, in that God is the ultimate reality of both mind and matter. He is also spoken of as the Absolute, or the Infinite. But these terms designate only the transcendent attributes of God. They affirm only that he is absolute and infinite, and so doubtless affirm an aspect of the truth. For God is also relative. He is self-revealing. He lives in time as well as in eternity. Hegel breaks with Spinoza and regards God as Subject rather than Substance, but Subject coming to self-consciousness in the life of the universe. But this Hegelian development is only true of the cosmical consciousness of God. The eternal consciousness of God is complete in itself—both one and infinite. God is also termed Pure Act—a definition handed down from the schoolmen. This insures simplicity of nature but not personal life. God is not only pure being or activity, but an activity that knows and determines itself. God has also been conceived as simple and pure Will. But this makes him simply arbitrary. He has been termed the moral order of the universe. No doubt this is the one grand effect of his presence in the universe. The ground and reason of this effect is God, but the effect itself does not adequately present the divine nature and character. Herbert Spencer identifies God with the unknowable. But the knowledge of his existence is a knowledge of his character however partial that knowledge may be. If we are absolutely ignorant of his character we are absolutely ignorant of his existence.

The Scriptura designations are far in advance of these. The Old Testament gives us two: *First*, that of Elohim; and *Second*, that of Jehovah. The radical meaning of the first is strength, power. The plural form denotes the infinite fullness of the divine nature. It presented God as manifested in the world at large, and was thus among the Hebrews the most common and the most generic name of the Godhead. The radical meaning of the second is brought out in Exod. 3:14; "I am that I am," and conveyed to the Hebrew consciousness the idea of Self-existence. Plutarch tells us that on the front of the temple at Delphi, was carved the word meaning "Thou art." Here he claimed to find the real name of

God. A self-existing God stood to the Hebrew consciousness as the God who was true to his promises. The name was adopted by the Jews as their national name of the true God. Yahveh was probably the original form of the word. The New Testament designates God as Spirit and as Love—*i. e.* as a supreme moral personality. The favorite expression of both Testaments is the Living God. This phrase describes God in opposition both to the idols of intellect as well as to the idols of the sense—to the empty abstractions of the reason as to the lifeless forms of idolatrous worship. See Psalm 4:22; John 5:26; 6:57.

There are three elements which enter into our generic conception of God: *First*, that of Cause or Force; *Second*, that of Personality; *Third*, that of Infinitude. The last is doubtless drawn from the Cosmos itself; the second is derived from the soul alone; while the first is derived from both the soul and the Cosmos. We may say, then, that God is the Infinite Cause, knowing and determining Itself, or Mind in its absolute self-determinations. In these statements we have not sought to go beyond the generic conception of God.

SECTION SECOND.

THE PROOF OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.

At the outset, two seemingly opposing opinions force themselves on our attention. They may be stated thus: The existence of God cannot be proved: the existence of God need not be proved. These statements are, however, diverse only in form. They in fact mutually correct and explain each other. The logical proof is inadequate without a sense of the divine; and the religious instinct needs to be met and to be satisfied by the the revelation of nature and of history.

Following the method here suggested, we are, first of all, to show that man has a religious nature,—that the soul was made for God. We shall then be prepared to consider how far his inborn spiritual tendencies and cravings have been responded to in the signs and in the symbols of an Infinite Living Presence.

The most direct means we have of determining the original nature and destination of the soul is to appeal to man's primary

consciousness,—to that consciousness which is remote from whatever is merely individual, local, or natural, but which underlies all human thinking and feeling.

The analysis of that consciousness gives us the sense of absolute dependence. Here the law of necessity finds expression. This feeling rises with the dawn of our conscious life, and grows with our growth. We know that none of the life-forces which make up our being have their source in ourselves. We learn, too that their home is beyond our reach and our control. This consciousness of absolute dependence finds expression in the poetry and in the philosophy of every people, as truly as in the more common utterances of prayer and of praise. Some form of worship is natural to man.

In this analysis we find, also, the feeling of supreme obligation. Here the law of liberty is revealed in our nature. This feeling carries with it an authority independent of all human legislation. It transcends in its imperatives the demands of passion or of interest. It can neither be annulled nor outgrown. No education, domestic or scholastic, can efface the idea of the right. All simple axiomatic principles of rectitude are intuitively recognized by all men, however they may differ when they come to apply them.

Again: our primary consciousness reveals to us another element; namely, a love for the good. Its lowest expression is found in our instinctive desire for happiness; and its highest manifestation is given in the spiritual longings and aspirations of the soul. Limited and defeated here, we are ever turning, in our best moods, to an invisible world, where we hope to realize the ideal of a perfect human life; where fellowship with the transient and the partial shall give place to a union with the source and ground of all that is true and good.

We need not carry the analysis further. These facts of our common consciousness have a profoundly religious significance. The first points to a *power above us*, absolute and complete. The second indicates an *authority over us*, supreme and perfect. The third points to a *goal before us*, final and ultimate. Now the power on which we depend, and the authority to which we owe allegiance, and the goal for which we strive, can find their synthesis only in a living personal God.

All this is apparent from the fact that these springs of action are the great regnant principles of our lives. They must then have corresponding realities out of and above ourselves, else the root of our nature is a lie. And, as they centre in a self-conscious soul, so the verities which they indicate must centre in a self-conscious God. Were this not the case, there would be disharmony within us and discord without us. Thus, a profound psychology must involve a true theology. The consciousness of a finite selfhood must find its counterpart and so its meaning in the consciousness of an infinite selfhood. The soul is the enigma and God is the solution.

This general view is confirmed when we look at the representative men of the race; for the men who have varied least from the idea and the law of their species best reveal human nature. We are not to go to the foremost men of any special class,—to scholars, poets, or philosophers,—to learn what that nature is, but to the great chiefs of humanity. These best embody the ideal of a truly human character and a truly human life. Now it will be found that manhood has not suffered by faith in a personal God. The more truly religious a man is, the loftier is his general character and the more perfect is his humanity. We need here only allude to the Child of the race, whom the doubter and the believer alike admit to have been the noblest and purest of all that have ever trod the earth. Now, he was not the head of a class, for character is before genius and before learning; nor was he the mere light of any age, or the mere leader of any people, but the Saviour and the Guide of the entire race. But this personage was the representative of humanity, because he was the most religious of mortals.

Thus, whether we examine our common consciousness, or read the inner life of the noblest and best of our race, we come to the same conclusion, that man is a religious being. The model man is the truly religious man. The view here presented has not the suspicion of novelty. Cicero, in his work, "*De Natura Deorum*," says that the idea of divinity is innate. "*Omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse Deos.*" Descartes declared that the idea of God could not have been originated by ourselves, nor have come from without, and so must have been implanted in our natures by God himself.

This mode of statement is, in many respects, faulty, and the

doctrine of innate ideas is now exploded; but there underlies this view the undeniable truth that man, by virtue of his innate susceptibility and inborn spiritual tendencies, does instinctively turn toward God.

The question then presents itself, is man's nature met and satisfied, or have we a worshiper without a sanctuary and without a God? Can this self-conscious and self-determining mind find its own infinite counterpart? Is its cry in the solitude of eternity answered only by a vain and empty echo? Must man be thus left forever incomplete? It cannot be so. Starting, then, with this assurance, we are prepared to examine the usually received proofs of the divine existence.

The Historical Proof.—The belief in a superhuman intelligence is held by all nations. Its universality can be accounted for most easily on the supposition that such a being does in fact exist. But, as there have been very general beliefs without any foundation at all, the real value of this proof must rest on the views we have taken of man as a religious being. His character will then explain and justify his creed. This common belief was noticed by the ancients. Cicero, who compiled largely from the Greek philosophers, and so represented the current opinions among the learned of his times, says, in the work above alluded to: "Non instituto aliquo aut more, aut lege sit opinio constituto maneat que, ad unum omnium firma consentio . . . Esse Deos." This view of the Roman orator and philosopher is now generally accepted.

It has been objected, however, that travellers have found tribes without any idea of God whatever. But such supposed cases have been very rare. The idea of some superhuman authority has maintained itself in the midst of great degradation and barbarism. The exceptional cases rest on doubtful testimony. If there are such, they are found where the moral and social nature has so suffered that an abnormal development has followed. Such tribes have no government and no institutions. They herd together and live together like the brutes. Their rational and moral perceptions have experienced a partial obscuration,—for a time even a total eclipse. As the Great Teacher declared, "If the light within thee be darkness, how great is that darkness." We are to remember that the instincts of rational creatures are subject to greater variations

than the instincts of the brutes; in short, that they are more or less under the law of moral development.

But how, it may be asked, shall we account for the Pantheistic and Polytheistic ideas which prevail so widely in the Eastern world? We have classed them together, because they are logically and historically connected. Both spring from one and the same root, namely, the estrangement of man from a personal communion with his Maker and the substitution of nature in his place. With the one, the life of the universe is the life of God. All living forms are only the transient waves of the infinite sea of existence. The Pantheist has lost all sense of God as a living person, and substituted instead his conception of nature as a whole, and deified his own abstraction. He has exchanged the unity of life for the unity of death. He has made an idol of his own generalization.

But, with the Polytheist, the various forces and agencies of the universe are so many veritable deities. In the place of one personal God, he puts the symbols of the philosophers and the personification of the poets, or those agencies of nature which throng and press him on every side. The one divine light is thus broken into many colors by the media of his own selfish hopes and slavish fears. He, too, must have his idols; but they must be brought down to the low level of his thoughts. The Pantheist sinks the living God in the idea of an unknown, impersonal force, infinite and eternal; while the Polytheist divides the infinitude of God, and loses his personal unity in the very modes of the divine activity. There is, then, no real difficulty in these diverse but related types of thinking. As we have said, we have here an instance of the fact that man's moral judgments are not as fixed or as unerring as the instincts of the brutes. Though they can never be made to affirm that there is no God, yet they may greatly misapprehend his character and his relation to the universe. The difference, then, between the Polytheist and the Pantheist is simply that of culture. The Brahman priest is a Pantheist, while the ignorant devotee is a Polytheist.

Besides, there is no evidence that the race emerged from Polytheism into the Monotheistic faith. Muller, in his work on the Vedic Literature, says: "There is a Monotheism that precedes the Polytheism of the Veda; and even in the invocation of their innu-

merable gods, the remembrance of a God, one and infinite, breaks through the mists of an idolatrous phraseology, like the blue sky that is hidden by passing clouds." So, also, Creuzer, in his great work on symbolism and mythology.

The Ontological Proof.—This has always been a favorite argument with speculative thinkers. Anselm was the first who gave it a formal statement. We give his own words: God is "aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest. Id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, in intellectu et in re."

We may render this argument into the following syllogism. Our *idea* of the most perfect being is our *idea* of God. Necessary existence is an element in our *idea* of absolute perfection. Therefore God necessarily exists. But the conclusion is not warranted by the premises. The only logical conclusion is this: therefore necessary existence is an essential element in our *idea* of God. We are still in the *ideal* world. We have only gained this lofty *conception* of the Deity, namely, that it belongs to the very nature of God to be, and not to become. We can only conclude that if God does exist, he exists in his own right and by virtue of his own nature. We are prepared to accept Jehovah's designation of himself, "I am that I am," as the profoundest which has ever been given. But we cannot infer from the bare conception of such a Being—though the conception may be complete—his objective existence. If the idea of a perfect Being were as necessary to our minds as the notion of self-existence is necessary to the idea of perfection, then Anselm's argument would be irresistible. But only that subjective thought or apprehension whose denial in the light of existence is inconceivable carries with it the pledge of the objective reality of its contents. An ideal conception, which we are free to form or not, however lofty it may be, can only give us ideal perfection.

The idea of the infinite is, however, a necessity of human thought. The sense of the infinite rises in strength and clearness with the growth of the soul. It is, however, rather a feeling than a complete intellectual perception.

It accompanies every notion of the finite. We may gather the field of consciousness and bind the harvest in logical bundles;

But yet there will be gleanings on that field richer than all our harvestings. Thus, the feeling of the infinite recurring so often and along so many different lines of thought is, however vague it may be, one of the roots of our idea of God. It compels us to ascribe the tribute of infinitude to the Being whom our nature demands, and whom the universe reveals.

The objection does not avail that the idea is purely negative. This does not accord with our consciousness. The soul, in expressing its belief in the infinite, makes its broadest affirmation. It does not simply deny all limitations, but affirms the unlimited ground of all that is limited. The word infinite is not, in our vocabulary, a synonym for the non-existence of the finite. We have preferred to use the word "sense" rather than the term "idea" in this connection. For the feeling of the presence of that which is infinite, rather than any definite conception, seems to belong to all our highest modes of thought.

This proof then, stripped of all its defects in statement, is of great value. It completes all the others. It necessitates and so justifies us in taking the last step from the finite to the infinite. It points to a goal to be reached in all our argumentation on the divine existence, and helps us to reach that goal. It shows how the mind naturally and necessarily carries the idea of a God beyond the conclusions of the logical understanding.

If the last step in any syllogism gives us a cosmical cause, or an architect of the known universe, we are warranted by the very highest law of our thinking to affirm that that cause or that architect is infinite. This proof might have been termed the *ideological*, while the proper *ontological* proof would seem to require us to start with the fact of an existence, limited and phenomenal, and then infer existence which is infinite and absolute.

Such in fact was the argument of Dr. Samuel Clark. This proof has been termed the *a priori* argument. For though God is not an effect, yet the evidence of his existence may be the result of certain innate, rational tendencies.

This leads us to

The Cosmological Proof.—We have a series of finite and dependent objects, of secondary causes and effects. These can only be accounted for on the supposition of a first cause—*causa causarum*.

The first cause is not, however, a temporal antecedent to the commencement of the series, but the eternal presupposition of the entire series itself. The priority is logical rather than temporal, since logic is eternal and creation dateless. We are necessitated by a law of our nature to ask whence comes this changing and circling movement, and what is its gathering and governing centre. Must not all these forces turn

“Through darkness up to God”?

Waiving for the present the fact that geology seems to indicate many specific creations and so to preclude the idea of a simple evolution of an infinite series of dependent agencies, let us examine the *hypothesis*. The links in the chain of dependencies may be made on a colossal scale, and a grand phenomenal process may be conceived to go on somewhat after the following manner. Great cycles of creation will succeed each other. Each will begin with the elemental forces—primary molecules with their energies—forming in their combination and confluence a moving nebulous mass. This mass of nebulous matter will by its rotation become a sun to the bodies which it throws off from its surface. A solar system is thus formed, balanced by countless systems of a like kind, filling illimitable space and moving through great tracts of time. Each one of these myriad groups of worlds will in the course of ages reach its meridian of perfection, with all its forms of beauty and life, and then return, at the completion of its cycle, to its original nebulous condition. From out this state a new movement will commence, and advance by a like process to a like goal, and so on forever. What is true of one system will be true of all. But such a number of dependent series of worlds going on infinitely is simply impossible without a creating and moving cause. The beginning of each system, and the balancing of their innumerable centres as they all sweep through space, point to a supracosmical origin. An eternal Creator best satisfies the demands of our thinking. His continued presence must underlie all the continued changes of the universe. That which *absolutely* depends on God for its origination must *ultimately* depend on him for its continuance. It is within the sphere of the possible that these several series alluded to in the above hypothesis may have some unknown physical centre, though it transcends our imagination to conceive

of any such centre. Nor do the facts in the case warrant any such notion; nor, if they did, would that hypothesis aid us in the solution of the problem.

Besides, we cannot admit that a chain of causes and effects may be eternal though every link is finite and dependent. It is true we can as easily believe in an *absolute* endlessness in one direction as in another. We can as readily accept a timeless regress without an efficient cause, as a timeless progress without a final cause; for in truth we cannot accept either. The endlessness in one direction, as in the other, is purely relative in its character. The whole series is of a parenthesis connecting the first cause with the final cause and identifying the two, and is in the most absolute sense dependent throughout on the continued presence of a creative power. Besides, when we affirm the endless continuance of any one form of life, as, for example, of the human soul, we have only a relative term of departure. The link with which we start is itself absolutely dependent. We have not laid hold of even one end of the chain. We conclude, then, that an absolutely infinite series of finite and dependent forces and agencies is a simple absurdity.

If it be objected that matter is eternal, and that the entire series of worlds is only the result of the interaction of its inherent forces; we reply that matter, so far as we know or can know it, is dependent throughout; for we only know it as it addresses the senses or acts on our organism, or can be made the subject of experiments. If we analyze any form of it we never find a forceless entity, but a change-seeking and change-producing element. It is something to be accounted for. It is true, thus far we have not been able to reduce the elements to anything more simple; but these very elements are composites of forces,—minute summaries of attracting and repelling powers. And wherever we meet with matter, it presents itself as a combination of affinities and activities, and so as something demanding explanation. If there is anything else in matter, it is utterly unknown to us, and must be left out of the account both of the believer and of the doubter. If it be said that matter is a substance without properties, and so need not be accounted for; we answer, then it will account for nothing, and must stand at the opposite pole of self-existence and be represented by zero, and so proclaim its absolute dependence.

We shall have occasion subsequently to treat of the theory of development here suggested.

It is added, however, that such a Being is as inconceivable as an uncaused and eternal universe. It is true they are both beyond our power of conception. But the reason for the inconceivableness of the one is the impotence of the human intellect, while the reason for the other is its repugnance to the human mind; the one is above our capacity of comprehension, while the other is contrary to our reason. We bow our souls before the transcendence of the one, and repudiate the absurdity of the other. We cannot compass the idea of an eternal God, and we cannot rid ourselves of it if we believe in God at all. But the measure of our comprehension is neither the measure of existence nor the limit of our faith. We are often compelled by the constitution of our souls to believe what we cannot image forth in our imagination, or construe to our logical understanding; for faith is in its nature receptive, and not constructive.

But after all, it is still affirmed that the universe is simply under the reign of law. This mode of speaking is vague and ambiguous. The literal meaning of the term law is a command with sanctions. It is the expression of sovereignty. It has here a metaphorical or figurative signification. It means the action of forces. Now these are only the administrators of the supreme will, and derive all their efficiency from the constant presence of that will. Their mode of acting, then, is but the operation of that sovereign will, and the constancy of that action is only an evidence of the immutability of that will, and of the perfection of its government. It is this permanency in the forces of nature—this immutability in the will of the supreme Author—which makes civilization possible. To say that the universe is under the reign of law is only saying that it is under the reign of a supreme Lawgiver.

Finally, it is objected that this proof does not lead us to a personal God. We answer, it must not be taken alone, for it rests for its support on the preceding arguments, and is to be interpreted in the light of our essential spiritual cravings and of our abiding practical necessities.

The Teleological Proof.—This has attracted the greatest attention. The literature of our language is exceedingly rich in works treating

of this branch of our subject. The argument is, in truth, exhaustless. It is important that we fall into no mere play on words in our statement. Such is the case when we affirm that the world bears marks of design, and therefore must have had a designer. Here design means a designing mind; and so we reason in a circle. Besides, we assume a unity of purpose, and so beg the conclusion that there is only one intelligent Architect of the universe. 2

Care, too, must be taken not to limit to any one sphere the marks of intelligence. These relate to order, to beauty, and to utility.

Order pervades nature. The elements crystallize according to fixed geometrical forms, and combine in definite numerical proportions. All forms in the plant kingdom are built up after the idea of the class to which they belong. Every individual organic structure follows the law of its kind. Variations are only temporary, and touch only what is accidental, and merely adjust the creature to its new surroundings. In the animal kingdom, unity of plan is never sacrificed. Thus, when an organ ceases to be of use, its rudiments are still retained, to indicate the type to which the animal belongs. The structural pattern, in its chief outlines, is preserved in all the great branches of animal life in order to show how species are related to each other. Thus the bones of the hand, of the paw, of the fin, are similar in structure. These homologues indicate that the several species to which they belong were formed according to one generic plan. Here, too, variations are only temporary, and answer special purposes. The great divisions in the animal economy make up the entire system of animal life, and mark the generically distinct and ascending path in the creative movement. All this indicates thought of the greatest breadth and farthest reach. The intelligence here revealed is the intelligence of the scientist; for order is at the basis of all science. L

Beauty, too, is an end in nature. Its presence is all pervading. In the shells of the ocean; in the precious stones and metals hidden in the mountains; in the color and contour of leaf, and of flower, and of fruit; and in the statuesque form of the living stalk that supports them all; in the gorgeous plumage and in the graceful evolutions of many kinds of birds; in the symmetry of animals, and in the spiritual features of the human face;—in all these we

see the evidence of the beautiful. Here, then, beyond question, we have the intelligence of the artist.

Utility is admitted to be an end, and perhaps the chief end in creation. We see it in the countless number of special adaptations which front us on every side. Some of these will be presently noticed. But just here it only concerns us to mark an additional evidence of intelligence,—the intelligence of the mechanician.

These three ends generally blend together; for model, and symmetry, and contrivance are found in the same structure. Yet any one of these may be dominant, though hardly exclusive, as in the crystal,—where order and beauty seem to take precedence of utility,—or as in animals of the primeval world, where beauty gives place to the law of adaptation: yet even here there is an element of the beautiful in the perfect adjustment of life to its external conditions.

We wish to show that the adaptations of nature are all adjusted to each other, and that all point towards a unity of design.

The elements of nature enter into the framework of every living structure. In their mechanical combinations they are the conditions of all life, vegetable as well as animal. You cannot increase the oxygen of the air without inviting a universal conflagration, nor can you diminish it without bringing on a general stagnation. And in their chemical unions they form solids, or fluids, or gases, and thus make the different types of life possible.

The inorganic world is the direct support of the plant kingdom. The vegetable lives on the elements which play about its leaves or gather at its roots. They are the materials by which the germ principle builds up its organism, and shapes its stalk, and determines the angle of its branches, and the outline of its leaf, and the color and flavor of its fruit. Here the two worlds minister to each other. The plant gives back at its death what it has received during its life. In fact, the soil itself advances in fertility as it becomes the residuum of organic forms. Nature feeds on her decay.

Again: following the ascending stream of life, we find that the animal lives on organic matter alone, though the elements are, as we have said, the condition of all life. The two kingdoms of nature support each other. Thus, while the animal takes the

oxygen from the atmosphere, and gives back the carbonic acid, this in turn becomes the chief food of plants. It is consumed and decomposed, and the oxygen returned to the atmosphere for the animal. By this mutual respiration, in part, at least, the balance of the elements in the air, so necessary to all the higher forms of life, is maintained. The microscopic animals of the earth, air, and water, are the invisible scavengers of nature, whose office seems to be to devour those decaying organisms which might breed pestilence and death. They thus prevent particles of matter from passing into elementary gases, and, by a living appropriation, start them again on the upward current of life.

All these departments of nature have paved the way through a series of vast geologic periods for the reign of man. The earth slowly formed its solid crust, and the great forests of the ancient world gathered the noxious gases from the atmosphere, and prepared it for the animal life, and then sank beneath the surface, thus reserving their treasures for human wants. During this great transition epoch, animals must gradually appear, else the atmosphere would lose its balance; and they must be adapted to their conditions, and must finally give place to others more useful to man. The coral insects must build up the island of the sea, and lay the foundation of continents, and protect their shores by solid ramparts. The secret forces of nature must work in her laboratory, and prepare for human needs all the precious and all the useful metals. The internal agencies must lift up the beds of the ocean, and bring to the light of day its accumulated treasures. They must, too, heave up the mountain ranges, and open the well-springs, and form the various systems of rivers which now water the earth. These and other forces must vary the surface of the continents, and create natural harbors along their shores. Unless in all these, and a thousand other ways, preparations had been made for man, he could not have fulfilled his destiny, and there would have been a fatal break in the higher adjustments of nature. All this points to a unity of design.

But the earth, the abode of man, does not move in space apart from the solar system; nor is the solar isolated from the astral systems, or from similar groups of worlds which make up the great Cosmos. The design here indicated must be connected with other

purposes unknown to us, but possibly revealed to other orders of beings; and all these relative intentions must issue in one ultimate and absolute end. That end—that final cause—can only be commensurate with the first cause; in fact, identical with it. This is favored by the grand conclusion towards which all science tends, namely, the doctrine of cosmical unity. Thus, the great Architect will exhibit his own ideals, will realize his own thoughts, and will make manifest the perfections of his own character.

It is objected that we cannot infer an infinite designer from a finite system of contrivances. We reply, that when we have reached one designing mind, adequate to the known universe, we naturally conclude that that mind is infinite. This proof is bound up with the ontological and the cosmological argument.

The same objection is repeated in another form. It is said that the designer shows marks of design, and so needs to be accounted for. But this is a mere play on words. When we have reached the Architect of the universe we can go no higher. We ascribe at once to him the incommunicable attribute of self-existence. The mind rests here. The legitimacy of the idea of the infinite makes this process legitimate also. The mind is not driven along an endless series, in the hopeless search for the absolute, but is led by a law of its nature to ascribe infinitude to the Architect of the universe.

It is also objected that this proof leads us only to an Architect, and not to a Creator. But we have already shown the legitimacy of the idea of the absolute, and we have also shown that matter always presents itself to us as something that needs to be accounted for. We conclude, then, the Architect can only be the proper Creator himself.

But it is intimated that these very contrivances result from forces adjusting themselves to each other. In this way the light acts on the eye, and the air on the lungs, and the water on the gills. But the power to modify any existing forms is wholly separate and distinct from the power to originate them. The power to affect externally a plant or an animal is certainly something different from the power to create a plant or an animal. The fact that a creature can adapt itself to new conditions is only another instance of the wisdom of its Maker. The variations, however, even here, have

their limits. One species does not pass into another; at least one great branch of the animal kingdom does not pass over into another and different branch. Besides, what shall we say when we find that the flower and the insect seem to be made for each other? Any process of essential mutual adjustment would seem to be fatal to the life of both. The question would return, how did flower and insect first come into life? There is no evidence that the elements can create life, and, even if they could, it would not eliminate the idea of a Creator. Spontaneous generation, even if it were true, could only be a creational law,—simply a mode in which God creates the lowest form of organic life.

Moral Proof.—This has been ably elaborated by the German philosopher, Kant. As presented by him, it is, in brief, the following: We are made for the highest virtue, and the highest happiness. Both are desirable, and both attainable. Both must lead to one common goal. That goal can be reached only in another life, and in fellowship with God.

This argument has in part been anticipated by our view of man as a religious being. It rests on the great facts of human life and human history. These reveal a moral government, established, though not perfected. To state the case more specifically, the evidences of a divine government are found:—

First. In the fact of a moral nature. We are endowed with a moral sense, and recognize a moral law, and apprehend ultimate moral principles, and so must cognize a moral Lawgiver.

Second. In the actual rewards of virtuous living, and in the actual penalties of a vicious life. These are felt and seen in our self-approbation on the one hand, and self-condemnation on the other. We thus recognize ourselves as the subjects of God's government.

It is further made known in the social advantages of virtue, and disadvantages of vice. The results of virtuous acts often seem to be counterbalanced by others of greater pretensions and show; but these are always of a lower grade, and of temporary worth. Virtue may even bring along with it special trials, and vice carry along with it special attractions for a season; but it will be found that virtue in the end, and on the whole, will ever secure the richer blessings of life.

Third. In the fact that human government must punish crime as injurious to society, in order to maintain its existence. This procedure is essential to its stability. The government may make a mistake in deciding what is criminal, but it cannot ignore its own idea of virtue as a conservative force in society. Let the distinction between virtue and vice be given up, and no political machinery, or mere physical force, can save the commonwealth from destruction. Thus, every human government rests on and testifies to the invisible moral government of God.

Fourth. In the providential history of the world. The history of humanity has not yet reached its goal, and just to this extent this proof must be incomplete. But there are clear traces of a divine movement in the lives of individuals and of nations. We find a Providence in the general progress of humanity, in the mission of nature, and even in the great wars which have afflicted our race.

Fifth. In the tendencies of virtue and of vice to secure their respective ends—that of reward or of punishment. The hindrances and delays to these results are artificial, and so temporary, while the tendencies to them are natural, and so sure to prevail in the final issue. The expectation of such a perfect moral government is, then, warranted by the course of Divine Providence.

Each of these proofs of the existence of God, taken by itself, is incomplete, because it is based on a partial view of the facts in the case. They form together *one complete*, and, we think, convincing process of argumentation. If we break the demonstration, we have at best only great fragments, inviting our criticism, and awakening our doubts by their very inadequacy. But when these proofs are all taken together, and are interpreted by the religious wants and aspirations of the human soul, they cannot but carry to every open mind the conviction of the existence of a living and personal God.

CHAPTER II.

REVELATION.

SECTION FIRST.

THE POSSIBILITY OF REVELATION.

Doubt on the possibility of God's revealing himself in acts which transcend his fixed modes of operation, springs essentially from false conceptions of his character. The real difficulty is not found in any views of man's sufficiency to himself, nor in any notion of the adequacy of nature to meet his demands. These last are, indeed, the main points thrust forward in the controversy, because they are more within our mastery than any *a priori* determinations of the divine mind. Behind and beneath the reasoning of the skeptic, there is the assumption of the impossibility of God's re-appearing in the course of nature or in the life of humanity. Independent of revelation and of all that we have gathered directly and indirectly from its teachings and its influence, we can not affirm that God could thus reveal himself. But, on the other hand, the rationalist is not warranted in assuming, independent of proof, that there are no new ways—ways transcending the known laws of nature—in which God may manifest himself to his creatures.

The Christian conception of God is a grander idea than that of the skeptic. The one must, if he be logical, deny personality, in every sense of the word, to God. The other must hold that He is the universal and absolute Life in its self-consciousness and its self-determinations. The one insists only on the immanence of God and his presence in nature. The other holds to the higher unity of his transcendence *and* immanence, by virtue of which the natural and the supernatural stand in harmonious relations. The ethical element is regnant in the one conception; while in the other it is fluctuating, or completely prostrate.

It belongs, then, to the very nature of God as thus conceived, to reveal Himself. While revelation is a free act, it is not arbitrary in its character; nor is it occasioned by a mere emergency in the divine government. God is ever seeking to re-appear in time and

space, and to reveal Himself more and more fully to his creatures.

The epochs of revelation, and the forms which they will take, must depend on the crises in human history, and on the kind and degree of culture which different communities may take on. It does not follow, because it is God's nature thus to manifest Himself, that no rational principle will govern his movements. There is economy in the divine government. God will waste no power; but will make his ordinary methods answer, if possible, his own ends. He will reverence his own image, by giving play and scope to the natural workings of the human faculties. He has made man a seeker and searcher into the mysteries of existence. And the education of the individual and of communities is found in their capacity to interpret the secrets of nature and of life. God will thus reveal Himself only in modes which best answered the moral ends of his government, and so best honor his own character.

The idea, then, of a revelation which shall transcend the common course of nature, in the interests of that moral order which nature herself recognizes, and toward which she tends, is not repugnant to human thought. As we have seen, it is not inconsistent with the loftiest conception of God. It is not an abrogation of any of the laws of nature and of life; for the bond between cause and effect is never broken. The same power which underlies the ordinary laws of the Cosmos emerges in a new and transcendent way on great and worthy occasions. The appearance of a *supreme spiritual energy* transcending nature, is not at all incredible; since it finds a faint, though real, illustration in the free will of man as a fresh spiritual force in the life of the race. There is in this free will a supernatural element which counts for something in the great issues of life—a supernatural element of which we are conscious every day of our existence. To affirm then, that the supernatural is impossible, is a mere assumption without warrant either in science or in philosophy. [See "*Evidences of Christianity*," Chapt. II, Sect. 1.]

SECTION SECOND.

THE VALUE OF REVELATION.

Without revelation, man in his innocency and sinlessness, supposing such a state could be realized, would still be unawakened and undeveloped. The spiritual consciousness, however pure it might be, would lack both clearness and depth of apprehension. The veil of nature would conceal the Holy of Holies, and leave the worshiper only in the outer sanctuary. He would have no trial to endure, and no task to achieve. With no great duties and no great cares, and with no great hopes or fears, the deepest springs of his moral life would remain unopened and unmoved. He would have no enigmas to interpret and no problems to solve. Art would be limited in its subjects, for it could furnish no heroic or saintly characters; and science could only follow in the wake of the common wants of humanity. Philosophy could not well have existed; for man, limited by his senses, undisturbed by the uncertainties both of life and of thought, contented with the issues of the present and of the future, whatever they might be—man, thus situated, could have no motive to enter at all into the region of speculative inquiry. Superior to the men of the old classic culture in the purity of the affections, he would have remained their inferior in all the forms of intellectual life. For evil is the source of more mental power than simple innocency or mere negative goodness. In order that man might be revealed to himself, and might realize the possibilities of his creation, there was a need of a supernatural revelation of the Almighty.

But the presence of moral and physical evil also necessitates a divine interposition. Man is not now in a normal condition, either on the higher or lower side of his nature. There is no evidence that he could in the lapse of the ages ever attain this condition. The radical character of this evil, its appearance at the very dawn of conscious life, its dominant power in every individual, and its presence in all, preclude any natural means of recovery. No community whatever, without the direct or indirect influence of revelation, has made any great advance in a right religious life. No form of education and no culture has tended toward the recovery of the race. The experiences of the individual and of

society, accumulated through centuries, and transmitted with ever increasing volume and richness, have not, outside of supernatural assistance, ever restored man to the love and favor of God. Single souls do here and there appear in the firmament of the moral heavens; but they shine only out of the thick darkness of heathenism. It is only by denying the reality of sin as guilt and pollution, and by insisting that it is merely a transition step or stage in the onward progress of the race—it is only in some such way as this, that our conclusion can be avoided. But the judgment of the general consciousness is with us in insisting that moral and physical evil are the permanent possession and inheritance of the race; and that civilization may gloss them over and change endlessly their forms, but can never eliminate them from human nature.

Man is thus precluded from a return to a state of innocence. If he would become sinless he must also be made positively holy. Now this is more than a restoration. It is an exaltation to a state higher than that lost in the original catastrophe. This moral and physical transfiguration could only be brought about by a divine interposition. [See "*Evidences of Christianity*," Chapt. II. Sect. 3.]

SECTION THIRD.

THE EVIDENCE OF REVELATION.

We give here again a summary of what may be found in our work on the Evidences. The proof of divine revelation rests on the following facts and principles:—

First. Man is above as well as of nature. He thus can apprehend the supernatural element in the life of nature herself. He cannot, however, be satisfied with what she reveals. He demands a higher revelation. His infinite susceptibility of God can be satisfied only by a fuller knowledge of and a closer communion with God.

Second. Man is, as we have already intimated, below his true level, and so far below it that he needs a divine helper.

Third. The traditions of a primeval revelation are supported in manifold ways. They best explain, on the historical side, the germinal beginnings both of Judaism and of Christianity. They are imbedded in an ancient literature, and are presupposed by the

very life of an ancient people. They are given in forms singularly simple, and embody a spirit and a class of ideas singularly pure and profound. They thus appear to stand on a plain above the entire region of Pagan superstitions. Thus are the originals apart from the corrupt alloys which mark the light traditions of the Gentile nations.

Fourth. Judaism was the great miracle of the old world. The life, the people, its providential history, its prevalent government, its institutions social and religious, its sacred literature, its line of prophets and its order of priests make it a unique phenomenon unexplained and inexplicable by the ordinary theory of historical development. Judaism has thus an evidential value of its own. It was all prophetic in its character. It professed itself to be incomplete. It was the religion of a great promise and a great hope. It was thus a great testimony prolonged through the ages to the revelation yet to come—to the final message of God to the race. The facts here involved are too clear, too novel and too decisive to be seriously affected by the results of any critical investigations of the Hebrew Scriptures.

Fifth. Christianity claims to be the religion of humanity. We have to notice. (a) It gives us a Christ. Most certainly we have the idea of Christ in the New Testament alone. Nowhere else in all ancient literature do we find such an idea. Besides, this idea is drawn out at length and given to us in an actual life of an actual character. For the history of Christ must have given birth to the idea of Christ. This is the only possible way to account for such an idea. Again, no school of critics doubt but what the larger epistles of Paul were written by himself, and are genuine historical records. These place it beyond doubt that at the very time Paul was converted, the Church had accepted Jesus as the risen and glorified Redeemer. Paul puts the appearance of Christ to himself on a level with his appearance to the other apostles. The account is given in a simple narration and in a style essentially different from that which Paul uses where he mentions any vision of our Lord. (b) It gives us a kingdom of God suited to human nature in its finiteness and infiniteness. (c) It gives us a civilization in which man can reach the earthly goal of his existence. (d) It is a fulfillment of the past and a prophecy of the future. That

future, however, is its own triumph and its own consummation here and hereafter. It is the finality.

SECTION FOURTH.

INSPIRATION.

I. THE IDEA OF INSPIRATION.—The Scriptures are a record of revelation—but a record which interprets and enforces that revelation. They not only give the supernatural facts and symbols; but they unfold their worth and their meaning, as this worth and this meaning are apprehended in the understanding or felt in the spiritual affections. The Old Testament gives the experiences of men who stood in close, conscious fellowship with Jehovah; and the New Testament contains the experiences of souls which were in intimate relations with Christ himself. But both give us the Christ-consciousness as it is developed from its incipient and implicit form among the prophets to its full and explicit manifestation among the apostles. It is this unique character of the Bible which is covered and expressed by the term inspiration. It is not merely the accurate and full statement of the truth which distinguishes the Scriptures from all other writings: but also the fresh, original and divinely wrought experiences, which make these writings alone the Word of God.

Inspiration can not be strictly defined, since the supernatural, here as elsewhere, in its ultimate source and innermost movement, is above the range of science or philosophy. Besides, inspiration is only known by those effects which were witnessed in a by-gone age or stereotyped in a foreign tongue.

We can, then, only describe it in respect to its manifest design and recognized results. It may be termed a supernatural spiritual illumination. It enables its possessor to be an authority in the sphere of religion.

It belongs to the man in the performance of his religious functions and in the exercise of his prophetic or apostolic office, rather than to the man as acting in his personal or private relations. The prophet or the apostle is inspired simply when he performs the duties of a religious teacher.

Inspiration has revealed itself in three grand spiritual gifts.

The first is that of knowledge. This gives spiritual insight into divine truth. The second is that of wisdom. This is the spiritual power and tact to unfold and to apply the truth. The third is the gift of prophecy. This is the spiritual power to realize the truth, both in thought and expression. It may be declarative or predictive in its form. These three gifts are specially alluded to in the Epistles of Paul.

In inspiration, the very fountains of thought and feeling are quickened by the Spirit of God. It is his direct movement in the hidden depths of the human soul. This movement begins below the consciousness, and rises up in and with this consciousness, and takes on a divinely human character. The prophet or the apostle experiences an exaltation in his thinking and willing. This exaltation appears in his inspired preaching or writing. It may affect the memory, so that one recalls only the facts that have a special and spiritual significance, and recalls them with clearness and correctness. It may quicken the judgment, so that the objective revelation is rightly apprehended and interpreted. It may touch human hopes and fears in the light of the truth revealed, and so open to human gaze more or less of the eternal world. It may quicken the imagination, so as to present the truths of the spiritual world in forms taken from our present earthly conditions and relations.

Inspiration involves spiritual discernment; while sanctification secures the submission of the will, and so holiness of life and character. Still inspiration will ever exalt those susceptibilities of the soul which it touches and moves. It may awaken the conscience, or quicken the imagination, or rouse the mental perceptions, or touch the sensibilities; and in all these ways may affect the will and thus carry along with itself a sanctifying power. Yet its proper office is to secure a realization of what is revealed—the full reception and transfer of the divine truth. Thus it is possible to find a Balaam with his conscience aroused, and even his feelings moved, but his will unsubdued. Thus, too, Peter could dissimulate, and Paul and Barnabas could have a sharp contention. But yet it remains true that holy men “spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.” In ordinary illumination or enlightenment we have the result of reflection. When this reflection is instantaneous

—when the thought seems to us to come from without, though it is in fact but the flashing of the light within us—a light which has been kindled by the age in which we live—then this natural inspiration is the best type of the supernatural and divine one. In all minds the conscious processes are ever passing over into the unconscious states of the soul. From this hidden depth new and fresh conceptions are ever rising, and new moral intuitions are ever presenting themselves. Here we have some faint analogy of this higher movement which comes from the Spirit of God.

Objective revelation, as we have elsewhere said, is the presentation, in a supernatural manner and form, of divine truth to the human soul. It embodies itself in all the supernatural facts of religion, and in all those miraculous signs and symbols which shadow forth the verities of the spiritual world. All these are the objects of sense, as well as the objects of faith. In their last stage and in their final series they constitute the ground and basis of Christianity. They address not only inspired men, but men of ordinary capacity and character. They are to be interpreted not merely by prophets and apostles, but by all men of all ages to whose mind and heart they may appeal. This will remain true, though the interpretation given by inspiration may be regulative in its character; for later ages will have new and special applications to make of divine truth as given in the Word of God. Now, between this objective revelation by means of objective sensible media, and inspiration, the distinction is too broad and obvious to need to be further unfolded.

Inspiration is both a divine impartation and a human reception; and these two interpenetrate each other, and constitute the same mental state and movement, and make up one and the same divinely human process. Thus we see that the authorship in the Scriptures is a double one. The energizing Spirit secures infallibility; and the soul, working according to its own laws, secures intelligibility. But they are not outwardly united, as an author and his amanuensis in a written production; nor mechanically joined, as a pen with the moving hand; but they interpenetrate each other in a dynamic manner. *How* we know not. Nor does God supplement the prophet or the apostle. He does not watch and intervene in behalf of his truth just when and where he sees his representative

erring from that truth. This, too, would make the relation mechanical, and so introduce a new and needless difficulty. There is a double authorship in each and every part of the inspired discourse or writing. It pervades it and is co-extensive with it. The divine thought is awakened in the human thought. God so touches the hidden springs of the human soul that his own idea re-appears in the human conception and the human language. Thus the utterance and expression of the inspired prophet or apostle become more intensely and profoundly human, in the best sense of that term, than the language of any other class of men whatever. For it touches most profoundly all those sympathies and aspirations which are common to our nature as it issues from the hand of God. Thus revelation not only makes God known to ourselves, but makes us acquainted with our own nature. Thus all is truly of God and all is truly of man. All is human and all is divine.

The mode of this union is beyond our apprehension, yet the fact of a similar union is seen in the person of Christ. Here indeed is the mystery of mysteries. The whole life of our Redeemer is that of God and of man in one living unity. We have also a striking instance of a like union in the origin of the divine life in the soul of a sinner. Here the divine and the human elements interpenetrate each other, though the one is original and independent and the other derived and dependent. So again in nature, the Infinite and Finite are so united, that all the effects of natural agencies can be ascribed either to God as First Cause, or to some one or more of the secondary causes.

This double authorship is seen in the narratives of the Scriptures as well as in the predictions of the prophets or the experiences of the apostles. Luke, in his preface, clearly recognizes a human element. The Evangelists often acted as witnesses; and we know that recollection is the essence of testimony, and so there must have been a human element in the Gospels. But inasmuch as these writers have a higher appreciation of the worth and value of the facts and events in the life of our Lord, than that which ordinary historians could have had, so they must have been raised to a higher level and impelled by a higher spirit, than usually characterizes profane authors. Thus all the Bible, from Genesis to Revelation, has God as well as man for its author.

The individuality of the prophet or the apostle is always secured. If this were not so the human element would be weakened or destroyed. It is abundantly apparent in the variety of thought and expression which appears throughout the Scriptures. Of course, there accompanies this fact the other truth, that the organ of divine inspiration, whether prophet or apostle, is limited by his very constitution. He can only receive and appropriate the truth according to his particular mode and make of mind and heart. But as very many organs have been thus taken, they supplement and compliment one another in a wonderful manner. Again, as the Bible was written, not for scholars, but for men, and for men in ever varying conditions, so these very diversities and limitations in inspired men and their utterance are not defects, but rather excellences in inspiration. Thus it is that the Bible has touched both the Oriental and the Occidental mind—has found men out both in a state of civilization and of barbarism. The inspired man can only take in that side or aspect of truth which is suited to his nature; but this very limitation makes him all the more competent to act as a representative of God—as both a witness and an authority among men. In inspiration, as elsewhere, God is never arbitrary: we have all of perfection that is either desirable or possible.

II. THE EVIDENCE OF INSPIRATION.—The evidence of inspiration is cumulative.

First, We have the presumptive evidence. If Christianity be true, then there is at least no presumption against a record which shall be an authority in regard to both fact and doctrine. Is there not some presumption in its favor? If Christianity was designed for all ages and for all races, then have we not reason to expect an authorized exposition of its teachings—an exposition either personal or impersonal in its character, and in a fixed form for all time? Common tradition could hardly preserve and transmit through a long period the facts of the Gospel history—still less its doctrines in their purity. We must have either a succession of infallible teachers—or one vicegerent of Christ—or a written and authoritative document. Now God has not provided the first or the second; but in their place has given us a body of prophetic and apostolic writings. Is it unnatural or unreasonable to suppose that these

form the fixed and ultimate standard of faith and practice? Does not history show that we need some such authority to regulate our religious thinking? Was it not providential that the early church was not left to rely for a long time on oral preaching, though that preaching was in great part inspired? Without the Bible as an inspired volume the Reformation could have never taken place; though a religious revolt would doubtless have resulted from an antagonism to the despotism of the hierarchy. The reformers, in breaking from the pope, must appeal to some infallible guide; and that guide must be the Scriptures.

If it be said that the same argument would show that we needed some one to interpret the Bible, we answer: That does not follow; for the difficulty in this latter case is essentially subjective, and not objective. The difficulty in the interpretation of the Scriptures, so far as our duty and our destiny are concerned, is moral, and not intellectual in its character. We are, in this respect, put on probation. If we choose to wrest the Scriptures to our own ruin, we are doubtless free to do so.

If it be said that the same argument requires an inspired copyist, so as to avoid all intrusion of error into the sacred text, we answer: The transmission by tradition is impossible, not alone from moral reasons, but also from natural ones, for example, failure of the memory; while the essential errors of the copyist would arise from a neglect which would amount to a moral deficiency. God leaves the responsibility with the copyist.

If it be said that the same argument would lead us to expect a fuller account than we have of the teachings of our Lord and his apostles, we reply: The oral preaching of the early disciples of Jesus covered in extent much more than their writings, and was no doubt equally inspired, but did not cover more in subject-matter. We infer this from the fullness of thought in these writings; and also from the nature of the case, since men who seldom write are apt to condense the substance of their thinking. Thus the Bible is not fragmentary when compared with the oral instructions of the apostles. It can only receive this name when it is contrasted with the revelation which is yet to be made at Christ's second coming.

No difficulty is involved in the fact that, after all, there will be

need of a translation from the original Hebrew and Greek. There is a gain in the fact that the Hebrew and Greek are closed languages, and so the original import essentially fixed and settled.

There is also presumptive evidence, in the fact that the spirit of the New Testament harmonizes with that of the Old. A self-forgetfulness and an elevation of thought and sentiment show themselves in all the sacred writings. There is no fine writing in the Gospels or the Epistles. There are no moral reflections, that are at all extended, on the character even of Jesus; and no eulogy on his life; but a simple, plain narrative of his deeds and his words. And in the Epistles we have an interpretation of these facts, and an application of the truths which they embody to human character and life. A cautious reserve marks all these writings, indicating the presence and the guidance of a higher Spirit. The enthusiasm of these men is a subdued one. Their intense earnestness is tempered with rare caution. They make no attempt to fill up the gaps in their knowledge of the childhood of Jesus, as unlettered fishermen might have been expected to do, and as the writers of the New Testament Apocrypha actually did. They enter into no details of the future life; but confine themselves to broad, generic statements. Their silence on these and kindred points is quite significant. They do not follow their own impulses and throw out their own speculations, as is done by men who found a party or originate a sect. In short, they seem to speak as those moved by the Holy Spirit.

This presumptive evidence appears all the stronger when we compare these writings with those of the Apostolic Fathers. What a chasm there is—what a lowering of thought and feeling, as one passes from the apostolic age to that which immediately followed it—from Paul and John to Clement and Barnabas! In fact, the culture of succeeding centuries has produced no works which, in original, creative, spiritual power, can be compared with the writings of the early disciples of our Lord. On the theory of inspiration we can easily account for their origin. Can we as easily account for it on any other supposition?

Second. The positive evidence for the inspiration of the New Testament is furnished by the documents themselves. We need to assume only the historical character of these documents. [See

"Evidences of Christianity," Chapt. I.] We have the promise of Christ that He will guide his disciples into the truth, the germinal fulfillment of that promise on the Day of Pentecost, and the claims of the apostles themselves. Let us note.

A. The promise of Christ. This was first given when he sent forth the Twelve; See Matthew 10:19, 20; Mark 13:11; Luke 12:11-12. These assurances of our Lord have reference to the form and to the substance of what they were to say. The promise has primary or direct reference to their preaching on trying occasions, and so a general regard to their proclamation of the truth on any and every occasion. Essentially the same promise was given to the apostles just before the apprehension of Jesus. It is, however, in clearer and broader terms. Thus; "He shall guide you into the entire truth;" "Shall show you things to come;" "Shall teach you all things and bring all things to your remembrance." These three things are to be observed; namely, the promise of a fuller and richer communication of the truth; that the past was to be recalled; and the future would be revealed. We must not limit this promise exclusively to the apostles. It refers to all Christians; but to each according to his condition or position in life. Thus, for the apostles and apostolic men engaged in introducing Christianity into the world—to all these, it was the promise of supernatural assistance; to all others, it was only a promise of the illumination of the Holy Spirit. For Christianity has not only secured to us the sacred record, but also the abiding presence of the Comforter.

B. This promise of our Lord received its germinal fulfillment on the Day of Pentecost. The apostles waited at Jerusalem for this fulfillment, Acts 1:4; and Peter claimed it for the Christian company then present, Acts 2:33. This incipient fulfillment was still further carried out in the subsequent lives of the apostles, and was extended to apostolic men and women especially called to propagate the new religion.

C. The apostles, especially Paul, frequently claim a special higher guidance than that of the ordinary Christian. Peter is declared to be "filled with the Holy Ghost," Acts 4:8. Paul's claims are found in I Cor. 2:10-13; Gal. 1:1, 12; I Thess. 2:13; and 4:2; II Thess. 2:13-15; I Tim. 4:1. The apostle Peter

seems to recognize the authoritative character of Paul's ministrations, in II Pet. 3:16. The passages which seem to militate against this view are found chiefly in I Cor. 7, and present no great difficulty. They illustrate the principle that exceptions prove the rule. The apostle there declares that on these minor points—on these questions of expediency, Christ had given no commandment, and so he would give only his advice.

Were, then, the apostles deceivers or self-deceived; or were they what they claim to be, authoritative teachers? Without developing the points raised by these questions, we may say that the signs of honesty are too many and too marked to allow of the supposition that they were conscious deceivers; and that their sobriety and self-possession will not allow us to suppose that they were mere enthusiasts; and that the pure and lofty spirit of self-sacrifice which they exhibit forbids the idea that they were mere fanatics. We must conclude, then, that they are, in the sphere of religion, the authoritative teachers of mankind.

If the inspiration of the New Testament be admitted, that of the Old Testament follows as a matter of course. Our Lord and his apostles refer to it constantly as a supreme authority in matters of religion. In fact the inspiration of the Old Testament is never doubted by those who admit of the supreme authority of the New.

The conclusion, then, to which we are led, is, in brief, the following; the prophets and the apostles were inspired, both in their oral preaching and in their written communications. Their writings are authoritative in the sphere of religion and of morals, and make up, in the main, the Old and New Testaments. It belongs to Biblical criticism to show that those books which were not written by prophets or apostles, have yet a prophetic or apostolic sanction. This applies especially to Mark and Luke—men who lived in an era of inspiration, and whom tradition has placed under the guidance respectively of Peter and of Paul.

Every book of the canon is to be accepted or rejected as a whole; and the Bible itself, as an organic unity, is likewise to be accepted or rejected in its entirety. The critic may be able to eliminate from the canon any book which he can show not to have the apostolic sanction. It is not literary perfection that is to be insisted on, nor

scientific accuracy that is to be looked for; but the authority of each and every production of the inspired penman, viewed in its living unity and as it addresses our religious consciousness.

The best critics have generally admitted that Providence has allowed works to perish which were written by prophets and apostles. These, however, never belonged to the sacred canon. They served a temporary purpose, and were superseded by fuller and more extended works, either by the same author or by some of his associates.

Revelation and inspiration are thus limited to the sphere of religion—but of religion in its practical as well as its theoretical relations and bearings. Thus the province of religion would embrace a vast range of details which touch the course of nature and which hold a near or a remote relation to our common life. The presumption is that all that we find in any of the inspired books has some bearing on the duties or destinies of men. Here the burden of proof rests on the one who doubts our conclusion.

The writers of the New Testament quote with great freedom from the Old. In fact, they often use the Septuagint version instead of the original, even where that is faulty. But they do not quote it as critics, but as religious teachers. Their interpretations are authoritative for the purpose they had in view; namely, to present some one aspect of the truth as given by the prophet. In such cases they do not seek to give a full exposition of the prophet's statement, but only some side of it which suits their purpose.

The seeming discrepancies of Scripture and its apparent mistakes must be left to the Biblical critic. Such difficulties do not vitiate the general argument. For a critical examination of them, see Davidson's *Hermeneutics*.

III. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION.—No theory of inspiration has, or can have, a scientific authority, because it proposes to explain what is inexplicable. There is, however, a difference in the value of the theories which have been proposed.

The Verbal Theory may be accepted as the partial statement of a fact in inspiration; namely, that God is in the language, as well as in the thought, of the inspired writer. For thought, when born into the world, takes on an independent organism. Still it remains true that thought naturally and logically precedes expression. In

fact, it is a test of real, substantial thought, that its expression can be changed without serious loss. Doubtless the general truth remains, that perfection of thought allows of but one expression. It is only by analysis, and that, too, of a delicate and exhaustive character, that an exact equivalent can be obtained for the original expression. The theory, then, seems to have a mechanical and unphilosophical air. For thought generates language, while words do not absorb thought. Besides, the theory seems to conflict with the fact that the same discourses of our Lord are differently reported by different evangelists. Again, we should have expected, according to this theory, that the exact forms of the inscriptions on the cross, in three different languages, would have been communicated by the sacred writers. And we also should have expected that the formula in the institution of the Lord's Supper would have been given in precisely the same terms by Matthew, Mark, Luke and Paul. Such, however, is not the fact. Now the fact is, that each writer has given his own conception of its general import. The agreement is general, but not minute.

The Plenary Theory is only the statement of the fact that the whole Bible is inspired. It is not, however, an explanation of that fact. The theory can be accepted, but yet it has no scientific value whatever. If it could be proved that there were in the Scriptures matters of a purely secular interest or of a purely scientific value, having no bearing whatever on religion or morals, then the Plenary Theory, as a statement of a general fact, would be refuted. The Bible does not simply contain the Word of God, as the objector would insist, but is itself that Word.

The Dynamic Theory—the theory which insists that the divine and human elements blend together in inspired thought and expression, is undoubtedly the best of all the theories which have been proposed. But this contains no proper explanation of the mystery. It is a clear and simple statement of fact.

The various supplemental theories are of little account. That given by Dr. Hill, of superintendence—of elevation—of suggestion, is mechanical, and supposes that God acts on the soul as a man acts on his fellows in the formal relations of thought. That given by Dr. Henderson, of excitement—of invigoration—of superintendence—of guidance—of direct revelation, is confusing and faulty

for the same reason. A brief notice of the history of opinion on this subject may not be out of place.

First. We have the strict supernaturalistic view. The ancient church expressed its views on this point in a free, popular manner. The soul, they affirm, is like a musical instrument upon which the Spirit breathes, or like the strings of a harp, which the Spirit touches. In this case the tone would depend both on the instrument itself and on the hand that swept the chords.

The Council of Trent gave no authoritative theory on the subject of inspiration. The great teachers of the Modern Catholic Church, the Jesuit Fathers, took, however, a freer view of inspiration. In this respect, as in others, they were opposed by the Jansenists. The Puritans generally took also a strict ground. In fact, the theologians of the seventeenth century carried the strict theory to the most extreme point. Many of them claimed that the interposition itself was from God, and that the diction of the New Testament Greek was the highest instance of Attic purity. It may be said that, with the exceptions referred to, among which Luther and the Socinians must also be classed, the strict supernaturalistic view prevailed till the seventeenth century.

Second. We have the free supernaturalistic view. This prevailed generally in Germany from the seventeenth century onward. Most evangelical theologians of Germany and of France hold that there are errors of fact and of opinion in the Bible, and are fond of saying that the Bible *contains* the Word of God. The more conservative members of the Broad Church in England, such as Arnold and Stanley, hold this view. They explain inspiration as an exaltation of the intuitional consciousness, and a spontaneous action of the reason in its greatest energy.

Third. We have the free naturalistic view. The radical members of the Broad Church of England, and the radical Unitarian leaders of this country, hold to this view. In their opinion, the Bible differs not at all in kind from other books. All good men are inspired. The difference between this last view and the preceding one appears often very slight. Matthew Arnold, who altogether rejects the supernatural, but yet ascribes to the Scriptures a unique character, is the best representative of this view.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHARACTER OF GOD.

SECTION FIRST.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

We have here to consider not the outward revelation of God, but our knowledge of Him—the essential elements which enter into all human apprehension of the Divine character. It is not merely our actual but our possible knowledge of Him under our present probational limitations which is to come under consideration. Whether we can know God at all, and in what way and how far we can know Him, will depend essentially on our conception of God. If we can conceive Him as a Being who is without relations, and in this sense as the Absolute, then we can know nothing whatever of his nature. But if we conceive Him as the Being who is the Absolute in the sense that He alone determines his own relations, then we may and do know Him. This knowledge comes to us along three different channels, though the waters are essentially the same.

First. We know God through our moral and rational intuitions. We have the intuitions of Force, of the Infinite, of the Right, of the Good, of the Beautiful, as well as others of a like kind. All these present different aspects of the one living presence whom we call God. These ideas may require some experience, and even a high degree of culture, before they arise in our consciousness; but as soon as they appear they are recognized not only as regulative in character, but also as absolutely true. But this knowledge is both abstract and indefinite in its character.

Second. We know God by analogy. He has revealed something of Himself in the forces of nature and of life, in the laws of the Cosmos. Man himself is a miniature copy of this Cosmos; that is, he is mind and matter is one living form, and is thus the image of God. Theologians have been accustomed to form their conceptions of God by eliminating from man all his imperfections, and by giving infinite efficacy and worth to all his perfections. This resemblance between man and God is a valid source of our

knowledge of Him. This dependence on analogy is not altered by the special revelation of God in Christ. For we have to judge of the divine sympathies by human affections. The new material given in the person and life of our Lord does not create superhuman forms of thought and expression. All our terms in regard to the divine character must still be analogical. Only in the sense and to the degree in which our souls are consubstantial with the divine nature—only in that sense and to that degree can these terms have an absolute validity.

Third. Our knowledge of God is experimental. We have a sense of the Divine. Our affections do not find rest in a complete manner except as they find it in union with him. Our deepest cravings and longings are satisfied only by such a fellowship with Him. Our very experience of evil as well as of good reveals God to our souls; see Ps. 139:8. The deeper our knowledge of self is, the deeper is this sense of the Divine: and thus a consciousness of self carries along with it a consciousness of God. In this sense faith precedes knowledge.

It is true that we do not know the Infinite as unrelated to the Finite, any more than we know the Finite cut off from its relation to the Infinite. Neither can be known apart from the other, for neither can exist without the other. In fact, we know the one by the other.

It is also true that knowledge is absolute only when the knower and the known are one and the same, which, in the strictest sense, is true of God only. Our knowledge is indeed relative, but it is, nevertheless, a positive knowledge, however partial and inadequate it may be. This knowledge might be measured by the fraction, in which man should be the numerator and God the denominator. That negative terms are often used to designate the nature of God does not at all show that the ideas which underlie these terms are also negative. [See "*Evidences of Christianity*," Introduction.]

It is objected that we can form no conception of God, and so can not in any sense know Him. We answer: The imagination can, indeed, form no image of Him, nor can the reason comprehend Him; yet the concept is not repugnant to our thinking. On the contrary, a belief in God is a necessity for a true human life, and so has its warrant in human nature.

It is to be noted that, when the author of Genesis declares that man was made in the image of God, he presupposes a knowledge of God, and would have us interpret the copy by our knowledge of the original.

SECTION SECOND.

THE NATURE OF GOD.

The nature of God is not the sum of his attributes but their synthesis—not their mere addition but their confluence and identity. We cannot reach the idea of the divine nature by simply adding the divine perfections together. The life of each is in the last analysis the same as the life of the other. They cannot be separated except in thought, and even then only in a superficial and inadequate manner. The essence of each is in the other, and each exalts and glorifies the other. They differ only in their directions and their ends. Thus the incomprehensibility of God is to be found not so much in the attributes of his character as in his very nature. We here note simply the leading marks of that nature.

A. Simplicity of Being. The nature of God is not made up of the union of diverse elements, but is the ultimate fountain-source of all the forces of the universe—ideal or real, material or spiritual. Thus his nature is both original and the origin of all cosmical forms and forces. His essence determines his existence. In Him the dualism of mind and matter disappear. The absolute and the relative are one and the same in the divine nature. All opposites, as of being and becoming, as of potency and activity, as of motion and rest, as of liberty and necessity are identical in Him. His being is eternal, his becoming timal; yet both enter in to his very nature.

B. Unity of Character. God is one in a sense in which he is not all; and all in a sense in which he is not one. He is one in that he separates himself from the universe; he is all in that he identifies himself with the universe. The very life of the universe exalts this unity. Thus the unity of God is simple and singular. The necessity of thought, the unity and universality of reason, the common centre of worship and the wonders of the cosmos,—all demand that there shall be one God and one God alone.

C. Fullness of Life. God is not merely absolute, else he would not be designated by the philosopher as Cause, nor by the apostle as Love. He would not be God if he did not create. It belongs to his very Essence not merely to live in eternity, but to live in time—to impart himself for ever and ever in and to and through his creatures. We are to conceive of Him not simply as having an infinite and eternal consciousness, but also as possessing an omniconsciousness as manifested in the all-life of the world; and also as having a human consciousness revealed in the race life, though centered in Christ alone. 21

This fullness of life is expressed in the Church dogma of the trinity. The extent and manifoldness of the universe—its heights in the spirit life—its telic character—its potential infinitude—all these are the witnesses of the pleroma of life in the Godhead. 204

SECTION THIRD.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

An attribute is God in relation. The fullness of the divine nature is in each and every one of them. The attributes have been thus classified: *First*. The absolute, the internal, the quiescent, the incommunicable, the natural. Those terms denote one and the same class. *Second*. The relative, the external, the communicable, the moral. These terms likewise denote one and the same class. This distinction, however, can not be fully maintained. Every essential attribute is in some degree both absolute and relative. The truth involved in this classification is that God is both immanent and transcendent. The immanence of God denotes his presence in nature. The transcendence of God denotes his presence in the supernatural, whether that is revealed or unrevealed. The one is the extra-mundane presence of God; the other is his intramundane presence. Now these two grand attributes of the Almighty interpenetrate each other in the life of the Universe. They might also be classified as the attributes of intelligence, of sensibility and of will. This division has the advantage over others that it lays as much emphasis on the divine affections and sympathies as it does on the divine thought and intention. But for the sake of unity it would seem best to treat all the attributes as

indicating the various relations which the one and the same God holds towards himself and towards the world of being and of thought.

First. Those which mark the relations of God to Himself.

A. His Self-existence. God alone exists by a necessity of his nature. It belongs to him to be. All other beings become what they are. His existence is the ground for the existence of the universe. Jehovah, in the account which he gives of himself to Moses, represents himself as the "I am."

B. His self-consciousness. God alone perfectly knows himself. Here self is the sole and full content of his eternal consciousness. His personality is absolute in its character. There is no latency whatever in Him. Though infinite, his knowledge of Himself is absolutely complete. This self-consciousness has three generic forms. God knows Himself in his infinitude, in his cosmical life and in humanity. Here we have the eternal consciousness of God, his world-consciousness and his Christ-consciousness. They stand to each other as concentric circles of which the outermost is the conscious infinitude of God.

C. His Self-determination. God alone absolutely determines Himself. For convenience we distinguish between the nature of God and his will, but in reality God is what he determines Himself to be. Thus in Him being and knowing, substance and thought, essence and action, the knower and the known, are one and the same. He can limit Himself in time and space in a formal manner, by creation, and in an essential manner, by the freedom of the creature. But this very limitation is the way along which God glorifies Himself in the life of the universe. God is free, though the freedom has in itself the principle of absolute certainty. His determinations are the ultimate ground for all the changes in the universe.

D. His Self-sufficiency. God alone has the reasons for his own acts in Himself. He is responsible only to Himself. He has all resources in Himself. He is thus adequate to his own ends, and sufficient for his own happiness. The universe, as separate from his thought and his will, adds nothing to the blessedness of his nature. It is only as the expression of that thought and will that it is a source of joy to the Creator.

· E. His Self-love. God loves Himself supremely. The perfections of his own nature are the objects of supreme attraction to Himself. There is in this love the union of freedom and necessity—a freedom without arbitrariness, and a necessity without constraint. The divine self-love is infinitely removed from selfishness. It is the motive for creation, as for redemption. It is the basis of the moral order of the universe. It is the attribute which gives unity to the divine consciousness. It is the holiness of God. Thus his self-assertion and his self-impartation are the opposite poles of his love.

Second. Those which mark the relations of God to time and space.

A. The eternity of God. He is exempted from all limitations and changes of time. His life has neither beginning nor end, and his infinite consciousness is without succession; I Tim. 6:16. All these statements, however, are negative. The positive conception of this attribute may be thus expressed: the eternity of God is the full possession at once of infinite life. It is that perfection which conditions time, and predetermines all the changes of time. Thus the eternity of God must be conceived in connection with his almighty power.

Eternity, as it excludes succession, is predicated of the absolute consciousness of God. But God enters into time and space by virtue of his eternity, and we have the cosmical consciousness of God. Here there is a succession—a succession commensurate with the changes of the universe; but gathered to a relative unity in the one divine thought and volition which the Cosmos, as a whole, embodies and expresses. Again, God re-enters into humanity, and centres Himself in Christ, and we have the human consciousness of God. Here, also, there is a succession, marked by the changes in the divinely human consciousness of Jesus. These three forms of the divine consciousness stand related to one another as concentric circles.

B. The Immensity of God. Here we have the like negative and positive affirmations. God, in his eternity, is above space, and independent of all its limitations. He fills but does not occupy space. As human thought in this world has position but not place. But he also conditions space, and determines all its contents. Time

and space are here treated as the synonyms of duration and extension.

C. The Infinitude of God. This attribute is applied, in a general way, to the two we have just noticed.

D. The Immutability of God. This is not insensibility, nor is it immobility. Perfect activity is perfect rest. It is the unhampered exertion of power—the full execution of one's purpose which gives repose. God makes room for his activity in ever leading the world on from its potential to its actual infinitude. And he finds the joy of this activity in the growing accomplishment of this grand purpose. As all the forces of his being are in full play, so he has both perfect activity and perfect rest. The unchangeableness of such a nature is seen in its truth. (See further on).

Third. Those which mark the relation of God to the Cosmos.

A. The Omnipresence of God. This is essentially the same as his immensity. The latter characterizes God's relation to space; the former his relation to the created universe. It is one and the same attribute, considered from different points of view.

God's being, his essential presence, can not be limited to any one place, since He is everywhere, for the same reason that he is anywhere. Self-existence necessitates his omnipresence. He cannot exist merely in all places, for then we should predicate extension of his nature, and fall into materialism. To avoid this difficulty, the Socinian Crell taught that the omnipresence of God was his power to act everywhere at once. Many orthodox theologians have accepted this definition. But this would seem to localize God. It is better to hold to the more Scriptural and churchly view, that God is essentially, as well as efficiently, present everywhere in the universe. Turretin has stated this attribute thus: *Deus ubique est totus; totus est in omnibus; totus extra omnia; nullo loco inclusus; nullo etiam exclusus*. God is present in the fullness of his power at one and the same moment throughout the universe. This omnipresence is also an omni-consciousness—a presence that knows and determines itself. It is the condition of every finite presence—its ultimate support and ground. This presence is both transcendent and immanent: for God is over all, as well as in all. This ascendancy flashes forth on the soul whenever the soul comes in close contact with God. This contact may be on the side of the

imagination, or the conscience, or the affections. It may appear also when God goes forth to meet or to find man in supernatural events or symbols.

The difference in the manifestation of this presence constitutes heaven or hell. For God is as essentially present in the one state as in the other.

B. The Omnipotence of God. This has been defined as the power to do all that is possible. But this definition seems to make God depend on something outside and above Himself. Abelard, and after him Schleiermacher, maintains that God could only effect the actual. This view might be accepted, if the actual were an equivalent for the sum of all the phenomena of the universe, as that universe is viewed in its infinite totality. But it is entirely untrue, if we isolate any section of this great, endless movement. The omnipotence of God is his power to do whatever He will. As God's will is expressive of his nature, so the only limit to the divine omnipotence is the divine nature. Without this limit, the attribute would be the greatest imperfection. Absolute liberty would become supreme license.

This attribute is perhaps the most wonderful of God's natural perfections. It is not the extent of creation, nor its manifold agencies, nor its various forms, nor the universality of its laws, which so overwhelms the mind, as the simple fact of absolute creative power. We can find only a weak representation of creative power in the human will, and mimic imitations of it in the human imagination. We must take care not to make God depend on anything outside of Himself. The first truths of all the sciences are only the fixed thoughts of God. The transcendental ideas of the Good, the True, the Right, find their home in the bosom of the divine reason. The universe itself is but the prolonged expression of his will.

C. The Omniscience of God. This is God's infinite intelligence. The Orientals term God *the Eye*, that is, pure vision--perfect intelligence. This attribute, as well as its two cognate attributes, omnipresence and omnipotence, are everywhere glorified in the Old Testament and in the New.

God knows all things in the light of his own nature. He knows the possible in knowing his own power, and the actual in knowing

his own purpose. He thus sees them in their ideal state, and in their inner ground and essence. Thus his knowledge excludes all doubt and uncertainty.

God knows all things from the eternity in which he lives, and thus sees them with one glance. His knowledge is not discursive; but intuitive—not gained by reasoning or reflection, nor by remembrance, nor by anticipation; but by direct vision, and by the immediate consciousness of his own eternal plans. In fact, God's infinite self-consciousness must involve absolute knowledge, for it must be total and simultaneous.

God, speaking from his cosmical consciousness, is said to remember the past and to foreknow the future. Behind these anthropomorphic and anthropopathic representations there lies the great truth that God has entered into time and space. His cosmical consciousness moves on with the events of time and space, and is thus relatively successive. But the absolute eternal consciousness of God is the ultimate fact in relation to the divine intelligence. By virtue of this omniscience, God does not gather knowledge by repeated observations, nor by successive intuitions. He sees all things instantly and at a glance.

He knows the free acts of the creature as free. To the creature they are contingent; to God they are certain. This certainty in the mind of God no more affects human freedom than our certain knowledge of the past affects the freedom of the agent.

Fourth. Those which mark the relations of God to his moral and rational creatures.

A. His Holiness. We have various definitions of this attribute. Mosheim defines it thus: It is the final determination in the will of God to act in conformity with his moral perfections. According to Quenstedt, it is that purity in God which requires purity in man. Buddeus gives the following definition: It is God's love for his own purity. Schleiermacher defines it thus: It is that in God which causes conscience in man. Hase states it thus: It is that attribute by which God is the chief good. Klein's definition is very much like it; namely, That attribute by which God is the fountain of the moral law. Kaoll defines it: The infinite love of the good and the right. The common definition in English writings is: This attribute is the sum of God's moral attributes. Most of

these definitions return upon themselves, and do not essentially advance our conception of the divine character. Holiness is God's self-love, as this appears in the assertion of Himself. This accords with Jonathan Edwards's view of holiness. Holiness thus sets up a goal for the creature to reach and a standard for him to follow. It reveals itself in the human conscience, and in the divine law. Holiness is thus authoritative in its character, and imperative in its nature; because it is God's self-assertion. The love of God has another side; namely, that of communication or impartation. Here love is attractive in its character, and sympathetic in its nature. These two aspects of love are complements of each other. God will assert Himself, because he will impart Himself; and he will impart Himself, because he will assert Himself. Love, in the union of both aspects, is the regulative element in the consciousness of God. If, however, the two aspects were to be separated, one would say that holiness is the dominant attribute in the character of God. The purity of God is a negative aspect of his holiness. It denotes not only his freedom from actual sin, but also his freedom from its possibility. Thus he differs from the creature, and we have an instance of an attribute which is both communicable and incommunicable.

Justice is holiness legislating for the world, and executing its own behests. Leibnitz termed it, Benevolence wisely administered. This is true, in that justice must be connected with love. It cannot be the contradiction of mercy. For there can be no contradictions in the divine consciousness. For justice requires that the recipient of favors should be fitted for their reception. It also not only demands that its own high ends should not be defeated by mercy, but should be furthered and made more illustrious. Justice must save mercy from indifference, and mercy must make justice more transcendent.

Its province is to maintain the worth and worthiness of God. It must secure the ends of good government, either by the execution of formal penalties, or by that which is an equivalent in the interests of the law-giver. It is to be noted, however, that in this equivalent there will be room for the exercise of mercy, without an infringement on the attribute of justice. It is also to be noted that the welfare of the universe must harmonize with, and, in fact, be expressive of, the glory of God.

We have the legislative justice of God in the laws established for human guidance. These are natural in so far as they make up the constitution and course of nature, and are gathered from nature by human experience. They are termed positive in so far as they do not naturally suggest themselves to the human reason, but are given in revelation. Distributive justice is justice meted out to individuals. Retributive justice is seen in the rewards and punishments affixed respectively to obedience and disobedience.

B. His Love. We refer here to God's love of the creature. It is the impartation of Himself in and to that creature. This impartation is, of course, limited according to God's plan and method in creation. Without regard to these points, infinite love would become infinite weakness and fickleness. It is commonly termed, that inclination which leads God to bestow on his creatures all the good of which they are capable. But this very susceptibility itself is one of the highest instances of God's love. It is not merely a desire on the part of God for the creature—for his service and for his worship; but a desire that the creature may enjoy the blessedness of communion with his Creator.

God's goodness is the generic term for this attribute. By virtue of the divine goodness life is, in the case of the innocent, always a blessing—always better than non-existence. Grace is God's love directed toward the ill-deserving. Mercy is that love bestowed on the guilty. Pity is that love exercised on the wretched and miserable. Patience is that love manifested in the case of aggravated and long-continued transgression. Benevolence is used as a synonym of goodness, except where it is opposed to beneficence, to distinguish the divine inclination from the divine act. The Schoolmen originated a favorite distinction between the love of complacency and the love of benevolence; but all love is both complacent and benevolent. The real difference is in the object loved, or in some distinctive aspect of that object. God takes delight in his creatures *as such*, and is always benevolent toward them *as such*. Thus Christ affirms that "God so loved the world," that is, the world of sinners. But he takes a richer pleasure in those that bear his moral image. For though the moral image may be lost, the natural one never can be obliterated.

C. His Wisdom. This attribute is made up of omniscience and

love. It proposes the highest ends, and devises the best means to secure those ends. We have throughout the material universe numerous illustrations of this attribute. But the presence of evil in this world has occasioned new and special revelations of this attribute. Its highest exhibitions are presented in the economy of redemption.

D. His Truth. The truth of God is the conformity of his life to his nature—of his actions to his attributes—of his creations to his volitions—of his deeds to his purposes—of his punishments and rewards to his threatenings and his promises—of the realities of the present and the future to his declarations and predictions.

Veracity is the disposition to indicate by signs the will and purposes of God; while faithfulness is God's disposition to meet and fulfill all his engagements. Whenever God's threatenings do not seem to be fulfilled, the seeming failure is to be explained on the principle laid down in Jer. 18:7, 8—a principle illustrated in the non-fulfillment of the promise made to Jonah; namely, that Nineveh should be destroyed—the principle that a condition is implied, though not expressed. The truth of God is the ground of his immutability. God Himself is changeless because his nature is fixed.

The creature changes, and this leads to a change of procedure on his part. These changes in his dealings with his creatures are governed by the immediate character of his perfections. Thus immutability is not immobility.

The uniformity of the laws of nature rests on the immutability of God. This uniformity holds within the sphere of the natural. There is a like uniformity in the supernatural, in the fact that God does not interfere at random, but according to the fixed principles of his own moral and rational nature. Thus again we reach the attribute of truth in God.

Impartiality also rests in this attribute. God deals with all his creatures according to the common principles of mercy and of justice. This perfection allows God to create different classes and orders of intelligence, and to assign to them different spheres of life and action. No creature can make any claim on God for any endowment or any gift or any position in the universe, or, in fact, for existence itself. It is true that God is pledged to Himself that

in every case existence shall be better than non-existence, provided the creature has not forfeited the love and favor of his Maker. God will also secure to every creature the just results of his own deeds. Impartiality requires that when he makes a distinction between one order of his creatures and another, or between creatures of the same order, He shall do so for the wisest and best reasons. These reasons can be fully known only to Himself.

E. His Sovereignty. This is God's right to reign over his creatures. It is based on his perfections, and on his relation as the Absolute Creator. The right is thus founded both on capacity and on position. The second of these rests, in fact, on the first. God has a perfect right to dispose of us and of all we are and have according to his will; see Rom. 9.

But no idea of arbitrariness or willfulness must be associated with this attribute. The sovereignty of God is the sovereignty of infinite wisdom and infinite love, as well as of infinite power. His sovereignty is limited alone by his nature, and so by obligations self-imposed—obligations expressed in the tacit covenant of creation, and revealed in the promises of his Word.

F. His Blessedness. God is blessed in Himself. The universe cut off from God does not and cannot add to his happiness.

God's delight in his works is a delight in them because they are his works and reflect his attributes. The joy of the creature is a part of the divine joy.

A part of the misery of the creature comes from his finiteness, and a part from his sinfulness, and a part from the interaction of these two elements. God is affected by none of these sources of misery. Again, God is not disturbed by the presence of evil; for he knows that evil is under his own control, and is to be completely mastered by him. He knows also that he can make it the occasion of introducing a higher good into the universe. Thus as he sees all things from their beginning to their end, his own mind and heart remain undisturbed by the wickedness of men.

It is true that the cosmical consciousness, and still more the human consciousness of God is subject to changes. God's heart is touched with pity or moved with grief at the conduct of his creatures. But all these sufferings are only relative. They are the occasions or the accompaniments of a richer and deeper joy in the

divine mind. For the path of suffering on the part of the good, in the case of man or in the case of God, is an advance from the state of transient humiliation to a state of more complete and full glorification. As Christ prayed at the close of his life; "Glorify Thou me," that is, anew and afresh, "with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was."

G. His Glory. This is sometimes used as a synonym for the honor of God. But the glory of God generally expresses the unity of all God's attributes, as they are revealed in creation and redemption.

The number of attributes might be indefinitely enlarged, as we discern new relations in which God stands to his creatures. For example, God is a God of taste; that is he delights in beauty for its own sake, irrespective of utility; and so on.

SECTION FOURTH.

THE TRINITY.

The Trinity denotes the tri personality of God. It thus indicates the triune character of his absolute consciousness. God thus exists as one in three and three in one. He is one in the sense in which He is not three, and three in the sense in which He is not one. The oneness pertains to his nature, and the threeness to his personality. This triunity is another name for the living God.

A distinction is to be drawn between the Trinity of essence, or the Ontological Trinity, and the Trinity of revelation, or the Economical Trinity. The first pertains to the being of God; the second to his manifestation in creation and redemption. //

A. Proof from the Scriptures. The Old Testament could not well bring out in distinctness the triune character of God, for Christ has not personally and visibly appeared. But the common name for God denotes a fullness of being and life. Besides, a creative and life-giving power was ascribed to the Spirit, and Wisdom was spoken of by Solomon very much as the Logos was spoken of by John. Here we have gleams and intimations of the doctrine which could only be fully disclosed by the coming of the Son of God. //

The more common reference of the New Testament is to the Trinity of revelation. But here the Trinity of being is pre-suppos-

ed. The confessional formula of baptism, given as it is in the great commission, and embodying as it does a summary of the Christian faith, has decisive weight as a proof-text of this doctrine. The doxologies of the Epistles, whether partial or complete, imply essential distinctions. It seems to be taught more or less distinctly in I Cor. 2:10-12; I Pet. 1:2. All those passages, too, which prove the divinity of the Son and the personality of the Spirit—and they are very numerous—also prove an essential, as well as an economical, Trinity. See under *Soteriology*.

B. Proof from Christian Consciousness. The church in all ages, with exceptions insignificant both in numbers and in religious life, has accepted the doctrine of the Trinity.

The Christian, to whatever age or nation or branch of the church he may belong, has ever found rest in God as his Creator, his Redeemer, and his Sanctifier. In his creaturehood he apprehends God as Father; in his guilt he accepts Him as Son; in his depravity he appropriates Him as Spirit. The fact of the Incarnation, and the statement that the Son was sent by the Father, and that the Spirit came from the Father by the Son, have led the heart and the mind of the Christian to feel that these distinctions were not mere manifestations of one God, depending on exigencies in his government; but were rooted in the divine nature itself. Notwithstanding the inherent difficulty in the conception of this doctrine, and notwithstanding its exposure to the shafts of ridicule and the attacks of formal logic, yet the church of all ages has not only clung to it, but steadily rejected every form of the Sabellian heresy.

C. Philosophical Construction. It has often been objected that all attempts to even state this mystery are idle and misleading. But this mystery, like every other, does touch some side of human thought; and so is capable of a statement which will not only bring out that side, but also escape a contradiction in terms.

The problem is to realize, if possible, that the absolute self-consciousness and self-determination of God is tri-personal in its character. We must do so by an analogy. Now in our personal life there are always and from necessity these three elements; Subject, Object, and resulting Unity of both. If the soul is made in the image of God, it must be like its great Original in this, as in the other essential facts of its nature. But there is also a differ-

ance, as well as a resemblance, between the human consciousness and the divine consciousness. The soul grows by degrees to consciousness: it is never complete, for it never perfectly knows itself; and the contents of that consciousness are not generated by itself; but are the results of the interaction of the soul with the outward world. But in all these respects God is totally unlike his creatures. He knows Himself at once, for He is not the subject of growth: He knows Himself absolutely, for there can be no latency in his nature: He knows only Himself, for his nature makes up the essential contents of his absolute consciousness. But see *Omniscience of God*. Thus while the soul needs an object outside of itself, in order that it may come to life and live; God has need of no such object, for he has "life in Himself." Thus, then, God must be threefold in his nature; Subject, Object, and their Identity. The Father knows Himself in the Son, and realizes Himself in the Spirit. This is the eternal, finished, but abiding process in the absolute life of God. God in eternity comes to the consciousness of Himself through the Son in the Spirit. The absolute personality of God reveals itself in these three essential forms. These forms are, again, so many centers of activity. It may be that this conceptual structure will be more clearly seen without the intervention of analogies. We may affirm the following: God is absolute thinking--absolute thought--absolute thinking knowing its thought. Each involves the other and each is essential to the idea of a living God, and these three moments complete the eternal consciousness of the Godhead.

The order of subsistence in the Godhead determines the order of activity in creation and redemption. For these centers of self-determination hold a relation to one another in the Godhead itself. The Father is the center of centers. He is thus the First Person in the Trinity. The Son not only moves from his own center, but from the center of the Spirit, and is thus the Second Person in the Trinity. The Spirit moves alone from its own centre, and thus is Third Person in the Trinity, and so completes the absolute self-determination. The Son is the object of the Father's thought. He is thus called the Logos--the full expression of the divine mind. The Logos, as the silent thought of God before creation, naturally becomes his spoken Word in creation and redemption. Paul

declares that *in Him* (*ἐν αὐτῷ*) all things were created. Winer, Ellicott, and Alford insist on this translation. Thus were pre-contained in Him, in an ideal, if not potential form—if any such distinction can ever be drawn—all forces of the universe. Thus we see why the Son is the Mediator in creation and in redemption, and so why He alone could be incarnated. Again, as God realizes Himself in the Spirit, so He realizes his thought and will through the Spirit in creation and redemption.

The sphere in which the Father moves is that of sovereignty and authority. The sphere in which the Son moves is that of mediation and sympathy. The sphere in which the Spirit moves is that of life, both physical and spiritual. The Father, being the First Person, may also have all the predicates which properly belong to the Second and Third Persons. The Son, being the Second Person, may also have all the predicates which properly belong to the Third Person. The Spirit, being the Third Person, can have only the predicates which properly belong to Himself. There is, then, a subordination in the order of subsistence: but not in priority of being, or worth of character. For this order is a necessary and eternal one.

Abstract unity is cold and dead. It can have no freedom, and so no personal life. It inevitably leads to Pantheism; or, in superficial thought, encloses itself in Deism. It is only the one living God—who has life in Himself, and so is tri-personal—that can save us from both of these extremes, and so can be worshiped and served by his creatures.

We may here remark that the term Person is used throughout this discussion in an analogical way. We mean that the Father is that in God which meets and satisfies the personal necessities of our nature, and the same may be affirmed of both the Son and the Spirit. We also mean that no one of these exists and acts without the other. They are not three numerical individualities in the Godhead; but only three relative Persons, making up the absolute Personality of the Almighty.

D. Statements and Illustrations. In Oriental philosophy we have Brabma, Vishnu, and Sebra, as the one revealed God. Here are represented the creative, the preservative, and the destructive agencies of God. The process indicated is physical, rather than

spiritual, and is strongly Sabellian in its character. Augustine states the Trinity thus: *Memoria, Intelligentia, Voluntas*, as making up one living being. Gregory of Nyssa expresses his view thus: The soul, the reason, and the vital power; or, as we should say, the reason, the understanding, and the principle of animal life, form the one living man. Auselm says: God's thought is Himself, which again is the Son: while the thinking mind and the thought are united to form the Spirit. Thomas Aquinas declares that God recognized Himself in the Son and willed Himself in the Spirit. We have a striking representation of the Trinity by Hugo St. Victor. According to him there was the Law Period—the day of fear—in which the Father revealed Himself; again, there was the Grace Period—the day of truth—when the Son visibly revealed Himself; still again, there was the Spiritual Period—the day of love—when the Spirit revealed Himself. Melancthon states his view thus: The Father generates by thought the Son, the perfect image of Himself, and their mutual love breathes forth the co-eternal Spirit. The poet Lessing expresses his idea of the Trinity in a striking manner: God thought Himself from eternity, that is, created a Being who is wanting in no perfection which He Himself possessed. This Being the Scriptures term the Son of God; the preferable term is Son-God—God, since none of the divine attributes are wanting—Son, since that which is represented (the Father) is prior to that which represents (the Son.) He is the image of God. The harmony existing between these two is the Spirit. Now this harmony could not be God if the Father were not God and if the Son were not God; both (Father and Son) could not be God if this harmony (the Spirit) were not God. Hollaz states the doctrine thus: *Trinum est quod in essentia unum, tres habet subsistendi modos*. Turretin gives the following definition: *Essentia est unica; personae tres. Illa absoluta; istae relativae. Illa incommunicabilis; istae communicabiles. De natura distinctionis istius non consentiunt inter se theologi. Alii reale statuunt, alii formale; alii virtuale; alii personale; alii denique modale. Persona differe dicitur ab essentia non realiter, id est, essentialiter, ut res a re; sed modaliter, ut modus a re*. Shelling's postulate for the Trinity was, identity in tri-plexity. Coleridge gives the following: Thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Whately declares that the Trinity is a threefold manifes-

tation of one God. N. W. Taylor affirms that God is a Being of one substance, with a threefold divine nature; by which he is qualified for the distinct personal forms of phenomenal action. The Trinity, according to Haven, is a threefold distinction, out of which arises a threefold manifestation of one God.

The most common illustrations are the following: the figure of a triangle, with its three equal sides, and yet one figure; a cube, with trinal extension, and yet one solid; the atom of force with its attraction, its repulsion and their equilibrium; the sun, with its rays of light and heat and chemical action, yet forming one luminary; the hidden spring, the visible fountain, and the flowing current, all making up the same stream; the root, the stem, the flower, all forming one plant; the body, soul, and spirit in one living being, and illustrating the power, intelligence, and love in one infinite person; the seal, made up of the material, the form, and the impression; the syllogism, with the premise, middle term, and conclusion, and yet one conscious process. This last illustration seems to have been originated by Abelard. The simple affirmation involves subject, object and their relation. How defective these illustrations are, is apparent on the surface.

SECTION FIFTH.

THE WILL OF GOD.

The will of God is his absolute self-determination. It is the First Cause consciously determining Itself as the Final Cause. It is the complete expression of his essential nature. Thus God, as absolute will, determines his own thought and his own action—realizes his own idea and moves toward his own goal. He disposes of Himself.

This view of the divine will accords with the definitions given by eminent theologians. Thus Gerhard defines the will: *Voluntas est ipsa Dei essentia, seu Deus volens*. Hase states it thus: *Divina voluntas qua Deus ipsius rerumque universitatis suprema existit causa*.

The will of God is free. Freedom is the power to move from his own center toward his own rational goal, according to the law of his own nature. But as God alone is the supreme law to Him-

self, so again this freedom is absolute in its character. It excludes all arbitrariness and all chance: for, as God is love, so He always chooses the supreme good as the final goal of his agency. This certainty may be termed a moral necessity. For in the highest forms of life, whether human or divine, liberty and necessity are one and the same attribute. The one indicates the freedom of the choice made, and the other the certainty of that choice. The will of God is a free, loving will, and so must, as we have said, ever freely choose the good and the right.

The divine will is in itself undivided and indivisible; for the three relative Persons are inseparable in the unity of one absolute Personality. This will is the one supreme resultant demand of all the essential attributes of God. As the will of God is one, so, absolutely considered, its object is one; namely, the ideal and potential Cosmos in its totality and unity—the one grand scheme of the universe as realized in the divine thought. The actual universe is only potentially infinite, and so can never exhaustively express the divine will. In fact, that will does not exhaust its energies at any step in the onward progress of nature and of life. But the Cosmos, in its onward growing unity and totality, is ever expressing more and more both the divine thought and the divine will. In viewing this universe in its totality, all secondary agencies and forces are lost sight of, and the Cosmos is considered as the effect of the efficient agency of God.

* All persons, all objects, and all events, viewed as parts of the great whole—considered purely in their relation to the entire system of the universe, are in a secondary sense the objects of the divine determination. Every event is an object of divine decree in just so far as it is the direct effect of the divine efficiency. Thus this appears in every new creation or new movement, whether it be physical or spiritual in character. The number of secondary agencies introduced, or the character of the secondary agencies, as in the case of free volition, separates the divine efficiency from the act. Thus neither a holy act, nor a sinful act, nor any event which comes from physical law, can be termed, in the strictest sense, a decree of God. It must, however, remain true that God is indirectly, by virtue of his connection with the universe, connected with every event in that universe. It leads to a confusion of thought

to affirm that God decrees whatever comes to pass. He determines his own agency, and decrees whatever is the effect of that agency alone. Thus the will of God, and so his decree, enters into any event just so far as the divine efficiency enters into it. An event is decreed in just so far as that agency is the immediate and sole cause of that event. In just so far as the event is separated from the divine causality, so far it is not decreed. Thus there is an absolute moral separation between the guilt of sin and God's efficiency. So that, in no proper sense of the word, can God be termed the author of sin as guilt. The great mystery, however, still remains, how to reconcile the freedom of the creation with the sovereignty of the Creator. But see under *Freedom of the Will*, and also under *Election*.

The order in which events are connected must determine the order of divine decrees. The principle that what is last in execution must be first in thought, is true where the divine agency alone is concerned; but is inapplicable where any other free and independent agency is involved. The Supralapsarians were right in the principle; but wrong in the application they made of it. Where events occur dependent on the free choice of the creature, there the determinations of God correspond in their order to the order of the events themselves. The great truth remains, however, that all related decrees run back into an absolute one.

Various terms have grown up in the discussions on the divine will. We need notice but a few of them. The Decretive Will, that is, the will of God in the strictest sense of the word, accords with the view we have just considered. The Permissive Will has reference to the existence of moral and physical evil. God has suffered evil to enter the world. He has interposed, not for the purpose of excluding it; but in order to overrule it, and make it the occasion of greater good than either its non-existence or its forcible prevention could have brought about. Thus this permissive or suffering will of God resolves itself into his Decretive Will. The phrase has a popular, rather than a scientific value. The Preceptive Will relates to God's commandments and promises and threatenings. These wills do not conflict; for they have different objects. The first relates to the determination of his own agency; the second to his determination to suffer his creatures to act freely,

though wickedly; the third to his moral attitude toward his rational creatures. The Decretive Will refers to the duty He owes to Himself; his Permissive Will to the responsibilities which He has assumed on account of the introduction of sin into the universe; while his Preceptive Will has to do with his relation to the moral and rational universe. But the Decretive Will lies at the basis of both the Permissive and Preceptive Wills. The first and the second make up the rule for divine action alone; while the third is the only rule for human conduct.

The Arminians avail themselves of the Patristic and Scholastic distinction between the *Voluntas Antecedens*, that is, the action of God's will preceding the act of the creature, and the *Voluntas Consequens*, the act of God's will following the act of the creature, and determining its results. Thus God, by the first, willed the happiness of Adam, and by the second He decreed his punishment. There is no objection to this distinction, provided these relative purposes of God are not exalted into absolute ones.

The term conditional has also been applied to those purposes which have reference to the conduct of free beings. This, however, is a very superficial view of the nature of a divine decree; since even in its relative character it includes all the means and all the ends—all the conditions and all the consequences of the event so decreed. For example, God commanded Abraham to offer up his son, and when He had sufficiently tested the obedient spirit of the patriarch, He withdrew the commandment.

There is no such thing as the liberty of indifference. Christ Himself ignored this chimera of human thought; for he declares, "He that is not with me is against me." And again, it is said in the Apocalypse, "Because thou art neither cold nor hot, I will spew thee out of my mouth." Thus there is freedom, but not license, in the will of God; and so there is no room for the doctrine of chance.

Nor is there any room for Fatalism. For that excludes free self-determination. According to this theory everything moves on blindly toward its goal. Besides, fate has regard only to destiny, whether that destiny be right or wrong, good or evil. The divine purpose, however, looks to the highest good of the universe. The destiny of the individual is determined by the great principle of

rectitude. They agree only in one thing, namely, the certainty of the issue. But they differ both as to the character of the issue, and as to the mode by which the issue may be gained. The one holds to the law of spiritual freedom, and the other to the law of blind, unreasoning necessity.

SECTION SIXTH.

CREATION.

We are here to view creation both as an act and as a work of God.

God is absolute in the sense that He can determine his own relations. He is not without relations,—only these relations are the result of his own self-activity. Thus there is an absoluteness and a relativity in God. By the former He is complete in Himself; and by the latter He communicates his fullness in and to the creature. He is thus Master of Himself, and creation is possible. The world adds nothing and can add nothing to Him as an independent self-subsistence, because it does not itself exist as such. All its worth and significance is found in the fact that it is but the reflection of God Himself.

While Creation and Preservation involve efficient causation, conceived as completed or as continuous, Providence and Government look to the Final Cause as the reason for their existence. Thus Creation includes and necessitates Preservation; and both of these point to Providence; and all three culminate in the Moral Government of God. The Efficient Cause becomes what it really is, the Final Cause.

Creation, as the work of God, is expressed in the New Testament by two terms, *Cosmos* and *Æones* (ages). The first denotes the world of order and beauty, thus pointing to an intelligent author as its source. The second denotes the same world as measured in time and space, and points to God as its goal. The first embodies the Greek thought; the second the Hebrew thought. The one, however, does not exclude the other.

The idea of the creative act is, in a peculiar sense, Christian. The Bible opens with this grand conception. The prophets celebrate God's creative power in their hymns, and the apostles in their

doxologies. The idea, in its strictness, was foreign to heathendom. Pantheism and Dualism have always held sway over the heathen mind. Simple emanation, or evolution from mind, has made this Pantheism idealistic; while the reverse process has made it materialistic. Dualism has accepted the antagonism of mind and matter—an antagonism made the more severe by the theory of ultimate atoms in nature, and also by the view that matter was inherently evil. The course of modern thought in its Anti-Christian tendencies, has reproduced the same general phases of speculation in the Deism of the seventeenth century, and in the extreme Development Theories of the nineteenth. The first is dualistic in its nature; the second, pantheistic.

Creation, in its possibility, is grounded in the nature of God. The Cosmos, as an effect, is pre-contained, though in a transcendental form, in its Supreme Cause. This is implied in John 1:1, and in the use of the preposition "out of" (ἐξ οὗ) in I Cor. 8:6 and Rom. 11:36. Paul endorses the sentiment that "in God we live and move and have our being." The Cosmos exists ideally and potentially in the divine reason. Thus the absolute reality of the universe is not in itself, but in the thought and will of God. Its certainty is in the fact that "God is Love." It belongs to his very nature to impart Himself in and to the creature. Creation, as his real work, is the simple result of his free volition. But creation can not be viewed as an accident or arbitrary product of the divine will; nor can it be considered as a blind emanation from the divine nature. God creates it from Himself; but does so from the free loving act of his own will. We may conceive of creation as a whole, timeless in its beginning and in its end,—then the act of God must be viewed as one complete and finished act. But even here it is complete only in the divine thought and intention. Again, we may conceive of creation as it appears in time and space, going on forever to its goal; and then the creative act must be viewed as unfinished and continuous. When we consider special cycles of creation—as that noticed in Genesis, where the earth is the moral center of the universe as known to Moses—then the creative act of God may be considered as finished, with reference to the group of worlds brought in view.

The expression, "God created the world out of nothing," was

derived from II Macc. 7:28. The Vulgate translation has in this connection the phrase, *ex nihilo*. The idea has support in Rom. 4:17. The expression, however, is faulty, if nothing is considered as the material out of which the world was formed. But the phrase gives us these two important thoughts: *First*. This universe itself has no absolute reality, and no independent existence whatever. *Second*. This universe is, on the other hand, absolutely dependent both for its origin and for its continuance, on the presence of Almighty God.

As creation, on the one hand, and time and space, on the other, mutually imply each other, so we may say that creation originated in no point of time and in no region of space. As Augustine says, it commenced not in, but with time. See *De Civitate*, B. 12; chap. 15. It is to us timeless, since time does not date its origin; but rather its origin dates time. Creation is not, however, eternal; for the Creator must logically precede creation. On the other hand, God was always a Creator. He had no periods or epochs of mere self-reflection or idleness. As soon as we think of God's activity before creation, we think of it as internal—in the nature of the Godhead Itself—and also eternal, and thus an activity existing as well after as before creation. Here the terms after and before, as indicating points of time, lose all their meaning.

The created world can never come to an end. The reason or ground for God's creating at all is found in his nature, and so is a permanent one. The annihilation of the universe would be a miracle equal to the miracle of creation, in its awful grandeur; but would be not only without any moral purpose whatever, but in direct conflict with the essential nature of God as love. To think of annihilation as the penalty for universal and fatal depravity, would be to affirm that the Sovereign of this universe had made a complete failure in his government. But though this creation will never come to an end, it is not actually infinite, but only potentially so.

The end of God in creation is the full revelation of his own infinite perfections. Thus it is his own glory. This view does not exclude the idea that God's aim in creation is the happiness of his creatures. For the highest happiness of the creature is dependent on the conformity of his nature with God. God's glory issues in

the happiness of the creature, and the happiness of the creature makes up the crown of God's glory.

The world is thus the best world possible, when viewed in reference to its grand finalities. Its limitless extent, its endless development, and the compass of its life from the lowest forms to its supreme creaturely glory in the humanity of Christ—all point not alone to the mastery of evil, but to the subordination of this evil to the highest conceivable good. It is only partial and superficial views of the Cosmos which would lead us to any other conclusion. We can no more doubt the perfection of God's work than we can doubt the perfection of his character. Creation, as an act of God, has been divided into Primary or Immediate and Secondary or Mediate. The first is creation in the strict sense of the term; the second is what is called conservation or preservation. Again it has been divided into Primitive and Definitive creation, that is, creation, at its origin and at its close.

It has been objected that creation is impossible, since no new force can be added to the universe. There is a sense in which this is true; for God is in the universe, constituting its ultimate reality, and He is the source of all force. The universe is nothing apart from Him. In creation no absolute new force was generated; for the essence of all force is the volition of Almighty God.

SECTION SEVENTH.

PRESERVATION.

Preservation is the creative power working in and through created forces. It is thus virtually continuous creation. As Christ said, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." In creation the creative power endows matter and mind with all their properties; and in preservation the same power continues them in existence and in operation. All the evolutions and the interactions of forces, and all the resulting network of agencies, are but the development of the attributes and qualities with which creation was first endowed—but qualities and attributes which find their support and their very life in the continuance of the creative efficiency of God Himself.

Thus preservation is but the immanence of God in nature. The

creative act is the transcendental act of God. This transcendence, however, is ever passing over into the immanence; the immanence is ever resting on the transcendence; and thus the two blend together in one divine efficiency. Thus preservation allows of the occurrence of miracles all along the crises in the history of the world. In fact, the supernatural is, in this view, the key-note of the universe.

The problem to be solved is the following: the Finite and the Infinite being given in creation or in nature, to find their relations. In other words, how is God related to the constitution and the course of nature? There are several theories:

A. The Theory of Mechanism. God is separated from the world. He has created matter and mind, and formed the universe as a great machine; and then left it. This view was held by the Deists. Their idea seems to have been, that where there is law there is no God, and no need of a God; and that nature everywhere and uniformly is under the iron necessity of law. Now both of these views are false. Law is the sign of a greater presence than itself, without which it finds no adequate explanation. The indirect testimony of science shows that there have been interventions in nature; and the direct testimony of competent witnesses shows that there have been interventions in human history.

The theory can satisfy neither our reason nor our faith. It is as shallow as it is irreligious. "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God"; that is, no God of Providence. A God excluded from the universe, even though self-excluded, is no God at all—at least not for man, whose highest instinct is that of worship, and whose greatest need is that of pardon and of fellowship. Besides, it is a crude idea that active powers were at the beginning impressed on matter. For these forces do form an essential part of matter itself, and may possibly constitute the whole of matter.

Again, it is a tremendous assumption that the universe could be wound up as a clock, so that it could go on forever. One might well ask, could it run at all? And if at all, are we sure that it could go on forever? Must not the creative energy be everywhere present, not as an accompaniment, but as the ultimate support and life of nature herself? The one fatal objection to the Deistic view is this: forces that are absolutely dependent for their origin, are

equally dependent for their continuance. Self-continuance can not be imparted to the creature; for it implies self-existence.

If the Deistic conception is true, all that is left us is to reverently worship and follow nature. The men of genius are the men to be put in our calendar of saints. Heathenism only needs to be reformed and re-adjusted to the culture of the present century. How sadly inadequate such a deification of the forces of nature would be, is evident on the bare statement of this alternative.

B. The Theory of Occasionalism. God is the only cause at work in nature or in life. The so-called second causes are only occasions on which God acts. He alone produces the effects. Sir Isaac Newton says, "The laws of nature are only the established modes of the divine operation. * * * God is the only efficient agent in the universe." Here, perhaps, the philosopher over-states one aspect of his view. Geulinx, a Dutch philosopher of the seventeenth century, and Malebranche after him, held to this view.

But is not the theory one-sided? Are we not obliged to give a relative validity and worth to the forces of nature and of life? The Scriptures do indeed give prominence to the divine efficiency; but they do not exclude secondary causes: see Gen. 1 and 2. Besides, the soul is addressed as a free cause, with power to determine its own destiny. The view, carried out, would end in Pantheism. The sum of the teachings of the Bible on this point, is the following: The First Cause is absolute for its absolute ends; the secondary causes are relative for their relative ends.

C. The Theory of Concurrence. God is the only absolute cause, the only primary efficient agent. There are also dependent efficient causes. These causes, the one original and independent, the others derived and dependent, so interpenetrate each other that we are able to ascribe any course of events either to the First Cause or to the secondary causes. There must, then, in this sense, be a concurrent causation. Quenstedt has expressed it thus: *Eidem effectus nec a Deo solo, nec a sola creatura, nec partim a Deo partim a creatura; sed una eademque efficientia totali simul a Deo et a natura.* While we hold thus to the co-working of these two agencies, we are to keep in mind the distinction already indicated; namely, that these are not co-equal factors, nor of the same

kind. The one is absolute and original; the other is relative and dependent. The absolute cause is conscious force—will, and so differs in kind from the relative causes, which are unconscious forces. The one is cause alone, and never an effect; the other is always an effect as well as a cause—a cause in effecting a change, and an effect in suffering a change. The first so interpenetrates the second as to give it absolute support, and yet secure its relative efficiency. We have an illustration of such a concurrence of unequal forces in the life of this planet. The sun is the ultimate source of all heat in the earth, and yet there are numerous secondary causes coming to our notice every day.

But does not this view, after all, absorb the Finite into the Infinite. We answer; it does not, as here stated. But we have only a statement of the mystery—though a statement warranted both by Scripture and by human experience. The mystery, however, remains. In the nature of things it can not be solved. For it involves the co-existence of the Infinite with the Finite. The difficulty, however, is not peculiar to Christianity. It emerges everywhere in philosophy, in the East and in the West, among Mohammedans as well as among Christians. It obtrudes itself into the experience of every calm and earnest thinker. Now, to deny either of the great broad and necessary facts which are witnessed to by all men because we can not reconcile them, is unphilosophical in the extreme. The denial assumes that the measure of finite thought is the measure of all truth. Besides, we experience, every day, a sense of the distinction between the knowledge of the existence of a fact and the incomprehensibility of its mode.

We have left out of account here the relation of the divine efficiency to the human will. The will of man is not a supernatural force, though it has a supernatural element; for when it appears in the universe as a force it appears in connection with physical energies, and so is subject to physical laws. All this is apparent both in the organism and in nature. See under *Freedom of the Will* and under *Election*. We have also left out of account God's relation to physical and moral evil. See the section on that subject.

SECTION EIGHTH.

PROVIDENCE.

Providence is creation and preservation realizing their ends. It is the reign of God in the life of the universe. As known to us, it is God's presence in human history, as that history includes its geological preludes and its supernatural issues. It is the course of that moral world of which man is the center, as that world is mapped out according to the divine idea, the divine plan, and the divine goal. That idea is the growing revelation of God in the development of the earth and in the destiny of man. That plan is the subordination of the natural to the spiritual, and the utilization of its forces in the service of moral and rational beings. That goal is the spiritual world whose life and glory is in Christ, who thereby becomes the new center of the moral universe. Providence has the following aspects:

A. It is universal. This is admitted by all who believe in providence under any aspect whatever. Its denial is the only sense in which Atheism seems possible.

The Cosmos is one. This vast, infinite system has an actual unity. This unity is secured by the unchanging and all-comprehending will of God. Such is the result to which all the sciences are clearly pointing. This supreme will manifests itself in the uniform operation and interaction of forces which we term the laws of nature. It also flashes forth in its own immediate and direct efficiency, and these flashings forth are also regulated by fixed principles of the divine mind. The supernatural is the beginning and the close of all the natural movements in the universe. It originates and finishes the epochs which make up the life of the universe. Thus the natural and the supernatural make up the one infinite plan of the Almighty.

The great fact that the universe is governed by law which always allows of and necessitates the interventions of the Law-giver, is balanced and complemented by another great fact, that this universe has a history—that it is made up of a series of systems; namely, the mineral kingdom, the plant kingdom, the animal kingdom, and the crown and glory of all, the kingdom of man. Thus the world has a meaning and a purpose. It is telic in character.

Thus there are final as well as efficient causes—thus, in brief, there is a Providence. Fate and chance are both fatal to a divine presence ruling in human affairs. For the first denies final cause, and the second ignores the very idea of cause both efficient and final.

The wisdom of a providential government by law—by law which allows of interventions only on worthy occasions—is apparent. Without it, science would be impossible; for knowledge would be confined to isolated concrete objects, and could not be formulated or systematized. Every moment of consciousness would stand by itself and for itself alone; all continuity of thought would cease, and anarchy would reign in the soul as in nature and in life. The ground and stimulus of hope and the fruits of experience would be impossible, and the growth of the individual and the culture of the community would be utterly and forever precluded. This universal Providence will vindicate itself, though many a noble nature goes to an early grave and many a noble enterprise totally fails of its conscious end. The grand educative and disciplinary effects which these lessons teach, more than make up for the passing evils which attend this uniformity in the laws of nature. They stimulate forethought, and they rebuke presumption. They awaken the sense of common helplessness, and strengthen the bonds of a common sympathy, and, at the same time awaken and bring out whatever is saintly and heroic in human nature. See *Section Ninth*.

B. It is particular. Every event must participate in the general life of the whole, and so must be providential. The extent of this participation depends upon the part it plays in the divine plan, and thus upon its importance—its importance, not as viewed by us, but by God Himself. No one event can be pronounced so trifling as to be beneath the notice of God. If God could create or allow to appear in the grand drama of existence any class or order of creatures, however inferior, He could consistently with his dignity care for them. But it is to be remembered that events broken from their connections have only a fractional bearing. They must be kept in their places in the movement to which they belong and of which they are a part, and this movement must be interpreted as a whole.

C. It is often special. God has fixed the interaction of his laws—their complex interworking—the relation of each sphere of life to all the others. He has established, beforehand, harmony between the results of all their interactions, and both his temporary and final purposes. Thus He reconciles causes with ends. Now we know that these ends, or moral purposes, are often special in their character. Thus what was unforeseen and apparently accidental comes under the sovereign direction of God, and tends to advance his cause and kingdom in the world. It is then termed a special providence. This is illustrated in the history of Joseph and his brethren. Such events not only secure the ends of law, but also those ends which the moral order of the universe requires—ends which are recognized at once as moral in their character. Thus the same event may accomplish more purposes than one. In fact, this is a peculiarity in the providence and argument of God. We may say, then, that every event which singnally favors the right and singnally rebukes the wrong, and that, too, aside from any foresight on our part, is a special providence. The course of human history in which the successes of bad men and the failures of good men are made the springs of a new order of things, reveals a divine plan counter to human purpose and transcending human intention.

D. It is in every great crisis in the world's affairs, supernatural. The supernatural providence is, as has been already intimated, an essential part of God's universal providence. God intervenes as He always purposed to do; and intervenes according to the principles of intervention, which may be termed the higher law of the universe. The supernatural, indeed, is the only key to Providence. Butler in his *Analogy*, affirms as much as this. He says, in Part II, Chapter 4, "That the affairs of the world, being permitted to go on in their natural course just so far, should just at such a point have a new direction given them by miraculous interposition, * * * may have been by general laws. These laws are, indeed, unknown to us, but no more unknown than * * * innumerable more things * * * which we can not reduce to any laws at all; though it is taken for granted, that they are as much reducible to general ones as gravitation." Butler is certainly right here, if laws be taken as denoting fixed principles, which govern the divine activity in time and space.

The old Testament is full of these interventions. The New Testament makes every miracle to center about the one grand miracle of the ages; namely, the appearance of the Son of God in human history.

The interpretation of special providences, so far as they are designed to regulate our lives, is attended with great difficulty. In fact, such providences are designed primarily to exalt our souls, rather than to regulate our lives. But this very moral exaltation helps us to choose the highest ends, and to make use of the wisest means to reach these ends. Providence becomes our guide by thus becoming our Enlightener and our Comforter. The Bible helps us to interpret providence. For there we have God's methods and procedures, as well as God's promises. Any interpretation of any event in our lives which does not thus accord with the Scriptures, is false, and leads to fanaticism. Thus the teachings of God's Word, and the leadings of his Spirit, take precedence of assumed special providences in the practical questions of life. It is superstition, instead of an intelligent piety, which would reverse this order.

Long periods often are essential to enable us to read aright the providence of God. We must often take in the sweep of centuries to enable us to apprehend the drift of God's doings. In this respect it is like prophecy, which is providence foreseen and foretold. In fact, prophecy itself, with its many lines of movement, now particular, now universal, now Messianic and now anthropic, now touching the individual and now the nation, is the one grand Scriptural argument for God's ceaseless care over his creatures. The doctrine of prayer is another proof of equal cogency. In fact, the Bible is the history of providence. Providence is also necessitated by our spiritual necessities. These necessities are as authoritative as the conclusions of logic. There are some proof-texts worthy of special attention; See Ps. 139:7-12; Prov. 16:9; Is. 55:7; Amos, 3:6; Matt. 6:26-30; 10:29-31; Acts 2:23; 4:27-28; 17:26; James 4:13-15.

SECTION NINTH.

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

Providence culminates in the moral government of God. This government, as established and carried on in this world, is not a mere legal system with special applications to new relations. It is supra-legal in its character. But while it subordinates the law in its methods of procedure, it exalts the law by its influence and by its ideas, by its present results and by its final issues. Its prophets and apostles do not present themselves as the mere exponents of divine justice and the executors of the divine judgments. They are certainly the preachers of righteousness; but they are also heralds of grace and mediators between God and his guilty creatures. The moral government of God, as established among men, is determined by his interventions. The very miracles and prophecies recorded in the Scriptures witness in a transcendent manner to the moral order of the universe, and yet these interventions are interventions of mercy. The law is promulgated not only in lofty abstract statements, but also in the lives of saintly souls, and above all in the sinless career of Christ Himself. But Christ did not present Himself as the Supreme Judge; for He was not merely the incarnation of the divine conscience. His methods, too, were gracious, rather than legal in their character. The delay of punishment justified by his appearance, the proffer of pardon warranted by his life and death, and his redemptive agencies are, in their united influence and ultimate bearing, in the full interests of rectitude and religion. They inspire the spirit of loving obedience in the heart of the sinner, and educate the erring believer by the gracious discipline of divine providence. But still the Gospel is a savor of death unto death, as well as life unto life. For while it presents unique incentives to obedience, it also presents unique sanctions in the case of disobedience. We are, therefore, authorized to affirm that the government of God, as now administered, is supra-legal in its character. The evidence of such a government may be found:

A. In the moral nature of man. Though depraved, he is capable of redemption. This may depend on the constitution of his nature, as body and soul in the unity of life. It may also

depend. as a consequent, on the transmission of evil by inheritance, so that evil is not in all respects self-originated. Again, as man is not pure spirit, so sin is not sented exclusively in the spirit, thus apparently destroying all capacity for redemption. Besides, in the fall there was a tempter. In his sense of the right, in his impulse to virtue, and in his condemnation of vice, in the joy which he has in virtuous living, and in the misery and unrest which he experiences in his course of life, in the fear of something more yet to come beyond the grave—in all this the moral law, inviting an interposition, is revealed as wrought into our very constitution. This is more apparent as the individual and the community advance in moral culture—advance both by their own striving and by the inheritance of the past. Thus, wrought into human nature, we have not simply advice or a command; but a command accompanied with incentives and sanctions.

B. Human governments have to recognize the moral element. It is true, however, that more account is made of the sanctions than of the incentives to virtue. Society can not live if it confounds the essential distinctions between virtue and vice, or neglects even its own discriminations between right and wrong. Every human government must punish that which it deems vicious. It must do so, or begin to rot at the core. Moral statistics show very clearly that those nations which lead a moral life—and those only—attain to the highest type of prosperity, as that prosperity is tested by the amount and the degree of human happiness.

C. This idea of a moral government of God is warranted also by the fact that the possibilities of a virtuous society are vastly greater than what is actually realized in the life of that society at any stage of its earthly existence. These possibilities rest on the inherent tendencies of virtue—tendencies which, under new and better conditions, would be sure to secure a form of human happiness vastly better than any which is now realized. What now stands in the way of this realization may possibly be removed; while the tendencies of virtue are inherent in the nature of virtue itself. These very possibilities, with only artificial hindrances, point to an interposition—partial in probation, final and complete at its close.

D. The real interventions of God spoken of in his Holy Word

prove this moral government, while they form a part of it, and, in fact, constitute the basis of it. They are not simply moral in their character; but also remedial and redemptive in their nature and tendency. They are all to culminate in the second coming of our Lord, when the moral government of God in its present form will close.

There are three great stages in this government of God.

First; the Theophany—the initial stage—the government of the family:

Second; the Theocracy—the transitional period—the government of the state:

Third; Christianity—the final stage—the government of the race.

We need here note only the chief features of Judaism, as they appear in contrast with Christianity.

A. Judaism was a theocratic state; while Christianity is a theocratic life. The theocracy of the first was outward and objective; that of the second is inward and subjective in its character. In Judaism the family was the unit; while in Christianity the individual soul is alone the unit. In the one case God ruled the community by his positive appointments; and in the other case He reigns in the souls of men by the indwelling of his Spirit; see Jer. 31: 33.

The summary of Jewish law given on Sinai, the fuller code of positive statutes promulgated by Moses, the tabernacle, and afterward the temple with its cultus, the line of priests, the succession of judges and kings as the ordinary administrators of the divine will, the order of prophets as the special interpreters of that will, and as the special organs of a supernatural efficiency in nature and in life—in all these ways Judaism appears as a theocratic establishment.

This method of dealing on the part of God was suited to the race in its childhood—to a people rude and sensuous in their culture. A more spiritual economy would have failed to reach and to mould them.

B. Judaism was designed for one nation alone; while Christianity was adapted to all nations. The one had a national stamp; while the other bore the character of universality. But no nation formed under polytheistic influences and upon a polytheistic basis

could be selected and reformed and made to bear witness to the truth through the long night of heathendom. Such a procedure would have required an outlay of supernatural and spiritual forces inconsistent with the constitution of human nature, and at war with the free growth both of the individual and of society. The nation can not be selected—it must be formed by the bond of blood, and on the principle of inheritance—an inheritance by transmission and by tradition. Some one individual person must be selected as the founder of the nation—an elect soul for an elect purpose. Now Abraham was the best representative of that primeval faith which in his day was fast dying out, as he was the best fitted by his natural character to be the head of a monotheistic race. The experiences of the patriarch, both natural and supernatural, blended as they were with those of Isaac and Jacob, strengthened and enriched the national life of their descendants, and laid the foundation for that intense cohesion and persistency which have marked the history of the Jews and have fitted them to play so decisive a part in the drama of the world's history. The nation thus founded was disciplined and educated to be the depository and the organ of revealed truth. It was set apart by its beliefs, by its pursuits, and by its institutions, from all other tribes. Besides, it was assigned a peculiar geographical position—a position isolated, and so suited to its earlier vocation—a position, too, central, and so suited to its final providential mission. [See *Evidences of Christianity*, Chapt. VIII, Sect. 2.]

The ground for thus founding a nation and choosing a people to be the organ and witness of the truth, was found in the fact that humanity had been broken into fragments by the spread of polytheism. A free religious society, based on character alone, and independent of the distinctions of race and of nation, would at that time have had no chance for itself. It could not have obtained an existence among the warring tribes of the earth—much less could it have spread and have become the religion of humanity. Besides, the polytheistic culture was, among the masses, altogether materialistic in its character. They could not have apprehended a spiritual religion. To them it would have been simply atheistic. In fact, this was one of the charges made in the classic period by the Pagans against Christianity itself. Had

they accepted Christianity, the acceptance would have been merely nominal. The very symbols of our faith would have become only a new form of idolatry. There was, then, no alternative but to adapt revelation to the necessities of the world, and to make religion a national, defensive church establishment. This was, however, but a prelude to the New Economy, and to the worship of God in spirit and in truth.

C. Judaism was ritualistic, while Christianity was realistic, in its nature. The one gave the types and the symbols of great spiritual realities. The other gave the realities themselves, as they were summed up in the person and the life of the crucified and risen Redeemer. The sacrifices of the old economy pointed out the way of approach to Jehovah. The great sacrifice of the New Economy constituted that way—actually opened it at once and forever; see Epistle to the Hebrews; John 1:17; 2 Cor. 3:7—11; Col. 2:17. The ancient offerings had only a very limited efficacy, so far as their direct bearing was concerned. They atoned only for sins against theocratic ordinances, and brought the Jew only as a member of the theocracy into a state of reconciliation with Jehovah, as theocratic King. But Christ in his sacrifice secures an objective reconciliation for every member of the race, and enables every soul, if it will, consciously to share in the blessings of that reconciliation, even to the point of entering into fellowship with God. The one was the symbol of higher covenant mercies than it immediately and directly secured; while the other was the actual bestowment of these mercies according to the measure of receptivity in the soul. The one had a typical signification, though the distinct consciousness of its import, as a grand prophecy waiting for its verification and so its interpretation in the history of the church, was veiled from the Jewish worshiper.

D. Judaism was civil and political; while Christianity is spiritual and moral, in its character. Jehovah dealt with social vices as a wise legislator, rather than as a moral governor. Thus He aimed to realize in the best possible way his own moral and religious ideas. He did not force them on the people at once and in spite of all opposing influences; but so tolerated and so regulated the evil as to secure its ultimate extinction. But Christianity, while it has the same tolerant spirit, seeks to reach its goal not so

much by formal laws as by moral and spiritual influences, as these influences are brought to bear on society by the church, and by all the appliances which the church can directly or indirectly create and support.

E. Judaism was a providential dispensation; while Christianity is the economy of the Spirit. God governed his ancient people largely by special and miraculous providences. These were often punitive and disciplinary in their character. It was by his immediate presence—his mercies and his judgments—that He educated his people. God makes use no longer of supernatural providences; but rules the church by the presence of his spirit. His reign is universal and spiritual.

F. Judaism in its spirit is separative, repellent, defensive; while Christianity is diffusive, attractive, aggressive. But they agree in the fact that the one is prophetic of the other, and in the fact, too, that Jehovah was to the Jewish consciousness what Christ is now to the Christian consciousness. Judaism was abrogated simply by being fulfilled.

SECTION TENTH.

THE RELATION OF GOD TO EVIL.

Evil, not in its own nature, not in its origin, not in any one period of its progress, but as related to the universe—as the condition of the grand finalities of that universe—is the object of the eternal will of God—the effect of his absolute decree. That decree realizes itself in the countless steps which measure the life of creation. Our clear and full knowledge is confined to this earth, to its geological and historical periods; and so in reference to the whole field of knowledge, the entire movement of God in space and time, is infinitesimally small. We can discern, however, a divine agency in the creation of beings endowed with sensibilities and intrusted with free will: we can recognize the divine intentions in the incentives and sanctions of the moral law as that is given in the conscience, or is voiced in Providence, or enunciated and emphasized in revelation: we can apprehend the sovereign love and the power of God in his supernatural interventions in behalf of religion and virtue—interventions limited by a regard for the worth.

of the free moral agent, and conditioned in form and efficacy by his moral and spiritual receptivity: we can believe in the ultimate triumph of truth and rectitude, in the redemption or in the completion of punishment, so that sin shall be more than mastered, and so that creaturely virtue shall come forth from its probationary state in a form transfigured and glorified.

This general view of God's relation to evil shows that the difficulties which spring up from its presence and its spread into the world are not insuperable. Some of these difficulties may, however, be somewhat weakened by a more detailed consideration of the subject.

We here dismiss at once all idea of "Metaphysical Evil," that is, of evil originating in finite conditions of existence; for finiteness is not an evil in creation; but the essential condition of creation in any form whatever. It is, in no proper sense of the word, evil, unless creation itself be everywhere and always evil. We content ourselves with noticing:

I. NATURAL EVIL.—Natural evil is confined to the realm of nature; while moral evil is formed alone in the realm of spirit. This form of evil appears in the waste, misdirection or violence of the forces of nature; in the malformation and premature extinction of plants and animals; and in the close resemblance to depraved elements in human nature, which we notice in animal life.

But we are to consider that the very complexity of nature, the number of its forces, the variety and interdependence of its kingdoms, the endless combinations and permutations of its energies, may necessitate many of these evils—which may themselves in other respects be blessings to sentient creatures. Here the central regnant harmonies of the world subordinate and even utilize those discords which play at times on their surface. Again, different species seem to be created with such a fullness and richness of life, and to stand in such relations to the mineral kingdom, as not only to allow departures from the normal type, but to generate disturbances which may issue in deformities or in early deaths. These are excrescences in growth, or the necessary accompaniments of the very affluence of organic life itself. Besides, the community of life, between the animal kingdom and the world which underlies

it, may be so intimate that any disturbance in one sphere will involve a corresponding disturbance in the other. How far, too, human perversity may have affected animal life, we are not able to determine. This much, however, is certain, that the brute can feel the friendship or the hatred of man, and can accept his legitimate authority, or can flee from his unjust tyranny; and, what is here of supreme importance, can transmit these acquired feelings to its posterity.

The sufferings and death of sentient beings involve special interest and deserve special notice. The possibility of these evils is involved in the creation of sentient creatures. The capacity for suffering is always equal to the capacity for enjoyment. Every organism, from the nature of the case, must sooner or later wear out; and if it is a sensitive organism, its extinction may be attended with pain. To exclude the possibility of this is to exclude life from the universe—at least life in any form which we can either experience, or imagine to exist, outside of the plant world.

Whether this possible evil shall become actual, depends ultimately upon the purpose and plan of God. We may suppose that, if He could make it the occasion of more good than would result from its exclusion, He would allow its introduction; that is, He would not interpose to prevent it. What reasons, then, might influence the divine mind not to interpose, so as to exclude natural evil from the universe.

First. No injustice must be done to any of his creatures in so creating them that non-existence shall be preferable to existence. The instinct of preservation shows how strong the love of life is in the brute. A sensitive physical nature is desirable even for a brief period, though pain be an accompanying necessity. Life, on the whole, must be a blessing to its possessor. The individual is not to be sacrificed for the good of the whole, though he may suffer in the interest of others. This suffering, however, can never be such as to make existence itself miserable.

Second. Physical evil in its highest form of expression, namely, that of a violent death, must, on the whole, be productive of a greater amount of happiness than could otherwise find place. Thus races of animals are saved from the horrors of famine by being exposed to a more violent but less lingering and less painful

death from their more powerful neighbors. Thus, too, by the same provision, the orders of sentient beings are multiplied, and the number which makes up each order vastly increased, and thus the sum of creaturely happiness is augmented. The very struggle for life, the means of defense and attack, the hopes and the fears of the brutes—all these give to animal existence its highest form of development, or at least are the inevitable accompaniments of that development. Death makes room for life, and is one of the conditions by which the great gap between the lowest sentient being and man himself, is filled up with various forms of conscious existence.

Third. Physical evil is often corrective. The pain which results from the disregard of organic law often tends to check or to guide both the brute and man in their outward activities. It often serves as a warning to the man who violates the organic law of his nature. If no physical suffering followed from licentiousness, moral evil would seem to command a premium, and there would be no limit to human corruption. Besides, many of our physical pains are essential to the very preservation of our organism. Were it not for this, the child might amuse himself by seeing his fingers burn off in the fire.

Fourth. This evil must, among men, often be punitive in its character. It must often carry along with it the condemnation of the moral source from which it ultimately springs. It would be quite inadequate in this world to limit the misery of guilt to the mere feeling of remorse. Many escape that penalty, at least for a season, by sinning away all their shame and all their consciousness of guilt. But they can not escape, except for a time, the sufferings of a depraved organism.

Fifth. These evils constitute a part of the discipline to which good men are now subjected. Virtue needs to be tried. It must be tried by sufferings in the discharge of duty. Afflictions, too, of all kinds, may have a chastening influence, and thus serve to beautify and ennoble the Christian character. Again, the presence of misery in the world calls forth sympathy, and awakens a kind of suffering in our own souls—a suffering which helps us to throw off our selfishness. In fact, without the presence of evil in the world, there is no room for anything saintly or heroic in human history.

Sixth. These evils are certainly preferable to a constant inter-

position on the part of God to prevent them. And it is impossible to see how they could be prevented except by his continuous intervention. The unfortunate results of such an intervention we have already considered. We may add, however, that if nature's laws were not uniform, human reason would be either undeveloped or unsatisfied; and if developed to its full capacity, a source of unmitigated torture to ourselves.

II. MORAL EVIL.—This is found in the moral and rational consciousness of the creature, and it consists in his break with his Creator.

Freedom of the will carries with it the possibility of sin. That possibility is both natural and moral, when the creature at the opening of his full moral consciousness makes his great life choice of self, in the place of God. At this period moral habits have not been formed, and a special tendency to holiness has not been generated by action, and the creature stands forth with power to determine his own moral character. He becomes what he wills himself to be. After he has made his one regnant life-choice this is reversed, and he wills himself to be what he has already become.

By virtue of this power the creature broke with his Creator. Sin took on at first and at once its worst forms—pride and hate—the twin offspring of pure self-will—the natural outcome of a false independence. Thus its real nature appeared in its Satanic origin and in its diabolical culmination. This came from the fact that sin originated in a being purely spiritual, without any sensuous organism as a medium of temptation, and without any tempter; and so stood forth in its naked enormity—irreversible and irredeemable, and thus to be distinguished from human sin.

We can not explain this fatal choice. We can simply affirm its possibility, grounded on the freedom of the creature in its original and primal exercise. God is not, however, in any proper sense of the term, the author of sin. He only creates the power of free choice; but He does not necessitate that choice. The power of free self-determination is from Him; while the determination itself is from the creature. The power of Satan to carry into effect his purposes is limited by the constitution of his own nature, and by the order of the universe; and so he is still controlled by the omnipotence of God.

God could not prevent sin in the highest moral system. For such a system allows of the possibility of moral freedom and forbids any intervention for the purpose of the exclusion of moral evil. Manifestly the highest form of moral government is where sin itself shall be utilized for the good of the creature. There is no tendency in moral evil toward the good. It requires infinite wisdom and infinite power to make it thus subservient to a good greater and better than that lost by its introduction.

God's special relation to human sin is considered at length under *Anthropology*.

SECTION ELEVENTH.

THE WORLD OF SPIRITS.

By the world of spirits we here mean that order of spiritual beings termed, in the Scriptures, angels.

A. Their Existence. Their seems to be no presumption against the existence of angels. If souls survive the shock of death, as we are assured they do, then there certainly exists an order of spiritual beings absolutely removed from the sphere of our recognition. That these spiritual agencies should be self-conscious is credible; since consciousness is the one broad fact of human life which we should expect to survive our dissolution. Nor is it anything to the purpose, to say that angels are invisible; since that is true of the most subtle forces of nature. Nor can the objection be made good that we have no need and no use for them. Their agency is connected with universal Providence, and must hold such a relation to Christianity as Christianity itself holds to that Providence. The Scriptures teach in the plainest terms the existence of angels, and such has been the faith of the church in all ages.

B. Their Names. The word angel means, according to its etymology, *messenger*. This appellation designates the office, rather than the nature, of angelic beings. They are also termed gods, and the sons of God, because they both resemble and represent God Himself. They are also called spirits; that is, immaterial beings—or beings whose consciousness is formed by spirit alone. There seems to be a class of angels called Cherubim. Their symbolic form consists of the face of a man, the mane of a lion, the

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body of an ox, the wings of an eagle; thus representing the union of intelligence, courage, strength and swiftness. They seem to indicate the highest form of creaturely life, and thus stand forth as at the head of the celestial hierarchy. The name Seraphim seems to denote another order, and possibly they are so called from the splendor of their appearance. It does not seem clear from the New Testament that there is more than one archangel; see 1 Thess. 4: 16; Jude 9. He is called Michael, which signifies *Who as God*; that is who represents God. Possibly Gabriel—the *Strong One of God*, as the word denotes—may be one of this order, but the Scriptures make no such affirmation. Angels are also denominated thrones, dominions, principalities, powers. But it is impossible to construct, as the Catholics do, any formal hierarchy. Their system of three classes and nine orders is altogether too artificial an arrangement.

C. Their Nature. They are pure spirits, with an invisible body, such as their natures demand; but with a capacity to take on such visible forms as the sphere of their operations may require. Thus they manifest themselves now as the forces of nature, now in colossal forms, as in the vision of Ezekiel, and now again as men, using the language and performing the functions that belong to our physical nature. We have assigned to them an invisible organism, grounded partly on 1 Cor. 15: 44; and partly also on the supposition that every finite spirit must have an organism of some kind. This body, however, in the case of a pure spirit, is a pure form and instrument—a form by which it can hold a distinctive existence; and an instrument by which it can hold communication with the universe. It is not, however, a material organism, which is always a factor in consciousness. It has no substantial existence by itself, and contributes nothing to the contents of the spiritual personality. Such a body does not conflict with the idea that angels are pure spirits.

D. Their Employment. They are the representatives of God's presence in his providence. Thus they were present at the giving of the law. Thus they waited on the ancient people of God and were the avengers of divine justice or the dispensers of divine mercy. They announced beforehand the birth of our Lord, and heralded his appearance in the world. Thus they often interpose

in behalf of his disciples. On the other hand, they do not accompany the Spirit's influence. The sphere of their operation seems to be outward, rather than inward; and in the dispensation of the Spirit—in the Christian Economy—their position is a subordinate one. They are the ministers of God's providence; while men are the ministers of redemption. Their office and mission does not concern us so much as the ministry of good men.

Their agency, however, is not to be overlooked. They are our guardian spirits; Heb. 1 : 14. They rejoice over penitent souls; Luke 15 : 10. They convey souls to heaven; Luke 16 : 22. They watch over the souls of the redeemed, however, only in a providential way, taking no part in their sanctification. Thus they could strike off the chains of the apostle Peter, and release him from prison, but they could not sympathize with him. For they are not allied to us by the bonds of a common experience.

The Angel of Jehovah—the Angel of his presence—the Angel of the Covenant, is the representative angel of Jehovah, or more definitely of the Son of God Himself. In fact, every theophany is a Christophany. Thus no angel is Christ, but only his vicegerent. Passages in the earlier historical books seem to favor the view of a strict identity between the angel of the Lord and the Son of God; while passages in the later books and also in the New Testament favor the view here indicated; namely, that the angel of Jehovah is the special organ of the Son of God Himself, or of Jehovah revealed. The latter view must fairly interpret the earlier one, on the principle of a development in revelation. Besides, we break the unity of the Old Testament revelations and obscure their generic import, if we thus exalt the manifestation of the Angel of the Covenant so as to make them different in kind from the other theophanies. Besides, the occasions on which the angel appears do not warrant such a distinction. We need to hold to the principle that Christ is in all of them—their Source, their Substance, and their End. It is well here to recall a simple rule of interpretation; namely, that all symbols, all types, and all representative persons can have precisely the same predicates as the thing or person they represent, and can, in fact, be in all respects identified with them.

E. The Relative Position of Angels and Men. The angel at

his origin is superior to man; but is inferior in his growth and in his destiny. The springs of the life of the one are in the spiritual world alone; while the springs of the life of the other are in both worlds. There is thus the basis of a richer and deeper experience in the human soul than in the angelic nature. The bond among angels is simply a mental and moral one. They can gather nothing by inheritance—nothing through domestic and family life—nothing through a society held together by a bond of blood. Besides, the Son of God has assumed, and so is destined to transfigure, human nature. The kingdom of God, in its highest form, is to be realized in redeemed souls, and not in the sinless angels. God comes nearer to them than to his angels. They have new hopes, new aspirations, new motives, new struggles and new labors; and so have grander possibilities than the cherubim of heaven can have. Hence Paul could say, "Know ye not that ye shall judge angels?" that is, do you not know that your profound experience shall make the angelic experience appear inadequate and unworthy?

In this connection we see how unfit is the worship of angels among the Romanists. It is true that they make a distinction between a strict worship and the reverence due to the angels. But there are serious objections to the Romanist's view:

First. It is sure to degenerate into superstition.

Second. It is not commanded or authorized by any Scriptural precept or example; but seems rather to be forbidden in the words, "See thou do it not;" Rev. 19:10; 22:9.

Third. It introduces a new kind of dependence, and separates us by means of an angelic mediation too far from God. It remains true, however, that every good act and every right feeling unites us to a world of goodness higher than that which is at present realized.

What is here said of the worship of angels is also true of the invocation of saints.

F. Fallen Angels. The Scriptures reveal the fact that angels have fallen from their original state of purity; see above, *Section Nine*.

First. Their Names. The term Satan means adversary, and the word Devil means slanderer; that is, the one who slanders man before God and God before man. Both terms denote the same

being. He is also called the Wicked One, because he incarnates the principles of moral evil. Besides, he is termed the prince of this world, and the god of this world; because the world of mankind is conceived as a fallen and lost world. He is also termed the prince of the power of the air, because his unholy influence inspheres the human family as the atmosphere does the earth. Inferior fallen spirits are termed Demons.

Second. The Possession of Demons. This is always ascribed to some demon—never to Satan himself. Its effects are physical or psychical or both together, and never directly and immediately moral. The demon takes possession of the organism, rather than of the conscience or of the affections. The organic disharmony is brought about by natural agencies, and thus an opening, so to speak, is left for the entrance of the demoniacal agency. The demon does not directly and immediately originate these physical or psychical influences; but rather allies himself to them and intensifies them. This two-fold agency is indicated in John 10:20, in the words, "He hath a devil, and is mad;" and where the casting out of a devil is called a healing; and where a thorn in the flesh—some physical difficulty—is called a messenger of Satan. Thus these effects are not to be ascribed exclusively to the demons; but also to the influence of various forms of disease. There seems to be a dark community of life between physical and spiritual evil.

Third. The Temptation of the Devil. Temptation is never ascribed to any demon, but always to Satan alone. It consists in an appeal to the impulses and to the affections of our nature, and its aim is to draw the soul away from God. Its effect is moral and religious.

Satan is not the proper efficient cause of any wrong thought or feeling or purpose. Here, too, we recognize a two-fold agency. This seems to be implied in John 13:27, "Satan entered into him," that is, took possession of his moral nature in conjunction with the command, "What thou doest do quickly;" and again in the declaration, "Satan entered into his heart," balanced by the affirmation, "He was a thief." Paul lays stress on Satanic agency; while James gives emphasis to human efficiency, in the production of human sin. But Paul, again, everywhere throws the responsibility of sin on the man, and not on Satan. The devil allies himself with our

corrupt passions, and forms a new link in the chain of evil influences; and thus opens to our souls a dark realm of evil which lies beyond and above us. We find ourselves in fellowship with fallen spirits—spirits from whom all susceptibility for salvation has died away—in just so far as we break with God. Thus in every sin man approaches the verge of a kingdom of darkness from which there is no redemption, or plunges into that Satanic state from which there is no recovery.

The mode of action on the part of Satan is unknown to us. This agency is subordinate only to the free self-determination of the soul itself. The influence of Satan may show itself as well in speculation, as in practice. We may have a system of Metaphysics inspired by him, as well as an unholy life generated by his fellowship. One thing seems certain, that our consciousness of sin, of its depth, and of its extent, depends in part upon our views of Satanic agency. Those denominations which think lightly of Satanic influence, think lightly also of the nature and guilt of sin.

PART SECOND.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE ORIGINAL CHARACTER OF MAN.

SECTION FIRST.

THE ORIGIN OF MAN.

There is every reason to believe that the soul of Adam originated with his body. Such is the plain meaning of the record. The theory of the pre-existence of souls has no support from consciousness, and no foundation in the Scriptures. If it were true, we might reasonably expect that in some one of the many millions who have appeared on earth there would be some reminiscence, however weak, of this anterior state. But such is not the case, except in the mere fancy of Plato and his disciples. On the supposition, then, that there is a pre-existent state, we must infer that it is so absolutely unlike our present temporal condition as to preclude self-consciousness, and so be utterly unable to explain the origin of human freedom or of moral evil. The silence of the Scriptures, too, is significant. If this extra-temporal condition had any influence whatever on man's duty or destiny we should have expected some allusion to it. The apostles refer back to Adam as the head of the race; but never intimate that the soul had a higher origin in the unknown realm of spirits. In fact, they seem to give a definite date for that origin: namely, at the close of that cycle of creation of which this earth was the moral center. Besides, when the soul does appear, as at birth, it does not display then, or at a subsequent period, any form of knowledge which demands a previous life for its explanation. It is true that birth is not altogether a new creation, and every soul thus born has a

germinal existence before its historical appearance as a personal individual. Wordsworth gives to the idea of pre-existence the support of his fancy in his *Intimations of Immortality*;

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting.

The advocates of this theory, among whom we may class Kant, Schelling, J. Mueller, and E. D. Beecher, defend it in the supposed interest of some dogma of philosophy or of religion. It thus remains a mere hypothesis, and an hypothesis, too, of no appreciable value; for it simply transfers difficulties from this world to another, and creates, as we have seen, new difficulties of its own.

It would seem that the human race began with Adam. We have no account of, or allusion to, any pre-Adamite or non-Adamite races of man. This view is supported by Mark 10:6; Acts 17:26. The first passage points to Adam as the beginning of the human species, and the second indicates the organic unity of the human family. Our view is also favored by Rom. 5:12; I Cor. 15:21-22. It has been said that the supposition of another race besides that of Adam removes the difficulties suggested by Gen. 4:14-18. But it is to be noted that the distinct family life, and so the laws subsequently enacted regulating the marriage of near relatives, was inapplicable. The supposition creates as many difficulties as it removes. We should then be at a loss to account for the formal ignoring in the Scriptures of the race which antedated Adam, and yet blended with his descendents. We should also have to reconstruct our idea of the unity of the human family, and make it depend, not on an organic unity, but on an essential affinity of nature. We should also have to readjust Christ's relation to the race, in that his birth would be of value only because he took a nature like that which all the races possessed in common. If, however, in the advance of scientific discoveries, we should gain evidence that such an order of Adam-like beings had existed before our first parents, then we might entertain with more propriety this theory.

Closely connected with the above supposition is the question of the antiquity of the race. This must be left to science. But until the case has been settled against the more obvious interpretation

of the Mosaic record we are justified in accepting the common orthodox belief. In any event, however, Christianity remains intact, because religion is not a matter of chronology.

Many scientists reject the idea of any specific creation, and seek to account for the origin of man on the theory of a development from brute life. But it would seem that we could not start from zero, and that any beginning whatever must imply creation, and this first creative act must certainly be followed by other steps in the creative movement; though the subsequent ones might be subordinate to, and in some sense dependent on, the first. Besides, there are special objections to this view as applied to the first appearance of the race.

First. There are no traces, in the geological record, of such a transition. Our knowledge of this record is indeed very scanty, when compared with the entire record itself: but, scanty as it is, it seems inconsistent with the idea of transmutation of species. For if we had intermediate forms, as we must have, on the theory of development, we should have them everywhere, and so can test the truth of the alleged fact by even partial excavations. It is noteworthy that the more cautious advocates of the theory admit that it is not yet made out, and stands as a simple hypothesis.

Second. There is a difference in mind between man and the brute which, as Huxley affirms, is practically infinite. It has been said, and the saying has been admitted to be true by all parties, that the distance between a man and an ape is greater than that between an ape and a mushroom. The difference is one of kind, and not merely one of degree. Man alone has abstract ideas, a moral sense, and free will. The evidence that he is thus distinguished from the brute is found in human speech, in human society, and in man's wonderful power to know and to utilize the forces of nature.

Third. Man is superior to the highest order of animal life in his physical organism. The law of congruity would lead us to expect as much as this. Spirit takes on an adequate form. Both go together. Man's physical superiority may be indicated in his larger brain, with its finer texture, and its greater number of convolutions. It is certainly intimated in the fact that, in comparison with the ape, the order that is nearest to us, one pair of hands have

given place to perfect human feet, and another pair have ceased to be organs of locomotion and have become instruments of mind. There is an advance by successive stages, and man is the last step in this upward movement. The highest type of animal structure reaches its goal in him. Prof. Flint in his recent work on the Philosophy of History says, "The school of Schelling elaborated and spread the notion that man is the living synthesis of nature—a being who sums up in himself all its processes in perfection and harmony." Oken in his Physio Philosophy declares that "Man is the complex of all that surrounds him; viz. of mineral, plant and animal." Again, that "Man is the entire image or likeness of the world" * * * and that "All the functions of the animal have attained unto unity, unto self-consciousness in man." This order of development is stated as a part of God's general method of procedure, in I Cor. 15: 46.

The only modification of the orthodox view of the origin of man which is likely hereafter to be received, is the substitution of a supernatural birth for that of a specific creation. Such a theory would affect, not the fact, but only the method of creation. Whatever view we may take of man's origin, he must ever remain the great surprise and the great wonder of the animal world.

If the theory of development concerned only vegetable and animal life, and did not apply at all to man, it might be admitted with advantage so far as mere theological difficulties are concerned. What we need, however, is a scientific proof of the theory itself. As the question now stands, with our present light, we must content ourselves with the idea of a specific creation, and *thus* account for the origin of the race.

SECTION SECOND.

THE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS OF HIS BEING.

Man is body and soul in the unity of life. They both contribute to the contents of the one human consciousness. Each rules in its own sphere, and each sphere acts and reacts on the other, and both are united in one and the same individual, and both express their final worth in one and the same personal life. The body links us to the world of matter; the soul to the world of spirits. In and

Through the physical organism the soul reaps all that this earth can yield, and carries with it into the other life all its rich harvestings, and makes these earthly experiences, through the resurrection body, its permanent possession. This organism is thus not the passive instrument of the soul; but rather its agent, with special functions of its own. Still less is it the prison of the higher nature; and not rather its temple, its storehouse, and its station. Thus man—the bond of the natural and supernatural—is the crown and goal of creation, the focus of its material and spiritual elements, the crystallization of all its principles. Thus the earth, as his abode, and the abode of the Son of man, is one of the great moral centers of the universe.

According to the ordinary phraseology of Scripture, man is made up of soul and body, and we might content ourselves with this statement. There is, however, another class of passages that point to a tri-partite division of human nature; see I Cor. 2:14, 15; I Cor. 15:44, 46; I Thess. 5:23; Heb. 4:12. We need to briefly examine the main features of this Biblical Anthropology.

We have the body, the animal soul, and the rational spirit. The animal soul is the chief formative and animating principle of the present physical organism. Here it works in the darkness of unconsciousness. Under its sway the secret operations of growth and decay, of waste and repair, of life and death, with all their attendants, go blindly onward. Our present physical structure is, in its ground-work, the out-growth of the soul, though the organism reacts on the soul itself. The soul, as here defined, is the seat of our appetites and physical desires, and also of our sense-perceptions and sense-judgments. The rational spirit works in a higher region. It is the seat of all our spiritual affections. It is thus the very organ and shrine of the Spirit of God. It lifts the blind desire of the animal soul into its own free-will. It converts the spontaneous and broken expressions of animal feelings into articulate and rational speech. While the organism is determined in its elements by the soul; its final and more spiritual features are determined by the *Pneuma* itself.

We have separated in thought these three constituents of man's nature. Yet they exist in vital union, and their influences mutually interpenetrate each other. By virtue of this distinction between

the soul and the spirit we may gain some apprehension of what Paul means by a spiritual body. But see under the appropriate section. This three-fold division of human nature, resting on the passages we have quoted, is favored by the following critics: Olshausen, DeWette, Meyer, Alford, Delitzsch and Ellicott.

Thus man was made in the image of God. This image consists in his moral and rational capacities, as these capacities are gathered in a human personality. This is the natural image of God, and can never be lost. The moral image of God consists in a moral likeness to his character, and is marred or lost by human sin. The Roman Catholic theologians have sought to establish this distinction by distinguishing image from likeness, as these terms are found in the Mosaic record. Their interpretation is manifestly wrong, though the distinction is warranted by the general drift of Scriptural teaching.

SECTION THIRD.

MAN AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND AS A RACE.

Adam was created both as an individual and as the father of his kind. Eve likewise was created as an individual, and also as the mother of her kind. But while each is incomplete without the other, the headship of the human family is placed in Adam alone. He is the prototype of the race.

The individualities of our first parents were solitary and unique. They had no ancestry, and so no past. They had no birth, and so not the growth of infancy and childhood. They did not appear in the midst of, and as a part of, a great community, to mould and to direct their characters. They were, especially in the dawn of their lives, each everything to the other. In this sense, the first marriage was the most perfect realization of its ideas—moral oneness of life. They had, however, separate individual peculiarities which were marked by the distinction of sex—a distinction which makes itself felt through the entire nature of man. Thus it is that Adam's creative power was balanced by Eve's receptivity; and his reach and grasp of intellect was matched by the depth and delicacy of her spiritual sensibilities; and his energy of will was paralleled by the endurance and fortitude of her nature. Just because each was

the counterpart of the other, each must exercise a moulding influence on the other. Besides, they were also more or less impressed by their serene communication with nature and with God. Thus, in their sinlessness, their respective individual characters began to be formed. But their later experiences, so radical and revolutionary in their nature, must have experiences, so radical and revolutionary in their nature, must have individualized still more their lives. Their sin and its penalty, their hope of recovery, the institution of sacrifice, and the great promise, and also the varied and distracting care of their near descendants—all these must have greatly altered the individuality both of Adam and Eve.

The original condition of our first parents is not to be viewed from the stand-point of modern enlightenment. We are not called on to affirm that they were either civilized or the reverse. They were the children of nature, but also the children of God, and we must judge of them from this point alone. In fact, we know hardly anything more.

All other human beings have been born, and not immediately and directly created. The individuality of each is formed by special inheritance, by family life, by the influence of the nation and of the race, and by the sum total of all man's surroundings, both natural and artificial. This individuality, takes on a higher character by the free self determinations of the human will. In and by this last fact, every soul, as it emerges into personal life, becomes an original, independent and responsible being. He has a separate life of his own, and is the subject of moral law. He has his own duties and his own destinies. His separate type of character may reach its own relative symmetry; but can never be lost in the general mass, and must stand forth alone forever in time and eternity. Here is the pledge of his immortality. [*See Evidences of Christianity, Introd.*]

But every man is also a copy, a sample, a specimen, and an embodiment of a common nature. This is involved in the fact of a real birth, and a real inheritance. Thus there is an identity of life between each and every member of the human family. There are certain mental and moral, as well as physical, traits which are common to each and every individual, by virtue of his organic relation to the race. Thus every one shares in the moral good or

moral evil which may belong to the race. Thus the race can be the subject of moral praise or moral blame, as though human nature had one moral consciousness, and acted as one responsible person. It has its own proper character, its own distinctive vocation and its own separate destiny. And humanity itself forms one great solidarity.

These are the two great facts in our natural life; namely, our individual personality, and the common nature which we all possess. The one proclaims our independence; the other our dependence: the one is the basis of responsibility; the other the ground of sympathy: the one gives us genius; while the other makes that genius grand and inspiring. That individuality is the greatest, which best represents what is of universal and permanent worth in our common humanity. Otherwise, genius is cold, formal, and technical in its character. The western nations have given prominence to the idea of individuality; while the eastern nations have realized most fully a community of life. A true human life is found only in the right adjustment of these two great tendencies. Their harmony is seen alone in the character of our Lord, who perfectly blended in Himself the Occidental and the Oriental spirit.

This subject involves the consideration of the two theories which have divided theologians in respect to the origin of the soul:

First. Traducianism, or Generationism. According to this view, both soul and body are propagated together. The reasons given for this theory are the following: (a) The general analogy of animal life favors it. Like produces like. The minds of brutes, as well as their organisms, are transmitted. (b) It harmonizes with the drift of Scripture teaching: "Adam begat a son in his likeness." The race is spoken of as a unit. This unity is not a unity of so many animals; but a unity of men, embracing both soul and body. It is only on this view that we can accept the idea of a common nature, except in the low physical sense of that term. Thus the fall and redemption both proclaim a strict organic unity. Tertullian seems to have first formally presented this theory. It was also maintained by Gregory of Nyssa. Most of the older Lutherans held to it. To what extent Jonathan Edwards held to it will be seen below.

Second. Creationism. This separates the body from the soul,

and supposes that the body alone is procreated, and that the soul is created directly by God, and is united to the body at or near the moment of conception. The reason for this view is found in opposition to the opposite theory. (a.) It is said that Traducianism necessitates Materialism. The defenders, however, of Traducianism insist that we must accept the fact that body and soul do act one on the other, and that man is made up of the unity of both. They also retort on those who defend Creationism the same charge of Materialistic tendencies. For if the soul is tainted immediately on its contact with the body, then sin has its seat in the physical organism, and not primarily in the will, and mental and moral traits are transmitted along physical channels alone. (b.) It is also affirmed by the advocates of this second theory that individual peculiarities can not all be explained on the bare theory of transmission. (c.) Again, they refer to Heb. 12: 9, where God is called the "Father of Spirits." It is doubtful, however, if this passage will bear this interpretation. For if the writer meant to teach Creationism, he would have contrasted the fathers of our bodies with the Father of our souls. The term flesh denotes human nature in its alienation and corruption, and the contrast is between our earthly parents as the fathers of our natural carnal life, and our Heavenly Father, who alone is the source of our spiritual life. This is the view favored by DeWette, Alford, Wordsworth, and Meyer. Yet the passage does show that the spirit stands nearer to God than does the body, and in so far favors Creationism.

The most consistent advocate of Creationism was Pelagius; for the reason that it best harmonized with his system. Ambrose and Jerome and the majority of the German theologians adopted this theory, vainly struggling, however, to reconcile it with their views of hereditary depravity. Augustine wavered in his opinion. So strongly, however, was his system associated with Traducianism, that Julian, his ablest opponent, gave him the name of Traducianus.

There can be no doubt that both theories contain elements of truth—elements which we may combine in the idea of a creational law, or creative process. This would harmonize with the view of Jonathan Edwards. He declares; "The child and the acorn, which

come into existence in the course of nature, are truly immediately created by God."

Traducianism is seen in the transmission of a common nature. It shows itself in the stamp of a family, of a nation, and of a race. If the child does not bear the natural traits of either of his parents, the fact is to be explained either on the well known principle, that the character of the offspring often reverts to some more remote ancestors, or on the principle that special combinations of elements in both father and mother may give traits unlike either.

Creationism is seen in the fact that every individual is also a new beginning—a unique and distinct individual personality—a personality which is in itself a supernatural energy, and so must be awakened by the direct efficiency of God. This theory is also witnessed to by the birth of men of extraordinary genius—the chiefs and the leaders of humanity.

SECTION FOURTH.

MAN AS A NATURE AND A PERSON.

Every man appears at birth as a nature. His very constitution is predetermined for him. All the functions both of mind and of organism are under the law of necessity. His intellect in its office as simple and pure intelligence has, and can have, no freedom. Its distinctive movements are fixed by the very laws of thought. His sensibilities, too, are called forth by a contact with the objects of life and are, likewise, in their exclusive province, under the law of necessity. Thus every man, as a nature, belongs to the network of cosmical agencies, of which he is simply an effect.

This nature has within itself a germinal personality. This latent personal power, however, can not be evolved by any merely natural process. Separate the individual man from his fellows, and so through the absence of this mediation from his God, and he loses his manhood and becomes simply an animal. Place him among savages and his personal life will become weak or abnormal. But place him in a society that performs its proper mediatorial functions for its members, and which, thereby, makes solitude all the richer for every single soul, and you will call forth the personality of the individual in all its completeness. It is a new creation when

God thus makes man a free sovereign person—the owner and disposer of himself. He is no longer an effect, but also a cause. The soul now knows and determines itself within the limits of its own finite life, and so is free. The power of choice is thus supernatural in its character.

Desire is the blind force of nature, and dominant desire is only the governing impulse of nature, while Will is supernatural in its character. When desire is permeated by rationality it ceases to be desire and becomes, in the strictest sense of the term, Will. This transmutation enables it to weigh motives of an unlike nature—to choose between goods of an essentially opposite character, as between pleasure and duty, and thus converts a merely natural impulse into a free personal choice.

The following points are to be noted in regard to the Will :

I. ITS RELATIONS AND CONDITIONS.—The will is surrounded by varying and opposing forces impelling it to action. These forces are found in the nature of man and in its environment. Their interaction gives the resultant impulse to every life movement. The natural incentives are the motor-powers without which the will could not act. They are all of the same essential grade; that is, all bear the stamp of nature, and nature alone. The person accepts or rejects one of the two or of the many motives thus pressed upon his attention. He does this by his own will-power—by reason of an efficiency derived from God alone. In this very choice he exalts the affection or the motive which he accepts. It ceases to be natural and becomes personal.

A general analysis of the entire process here indicated shows that the intellect gives the objects, and that the sensibility furnishes the incentives, and both prepare the conditions and occasions for the exercise of the human will. Conscience or some affection may urge the will in opposite directions, but the person is still free to determine his own line of life. As we have intimated, every natural affection becomes personal only as it becomes the free choice of the soul. These affections acquire a moral character only when they are taken up and generated anew and afresh by that mystic being whom we call self—person—I.

II. ITS FREEDOM.—The will is the essence of personality. It is the soul in its self-determination—mind in its self-activity. The

will is free in that it is the sole cause of its own determinations. Liberty is not freedom from constraint or restraint. This would be only the liberty of doing as one pleases—the liberty of outward action—of executing one's choice, but not the liberty of choice itself. It is not mere natural spontaneity, for this might be true of the brute as well as of the man. It is, we repeat, the liberty of choosing. If this choice is in any case spontaneous, the spontaneity is personal and not natural—the result of a habit freely formed, and not from mere innate tendency or blind impulse. By virtue of a free will the soul asserts and disposes of itself, independent both of outward restraint and of inward necessity. It settles its own character in the might and majesty of its own power. The will is thus a supernatural force, and so above the laws of nature and of life—a cause out of the network of natural causes, finite, but real; and standing in direct and immediate relations to the Infinite Cause Itself, on which, however, it is absolutely dependent. Whatever relations the will may hold to other capabilities of the soul, or to the organism, or to its surroundings, these relations are not causal in their character. If the will is over in bondage it is because it has put itself there.

Such is the nature of the formal freedom of the will, considered apart from its rationality. It is only on some such view as is here given, that the creature can be held morally responsible for his character and his conduct. He might, indeed, be punished in the way of mere correction, or for the sake of protecting society; but not in the way of moral desert as a criminal, blameworthy for his conduct. It is in this way, too, that the possibility of sin can be recognized and defended. Besides, such seems to be the testimony of consciousness, and the direct or implied teachings of the Word of God.

III. ITS RATIONALITY.—The soul tends toward the supreme good by virtue of the very constitution of its nature. That is the goal for which it was made. The will never chooses evil as such. If it makes such a choice at all, it is because evil is accepted as its good. Thus the will is rational because it has a reason for its preference, sufficient unto itself. Its acts are not groundless—mere blind, arbitrary determinations. If the choice of the will were thus motiveless, it would be destitute of any moral quality

whatever. It would be a mere random chance act—arbitrary in its nature and aimless in its movement. Its rationality appears in the fact that it is able to determine itself in harmony with, or in opposition to, a supreme moral law—that it can choose between the incentives of the good and the sanctions of the right on the one hand, and the allurements of a lower life on the other. This attribute of the will excludes both the liberty of indifference and the liberty of equilibrium, as it excludes the idea of pure capriciousness. The Scriptures everywhere address men, not only as free in their inward decisions, as well as in their incentives, but also as influenced by motives.

IV. THE BLENDING OF THESE ATTRIBUTES.—Liberty and rationality are polar elements neither existing alone, and each the complement of the other. Liberty without rationality is mere license, and rationality without liberty is mere instinct, however far-reaching and infallible its movements may be. Motive is that which can influence the will, but the will is not determined by any extravolitional power, or by any force outside of and independent of itself. It is true there are motives which have in their nature an intrinsic value, but it is also true that the soul can give absolute sway to what is inherently of the least worth. In this sense the will determines which motive shall be the strongest. It is the rationality of the will which enables it to act in view of motives—and of motives which relate to two opposite lines of character and life. We can not separate the two in our conception of the human will.

The blending of these two essential elements of human volition is seen in the analysis of any and every act of inward choice. The act will be found to involve:

First. Independence. The brute is ever one with his instincts and desires. He never separates himself from them. The governing impulse controls him without the intervention of a free rational will. In all these respects, man is different from the brute; for though conscious both of inducements from without and of incentives from within, he is also conscious of being a tenant of a spiritual world and an heir to an eternal life, and so able to modify the natural alternative thus presented and to choose between them. Thus he has a relative independence—a sovereignty finite but real.

Second. Deliberation. The brute hesitates, but solely under the sway of appetites and passions. Man, on the contrary, takes in, in the sweep of his vision, both the spiritual and the material world. He deliberates in reference to his relations to both worlds, and so proclaims both his freedom and rationality. In many lines of thought and of feeling a disposition may be formed by a process more or less deliberative but which has long ago passed out of consciousness—a disposition which becomes in turn the source of moral activity.

Third. Decision. The brute, too, decides; but only and simply as the dominant blind impulse impels him to his goal. Its desires are like the forces of nature acting on a common plane. The alternatives presented to it are of a like kind and of a lower kind as well. But the decision of man is essentially different. Between the strongest inward impulse of his nature and the inward or outward act, there is a new link, which, of itself, must pass for something—the free rational will. The alternatives here presented are in their character so essentially different that they can not be placed on the same level, nor can the choice be determined by any resultant of the forces involved. Thus this will is not the mere organ of desire, nor the mere index of a tendency, nor the mere instrument or indorsement of an outward motive; but it is the power to determine for itself its own course of action. In making this decision, it is conscious that it could have made a contrary choice, or could have refrained from making any special choice at all, or, if the case would allow it, could have chosen one of several courses of action.

V. REAL FREEDOM.—We have thus far treated of formal freedom—of that power by which the soul can determine its own character—by which it can choose its own ends, whether these ends be good or bad, ideal or actual, proximate or final. The design, however, of this formal freedom, is not merely to make a man responsible; but to enable him to choose the good—to reach the true goal of his life in fellowship with God, and thus to secure him in that state forever. When the will makes choice of the supreme good for its portion, then its freedom is no longer merely formal, but real. For there is not only no inward compulsion determining the will, and no outward force controlling it; but there is absolute harmony

within and without—with one's self, with the universe, and with God. Rational freedom is now realized, not alone in the act of choice, but in the thing chosen; namely, in a character and life in conformity with God Himself. On the other hand, real bondage is found in the choice of evil; so that while the will is formally free, it is really in servitude. But when real freedom has been once achieved, then the moral possibility of evil is precluded.

VI. CLASSIFICATION OF THE ACTS OF THE WILL.—These may be divided in three classes:

First. The Spontaneous Acts. All those acts which spring from character, without hesitation or deliberation, are spontaneous. Thus a being created with a tendency toward the good and without any knowledge of evil, is spontaneous in his movements; though his virtue is simply automatic in its character, and so deserving praise, but not reward. Thus again, a being who has made the governing life-choice of God, instead of self and the world, and so determined and settled his moral character as positively holy, may be spontaneous in all his subsequent moral activities. Here the acts of the will are one with the tendencies of character; for the character itself is but a crystallization of the soul's free determinations. In just so far as character has been thus determined, so far the will may move spontaneously. Character here covers the entire moral stamp and make of the individual soul, and includes moral tastes, dispositions, and tendencies—in short, everything which constitutes the moral state or condition of the person himself. That there is such a thing as a state of the soul, over and above any act or succession of acts, is shown by the very continuity of consciousness. Were it not so, our mental and moral life would be made up of loose fragments and filaments of thought—an unconnected assemblage of feelings, ideas, and volitions. The man of to-day would not be the man of to-morrow, and principles and habits of action would have no meaning. We should not know how to interpret the Apostle, when he speaks of "the law of sin and death," or refers us to "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus." That we are responsible for the spontaneous acts of our will, is evident from Matt. 15: 19, though, in such a case, they must spring from a character that has been created by the will itself.

Second. The Volitional Acts. These are our distinct and deliberate determinations. The great volitional acts of the will are those supreme determinations by which a new moral state is originated, or a new character created. We have an awful instance of this in the case of the transgression of Adam, and frequent examples of it in the conversion of the soul to God.

Third. The Executive Acts. These refer simply to the execution of the soul's resolves. They are outward acts, and derive all their moral character from the source of which they spring. Here Edwards' definition of the freedom of the will comes in place; namely, the power to do as one pleases.

It is here that the will finds some of its essential limitations. As soon as it enters the ideal, it is conditioned by the laws of thought, or the association of ideas, or the recognized authority of objective truth. On the other hand, as soon as it enters the domain of nature, whether in its own organism alone, or through this, the extra-organic world, it finds itself one of the forces of nature, and as such, able to accomplish its purposes only in harmony with the universal reign of law, and even in its very primal determinations, it stands directly dependent on the Infinite Cause, which has called it into life.

These acts of the will are in fact only different stages in one and the same movement. The moral dispositions and tastes of the soul coming to consciousness are the spontaneous acts of the soul. These are followed by the deliberative acts, and these again by the executive acts. There is often a conflict between our spontaneous activities and our deliberate resolves, as when a man seeks to reverse the current he has created, and to repress those sinful thoughts which spring from the fountain he has generated.

VII. **CONDITIONAL FREEDOM.**—The human will before the primeval trial was rational, but not really free. In that initial trial it proved itself free but not really rational. Here was the inward discord unexplained and inexplicable. Freedom is now conditioned by the great facts of human probation. We are samples of human nature individualized. We share in the acts of others—above all, in the great decisive act of our first parents. We have a moral inheritance, and appear with a character already originated, though not fixed. We do not choose our surroundings, but are placed in

them by Providence. God awakens the personal life gradually, so that we are at first only germinal persons. We do not wholly form in our probationary state our own characters. These are determined partly by our connection with the race, and the outward influences which accompany the irresponsible period of infancy and early childhood, and also, it must be admitted, by the self-determination of the soul itself.

By virtue of this last fact, a measure of real freedom is still left to the soul. It is not wholly in bondage; because, while it is determined by alien powers outside of itself, and by varying powers within itself, it is yet capable of redemption. The evidence of such a freedom is found in the struggles of the soul in its very inconsistencies and contradictions, in its reforms and often in its radical spiritual changes. The supreme testimony, however, is given in the deliverance of human consciousness, and in the acceptance of this testimony by the most enlightened nations of the earth and its endorsement all through the sacred Scriptures. Formal freedom also retains something of its power; but retains it by virtue of these two great facts:

First. Christ has altered the outward relations of the soul to God, so that faith, and not obedience, is demanded for our justification.

Second. The Spirit has altered the inward relations of the soul to God, so that the will has a strength not its own, by virtue of which it can in so far forth alter its character as to ally itself with the great Helper of fallen humanity; see John 16: 8-11; Rev. 22: 17. Man is personally responsible only for his personal acts and their direct consequences.

VIII. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE WILL.—These have been implied but need to be formally stated. The will is limited by the creaturely nature of man and his position in the present economy of Providence. The human will has to recognize an authority over itself. This authority does not compel its choice for the simple reason that it is an authority and not simply and purely a force. It proclaims duty and does not insist on necessity. The will, while thus free before the categorical imperative, yet has to recognize the supremacy of a law which it did not create and which it can not abrogate. Again, the will can not form its surroundings, nor

create its objects, nor make the alternatives from which, and from which alone, it must choose. Once more, whenever it enters the world of ideas it can only work according to the laws of thought. It can choose its lines, it can direct its attention, but its subsequent movement must be determined by laws out of and independent of itself. And whenever it enters the realm of nature it can only move in harmony with the forces of nature. It can choose one of two or many alternatives and can enter into the network of forces and so modify results; but the whole movement must be in harmony with the laws of nature and of life.

SECTION FOURTH.

MAN'S ORIGINAL RECTITUDE.

Adam was created a moral and rational being. His capacities took on from the first, by the very constitution of his nature, a moral stamp, and revealed themselves in a moral character and life. He moved freely and spontaneously toward God. But his purity was negative, rather than positive. He was sinless, without being positively holy. For sinlessness, in a morally pure being, is the appropriation of the good; while holiness is the conscious choice of the good in preference to the evil.

Virtue in Adam was not an inherited bias toward what is good; but the natural result of a direct endowment. It was not the growth of years; for he had had no childhood and youth. It was not the fruit of moral culture; for he had had no moral education. It was not the effect of trial and discipline; for he had been subjected to no test of character. It was simply a free, natural development of the soul in communion with God.

His goodness was thus spontaneous in its character. It involved no deliberation and no effort. It thus had one of the highest elements of spiritual excellence; namely, the beauty of a free, natural and glorious activity; and so the gentleness, the sweetness, and the freshness of a simple and pure life. It lacked, however, the power and the richness which come from high endeavor and noble self-sacrifice—the power which results from the free self-determination in a life-conflict between right and wrong. It was thus an automatic excellence, which simply grew out of the consti-

tution of the soul, and was not an achievement of the free will: for in Adam, before his fall, the person was not fully developed, and free will was one with the moral aspirations. The sense of his own worth was not awakened till the trial actually came. Thus Hegel in his logic is partially right when he says: "The first reflection of awakened consciousness in men told them that they were naked. This is an naive and profound trait. For the sense of shame bears evidence of the separation of man from his natural and sensuous life. * * * It is in the human feeling of shame that we are to seek the spiritual and moral origin of dress compared with which the merely physical need is a secondary matter." We need to correct this statement only by adding that while the choice of the good would have led to this result, yet the choice of evil did infect this shame with a sense of moral condemnation and with a dread of the unknown consequences which were to follow.

The rectitude of Adam has been regarded by many as the rectitude of innocence alone. But innocence, as we see it in the child, and as we see it reveal itself in this world, is never perfect and complete. For the harmony between the higher and the lower nature in the infant is never, in the full sense, absolute. Besides, innocence carries along with it associations incompatible with the facts of the case. His consciousness was more full and more elevated than belongs to the life of childhood. He began life as a man, and had, at the very first, a certain maturity of thought and feeling. He had not mere childlike glimpses of the spiritual world; nor did he content himself as a child with his abrupt questions about the unseen; but his whole nature moved serenely toward God and rested in Him. The spiritual world was not an object of curiosity or wonder to the soul. It seems best, then, to abide by our view; that Adam was sinless, though not positively holy.

Thus we see how one may fall from a state of unconfirmed goodness, without being able to rise from the condition of confirmed wickedness. The power to fall from one state does not imply the power to rise from a state radically different. The state of original sinlessness, in which man was created, was a state without moral habits; for it is not the bare repetition of acts, which engenders habit, but their repetition under difficulties. His fall was then possible, where there was no habit of virtue to hold him to his

integrity. But when he had once fallen, and had contracted the habit of vice, to return by a mere self-decision, without aid from above, was simply impossible. The first great, deliberate, regnant choice of evil for his good, was his life-choice, and fixed his character, and settled his destiny.

The great body of the Christian church has always held, in some form, the doctrine of Adam's original rectitude. The Catholic theologians and many Protestant ones represent the righteousness of Adam as a super-added gift, and not as the result of an original bestowment—not the fruit of a con-created tendency toward God. According to their view, a special supernatural grace was needed to give the creature a mastery over his lower propensities and to secure the rectitude of his character. But the purity of Adam seems to have been only the natural development and expression of right original susceptibilities, as these susceptibilities were awakened and sustained by the presence of God. The complete harmony between his spiritual aptitudes and yearnings and his animal wants and appetites was secured at and by his creation. The Catholic view, however, is right in asserting that if God had withdrawn Himself, this harmony would have been lost. But this divine presence was guaranteed to him—tacitly promised in his very creation. In this state of sinlessness, too, the frequent visits of Jehovah would seem to be not so much supernatural appearances as the natural features peculiar to such a dispensation. We may, then, with more propriety, call the virtue of Adam the natural growth from an original endowment, rather than a super-added gift. The Pelagians held that his original state was one of moral indifference. But a moral being must have a tendency toward the supreme good in order to be moral, though the will, in the majesty of its freedom, may reverse that tendency. Pure indifference is an absolutely characterless state—a state inconsistent with the possession of any moral character whatever. The Socinians took the same view, but added that Adam's righteousness was an acquisition, and not a bestowment. But the acquisition seems to have been only a spiritual growth from a harmonious spiritual nature.

SECTION FIFTH.

THE PRIMEVAL ECONOMY.

Adam was placed under an economy simple in form, but fruitful in possibilities—and possibilities, too, of opposite characters. On the one hand, it might eventuate in a purely legal economy, where all evil would be excluded by the free self-determination of the soul, and where obedience would receive its full reward. On the other hand, it might invite a redemptive interposition, where sin would be mastered, either in the acceptance or in the rejection of the proffered grace, as this acceptance or this rejection culminated in in the bliss of heaven or the woes of hell.

But the primeval economy itself embraced simply a great pledge and a great test. The promise of life on obedience, and the threatening of death on disobedience went together; for they were counterparts of each other. They were positive and negative sides of one and the same trial. The one presented the incentives, and the other the sanctions, of a holy life, as these were found in the rewards and in the penalties of the divine law. They were thus the complements of each other—each serving to give force and fullness of import to the other. Thus the preference of the fruit of one tree was the rejection of the fruit of the other. If Adam stretched out his hand toward either one, he thereby withdrew it from the other; for both trees stood side by side, and addressed at the same time, in their natural appearance, his senses, and in their symbolic import, his moral consciousness. Adam could not choose the fruit of the one without, at the same time, consciously rejecting the fruit of the other. If he should eat of the fruit of the tree of life, he would thereby abstain from partaking of the forbidden fruit. In this case he would have learned the knowledge of good and evil by choosing the good for his portion, and would have secured for himself the promised blessing of life. If, on the contrary, he partook of the forbidden fruit, he would thereby reject the fruit of the tree of life. In this case he would learn the knowledge of good and evil by the choice of evil for his portion, and would bring upon himself the penalty of death. Thus the great proximate object of both symbols, in their relation to each other, was to awaken Adam's moral consciousness—so that he might become, in

the fullest sense of the word, a man—a free personal being. He was not to become such by becoming a sinner, but by becoming the subject of moral law, and thus exercising a free self-determination—a free self-decision—in the choice of evil or of good.

The position of these trees with their symbolical import *in the midst* of the garden, has a special significance. It shows that they held a central place—a place of supreme importance, in relation to the well-being of Adam. All the other trees might be enjoyed at pleasure, for they ministered to his natural life, and ministered to it by their own proper virtues; while these alone by the special appointment of God were made to address his power of free self-decision, and thus to awaken his moral self-consciousness—and so had to do only with his higher spiritual life.

The symbology of Eden deserves a still further brief notice. The two central trees of the garden were literal trees; but received their respective names, not from the effects that their fruits would produce—a conception too materialistic to be entertained at all—but from their symbolic import. The tree of life was so called, because it was the symbolic assurance that God would bestow the gift of life on Adam, if he should partake of its fruits, rather than of the fruit of the other central tree of Paradise. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was so called because it was the visible test of how man was to come to this knowledge; namely, by the choice of the good in preference to the evil, or of evil in preference to the good. The partaking of it was death, for it involved the rejection of the tree of life. The non-partaking of it was life; for it involved the partaking of the tree of life. The eating of the fruit of one was an act of faith; while the eating of the fruit of the other was an act of unbelief. There was no room for a moral neutrality.

The threatened penalty could be known to Adam chiefly in a negative way; namely, as the privation of all that he had hitherto enjoyed in life, and of all that he could enjoy in the endless future. The term death would undoubtedly convey to him the general idea of a separation from God, though he could not well conceive just how, in all respects, that separation could be carried into effect. Doubtless he would feel that it was not the annihilation of his being, but the reversal of his life.

It will be seen from the previous discussion, that the view there taken was that Adam was created with a body naturally mortal, but with the pledge of immortality, conditioned on his partaking of the tree of life. Thus the immortality of the bodily nature was a gift, rather than an endowment.

This general view is supported by I Cor. 15:45, where, in a quotation from Gen. 2:7, Adam is called a living soul. Here the original Hebrew is to be translated, "a living creature"—a phrase which is applied to animal life. It finds countenance, too, in I Cor. 15:47, where it is said: "The first man is of the earth, earthy." Here the allusion is to the declaration in Gen. 2:7, "God made man of the dust of the earth." Adam's nature became a dying one, outwardly by his being cut off from the pledge of life, and inwardly by his falling under the process of death itself. For a time the garden remained intact, and Adam was exiled forever from its enclosure. The cherubim must guard the entrance to Eden. There can be no more recovery—no restoration, simply *as such*. Man can never become just what he was before the fall, or just what he might have been if he had remained loyal in spite of the temptation. But heaven may take the place of Eden, and man may be redeemed, and so more than restored to his former condition; that is, he may be glorified.

CHAPTER II.

THE FALL OF THE RACE.

SECTION FIRST.

THE APOSTASY OF ADAM.

Adam could not become himself without a trial of some kind. His natural life might move on serenely from its center to its goal, symmetrical in its proportions, and beautiful in its manifestations; but it would be on the low plane of an unconscious moral necessity—the plane of sinlessness, without positive holiness. He must be placed under some positive law—a law which should touch all

sides of his nature—his love of the good and his sense of the right, his love of the beautiful and his thirst for knowledge, his physical cravings and his spiritual yearnings—above all, as overlooking all, his power of free self-determination. The tree of life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil were made the means by which his whole nature was thus roused into special activity, and by which a new moral character was freely developed and determined.

Some test, then, was natural, and not arbitrary: for some test was essential to the highest form of moral life. The special test selected can not be regarded as in any way arbitrary, unless it can be shown to be unsuited either to the nature or to the surroundings of Adam himself. This does not seem to have been the case. It was given in a very clear and brief form, and in a solemn manner, so as to imprint itself at once on the memory. Besides, it found a permanent expression in symbolic forms—forms easy of apprehension by our first parents. The issues made accorded with the nature of the choice, and each issue was placed on a level with the other. The choice of good must in the nature of the case insure life, and the choice of evil must necessarily insure death. In either case the *form* of life would be elevated immeasurably above what it was before the trial came, though in its *contents* it might be one of real freedom or of real bondage.

The very announcement of the law of Paradise awakened in our first parents a germinal personality, so that man was at the outset distinguished from the brutes. His naming the animals, and so distinguishing himself from them all, brings out this significant fact. But this incipient personal life must remain in its incipency till the actual choice between the good and evil should take place. That choice could not well be made till the natural life of Adam had become fully developed and had completed itself. Before this development was reached, our first parents were accustomed to remain away from the center of the garden till the cool of the day, and then to come there for evening worship; see Gen. 3:8-9. They were content with their natural life, relieved as it was by the daily symbolic presence of Jehovah. But the time would soon come when the natural resources of Paradise would be exhausted—when the first glow of experience of its innocent pleasures would have passed away. It was then that they returned early from the out-

skirts of the garden to its center. They were drawn there by the longings of their souls. They dimly and vaguely craved a higher life, and so unconsciously sought some such trial, and some such test. In fact, they were ready for the actual trial that was to be made. Here also the tempter came. That trial ensued. Eve was deceived. Adam yielded. Both fell from their integrity. When evening came and Jehovah called them to worship near his own chosen symbols, they were not there, for they had become apostates. We are to note:

First. The apparent origin of this moral apostasy. The following points are to be considered:

A. The inward condition of Adam just prior to the temptation. This has already been involved in the previous paragraphs; but will, from its importance, bear a repetition here. Adam was created with a tendency toward God. This tendency, however, was a tendency of his nature, rather than of his conscious purpose and fixed habit. His moral perfection was thus primitive, and not definitive in its character. There was the simple spontaneous love of the good, but no conscious choice of that good as the only goal of his life. He is summoned to make that supreme choice, though it necessarily involves the dread alternative of life and death. This summons comes from within, and is but the echo of the voice of God from without and above. In obedience to that summons he, with his companion, leaves the other trees of the garden, and approaches the two central trees—the test-tree and the pledge-tree of Paradise. They are there ready to make their supreme choice.

B. The outward conditions at the time of the temptation. Adam and Eve were in the presence of the divinely appointed symbols, by which their loyalty was to be tested. They knew their meaning. The law of Paradise had for them an objective validity. It was symbolized in living forms before their eyes. Its great incentives and great sanctions were present in their memories, and loomed up with their unknown eventualities in their imaginations. In these surroundings was present an alien personage. He is termed the Serpent. It is not material for our purpose whether we consider the term here used as the name of Satan himself, or regard it as the designation of the form of animal life—real or assumed—which Satan utilized to make his temptation more

effective. The Mosaic narrative teaches us that a tempter was present, and Christ and his apostles have in some way identified him with Satan himself; see John 8: 44; Rom. 16: 20; I John 3: 8; Rev. 12: 9; 20: 2. It is certain, however, that our first parents recognized only the serpent.

C. The temptation. Satan addressed Eve as the weaker of the two individuals who were before him; see I Cor. 11: 3. For this purpose he disguised himself under one of the familiar forms of the garden. In his insidious approaches, he leaves out of account the great promise of God, and deals only with his prohibition. He thus busies himself exclusively with one side of the divine law, and that the least attractive—the side of authority and of penalty. He purposely makes no reference whatever to the great promise of life on obedience. He does not deal even with the prohibition in the distinct form in which it was given by God; but leaves out the specific designation of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and so weakens the import in the divine injunction. He begins by asking a general question, expressive of surprise that there should be any limitation at all. In her answer, Eve simply calls the tree whose fruit had been forbidden “the tree in the midst of the garden.” The solemn impression of its meaning has thus been allowed to fade away from her mind and heart. The tempter has already gained a hearing, and he now speaks with confidence and assurance. He boldly questions the motives of the Law-giver Himself. He denies that the threatened evil will follow. He even insists that the greatest blessings would ensue upon her eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

In this last point—the great decisive point in the temptation—Satan uttered his falsehood under the cover of a truth. His declaration; “Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil,” comports with Jehovah’s statement: “Behold the man has become as one of us, to know good and evil.” Man would indeed become like God in the choice of evil; but nevertheless it would be the choice of death. The natural image of God would thus become complete; but the moral image would be utterly lost. God sought to have man become a sovereign by the choice of the good. Satan urged him to become a sovereign by the choice of evil. He exalted sovereignty at the expense of goodness—nay, he made goodness to

consist in man's sovereignty, and so appealed to the love of power natural to the human heart, and thus awakened that passion—that pride of the soul—which separates it farthest possible from God.

The temptation seems to have created at first a bewilderment in the mind of Eve. She had no experience of falsehood. She was led to accept the words of the serpent by the very natural trustfulness of her nature, and her soul was at once in suspense as to whose words, those of the Creator or those of the creature, she should believe. If her judgment here had been independent of all selfish hope, no hesitation could have found place in her soul. But the serpent had spoken with assurance, and Adam had remained silent, and so had given his consent to the views of the tempter. Her moral judgment had become confused, and Satan had gained more than half a victory. The moral process, we may believe, was rapid in the extreme. She responded to his temptation, and began to look upon the fruit as the means of a higher intellectual elevation, and as the source of satisfaction to her lower nature. The results in her consciousness seem to have been the following: Hesitation, Unbelief, Pride, and Sensuality.

Essentially the same process doubtless took place in the mind of Adam. He was with her at the time, and, if he hesitated at all, his hesitation was mastered when she offered him the fruit. He was her natural protector—the head of the first family in the order of time, and so the head of the race, and for this reason is prominent in the condemnation.

Second. The Real Origin of the Apostasy. The apparent origin helps to account only for the occasion of the fall; but not for the fall itself. It still remains a mystery why Eve should have listened to the tempter rather than to her Maker. For loyalty to God must have been to her the supreme good. If her disobedience was simply the result of confusion of thought—a confusion which involved no perversity of feeling or intention—then it lacked a moral element, and was a mere mistake, to which no guilt could be imputed. If that bewilderment involved unbelief, how shall we account for the origin of such a state in a sinless soul? For unbelief would necessitate a moral and radical change, and no temptation from without can account for such a transgression. It is true that Eve had no holy habits; but she had a natural tendency

toward God, and perfect purity of mind and heart; and why, notwithstanding the temptation, should she have chosen the evil instead of the good? If we refer the origin of this choice to her free will, and regard the temptation as the condition of that choice, though not in the strict sense as its cause, we are undoubtedly in the right. We make, however, no explanation of the choice; but simply state the fact, and the conditions under which the choice was made. Free will, in a sinless being, does certainly account for the possibility of sin; but for its possibility alone. It does not make it evident why a sinless soul should choose evil rather than good. No theory of the will whatever, that leaves man in his integrity, can possibly give a solution of that mystery. It must ever remain, even apart from its relation to the divine character, one of the enigmas of life.

Third. The Consequences to Adam himself. These are summed up in the death of Adam—not the death of the body alone, nor of the soul alone; but in the death of both, and that not as a transient penalty, but as a permanent penal condition. Let us briefly note the following points:

A. Physical Death. Adam is cut off from the tree of life. The process of death ensues. This is the ground of manifold diseases, and the source of every kind of physical pain. It is the form in which the curse of God outwardly reveals itself. If Adam had obeyed his Maker, and chosen the tree of life, and eaten of its fruit, and so had reached the conscious knowledge of good and evil by the choice of the good, he would have had the pledge of the completion of the life he had thus begun; the pledge of a transfiguration and of a translation to a higher sphere. It would have come to him, and after him to every soul, on their reaching the goal of their earthly life. Their departure would have been a day of glad festivities. So much is involved in the promise of life.

B. Spiritual Death. This is the moral separation, broad and deep, between the sinner and God. His position is changed by his guilt; for he is now a foe, and not a friend of God. He is under condemnation. His moral nature is changed by pollution, and he is thus infinitely removed from the holiness of his Maker. This spiritual death is the source of all forms of moral evil he can experience, as they rise and culminate in remorse and despair.

C. **Eternal Death.** This spiritual death is a permanent condition. Sin is mastered in the perfection of its penalty.

Fourth. The Curse on the Serpent. Satan presents himself as a serpent, and is treated as such. The community of life in some way established between the tempter and brute is the ground for the curse falling on both.

Fifth. The Effect on Nature. Before the apostasy of the race, nature is represented as a garden, and all creatures are spoken of as standing in friendly relations to Adam. This relation seems to have been changed on the introduction of sin. In Rom. 8: 19-22 the inanimate world is spoken of as longing for redemption—for a participation in the glorification of the children of God. This seems to point to a previous community of life, by which the world, animate and inanimate, was to share in the fall and in the recovery. Possibly the earth is to be fitted up for animal life of a higher order than existing species, and in this way all nature is also to be glorified. Man may hereafter hold some connection with his old dwelling-place. Animals are not to be immortal, but animal life is to reappear on the reformed earth.

Nature has not changed, nor has the brute creation changed. The only thing that has changed is the relation in which they stand to man. He has put himself in antagonism to them, creating an antagonism on their part, which has become hereditary, so that the friendly relations have been destroyed. The very forces of nature are now very often his most relentless foes. Whatever view we may take of this mystery, one thing is certain, and that is that the law of congruity here holds good. Man's inward state corresponds to his outward condition. The sinner's destiny and doom are thus indicated by the world in which he lives—a world not indeed without a promise and without a hope, but yet full of signs of divine wrath.

SECTION SECOND.

THE CORRUPTION AND GUILT OF THE RACE.

The apostasy of Adam was the fall of the race. His first sin affected not his person alone, but also his nature. It was not the loss of any acquired virtue—else he alone would have suffered. It

was the loss of his original rectitude, and so carried with it the loss of a natural tendency toward God. It was even more than this; for it was the reversal of that tendency—the creation in human nature of a positive bias toward evil. It was thus not merely the first sin among many transgressions of a like kind; but it was *the* sin—the only one of its kind possible in human history. It was not simply a specific violation of moral law, altering the direction of the individual, but the generic life-choice of evil, altering the moral nature of man, and so changing the moral type of the race.

As Adam was the head of the race, so this central and fontal sin determined the moral character of the race. For all were seminally and potentially and ideally in him. For he fixed the type of all, and generated the substance of all. All his posterity fell in and with him, for all derived a common nature from him, and were made to resemble their prototype. His act was their act—their ideal and impersonal act—by virtue of a common life-origin. His sin was their sin, and his guilt their guilt, in so far as they all shared in his fallen nature. His punishment, too, was their punishment, in its generic bearings, and in its impress on the constitution of the individual. All were not in him as separate individual persons. As persons we represent ourselves alone before God. Adam also stood alone in his separate personality, and bore alone the personal consequences of his guilt. But all, as samples of a common nature, were in him. This original sin, and guilt, and punishment fell on Adam's nature, and so on human nature, and so again upon that nature as it is individualized in the descendants of Adam. The divine wrath expresses itself in the copies and exemplars of that nature, aside from the emergence of the free personal life of the individual soul. The penalties of this common corruption are thus executed in this life alone, in and on that constitution of body and of soul which underlies personal life and personal responsibility. The person is accountable only for his own sins, though they are conditioned by his native corruption.

We are not to suppose that we inherit nothing but evil from Adam—that our nature is totally corrupt in every respect and every direction. Such is not the fact. It is at war with human experience, and in conflict with the teachings of Scripture. For they

teach us that while our depravity is radical and fatal, so that we can not redeem ourselves, we are still capable of being redeemed. Thus, with a dominant bias to evil running through human life, every soul appears with something of its original nobility of nature.

Though Adam is the very fountain of moral evil, yet between him and ourselves there are a thousand channels, which not only alter the direction, but vary the character of the original stream. The sad inheritance of evil is very far from being in all respects the same in all men. The variation is as endless as the number of separate individualities. We mark it in the distinct races and separate families which make up the life of humanity, and we trace it in the historical development of different nationalities. This variation does not spring altogether from a number of separate individualities and the countless interaction of their lives, nor from the dominant power of the great leaders of society. Even with these modifications of the statement, it would not be true that we are swayed alone by hereditary influence. There are social life-forces to which we are subjected, altogether independent of its potency. Nature, with her physical features, her soil, and her climate, has power to make her own impression on those who are dependent on her bounties. But greater than all this is the personality itself, with its own reactive power and the mighty reactive agencies it can create and utilize. These agencies may be embraced in those educative institutions and processes and results which mark the intellectual life of a people. There still remains one other element which enters in to change the current of human sinfulness—the presence of the Spirit of God. It is this which awakens the better latencies of our nature, as well as resists its depraved tendencies. Still its very power to radically alter human life, carries along with it a testimony clear and distinct to the universality and depth of our common depravity. We are forced, then, to conclude that, in spite of all these reactive influences, every human soul is born with a vitiated tendency.

It is not, however, culture or grace that is transmitted. The child of the Christian is not thereby born a Christian, nor is the child of the scholar thereby born with scholarly instincts and aspirations. It depends on how radical and how complete the moral

change in the parent becomes, whether the better elements of his new character will be transmitted to his posterity or not. We may well believe that the child born of a Christian mother would, as a rule, be in moral advance of a child born in heathendom. But since the nature of a regenerated soul has still radically defective elements, so the child of every Christian parent must come into the world with a bias to sin.

The common sinfulness and guilt of human nature finds its support in the following considerations:

First. The Testimony of the Scriptures. The moral condition of the race, before and after the deluge, is given in Gen. 6: 5, and 8: 21, as naturally depraved. Christ requires his disciples to offer the daily prayer, "Forgive us our sins," and he expressly declares that "Whatsoever is born of flesh is flesh." Paul uses stronger language, and affirms that all men are "By nature the children of wrath." The apostles frequently use the term World, to denote our common depraved life, in its state of alienation from God. It is the uniform representation of Christ and his early disciples, that salvation is impossible, except by virtue of an inward, radical, spiritual change; a becoming a new creature; a passing from death to life. Thus, by implication and by positive statements, as well as by the general drift of Scriptural teaching, man is represented as both depraved and guilty, by virtue not alone of his practice, but of his inborn tendency; see Ps. 51: 5; 58: 3; Is. 48: 8; Rom. 5: 12-19; Gal. 5: 17. Christ's commendation of the child as a pattern of natural humility and trust is not in conflict with this view; for these traits co-exist with the inborn bias to evil; a bias which dominates the growing personality.

Second. The testimony of experience and observation confirms this view. Evil appears before conscious moral life; and as soon as that life is awakened, it is awakened with a sense of sin and guilt. Conscience condemns us as soon as it begins to exercise its office, and condemns us for the evil which already has possession of our souls. Thus this moral degeneracy not only appears at the beginning of our lives, but appears as regnant in every line of free self-determination. Whenever the good impulses of nature come in direct conflict with this selfish tendency, they invariably and inevitably go down. They play on the surface of the soul and vary

the forms which this selfishness may take on, and exercise partial and temporary restraints; but never gain a decisive victory over it. In the new life called forth by Christ, the Christian becomes profoundly conscious of both sin and redemption. Repentance, even, does not concern itself with isolated sins, so much as with that fountain of corruption and guilt which it finds in its own soul. The soul feels that it has had something to do with the very spring of moral evil itself; with its own depraved dispositions, affections, and tastes, and so feels more or less personally guilty for them. This Christian consciousness is thus a witness to a depravity in which the natural and personal elements have blended and grown together. While he feels that the degree of his guilt is lessened by his native corruption, he also feels that he is personally guilty in so far as his will has entered into this corruption itself. That it has so entered in, he has no doubt whatever. The partial palliation here indicated, grounded in the fact that we do not create our natures, and do not create our natural bias to evil, is also supported by the Scriptures; see Luke 23: 34; Acts 3: 17; Rom. 10: 2; I Tim. 1: 13, in all of which cases the ultimate ground of palliation is found in the depraved nature. But Christ distinctly affirms, on the other hand, that out of the heart proceeds moral evil, and He and his apostles plainly imply that personal guilt grows up in and with the guilt of nature. For the germinant personality runs through the whole period of infancy and childhood.

It is a relief to know that the sense of this natural depravity is one of the great bonds of a common Christian sympathy, as it is the condition of a common redemption in Christ.

SECTION THIRD.

THE THEORIES OF ORIGINAL SIN.

Original sin is the sin and sinfulness of the race. The scholastics designated the initial and fountal act as *peccatum originale originans*, and the consequent state as *peccatum originale originatum*.

The difficulties in realizing the origin of sin, so far as they relate to the sinlessness of Adam, have already been noticed. We may restate them in a summary form, thus: Adam had exhausted his natural life, and thus experienced a sense of incompleteness. The

growing desire to advance was thus a natural impulse, and was met by a formal summons on the part of God to make that advance—an advance to the state of free and full personality. Two ways were presented—one in the choice of the good—an advance in a relative, but real freedom, by the choice of God as his portion; the other in the choice of evil, in an absolute but false freedom, by the choice of self for his portion. God called to one path; the tempter to the opposite. Satan appealed to the love of free self-determination, especially to the aversion to self-restraint, and thus allured Adam to the choice of freedom for its own sake—to unlimited freedom—to absolute independence, and in that to real bondage—in short, to the making of self his god. But this explains the possibility of temptation, and so of human sin, and nothing more. For how could temptation make the principle of self-love, though only in a sinless being without holy habits, a stronger motive power than the simple love of God?

When we attempt to conceive of the origin of moral evil in relation to the divine causality, we encounter a like difficulty. As a fact in the world-plan, we would naturally ascribe it to the Author of that plan. But since power waits on love in creation and in providence, we would as naturally be led to deny that moral evil could find any place in the moral order of the universe. Thus we reach a moral antimony in our thinking. We may affirm that the possibility of sin is involved in the creation of beings in the image of God. This is doubtless true. But the question returns, why could not God have secured the choice of the good? And if he could have secured it, why did he not do so? We have to content ourselves with the view that, as he had limited himself by the creation of his own image, so he would abide by this self-limitation, which, however, is not absolute. The sinner, though free in his sinfulness, is yet under the direct power of the Almighty. God gives scope for the development of sin; but only to accomplish higher ends and grander results. The divine policy of conditioning and mastering sin, is wiser than the policy of exclusion, or of direct and immediate extinction. In this view, sin is the independent act of the creature, apart from the divine causality. The will-power comes from God and rests on God. But the guilty exercise of that power is the act of the creature alone. Here the efficiency

of the creature is apart from the efficiency of God. Here God limits Himself, though only relatively and for a time, and only to make that limitation the great means of his own glorification.

Hegel held to the necessity of evil, as the condition of the good. In his view the necessity for its origin and for its destruction is one and the same. Evil is, in fact, only such if it be perpetual. It is provided for; but only in order that it may be overcome. In harmony with this governing thought, he explains the nature of evil itself. We give his words in their seeming contradictions. "Evil is an adherence to naturalism." It is "the self withdrawal of the *Ego* from a state of nature." His meaning is simply this: Evil is blind desire passing into free will. It is the transition of the will, still cloyed with nature, into the free life of the spirit. This movement is a necessary one. Every step in the ascent is a transient evil, essential to the reaching of a higher good. But to this theory we may object that, when applied to explain the worst forms of human sin it is either ludicrous or blasphemous, according as we look upon it in a serious light or otherwise. We cannot consider human crimes as marking an abnormal development of moral evil, without destroying the very idea of that evil itself. But the broad objection remains, that the theory of necessity, if strictly adhered to, transfers all responsibility from the creature to the Creator, and so annihilates what it seeks to explain. It is essentially pantheistic in its character. If God had been conceived as a person, and the theistic idea had been received as a regnant one, then the Hegelian system would have been essentially orthodox.

One thing is certain, and that is, that the fact of sin is a decisive argument for original sin. If sin, in the proper sense of the word, exists at all; namely, as involving responsibility, guilt and punishment, then it had its origin in time, and in the free will of the creature, and this origin must consist in some irrational and dreadful break of the creature with his Creator. This origin and the subsequent spread of moral evil have received various explanations. We here give the more important ones:

First. The Theory of Pre-existence. This view is manifestly an after-thought, to escape difficulties. We have already stated our objections to this theory. The attempt to explain native depravity

by ascribing its origin to an extra-mundane character is inconsistent with the facts in the case. For our innate corruption takes on from the very beginning special forms and tendencies. This bias to evil exists only in these germinant forms. The alien form is identical with the alien spirit. Now these special vicious tendencies are beyond question, our sad inheritances. They come from our ancestors in this world, and not from our pre-existence in another and spiritual world. Besides, the oneness of our race life, now generally accepted by the thinkers of our time, is opposed to any such idea. For if the theory of pre-existence be true and this application of it be allowable, then the unity of our common life is broken in upon by every soul that enters it from another and higher world. We may admit the great and wonderful variations of this life by the free self-determinations of the individual, but this is a very different thing from the continuous breaks in the very chain of human existence itself.

Second. The Pelagian View. Every soul enters the world pure. It is endangered by the feebleness of its powers, and imperiled by bad examples. These examples lead to a fatal imitation, and this imitation leads to a moral habit of sin. Thus every soul falls by itself. But this theory is wholly inadequate. Our first parents had no bad example to imitate, nor had they at the outset the feebleness of infancy. Besides, the Pelagian view ignores the fact of a common nature, and so of a common redemption. It sets aside the great law of inheritance—the inheritance of mental and moral traits, as well as of physical peculiarities. It presents human beings as aggregates of forces, without any inward affinity, or any identity of life. Birth has no special significance. It is simply the way in which God creates isolated individuals. It does not easily account for the absolute universality of sin, and for its dominance in the earliest stage of life. On Pelagian principles, we could not affirm the absolute certainty, that all would become sinners as soon as they become moral agents.

Third. The Arminian View. There are inborn propensities, which lead to sin, but which are not sinful. Without God's grace, man is sure to fall into utter ruin. But this grace itself is a compensation for this liability to a state of hopeless sinfulness. In fact, original sin is simply a malady—a disease—a degeneracy,

though it is such a malady as will make it certain that all will become sinners. Limborch held to a physical degeneracy alone. Wesley believed in a moral corruption, the guilt of which was removed by Christ. Others describe the common sinfulness as the dominance of the sensuous impulses in human nature. The Arminians hold that native corruption is rather the occasion of sin, than sin itself, and that sin begins with moral agency and is limited to the acts of the individual person.

This view is faulty, since it seems to empty grace of its proper meaning. The gifts of grace may balance the ills of the fall; but they can not be termed a compensation; for that implies a claim on the part of the sinner, and to that extent destroys his sinfulness. Besides, the terms malady and disease seem to be out of place, because our natures carry along with them a germinant personality. We are, even before full responsibility, more than animals. In the earliest showings of life, there is a personal element, however weak it may be. By virtue of this fact, and by virtue, too, of a community of life between ourselves and Adam, we are justified in speaking of a guilt of nature. This guilt of nature does not make us responsible in our personal character, except in so far forth as the will makes itself felt in the nature. The remark of Coleridge is here not wholly out of place, when he says: "Calvinism is a lamb in wolf's clothing; while Arminianism is a wolf in lamb's clothing." This is true, however, only when these opposing views are pushed to their extremes.

Fourth. The Theory of Hereditary Depravity. Many theologians content themselves simply with this explanation of our common depravity. But this is inadequate, since it does not clearly connect our depraved state with Adam. It is certainly true, as far as it goes; but it ignores the essential difficulties of the problem.

Fifth. The Theory of a Federal Headship. Adam is appointed by the sovereign will of God to act for his posterity. He is our agent, and we must assume the responsibility of his doings. There is thus a legal imputation of his guilt to us. Though not personally guilty, we are legally so considered and so treated. Our innate depravity is primarily the punishment which God inflicts upon us, by the withdrawal of his grace. Innocent ourselves, we are punished by being left to be sinful. The legal consequences are

transferred from Adam to his posterity, not because of any natural relation to him, but because of a covenant relation; that is, a legal connection, established by God Himself. In support of this view, it is frequently said. "As the soul is justified by the imputation of Christ's righteousness, independent of its personal holiness, so the soul is condemned by the imputation of Adam's transgression, independent of its personal sinfulness.

That we are right in this statement of the theory, we quote from Dr. Hodge, and his son. Dr. Hodge the elder, says: "It is only on the principle of representation that the act of Adam can be said to be ours." Again, "Men are born in a state of corruption as a punishment, and this corruption results from the withholding of divine influences." He says, still more explicitly: "Hereditary depravity is a penal evil for Adam's offence." Dr. Hodge the younger, declares: "We become inherently depraved as a part of the penalty for Adam's transgression." Again, "The legal responsibility of Adam's sin is imputed to his descendants, and the inheritance from him of their corrupt nature is a consequence of that imputation."

This view of imputation was modified by Placcus, a French theologian of the seventeenth century. He held to a mediate imputation; that is, an imputation of sin, because of its inheritance.

This view sacrifices our sense of responsibility to our sense of sin, and so confuses our moral consciousness. Imputation has a twofold aspect. It is either judicial or gracious in its character. As judicial, it is the reckoning to a man of just what belongs to him—it is holding him accountable for just what is his own. Thus the sin of Adam is imputed to our common nature and to all exemplars of that nature, just because that nature originated in him and came from him. It is imputed to us only in the sense and to the degree in which it is our own. Again, our sins are imputed to Christ only in the way and in the sense in which they are his; namely, that He bears the consequences of them, and so he bears, as he enhances, their penalty. Any other imputation, as a judicial act of God, is unthinkable, because the moment we are held accountable for sins that are not our own—that moment we are treated with the greatest injustice. Gracious imputation comes

Before us in both a negative and a positive form—the non-imputation of sin, and the imputation of Christ's righteousness, to the believer. These are the complements of each other. Because God can graciously impute what a soul does not possess, it does not follow that He can judicially impute to the soul what it does not possess. Judicial imputation does not allow an innocent being to be held guilty for the acts of an other. It is true that Christ is treated in some sense as a sinner, but only in so far as He identifies Himself with sinners. Again, we cannot affirm that God punishes sin by sin—least of all the sin of one by the sin of an other in any way dependent on that one. God does indeed punish sin by obduracy and by blindness of heart and mind, but not strictly by sin itself; for sin involves an act of the creature. The obduracy and the hardness of heart come by Divine law, and are a part of the ordained penalty. This phase of Calvinism is nominalistic in its character.

Sixth. The Theory of Natural Headship. All are in Adam. He is the representative of all, by reason of a real oneness with all—by virtue of a natural union with all. There is thus a community of life between Adam and his posterity. The vitiated state which each inherits, is the result of that first sin, in which each and every one seminally and potentially participated. Edwards affirms that the co-existence in the root and branches of the evil disposition, is the consequence of the union between Adam and his posterity; but not the consequence of the imputation of Adam's sin. Adam's sin was the sin of his posterity, and so was truly and properly theirs, and on this ground it was imputed to them. Thus Edwards makes the legal relation depend on the real relation. The fact that we find casual opinions in Edwards' writings inconsistent with this view, is of no moment. His opinions are to be determined by the system which he wrought out; and on this point there can be no doubt whatever. The Calvinism here presented may be considered realistic in its character.

The realistic view is, without doubt, the true one, provided it be not pressed beyond its proper bounds. In our nature we are one with Adam; but not in our persons. The guilt of nature is to be distinguished from the guilt of person. We must hold to the twofold relation in which Adam stood to his posterity; but the natural

headship must take precedence of the legal headship. The truth of the legal relation is found in the law under which Adam was placed. The truth of the natural relation is found in the fact that we were all in him by nature when he broke with his Maker, and so all fell in and with him. Thus original sin was gathered up and centered in Adam's violation of a positive law. No personal character is transferred from the one to the other; but a vicious bias is generated and transmitted to all his posterity.

SECTION FOURTH.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.

The idea of representation presupposes a community of life—a life common to all—a life held together by the bonds of blood and of sympathy.

The human family constitutes such a community, and requires for its growth and perfection a double headship. It must originate in one human pair, and the first man must be the first representative. But the race must have its legitimate growth and its goal, and that growth and goal must be determined by the ideal man. He who incarnates human life and fully embodies its idea and its law, and so leads the race on to its perfection, becomes thereby its second and higher representative. The first is by creation the founder of the race; the second is by a supernatural birth, the guide and the goal of the race.

The idea of representation presupposed, also, an assent on the part of those represented. This assent is the tacit covenant wrought into the very constitution of the soul itself. It finds expression in our earliest utterances and deepest yearnings. The family life is human life in miniature. We here see the instant and glad recognition of the father by the children as their representative. And as the family grows up, each and every one gladly welcomes that member of the home circle as its head, who most fully embodies its common traits and most honors its name by the nobility of his character and life. Thus, in the great human family, we may say that Christ Himself is the response to the yearnings and longings of humanity.

But the system of representation needs to be considered more

at length. The following points may be noticed:

First. Some such system is everywhere present in Providence. In fact, this is true even in nature. The very idea of a plant-kingdom rests on the law of identity. Every correct classification has its basis in nature, and not in mere convenience. We see that the original pair constitute the heads of their own order or species.

But in Providence this principle has richer and higher illustrations, both in organic life, and in those combinations which are essential to the well-being and progress of society. Thus the family, the nation, the race, are all instances of a community of life, and all illustrate that system by which one individual is made to act for all, by whose conduct all are affected for good or for evil. The same may be said, though in a less degree, of the school, of the church, and of the corporation; for these constitute communities, though more artificial in their character than the former. In partial sections of society, we notice how the industrious suffer for the idle, the learned for the ignorant, and the honest for the dishonest; and, in short, how each one is made in some way to represent others who are in some way dependent on him. This representation, however, is most fully illustrated in the family life. Thus children suffer, by the vices of their parents, the most terrible evils—consequences which put them to the hazard of failure, even in this life. These results come to them both by inheritance, and by education, and by the regard in which they are held, not only by virtue of what they are in themselves, but by reason of their connections. Thus the crime of treason brings shame on the children of the traitor, as, on the other hand, the heroism of the patriot reflects honor on his descendants.

Second. The wisdom of the special and formal trial in Adam is apparent. The plan under which individual human beings were to appear, was radically different from the plan under which the society of angels was to be formed. Additions to the one community were to be made by birth, and they were to grow to maturity by degrees; while the number of angels could be increased only by a specific creation—a creation full and complete at once. Thus the human family was to proceed from one single pair, and so to find in them its natural prototypes. This necessarily involved the principle of representation.

That this representation should not be divided between Adam and Eve, seems obvious. There must be a unity in the family life, and Adam, as the stronger character, is made the real responsible head of the race.

The result of the trial depends on the way in which his free self-determination shall show itself. He is to pass to a higher life, and with him all his posterity—the life of free conscious activity. Nature is to give place to person. Every one that shall be born into the world, is to appear with a germinant and growing personality. Thus the form of human life is, in any event, to be higher than it was before. So much is absolutely secured by the trial. This formal elevation of the race is guaranteed, whether Adam is loyal to God or not. But the alternative of weal or of woe, must of necessity, accompany this passage to a higher plane of existence. For while the *form* of life becomes, by supreme self-decision, higher than it was before, yet the moral contents of that life may be immeasurably lower, as, on the other hand, in fullness it may become immeasurably richer and nobler. This grand alternative depending not on chance, but on the self-decision of the creature, seems to be in harmony with the world-plan of God, in which He would crown creation with an image of Himself.

The trial might have come in some other specific way, but any change in the symbols or in the surroundings would have been only a change of accidents. The essential thing was a positive test. The mere accompaniments of the transaction can be left out of the account.

But possibly a positive statute of any kind might be dispensed with, and a natural trial might have ensued. This view deserves a brief notice. It is obvious that a mere sinless life, in beings fitted for a life of positive holiness, could never constitute their proper destination. Either a positive law must call forth a longing for something higher and better, or an inward impulse must in some way awaken a free personal life. It is difficult to see how this latent impulse could be brought forth, without some outward objective law by which it might be awakened. Possibly it would have started into life by virtue of its own energy. In this case, Adam might have done violence to the cravings of his organism, or might, on the other hand, have abandoned himself to his organic passions.

He might have exercised his free will either in a sensuous self-indulgence, or in a repression of his natural instincts and passions. In either case, he would have become out of harmony with himself, for the body is not to be made either the tyrant or the slave of the soul. This disharmony would have been the natural result of a growing inward impulse, left without outward guidance. But even this could hardly be termed a trial, since no real issue would be presented to the moral consciousness of Adam. In order that such an issue might be made, he must be called on to choose between some form of duty, and some form of personal gratification—between objects unlike in kind. It would seem that such a choice could not be made, except in the presence of some outward objective law given by his Maker.

Under some positive law, then, the head of the race must make his supreme life-choice. The trial does and must gather itself up in one critical decisive moment—the moment of obedience or disobedience. For in this one decision, Adam asserts his free and full personality. There was no reason to believe, prior to the event, that Adam could not have chosen the good, and so have confirmed forever his posterity in the love and favor of God. God had made provision for his favorable choice, in the great incentives and great sanctions to obedience which he had connected with the very law of Paradise. If the fact of a personal tempter increased the danger, it also invited a subsequent intervention. That our first parents were not aware of the tremendous issues involved in their acts, may be true. But if they at all knew their own natures, they must have known that it would affect an unborn posterity. It is to be remembered that no one ever knows all the results of his own sins, or is ever fully alive to those results which he does know.

Third. The capabilities of this system.

A. This representative system is the basis of the family life, and of all that grows out of it. We are not united chiefly by interest, by friendship, by common views, but by blood. In the language of the Scriptures, we are "of one blood." Home is possible with us, but not with the angels. The idea of the family life is at least partially realized. What is best and noblest in this world is found in the domestic circle. A Christian home is the best type of heaven itself. Here the fountains of sympathy are open,

and here the mutual responsibilities of parent and child, of brother and sister, of husband and wife, find place, and here only. There are richer associations connected with the name of father and mother, than there can be with the name of cherubim or seraphim. In the rightly constituted family, the most beautiful characters and the sweetest lives are generated and developed. And, in a fallen world like the present, there could be no organized society, were it not for these bonds of blood. Thus it is that that government is most enduring, other things being equal, where the national feeling is one with the sentiment of race.

B. In such a system, and such only, general reforms and revivals of virtue and religion are possible. No soul is isolated from its fellows, but stands in vital relations with them. Thus we are able to approach men, not merely as single individuals, but as members of a community. Thus a common moral sentiment may be created, and a public conscience may be formed, and thus, too, there may be generated saving moral currents, which shall make themselves felt everywhere. These unconscious influences, more subtle and all-pervading than those of which we are distinctly conscious, in reality have most to do with generating and maintaining all great revivals of virtue and of religion. It is in virtue of such a community of life, in times of religious awakening, that a slight touch of the secret chords of sympathy will often avail more than any burst of eloquence or any logical presentation of the truth, however clear and argumentative it may be.

C. This system allows of an incarnation of the Son of God. Had there been no common nature He could not have assumed it. There might have been an alliance with some one individual, but it would not have been an incarnation; for the separate personal individuality would have precluded it. Now there was need of some such intervention as was involved in the assumption of humanity, for man even in his sinlessness. The veil of the physical and material world must be lifted, and the realities of the higher life must be disclosed. Man, as finite and physical, needed to have these realities embodied and centered in a human form. In this way only could his higher nature be fully satisfied. No symbolic presentation, as a finality, could be adequate, nor could any abstract presentation of the truth meet the wants of a

being who craved a revelation in visible and tangible forms—a revelation which should address his senses. Of course such an incarnation would differ somewhat from the incarnation which actually took place; for in the latter case men needed this intervention, not simply because they were finite, but because they were guilty.

D. This system of representation invites that form of the incarnation which is seen in the intervention of the Son of God. He takes into fellowship our fallen nature and makes redemption for the race. Were there no bond of union, real and substantial among men, He might have allied Himself to one individual, and possibly have saved that one, but only that one. For this alliance could not have been an incarnation, since there would have resulted from the union two separate and distinct personalities, and not one Christ organically united to the race. He might have incarnated Himself in one human soul, by creating that soul; but He then would have stood forth only as the model and exemplar of the race, without any share in its burdens, and so without any power to change its state or shape its destiny.

In fact, the first Adam makes it possible for the second Adam to appear as the new Head of the race. The headship of Christ is the complement of the headship of Adam. They must be viewed together; for a great promise accompanies the very condemnation of our first parents. It is a one-sided conception to consider our condition simply in the light of the evils which Adam has introduced into the world, and not also in the light of the blessings which Christ has procured for humanity.

We are, then, warranted in contrasting the two by the example of Paul himself. The race lost by its probation in one, and gained by its probation in the other. The one brought the race under condemnation; while the other brought it into a state of reconciliation and justification. We here view, it must be remembered, the race in its collective capacity, as if it were one responsible individual. Every soul, ere it has reached a free personal life, is lost in the one and saved in the other. By the one it inherits a bias to sin; by the other it is made a sharer in a spiritual influence, according to its own receptivity. By one, God's attitude had become that of enmity; while by the other that attitude was

changed into friendship. In virtue of our relation to one, we are doomed; for we can not keep the law of God perfectly. In virtue of our relation to the other, we are relieved from this necessity of legal obedience, and are required to exercise only a filial trust in God. Thus the soul is lost—if lost at all—not because of its sinfulness, but because of its want of faith—its want of faith in the midst of divine entreaties and divine promises, and surrounded by manifold means of grace, and in spite of a great spiritual presence which finds its echo in the soul's deepest yearnings.

But it may be asked, was Christ, then, under obligation to appear in our behalf? We must answer in the negative. The Scriptures everywhere speak of his mission as a supreme gracious gift and blessing. It was a matter of pure love that He came into the world and assumed our nature. But there is another aspect of the case. His coming was a part of God's plan, and an essential part of that plan. In this sense, it was a necessity. But it may be asked, would it have been just on the part of God to have withheld the Son after the apostasy of Adam? We answer, the question involves an impossible hypothesis, since it introduces into the very supposition elements mutually destructive. For it supposes that God could have given a probation without a mediator—a delay of punishment without any provision for forgiveness—a suspension of the penalty in its fullness and completeness without any legal ground or reason to justify such a suspension. We can conceive of a new plan carried out on new principles; but not of the same plan carried out on different principles—principles subversive of its governing idea. Thus, for example, we might imagine a mere legal scheme, in which Adam would be cut off immediately on his transgression. In such a scheme of law, simple and pure, there would have been no posterity. Law is designed for individuals capable of being free moral subjects. The inheritance of mental and moral qualities, and the dependent state of infancy, seem inconsistent with a legal scheme, in the strictest sense of the term. The actual plan, then, was redemptive, and not legal; so that we can not make any supposition as to what God would do if he had violated the regnant principle of the plan itself.

The truth seems to be that the whole plan was one of grace, the whole scheme in its integrity was one of mercy and of love. The

very creation of Adam, the trial itself, the continuance of the race, the sending of the Son, the coming of the Spirit, and the grand and awful issues which wait on probation are all essential parts of an economy of grace. No part of this grand economy must be taken by itself and examined independently of its connections. For taken by itself it has no existence except in thought. We had no claims upon God, except what He has freely put on Himself and invites us to present before Him—none whatever, except what are implied in his promises—none even for existence. If the Son of God had not come, then God's plan would have failed of realization, and failed, too, just where it bore most fully the divine stamp and exhibited most gloriously the divine character.

CHAPTER III.

PERSONAL SIN.

SECTION FIRST.

THE ORIGIN OF PERSONAL SIN.

The origin of human sinfulness has been treated in the previous chapter. In this section we are to discuss, not the initial sin of Adam, either in its relation to himself or to the race, but simply the origin of the sin and guilt of the individual person.

Our common nature was tainted in and by Adam, and so all the samples of that nature, as they appear at birth, share in that corruption. Personality is latent in every such exemplar of the common race-life. By this latency we mean that man is capable of being made a free conscious person. This self-consciousness is awakened by the inspirations which come from the spiritual world. It is called into activity with the origin of the sense of responsibility itself. It is, however, only germinal at first. In infancy the soul is hardly held accountable at all, so feeble is its proper self-decision. The sphere of its moral agency grows with the growth of its personality. Personal sin, then, is the sin of the person, viewed apart from his nature—of his person in its separate individuality.

Thus at the outset of our lives nature is strong and the person is weak, but neither is settled and fixed in its movement. They both grow together. The one is the occasional cause, and the other is the proper efficient cause, of all the personal sins of the soul. The will, however, does not determine itself from its very beginning by a supreme life-choice, either of good or of evil. Its choices are at first but half-conscious choices—choices in which the inborn tendencies make themselves potential. It gradually fixes its own personal character, and fixes it in the line of its governing impulses and tastes. That every person both determines himself, and is also determined by forces within him and without him, is an obvious fact of our common life. But still, the person in this self-decision does and must count for something. He is more than the mere index of natural impulses. He is not simply passively determined. His freedom has not absolutely departed. His bondage is not settled and complete. He has an inheritance of good, as well as of evil. His yearnings after a better life and his very sense of sin are motive powers in and by which the will can react and reassert its proper sovereignty. Though the bias to sin does dominate, yet it does not reduce the better impulses of the soul to a complete subjection to itself; nor does it make the freedom of the will purely formal and nominal in its character. There is no such dark and awful harmony of evil in the soul. The evil ever wars with the good, in every human soul. Thus the will has power to react against the vicious propensities of one's nature. It can assert itself, too, over against the might of personal habits, or habits into which the personal life has entered, and which it has partly engendered. This is seen in those crises in one's existence where long-cherished practices are broken and suddenly mastered—where radical reforms are started and perpetuated. This power of self-recovery is further seen in the fact that the will, moving in the realm of the spiritual world, and dealing with the moral realities of that world, is itself a supernatural energy, and as such is ever in direct relation—either of attraction or of repulsion—with an infinite supernatural presence—the presence of God Himself. Thus the will has sources of power outside of its organic or cosmical connections—outside of its causal relations to the fixed forces of the universe. The will is not only in immediate contact with the

Spirit of God; but it is surrounded everywhere by the tokens and signs of his presence. That presence accompanies nature, inspires prophets, voices itself in providence, incarnates itself in Christ, seeks an actual realization in the church, flashes forth in the lives of saintly men and women, and takes on a fixed expression in the Holy Scriptures—and thus, in and through all these instrumentalities, that presence surrounds and penetrates each and every soul. By virtue of the contact between the human spirit and the Spirit of God—a contact which we can not explain, for the very reason that it is an interaction in the very fountain of our lives—by virtue of this mutual interpenetration, the will can take on transcendent power, and by a supreme effort reverse its own life-currents, abandon self and the world, and make choice of God for its portion. On the other hand, its power is seen in the deliberate preference of evil to the good in spite of the deepest convictions of its conscience, and in violation of all the yearnings of its better nature, and in open resistance to the strongest objective motives that can be brought to bear on its decisions. In fine, the fact that it can sin against the Holy Ghost proves its freedom in the very ruin of the soul.

Our freedom, then, though conditional, is yet actual, and there is no reason to reject the plain deliverance of the consciousness on this point, or to explain away the equally plain teachings of the Word of God.

This occasional cause does not necessitate personal sin, for that would reduce to zero the will-power, as it would take from sin its distinctive character; namely, its guilt. But the occasional cause, working as it does in the infancy of our personal life, certainly does make it certain that our earlier dominant choices will take, in the main, a sinful direction. The will determines itself gradually and imperceptibly, but yet determines itself wrongly. It thus creates its own personal character, and is the author of all its strictly personal acts and states. The co-working of natural and personal elements is seen in the regnant dispositions and governing affections and dominant modes of thought of the soul. But here as elsewhere, the soul is only responsible for what is the effect and the result of its own free agency. It is not, however, necessary that we should remember the fact of origination, or that we should be conscious just how far our will has identified itself with our nat-

ural affections. Whenever we feel that any disposition is our own, that is sufficient evidence that we are, in a greater or less extent, the authors of that disposition itself.

Personal sin, then, originates in ourselves. Though our natures are vitiated, they are not hopelessly unsusceptible of anything good. There are still left us noble instincts, generous impulses, and a real pleasure in seeing and doing the right, when it does not conflict with our selfishness. The condemnation which we pass on ourselves is a witness to our better nature. The natural reason and conscience is ever on the side of the divine administration. As we emerge from our state of receptivity into one of activity—as we advance from the limitations of infancy—as the germs of rationality and freedom are awakened into life—in short, as we become original and originating agencies—separate individual personalities—we assume more and more a mastery over our characters and actions, and become free responsible beings.

Many theologians have maintained a different view; namely, that sin originates in man's sensuous nature, or in the dominance of animal passions and appetites. In defense of this view they refer to the New Testament, as indicating that human sin has its source and seat in the flesh. We must, then, inquire into the Scriptural import of this term. Its radical physical idea is our organic nature, kindred, human nature, etc. Its ethical meaning, however, is human nature alienated from its Maker—and not merely the physical organism, with its dominant appetites and passions. It is true that the disordered condition is the result of sin, and it is also true that the sensuous side of our nature is the common, although not the exclusive, theatre of our personal sinfulness. But the theatre of sin is one thing and its source and spring quite another and different thing.

The ethical meaning of the word *flesh* has several real parallels, as in the phrase "our old man," Rom. 6: 6, and "the old man," Eph. 4: 22, and in Col. 3: 9, where the whole nature, body and soul, is spoken of as unrenewed. In Gal. 5: 17 it is said, "for the flesh hath desires against the spirit." Here the antagonism is not between the body and the soul, but between human nature as renewed and as unrenewed. In Rom. 7: 18 it is said, "In me, that is, in my flesh." Here the words "my flesh" are exegetical of the

word "me"—the depraved self—the unsanctified person. The passage found in Gal. 5: 19-21 seems conclusive. Here we have various predicates of the flesh. These may be put into two classes: *First*. Those sins which belong to the animal side of our nature, and have the theatre of their manifestation in the organism; namely adultery, fornication, lasciviousness, and drunkenness. *Second*. Those which belong distinctively to the mind, and reveal themselves in the activities of the soul; namely, hatred, variance, wrath, strife.

Besides, to put sin in our sensuousness—to affirm that sin originates in the dominance of our lower propensities—leaves the fact of this dominance itself unexplained. The question will occur, how came they to be dominant? If by a decision of the will, then sin originated in the will. If by any force outside of the will, then sin loses its distinctive character, and ceases to be sinful. It may be a misfortune, but it can not be our guilt. It is also to be noted that Christ Himself centres personal sin and guilt in the heart; that is, in the very soul itself, in the words "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts," etc. Thus He excludes the idea of simple sensuousness as the source of sin, and locates its origin in the will. The term heart as used by Him is evidently a synonym of the soul—the seat of human thought, affections, and volitions. But there are still other objections to this view, which ought not to be overlooked.

First. It savours of the old Manichæan theory that evil has its origin in matter, for our sensuous nature is only the elements of matter in an organized living form.

Second. The child would, according to this view, be, relatively to the sphere of his life, more sinful than in his maturity. But this is not the view of the Scriptures. His sensuous nature is dominant—more dominant than in later years, but that fact is quite consistent with his relative innocence.

Third. On this theory Christ Himself must have had sources of sin in his physical nature—sources indeed which He ever repressed by moral activity, but which were ever latent in his humanity. Even if we fall back on the idea of an absolute harmony between the lower and higher sides of his human nature, and hold to this harmony in spite of the fact that Christ was subject to pain and to

death, even then there seems to be at least a minimum of evil in the very nature of our Lord—a power outside of his will that might at any moment generate sin and guilt.

Fourth. It fails to account for a large class of sins. We find that the child, even in its earliest years, when its wishes are crossed, often develops its hatred or its obstinacy; and when its interests are involved, will often resort to equivocation and falsehood. We find, too, that among grown people the sensuous impulses and passions give place to malice, ambition, pride, and avarice. Under the influence of these sinful principles the soul will sacrifice all the pleasures of sense, and all the lusts of corrupt nature. This theory does not account at all for that one supreme sin—the sin against the Holy Ghost—that spiritual condition which at once reveals the nature and goal of human sinfulness. We must conclude, then, that personal sin originates in the free will of the free creature, as that will is affected by the common sinfulness of the race.

SECTION SECOND.

THE NATURE OF PERSONAL SIN.

The Scriptures represent human sin under the following leading aspects: It is viewed as a resistance to the divine will, a departure from the divine law, a violation of the divine commandments, a hatred to the divine character; as a failure to walk in the path of life, and to reach its final goal; as the breaking of a covenant, and breach of trust; as an apostasy from the kingdom of God, a treason against heaven; as a discord and a deception; as a folly and a lie. Thus the Bible describes sin as a criminal act, a corrupt condition, an evil habit, issuing in a doom irreversible and perpetual. It unfolds its course and describes its final state as that of settled unbelief, which brings damnation—as that final state which is the sin against the Holy Ghost. This portraiture of sin finds many of its distinctive lines and features indicated in the etymology of the terms used to define its nature, and much of its filling up in the Biblical accounts of sinful acts and characters. The points to be considered are:

I. THE NEGATIVE PRINCIPLE OF SIN. The good is eternal, and

exists of itself. It is the state in which God dwells. For God's life is love. Thus it is real and positive, having in itself the sources of all moral power and blessings. Sin is the negation of the good. It is the state of the creature in his isolation from the Creator.

It is his creation alone—his sole possession and property—the one thing which belongs to him alone. It is in itself the source of no real power and the spring of no real joy. It is thus unreal in its nature. This must be so, for it originates apart from the divine efficiency, whether that efficiency works directly on the soul, or through the intervention of second causes. There is no provision for it in the order of Providence, or in the nature of man. It is not the normal exercise of any function of the body or of the soul. It appears by virtue of God's self-limitation. He creates a being free in his choices and independent in his preferences, and thus suffers the possibility of sin. Even with this scope for action, which his sufferance allows, sin reveals its own inherent powerlessness. It never dares to show itself as it is, to avow its own nature, or to rely on its own strength. Its sole power is found in its alliances with the good—in the concealments and in the assumptions by which it seeks to utilize forces which are in antagonism to its proper character. Whenever it displays its distinctive nature, the moral forces of the universe rally at once for its destruction. When it passes into the eternal world, and is revealed in the light of that world, the judgment comes; and the sinner stands before his Maker bereft of all power—utterly and forever paralyzed.

Sin has also been termed privative, as denoting the loss of original rectitude. This undoubtedly covers an important fact. The normal dominant tendency toward God is lost. There is thus a fatal departure from the moral type given us in our first parents. But sin is not simply the loss of what we had in our creation, but the rejection of the higher good, the positive holiness, which we might have had by obedience. The same sinful tendency reveals itself to day, everywhere in the race. The enormity of human sin is not expressed or measured so much by a departure from the original type given by the sinless Adam, as in the rejection of the new type given by the holy Redeemer. This negative character appears in various lights.

First. Sin is irrational in its character. It is pure self-will—self-will moving without a sufficient reason and without an adequate end. It is reason denying itself—abdicating its sanity and falsifying its nature. It is thus pure moral arbitrariness—simple unalloyed willfulness.

But sin is something more than this self-will, acting thus arbitrarily—more than a central and fatal inner disharmony—more than an inward schism and self-defection. It stands related to an absolute standard of right—an absolute norm of rectitude, out of and above ourselves. We must, then, characterize it by this relation, and advance to a more comprehensive statement.

Second. Sin is lawless in its character. It is no mere individual disharmony, which may be mastered by the higher harmonies of society. It is no mere capriciousness, which may be regulated by some general law, or lost in the advance of the common life. It is no mere temporary aberration, which may naturally wear away in the lapse of years. It is more even than a departure from some positive statute in the divine economy. It is the violation of the very principle of law—of law in its highest imperative and holiest sphere. Thus it stands related to an obligation outside of the soul from which it springs. It is not simply a conflict with the law of our natures, but with law outside of and above ourselves—with the moral order of the universe. In its essence and at bottom, it is a defiance of all law. In its spirit it ignores the very idea of duty, and tramples on the very notion of right itself. It thus violates the very principle of authority and every form of law, whether that law be wrought into our natures, or voiced in the general judgments of society, or given in a supernatural revelation. It is thus more than a trespass, a transgression of civil law—more than a debt, a violation of social law. It is a crime—a violation of moral law. Such is sin in its essence and tendencies, as hindered by virtuous impulses within us and by an authority without us and above us.

But sin is more than all this—more than an irrational act of self-will—more even than absolute lawlessness. It has a personal character, and involves personal relations. We must then advance a step further.

Third. Sin is Godless in its character. It is not merely a viola-

tion of law, but opposition to Him who is the very ground and source of law itself. It is hostility to God. The sinner does not merely repudiate the principle of authority, but he puts himself also in antagonism to the Sovereign of the universe. He does not merely oppose the moral order of society, but he rebels against the Author of his being and the Source of all his happiness. He is most in conflict with Him with whom he ought to be most at peace. He breaks that one great personal bond of union which is his only security and his only hope; namely, his obedience to his God. He arrays himself against the Creator whose power has made him all he is and whose love has given him all he has, and but for whose merciful presence and energy he would return to his original nothingness. It is not simply the principle of authority which he defies, or the idea of divine sovereignty which he scorns; but it is the sovereign God, the loving Father, whom he neglects and opposes. His attitude is no longer that of a subject or that of a creature—still less that of a child—but simply and purely that of a rebel. God's claims he ignores or repudiates; his judgments he denounces; his mercies he forgets; and his gifts he thanklessly grasps and thoughtlessly appropriates. God's works in nature, in providence, and in redemption, fail to awaken his filial love, or to command his filial homage. But human sin under the Christian Dispensation can take on another and more repulsive form.

Fourth. It is not simply Godless in its character, but it is also Christless. Sin is not only at war with reason, with law, with God, but also with Christ. In Christ, God comes with his sympathy, and offers his love; and makes good that offer by identifying Himself with the sinner, in carrying his sorrows, bearing his burdens, and dying his death. The sinner ignores this new and higher presentation of love. He slights the offer of pardon, and makes light of the divine compassion, and closes his ears to the divine entreaty. He even presumes on the very mercy he neglects; he believes that the love of God knows no bounds, and will accept him at last, in spite of his indifference. Sin in this, its final and worst form, may wilfully reject every evidence of Christ's presence, or contemn and scorn that presence, and so make its own damnation sure. For the unbelief which dooms the sinner is the final form which his sin takes.

II. THE POSITIVE PRINCIPLE OF SIN.—In these aspects of personal sin there are positive elements. The reason for the positive character of the sinful principle is obvious. God, in limiting Himself, in creating man in his own image, does thereby give the sinner a theatre of action, and to the sinner's agency a potency of its own—though that potency is not grounded in the constitution of the soul. That agency is real and positive by the sufferance of God. Though conditioned by probation and over-ruled by redemptive agencies and issues, yet human sin does take on for a limited period a positive character. For its aim is not so much the dethronement of God, as it is the enthronement of self. It is not, in its essence and tendency, a mere rebellion against the Creator; but it is also a usurpation by the sinner himself. It is not simply an attempt at a revolt; but it is a purpose to revolutionize the divine government, and to set up its own authority instead of the authority of God. It turns aside from the worship and service of the Creator, only to worship and to serve the creature. It seeks to put itself in the place of God, and to make its own will the sole and supreme law of its guidance.

The principle of sin has been traced by some to self-love, or to the excess of self-love. It is manifest, however, that this view cannot be true, for if virtue and vice were to be thus distinguished in their inmost principle, then the difference would be one simply of degree and not of kind. It is true, there is often the vice of excess or of deficiency, as in the case of almsgiving; but the principle which regulates the amount to be given is not the strength or weakness of self-love. Virtue and vice may, in some of their forms, be outwardly near each other; but inwardly they are infinitely from one another. If any class of vices seem to come from self-love, it is only from its perversion—a perversion which must be itself explained and accounted for. A perverted self-love is not so much a departure from the normal degree in which one should love himself, as it is a love for one's false self. Generosity does not become prodigality, nor does economy become avarice, nor does geniality pass into levity by the excess of an unselfish principle, but by the intrusion of a selfish element. In other words, there can be no such thing as the excess or the deficiency of any virtuous principle whatever. Such apparent excesses or deficiencies are not

the growth or want of growth of virtue, but its excrecences or its corruptions. In other words, if virtue is dwarfed at all or hindered in its development, it is owing strictly not to its own weakness but to the presence of some alien principle. Thus there is a difference of kind between a true self-love and a perverted self-love. We must seek, then, for some simpler and more radical principle than excessive self love, as the real and positive spring of human sin.

Now self-love is a normal and primitive impulse of our nature, and must be pronounced itself good and right. As a spring of action it has degrees in proportion to the strength of one's sensibilities and to the clearness and the largeness of his intelligence. In all cases, however, it is a legitimate principle, and if it ever fails, the failure must be superficial in its character arising from a misapprehension rather than from any vicious tendency whatever. The Scriptures recognize it as a measure of the love we owe our neighbor. See Matt 22:39; Luke 10:27; Rom. 13:9; Gal. 5:14. Christ and his apostles address our fears and our hopes, and so appeal to this very principle of action. Self-love is ever in harmony with the love of our fellows, and both find their support and justification in the love of God. The individual consciousness may start with any one of the links of this chain; but it cannot move forward without carrying along with itself the entire chain. Thus these principles ever act in harmony with one another. Just so far as any one of them is wanting in purity, just so far the others share in a like deficiency. Our love to God is one with a love to all who bear his image, and our love to ourselves leads us along the same line as our love to the great Original. The idea that the principle of reward should find no place in a moral life, is a pure fancy. The reward of virtue is simply virtue existing in perfect beings, and the inmost essence of that reward is the approbation of God Himself. Thus, though virtue is its own reward, it is nevertheless a reward. The happiness we are to enjoy is the consciousness of divine approbation. Thus the hope of a divine reward is only the hope of a sweet union with God. This reward is but the free joy of virtuous living, and so one with it. The penalty of vice is only vice revealing its enormity and its dreadfulness, and so bringing to our consciousness nothing but the sense of the divine displeasure. The fear of penalty is only the

hatred of sin; for in the final issues of life, the penalty itself is but the full experience of sin—the full consciousness of the antipathy and antagonism of God.

We have reference here not to any selfish hope which mistakes the real incentives to a good life, nor to any slavish fear which misapprehends the sanctions of the moral law; but simply and solely to those Christian graces which bring a man into right relations to himself, his neighbor, and his God. The longing for an endless life is not in its nature selfish. It is only the desire to reach God, and to find our completion in him. The willingness to renounce such a life does not indicate a higher moral state, for it is born either of a defiant pride, or of despondency and despair. In souls of a mystic tendency, these moods of mind strangely blend together, or follow each other in quick succession.

It is not, then, self-love, but selfishness, which is the principle of personal sin. Between these springs of action there is a radical difference. They are not simply divergent moral states, but opposite moral forces. They do not differ in degree, but in kind. Selfishness is a regard for one's self as an independent being, and so for one's false self. It is the setting up of self as one's supreme authority, and the making of self the goal of one's hopes and strivings. Thus self—the false and unreal self—is made the absolute autocrat. Selfishness is thus exclusive in its nature. It either subordinates all other principles of action to itself, or adulterates them with the virus of its own poison, or, where this is impossible, repels and silences them. It allows in the soul no fellow and no equal. All other springs of action are either swallowed up or made tributary to this governing principle of life.

But self-love is inclusive in its nature. It invites and necessitates a fellowship with all other right principles of action. For love, when real and true, is essentially the same, whether it is directed to self, or to the creature, or to the Creator. Thus self-love is a regard for one's self as the creature and the child of God, dependent alike upon his power and upon his grace. It is, then, a legitimate and right principle of action. Self-hate is immoral, for it is one with hatred toward man and toward God—one of the strange forms of human selfishness.

If we examine particular sins and vices, we shall be able to trace

them all to this one group. Thus pride is the enthronement of self. It may be pride of talent, of learning, or of position, or, what is the most monstrous form of all, the pride of virtue, for it is virtue destroying itself. Pride is exclusive self-homage. Vanity is the love of approbation. Pride is satisfied with one worshiper; while vanity is not content with this solitary self-homage, but is anxious to have others come and pay their devotions at its shrine. Ambition is self, seeking to bend the world to its own ends and its *cum* interests. Revenge is self, seeking unrighteous satisfaction for real and imaginary wrongs. Hate is the antagonism of the soul to all who have in any manner crossed its path, or who stand in the way of its plans and purposes. Jealousy is but the selfishness of love, while envy is the disappointment of love. Hypocrisy is only the prudence of the selfish soul; while falsehood is its cowardice. Ingratitude is selfish indifference, and cruelty is the callousness of selfish affection. Avarice is selfishness grasping after wealth as a means of self-indulgence, and the miserly spirit is self, transforming the means into the end and struggling for that end alone. Covetousness is the selfish refusal of the soul to part with one's wealth in the interests of others. Worldliness is holding one's self as a mere creature of this world and not as a child of God—is making an idol of human society and accepting its maxims as the supreme law of life and appropriating its goods to one's own selfish ends. Lust is the sacrifice of our higher nature to our lower impulses—to the moral and physical injury of ourselves and of others. In short, all forms of sensuous pleasure are only instances of a short-sighted selfishness. Even the supreme sin of unbelief is the negative form of one's absolute trust in self. The rejection of Christ is only the result of making a god of self. Thus selfishness finds its culmination in the rejection of the Gospel of Christ.

Even those forms of sin which seem to spring from the perversion of generous and noble impulses will be found to contain selfish elements. Thus the lavish giver is careless, or frivolous, or ostentatious, in his gifts. If none of these alien elements enter into the case, then it will be found that the giver has made himself one with the person or the cause which he so thoughtlessly befriends. Thus, in this very identification, his selfishness is manifest. In fact, devotion to an enterprise may take on a heroic form, when the devotee

finds his own glory in the triumph of his party. Here we find the selfishness of party-spirit in its best showing. Again, the indulgent mother displays her selfishness in sacrificing the real interests of her child to her desire to hold his affections. We may conclude, then, that all human sin has its root in selfishness.

When these negative and positive aspects of sin are compared, we must say that the principle of sin is negative when viewed absolutely, and only positive when considered relatively. In its negative aspect it is an infinite evil because it is the loss of an infinite good: in its positive aspect it is only a finite evil as a feeble and vain attempt at rebellion and as the forthputtings of a depraved but limited human will.

SECTION THIRD.

THE GROWTH OF PERSONAL SIN.

A catalogue of the sins of any individual at any stage of his growth would not exhaustively describe his sinful character. They would merely indicate its partial development. The dark possibilities of evil are still left to be evolved. The hidden spring of natural corruption has indeed become the open fountain of personal sin in vicious inclinations, dispositions, and habits of personal character. How much more there is underneath consciousness we do not know and can never affirm.

In the growth of sin there are three essential factors—the individual nature with its unfree impulses—the educative influence of its surroundings—and the conscious decisions of the person himself.

The natural character of the individual appears at birth. It is the special combination of human elements determined by his inheritance. It is singular and unique. No two souls are absolutely alike. Each differs from the other, both in quality and in force of character. Judging by the light of history, we might affirm that this factor in life was the most potential, at least in most cases, in settling human destiny. But nevertheless it does not fix, as by the law of necessity, the direction of one's moral life. The only absolutely certain fact is that the individual starts with a natural type of character which he will maintain throughout his

life. There will be variations from that natural type, but no radical change. This fact, however, depends on the development being so far normal as to preclude the disturbing effects of any great physical or mental derangement.

The character of the individual is, however, never the mere result of the evolution of forces given at birth. These do certainly indicate receptivities and capacities; but always in an untarmious combination. This very want of absolute harmony allows of a greater or less departure from the original tendencies. Only the essential natural type will remain unaltered. But this essential type has in it latencies which may not appear until many years after birth. Education includes repression as well as evolution. It may guide and strengthen what is naturally weak, and steadily neglect and repress what is already too strong, and thus secure new combinations as the basis of a relatively new character. It may generate new habits, and, by virtue of the power of the world to come, it may recreate the man. But even in this most favorable view which can be taken of human development, there will remain the dark possibilities of evil. Latent sinful tendencies may suddenly emerge, in great temptations and in marked epochs in the career of men, and plunge them into utter ruin. This will be found to be the case in the sad fall of men who have been long trusted and loved by their contemporaries. But again, education, when it is unwise and faulty, may pervert a nature otherwise as noble as that of its fellows, and so accelerate the growth of its worst propensities.

The will itself is not to be overlooked in the growth of the individual. It has not completely lost its freedom. It has yielded to the impulses of its nature, and converted these impulses into free determinations, and so has helped to mould its own moral character. But it still can form an alliance with its better natural affections, and can still be open to influences from the spiritual world. These last ever enable the will to exert a reactive influence and to reverse, in part, and for a longer or shorter time, its own downward course. Still the will may, and in most cases does, prefer the wrong direction, and thus creates in the soul a fountain of personal sin and guilt that is distinctly its own. It may and often does do more even than this, starting on new courses of sin, rushing into

new crimes, and so opening channels along which new currents of its depravity may flow. There is always a first sin in any career of crime, and in that very first sin the soul finds itself bewildered in a labyrinth from which the escape is almost hopeless.

The first stage in this growth is that of infancy. We do not pass at once from our seminal existence to that of full maturity. We first appear as infants, but from the very beginning of life we are more than animals. The germs of a personal existence are present in us from our birth. This personality is gradually awakened by a contact with the spiritual world. Now during this first period of infancy we are natures rather than persons, and so our affections are natural and necessary, rather than free and moral, and thus our responsibility has only a fractional place in our lives. To the young child the parent is the vicegerent of God. As he grows up, he advances slowly and with difficulty to the higher and broader view, that his parents, as well as himself, are alike amenable to a power above and beyond them both. The child lives in his senses and sensual impulses. His bodily appetites and his physical activities engross his thoughts and his feelings. The chief practical test that is presented to his soul is a temptation to follow his plays rather than to obey his parents. Still his higher nature flashes forth in those striking questions which at once proclaim his origin and his destiny. The growth of the person is involved in the growth of the nature; but shares slightly in the sin and guilt of that nature. As we have intimated, sin in childhood takes on the form of sensuousness. Its theatre of action is found in the organic and physical life. But beneath this garb of animal gratification, we plainly discern the germinal forces of moral evil, in the outbreaks of self-will, envy, jealousy, and hate. Thus, while sin in our earliest years, manifests itself chiefly in sensuous directions, it nevertheless has its source and origin in the perversity of the will alone.

Passing over this transition period—the period of mere infancy --the period which precedes full responsibility, we come to that of youth and early manhood. Now the soul begins to gravitate downward with an increased momentum. This is the first conscious state of its growth. It is the formative period, when the fluid elements of the earlier life begin to crystallize into a moral char-

acter. Here we find simple impulses and passions, and incipient sinful habits. Selfishness appears in wayward and fickle aims and purposes, and in a desire to make life a mere means of selfish enjoyment. The soul in its youth is alive to the claims of God, and, so long as these claims do not interfere with its pleasures, it is willing to yield to them. In fact, its heart and its conscience are tender and full of moral feeling, even though it may refuse to surrender its very self to the claims of God. This refusal is, however, for the most part, not direct and absolute, but that of evasion and delay. Thus sin reveals itself in thoughtlessness and carelessness, amounting at times to a transient recklessness.

The second stage in this conscious progress is that of a constant conflict. The intermittent struggles of youth settle down into the continued battle of life. The forces of good and of evil are brought into direct antagonism. Carelessness has given place to a fixed determination. The purpose and plan of life force an issue with God's purpose and God's plan, as these are brought home to the conscience. And throughout this prolonged strife, sin is constantly gaining the mastery. The habits of sin are growing stronger and stronger, and the moral and spiritual receptivity of the soul is growing weaker and weaker. The thoughtlessness of earlier days has given place to a quiet moral servitude. Conscience still speaks with authority, but without power. Reason points out the right way, but imparts no strength to follow in that way. Still the sinner is often active in a kind of external resistance to his manifest moral destiny. He attends to the means of grace and responds to the many demands on his time and his money. There are occasions, too, when startled by his fears, or roused by the presence of life's griefs, he puts forth a tremendous energy of will, and struggles to break up the habits of irreligion, and to change the current of his godless affections. The conviction at such times may, under the blessing of God, deepen in spiritual apprehensions; and the man may, even at maturity, be brought back to God. But such a case is exceptional. As a rule the struggle is short-lived. The effort is not simply superficial, but outward and formal. The soul breaks only some of its exterior habits, but does not reverse or radically change any of the under currents of its affections or its sympathies.

This brings us to the third stage of this development. It is one of moral settlement—of moral finality. The life-long habits of sin have become fixed. The sinful character has taken on a petrified form. The carelessness of youth has passed into the indifference and security of manhood, and these have grown into callousness. There now ensues that blindness of mind and hardness of heart that are so often spoken of in the Scriptures—a blindness and a hardness which are the tokens of perdition. One must not assume that the future of any soul is settled until the final summons calls him to the last judgment. But as the sinner approaches the close of a long life a dull despair steals over him—a moral stupor permeates his being. Underneath this callous indifference is found the spirit of hate—an aversion cold, calm and immovable in its persistency. In the culmination of this state is to be found the sin against the Holy Ghost. Every sinner is moving toward such a state. Such a state is the absolute reversal of that filial, joyous, perfect trust in Christ which is the condition of salvation.

SECTION FOURTH.

THE FORMS OF SINFULNESS AND THE KINDS OF SIN.

The first sinful act generates not only a special habit of its own—a tendency to repeat and to perpetuate itself—but also a sinful state and character. It thus makes itself felt outside of its own distinctive movement. It works inward and downward, and creates a fountain of evil in the inmost depths of the soul itself. Thus the habit of untruthfulness not only leads to a facility in lying; but also effaces the power to appreciate the sacredness of truth, and, in time, the moral ability to distinguish between fact and fiction, truth and falsehood. In such a case the man is false in the core of his nature. He is a liar. That is his character. The distinction between an act and a state is warranted by the very fundamental law in the growth of every soul—the law that all conscious acts pass unconsciously into mental states, and that out of these again are the issues of life.

The forms of human sinfulness are as varied as the aspects of human life. The two most marked are those which find their centre of activity in the realm of spirit, and those which reveal

themselves in the appetites and passions. Pride and hate, with their many variations and modes of manifestation, make up for the most part the first of the fatal forms of human sinfulness. They mutually imply each other. Hate slumbers in pride, and pride is the background of hate—its support and the source of its power. The one is active; the other passive. It is the union of these two conditions of life that make up the satanic state and character.

The second and lower form of sinfulness is found in sensuality. This state of the soul is the most common and the most repulsive in its showings and in its results, as it is the most fruitful of human misery. The courts of justice, the prison, the asylum, and the hospital witness to the awfulness of the vices and of the crimes which have issued from this fountain. When self-indulgence has gone so far as to break down the physical constitution, then no permanent reform is possible. All that can be hoped for is, that a partial and temporary reform may open the way for the grace of God to interpose and to save the soul. Pride and lust stand opposed to each other in their manifestations, though they spring from the same source, and lead to a common ruin. In the one case, the man degrades his personal worth, and in the other, he deifies it, and makes self his god.

Covetousness is subordinate to these forms of sinfulness, because it ministers to them both. Without the pride and the self-indulgence of human life, covetousness would have no existence at all.

The different kinds of sin have been grouped under the following divisions. These groupings depend on some peculiarity which is supposed to mark the divisions themselves. Thus we have voluntary and involuntary transgressions. This is an inadequate distinction, since personal sin is always voluntary, either directly, or indirectly by the very character it creates. Again, we have the sins of ignorance and infirmity. This is only partially true, since the ignorance is never necessary and absolute. Again, we have the sins of omission and of commission. But neither of these classes can exist without the other, though each class does give prominence respectively to the negative and the positive sides of our common depravity. We also have sins against God and against man. But here the latter class presupposes the former. We cannot sin against our neighbor without sinning against our Maker,

and that, too, in one and the same act. Still, again, we have secret sins and presumptuous ones. This is a real and practical distinction. The Catholics distinguish between mortal and venial sins. The objection to this is that it weakens the impression of the guilt which is common to each and every form of human sin. Lastly, we have the great Scriptural distinction between all the pardonable sins and the one unpardonable state of sin against the Holy Ghost.

It is better, however, to consider the different kinds of sins in reference to the different conditions and occasions under which they must appear, if they appear at all.

It is doubtful if there would have been, without sin, any marked individualities in the human family. Life would have produced like. Life would have moved on harmoniously, without any great variation, for it could not have come in contact with the opposing forces of good and evil. Now it belongs to sin to separate and to disintegrate. Sin in itself tends to isolate the individual, and so to rob him of the sources of his power. Thus sin alone is a source of weakness. It individualizes to death. It cannot alone create a great character. If the restraining and the redemptive forces of life were all withdrawn there would be a speedy physical and moral degeneracy, and the race itself would flatten out and perish. It is the antagonism of good and evil that makes a strongly marked character, and the nobility or ignobility of the latter is found in the triumph of one or of the other of these principles of action; namely, sin or holiness.

Sin, by virtue of the antagonisms it creates, differentiates one soul from another at birth. Now Christianity does not change the constitutional tendencies which are thus impressed on our natures, but utilizes and glorifies them. Its aim is not to annihilate these natural results, but to penetrate and to consecrate them. Thus these multiplied and deepened channels of our natures are filled with a new and higher life. Thus the forces which sin is supposed to generate in probation are themselves regenerated, and so utilized in the redemptive process. The very disharmonies of the individual soul are taken up and mastered by the higher harmony of the redemptive agency. The new individual type thus created is made the basis of a new spiritual character, and this character

maintains itself and reaches a symmetrical development according to the idea and the law of its new life.

Before and during this redemptive process, the forms of sin are determined in part by the distinctive peculiarities of the individual himself. These are seen in the natural dominance of the intellectual over the sensuous element, or in the reverse of this relation, by which a man becomes a devotee of pleasure. We often notice, too, some one marked tendency of the soul, as when the intuitive or the logical faculty takes precedence of all others—where, in the one case, the sense of guilt goes down in an all-absorbing mysticism, or, in the other, spends its force in mere doctrinal statements. Here the defects in the natural or the Christian character are noteworthy. From a soul endowed with a weak will, we may expect sins of omission, and from one blessed with a strong will, sins of commission. When the imagination and the sensibilities are profound and dominant, we may look for mere religious sentimentalism; and when they are weak, we may meet the hardened villain, though a villain on a small scale.

Separate individualities reveal themselves in dominant dispositions, and these again are the occasions of special defects and vices in human character. These are to be noted. We have:

A. *The Reflective Disposition.* This is one of the chief supports of a noble character. But when the tinge of sadness deepens into melancholy, the soul sinks into idle reveries or fruitless speculations. The spirit of doubt as to the ultimate triumph of the good, broods over its deepest thinking and feeling. It would renounce its very self-hood in the fond hope of an absorption into the Infinite. But all this is only a species of refined selfishness. When the contemplative spirit is associated with false views of life, it takes on an all-engrossing self-righteousness, all the more fatal for the reason that the subject of it is wholly unconscious of its presence. When it is united with a logical capacity, it voices itself in an unsparing criticism at once hating and hateful.

B. *The Active Disposition.* This was designed to be the basis of an energetic character. On this soil all the active virtues could thrive as in the reflective disposition all the passive virtues could take root and bear fruit. Every philanthropist and every reformer must have share in this temperament. But when this tempera-

ment becomes dominant and all controlling, the soul becomes restless and takes on an impatience of control and an irritability of temper which make its presence in society intolerable. The man becomes ultra in his opinions and in his actions. Conviction passes into dogmatism, self-reliance into arrogance, earnestness into severity. When the reflective element is weak, we meet those forms of vanity and conceit which are as offensive to our tastes as to our moral sense. This disposition may lead one to make a point of his being independent, and so may vitiate the virtue itself. It may prompt the ambitious man to seek his ends by any means whatever, or the vain man to gratify his vanity in display and extravagance.

C. The Sanguine Disposition. A hopeful temper of soul leads a man to the full enjoyment of life—makes him genial and affable—a power in society. With him religion is a joy rather than a duty. But when this temperament becomes unduly dominant, it leads a man to multiply projects he can never execute—to divide his energies on too many objects, or to waste them in unworthy pursuits. There thus grows up a levity and frivolity—a frivolity not playing on the surface of one's nature, but working at its core—a lack of all moral earnestness whatever. He laughs out of his soul all sense of his higher obligations to God or to man.

D. The Passive Temperament. This disposition, when rightly balanced, secures a quiet contentment with the present, and a serene acceptance of the issues of the future, whatever they may be. It is the necessary background of a great nature. But when the phlegmatic character has become vitiated, conscience is deadened, and a cold indifference pervades the entire life. The accomplished villain always has more or less of this temperament.

Many forms of sin are conditioned by education. The soul inherits special aptitudes, but no knowledge. It must begin in weakness and in ignorance, and can only learn slowly and by degrees. The age exerts a moulding influence on the soul from the beginning of its life, so that the contents of its consciousness are drawn almost wholly from the age in which it is born. The common thought and feeling of the age, its habits and customs, its government and institutions, its inventions and discoveries, its representative men, whether of the present or of the past, with all the treas-

ured and registered results of the centuries—all these constitute the great educative forces of society. They make themselves felt in the mind and heart of the individual. Thus we account for the ascetic tendency, in which violence is done to the impulses of one's nature. Thus, too, we explain the working of the very opposite principle, in a loose abandonment to sensuous pleasures and physical sports. Both extremes are opposite forms of human sinfulness. The serious side of our probation, were it not relieved by innocent enjoyment, would defeat its very end, namely, the reform and the redemption of society. Amusements, too, as soon as they are made the very source of our higher life, lose their character, and instead of being helpful and healthful in their influence, poison the very fountains of individual and social life. Again, it is partly owing to defective education that men so far separate religion and morality. By virtue of this separation, we have, on the one hand, a sentimentalism which is powerless against our selfishness, and on the other hand, a cold and barren legalism—the mere shell and husk of morality. It would be easy to show how the wickedness of oppression and the infamy of persecution were owing, more or less, to the spirit of the age in which they occurred. We need refer only to the dark catalogue of crimes committed in the name of the religion of Jesus. We omit here the fatal influence of a false domestic or scholastic education. The social position, too, of the individual often carries along with it special temptations, and is the condition of special sins. Thus wealth invites to all forms of extravagance. Thus the possession of power is always corrupting in its influence. Thus official superiority will engender arrogance of manner, and often a mean and petty tyranny. Thus learning may occasion the display of pedantry and of conceit. Thus the man distinguished by his family connections may take on the spirit of caste, and separate himself from all real sympathy with his fellows; while the opposite condition of life may call forth servility or envy or hate, or destroy all appreciation of real worth of character.

The divergent avocations in which men are engaged modify the manifestations of their sinfulness. Every business and every profession has its peculiar dangers, and so engenders peculiar defects of character. Thus the literary man becomes intensely selfish in

little things. He will give of his money, but not of his time. His pursuits tend to make him irritable. The lawyer and the clergyman are both in danger of acting a mere part—of sinking the private character in the professional one, and that, too, without being aware of it—in danger of seeming to be what they are not, and of uttering what they do not profoundly believe. The great sin to which the ministry is exposed is the sin of hypocrisy. The merchant is tempted to follow the customs of his trade, forgetting that a fair business transaction is impossible, which is not in harmony with the spirit and precepts of the Gospel. Perhaps Christianity suffers more from the low standard of morals which prevails in this respect among its disciples than from any other single cause whatever.

The discipline of life also is an occasion of sin and of sin in special directions. Our duties recur in new forms every day. They may be personal, domestic, social, or churchly, but they are of supreme importance. The discharge of these duties is always attended with more or less difficulty. Here we meet every day with special deficiencies. We do things we ought not to do, and leave undone the things we ought to do. Our shortcomings indicate the strength and the presistency of the selfish principle. The very griefs and afflictions of life bring out the natural depravity of the human heart. Here we see the want of resignation to divine Providence, in the form of murmurings against the goodness of God, or of rebellion against his authority, or even of blasphemy; or we witness the utter abandonment of all courage to meet the cares and responsibilities of life. Even religion, both by the perversions of its friends, and by the opposition of its enemies, has given occasion to manifold crimes and vices. Thus where religion takes a strong hold on the popular mind, there it will excite the greatest antagonism in those who do not accept it, so that we shall find more profanity than in less religious communities. The English-speaking races are the most profane communities in Christendom. Thus sectarianism is occasioned by diverse views of religion. The religious partisan holds that his own denomination has all the truth there is in Christianity. He is devoted to his own church, not as a means to an end, but as itself an end. He avoids, rather than seeks, fellowship with Christians of other com-

unions. Here, too, we must place the sins of heresy and of schism, and also that of infidelity. We call them sins because manifestly there is a moral element at the root of them all. We are certainly not responsible for our speculative beliefs, but only for those opinions and beliefs which address our wills, as well as our intellects; and of such a character, without doubt, are the truths of the Christian religion.

SECTION FIFTH.

DEGREES OF PERSONAL GUILT.

We need first of all to determine the nature of personal guilt, and the sphere of life to which it belongs.

Personal guilt is the criminality—the ill-desert—of personal sin. It is sin imputed to the sinner—charged to his account, and thus exposing him to condemnation and to punishment. It is the middle term between sin and its direct consequences, converting those consequences into penalties. Without guilt the results of sin might be painful, but they could not be penal.

The sphere, and the only sphere of life, where personal guilt can find place, is that of free moral agency. It can be predicated alone of a personal choice and a personal character and a personal life. Thus the natural affections, being independent of the will, and acting simply under the law of necessity, and having in their movements no reference to a moral imperative, can have no strictly moral character. They may possess a natural excellence or exhibit natural defects and deficiencies; but both are destitute of a personal moral element. These exhibitions are automatic in their character. They do not differ in kind, but only in degree, from the manifestations of brute instinct. They aim to secure the gratification of their own cravings, and not the spiritual approbation of the object toward which they tend. Thus they are instinctive, and not personal and free in their character. They thus issue from our natures, and not from our persons; and do not respond to the claims of any moral law whatever. They certainly carry along with themselves liabilities, but not responsibilities. They are also motive forces to be repressed, or chastened, or transmuted into a personal preference by the conscious determination of the soul itself.

We are responsible, then, for our own personal acts, and for no other class of acts whatever. We are responsible, too, for our own characters, just so far as we have had any share in making them what they are. This is the limit of our personal responsibility.

This limit is, however, by no means a narrow one. The natural affections precede and accompany and, so to speak, envelop our entire personal life. They influence the will, and are in turn often determined by the will. There are probably few or no acts of the soul into which the will has not more or less fully entered, and certainly there are no states of the soul which have not been somewhat determined by personal choices and preferences. In this way we are, to a greater or less degree, responsible for them all. Thus there can be no wrong thought or impure feeling in which the person has not himself taken a part, and for which he is not more or less accountable. Thus envy, or jealousy, or malice, may spring up in the soul apparently unbidden, and yet somewhere and sometime we may have done something to generate these very passions themselves.

Thus, in harmony with what we have said, our love to God, in so far as it is moral and personal, is not a mere aspiration of our nature, but a response to his claims. The soul receives God by faith, and imparts itself in prayer and sacrifice. Thus it appropriates the favor of God, and accepts the truth of God. Thus it surrenders itself to God, and finds its joy and peace in God. Thus it is an electing love—a love knowing and determining itself toward the Author of its being. It is the free, personal, loving choice of God in preference to self and to the world, and so it is praiseworthy in its character. On the other hand, all forms of hostility to God, since they are also repudiations of his love and of his authority, so are not natural and necessary, but moral and free in their nature, and so blameworthy. As we have said, the very presence of a bad thought or feeling or purpose is a *prima facie* evidence that we have sometime in our life invited such a visitor, and cherished such company. The soul can, by its own free agency, create a disinclination to a holy life, and when it does create such an aversion that aversion itself is the acme of its guilt. This very inability of the sinner constitutes his criminality. But this inability can never be absolute in its character, because the

power to react remains, and the bias to sin in our natures and in our habits is somewhat balanced by the transcendent influences of the spiritual world. Thus the soul is never under any inward, absolute compulsion.

All sins are alike in that they all spring from a common root, violate a common law, and result in a common unbelief. See James 2:10. Besides, a single sin never stands alone. Others spring up from a fruitful soil, and so form characters essentially alike and essentially guilty. But while there is a sameness in guilt, there is also, as much difference in degree of ill-desert as there is between the light of a spark and that of a flame of fire.

It is, however, quite impossible to measure the exact guilt which belongs to individual acts. We can here only indicate the leading elements which must enter into our moral judgments.

First. Guilt is to be regulated by the degree of a man's nonconformity to law. Thus sin is not imputed where there is no law. As a man violates his obligations, just in that proportion does his guilt increase. The higher the obligations violated, and the greater the number of the obligations disregarded, the deeper is his ill-desert. This is strikingly seen in the Christian economy. Here a man sins not only against his Father in heaven, but also against his Redeemer on earth.

Second. It is regulated by one's natural capacity and susceptibility. The man with ten talents is under obligations to be and to do more than the man with one. Now, the greater the genius, the higher the probation, and the greater its guilt if it fails to meet its obligations in life. The nobler the natural character is, the greater are the possibilities of the person and the more culpable is his failure in life.

Third. It is regulated by the opportunities which a man has neglected or misimproved. Education, domestic or scholastic, and the thousand other opportunities which a man has or might have had, enter in to determine his guilt. Thus possibly, in the case of Aaron Burr, his guilt was increased by the fact that he had such a mother as the daughter of Jonathan Edwards, and was thus a child of prayer as well as a child of genius. Thus it is that those who neglect special means of grace only enhance their own criminality in the rejection of the love of God.

Fourth. It is regulated by the conscious failure to put forth any effort to reach a high standard of character. A man may give himself up to a vicious course of life, or he may struggle nobly against his lower inclinations, and his moral worth will depend on which of these courses he takes. The man who struggles with his natural depraved tendencies reaches a higher probation, and belongs to a different class of characters, than the one who only moves in harmony with an amiable temper. The latter may be more attractive than the former, but certainly is deserving of less personal credit for his character. The excellence which he has is rather implanted than acquired, and automatic rather than personal and praiseworthy.

Fifth. It is regulated by the resistance which one makes to his own moral convictions. He thus generates inward habits of thought and feeling, and so creates a character by which he is spontaneous in his very wickedness. This is seen when the soul does violence to the yearnings of its better nature in the rejection of the Gospel. God overcomes all his difficulties in the proffer of his friendship; but the sinner will overcome none of his, even when his moral nature urges him to do so. In time, one becomes so accustomed to a certain course of sinful indulgence as to lose all remorse for his wrong-doings--so as to call good evil and evil good, and thus illustrate in his own case the saying of our Lord, "If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!" Thus sin attaches itself to character as well as to acts, and to acts that flow without deliberation from a fountain which the sinner himself has generated in his own nature. Thus it is, too, that the continued absence of right intentions indicates a greater degree of criminality, than the occasional presence of a positively wrong motive. The great sin of omission, the sin of unbelief, underlies, as it is the culmination of, all forms of human sin and human guilt.

SECTION SIXTH.

THE CHARACTER OF HUMAN DEPRAVITY.

We have to consider the depth and the extent of individual depravity, so far as that depravity is common to each and every soul.

It is important here to mark the distinction between religion and morality. These are only different aspects of one and the same divine life. In religion, God comes into union with man, and man freely responds to this divine fellowship. In morality, man enters into union with God, and in and through this union seeks a fellowship with all the creatures of God. In religion, man is receptive; in morality, he is active and forth-putting. Religion secures a moral life through the free self-decision of the soul. They are inseparable. The life of each interpenetrates the life of the other. Religion without morality is a quiet mysticism—a sentimental worship—beautiful in its forms, but powerless against the selfishness of the human soul. Morality without religion is a mere round of outward performances, legal in its spirit, cold, dry and barren, and without the soul of goodness.

Our depravity, then, must be measured by its departure from either of these aspects of divine life.

Native depravity appears first and foremost in our corrupt natural affections. We inherit depraved tendencies. But here, in the sphere of nature, the depravity is not supreme and total. This is not so, for the reason that every soul has still a natural love for the good, over against its inordinate self-indulgence. As a rule, in every conflict between these impulses of our nature, this natural self-love gains the mastery over the opposing principle. This, however, is not always the case. We meet with instances of natural heroism, as when a man, out of instinctive friendship, will peril his life for his friend. Here we have, however, nobility of nature, rather than of personal character. Still this is exceptional and one must admit that even the depravity that is born with us is fatal in its character. For the soul, as a nature, cannot restore itself.

When we come to our conscious moral self-decisions, then the rule seems to allow of no exceptions. The moral choice is ever and always, in spirit, or in form, or in both, a selfish one. Wherever and whenever this is not the case, the soul stands in personal fellowship with its God, and is a regenerated soul. This may be true of men out of the church, as well as of those in the church—of men who make no profession of religion, as well as of men who have taken on themselves the vows of God. But even in the case

of those souls who are still unreconciled to their Maker, we cannot say that the depravity is total in its character. Such is not the fact, for the following reasons: because evil is not chosen for its own sake, but for some imagined, temporary or partial good it may bring; and because of the hesitation and deliberation and frequent conflicts of the soul before the final sinful choice is made; and also because of the self-condemnation which often appears in the very act of choosing what is wrong. Here we see that there are movements and drawings toward the right, though always mastered by the finally dominant choice of the wrong. Again, the object chosen or the action determined upon may be wrong only in the sense that it lacks the highest motive; and thus it may command our approbation, notwithstanding its fatal inward deficiency, as tested by the moral law. All our best natural impulses move solely in a lateral direction, and cling only to the objects of this world. They do not concern themselves with the guilt of sin, but only with its misery and wretchedness. Thus the mother is interested in her child, but only as a member of social life, and not as an heir of eternity. Thus though men love goodness and wisdom and truth, as abstract conceptions or as far off realizations, yet when these assume their sovereignty, and bring God in his authority before their souls, they at once refuse obedience. There is here a natural excellence, but no virtue of a moral and personal character. The fact that the person rejects the authority of the very attributes which his nature admires, clearly indicates the fatal character of his depravity. Thus a naturally amiable nature may underlie a personal character and a personal life profoundly selfish.

But we do seem to meet instances both of splendid virtue and of beautiful graces of character. We are not able to refer them simply to the impulses of a noble nature. They evidently, in a large measure, belong to the person. Whatever be their worth, that worth must be imputed to the person, and he must have the credit of them. In some of these cases it will be found that the man has so identified himself with the larger community that its glory is his glory, and he is ready to die in its behalf, as when a patriot offers up his life on the battle field. The parent, in seeming unselfishness, devotes his time and money to the good of his family. It is a part of himself. He lives in the life of his children.

Their worldly success ministers to his pride. When his interest goes further and he takes into account their kinship with God as well as their relation to himself, then he gives evidence of being a child of God. This evidence is to be accepted, whatever be a man's creed or a man's conduct.

Depravity does not reach the intellect as such, except as it affects the physical organism. When a man is in good health, the decisions of his reason, acting in its own exclusive province and with a clear field before it, are, in the main, as right now as in a perfectly holy state. The reason certainly gives us first truths, and we accept them as a part of the natural revelation of God. In the case of the conscience, involving as it does both the sensibility and the reason, we are sure only of her highest affirmation. These moral axioms we receive without distrust or misgiving. They are infallible. This inner light never goes out. Our æsthetic nature is in like manner affected. We can only trust its highest and best judgments. It is, then, chiefly in our sensibilities, whether physical or spiritual, and through our wills, that sin reigns. But when we consider that character is one and life is one, and that these sensibilities and this will touch all sides of our being, we can easily see how sin might directly or indirectly affect our entire being. Thus it is apparent that we are responsible for our opinions and our beliefs, and our moral speculations, since these are all affected by our free personal agency, as well as by our sinful tendencies.

We must come, then, to the conclusion that our depravity is fatal in its character. We cannot restore ourselves, by any self-movement, to the love and favor of God. We are, however, capable of redemption, and, as we shall see, a full provision and a living agency have been made, not so much for our restoration to the state we have lost, as for our elevation to a higher plane of character and of life.

SECTION SEVENTH.

THE PENALTIES OF SIN.

Punishment is the consequence of sin, as determined by guilt. In so far as the proper consequence of sin does not follow, or in so far as it comes from other sources than that of guilt, in so far

consequence and penalty are not identical. This is the case in probation. The probational state results from the redemptive plan and agency, in which the final issues of life are removed to another world. The full and distinct consequences of sin are in this life precluded by the very offers of mercy. Besides, we are now so bound up with the woe of others, that we often experience ills which flow from their sins, and not from our own violations of the moral law. We suffer, even from our inheritance, disabilities which are not the proper penalties of our personal sin and guilt. Thus the bonds of blood, of sympathy, and of interest, often entail sufferings upon us, which cannot be considered as the punishment of our own transgressions. In fact, many of the evils of this life are designed by God to chasten, to correct, and to ennoble human life, rather than to punish the offender. In fact, all that we can term penalties in this world are but tokens of the coming retribution.

The very condition of the soul in this life precludes our looking upon the objective consequences of our sins as simple penalties. Secondary agencies and causes have so intruded as in a measure to obscure the consciousness of another Presence, greater than they all, because the support of them all. We are, too, so intent on our selfish pursuits and plans that God is far from our thoughts and affections, and we are unfitted to interpret aright the course of his providence. We also resist more or less the influences of the truths we do believe, and become blind and hardened; and accept the ills of life as matters of necessity, without any moral significance whatever. We love to pity, but not to condemn ourselves. Self-reproach and remorse are experiences from which we shrink, and from which we seek to escape by every means in our power. If our excuses and palliations are not sufficient for this purpose, we bury our souls in business, or turn in desperation to the intoxicating cup.

In the other world, everything is changed in our surroundings. Even God changes his attitude toward us, in that He no longer extends to us the offer of pardon; and the soul has also changed its character, in that it has reached a fixed state of moral aversion to a religious life. In the other world there is no room for secondary causes, coming between the sinner and his Maker. The individual soul comes into immediate and direct contact with the

fullness of the divine Presence. Its sole business is with God, and with Him continuously and exclusively. In such a state, the consequences and the penalties of sin are one and the same thing—absolutely identical. The consequences are no longer partial and intermittent, and alloyed with foreign elements, but simple, full and constant. For the conviction of sinfulness covers the entire character and life, as these are made to stand forth in a separate individuality, and are made to appear as they are, in the searching light of the divine Presence. Thus all punishment is both natural and positive. It is natural, because provided for in the constitution of the soul and in its essential relations to God. This constitution and these relations involve each other. Punishment comes at once into the life of the soul, as the soul finds itself flooded on all sides with the light of the divine presence. It is positive, because the punishment comes from God directly and immediately. It is, and is felt to be, an infliction of the divine Law-giver—a judgment executed by his hand. Self-condemnation is but the echo of the voice of God. The penalty issues from the divine decision, and embodies and conveys the divine wrath, as experienced in the consciousness of guilt. Thus punishment marks the personal relation between the criminal and the God whose law he has broken. In the case of the sinner the criminality is supreme as it indicates the final break between a God seeking to forgive and the soul refusing all forgiveness.

The feeling of remorse is at once the general condition of all forms of punishment, and the essential element in all kinds of penalty. It is the condition of retribution, because it is a sense of criminality. It is the one abiding element in punishment, because it is the pain which enters into the consciousness of guilt, and is the peculiar pain which follows divine condemnation.

Sin cannot be punished by sin, though it may be by the continuance and obduracy of sin. Here the tendency to perpetuation is the penalty, and not sin *as such*. It is, however, only the negative side of sin which reveals itself in this form of punishment—sin of omission. Here the power of sin is paralyzed. Despair destroys every activity but that of conscience. The sinner in the other world renders the homage of conviction, but not of affection. He is no longer aggressive in his sinfulness. He can no longer disturb

the moral order of the universe. He rather confirms that order; as a witness to the rectitude of God.

Human guilt culminates in unbelief, and so excludes the soul from Heaven. For, under the economy of grace, what finally condemns the sinner is that he rejects redeeming love. So that, while unbelief decides the question of acceptance with God, yet our particular sins against light and love, eventuating, as they do, in this unbelief, decide the degree of punishment we are to suffer in the eternal world.

This subject will again come before us when the question of future retribution is taken up.

PART THIRD.

CHRISTOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST.

SECTION FIRST.

THE COSMICAL WORK OF CHRIST.

The inter-trinitarian relations of the Son determine his work, both in creation and in redemption. As He was the Revealer of the Father to Himself, it belonged to him to reveal the divine thought and will overywhere and always. He is termed *the Word*, because the Father communes with Himself in the silence of eternity, and in that silent converse is conscious of Himself, and so when he voices that silent Word in time and space He expresses the fullness of his own mind and heart. Thus there can never be any revelation in the universe, except through the son of God.

The Son of God is, then, the Revealer, not partially and imperfectly, as the prophets were, but originally and fully—not by appointment merely, but by his very nature; for his character determined his vocation—not locally and temporally, but universally and eternally—as well to angels as to men—to all worlds as well as to the one in which we live.

The Son, too, is the Mediator in creation, by virtue of his very nature. The work of creation is natural to him. For as he mediates in that eternally continuous life-process by which the Father is conscious of Himself, so He mediates in that cosmical movement by which the Father creates the world. He contains in Himself all the ideal and potential elements by which creation was made actual. Thus He is not an instrumental cause, any more than the will of the painter is instrumental when it creates, through the in-

tellect, a work of art. He is, on the contrary, the mediating essential cause. "Without Him was not anything made that was made." Thus the Son is the only Mediator, through whom creation itself was possible. By virtue of this mediation, the Father puts his thought in creation, and creation in turn, expresses that thought. In fact, all created beings know the Father in and through the Son. Thus He is the sole Mediator of all finite beings, even though they are sinless.

These two generic views involve each other. If the Son is Revealer, then He is Mediator; and if Mediator, then Revealer.

SECTION SECOND.

THE PRE-INCARNATE PRESENCE OF CHRIST.

All the theophanies of the Old Testament, whether under the name of Jehovah, or of his angels, or of his representative angel, and all those which were accompanied by outward physical symbols, were Christophanies. See the prologue of John; John 8: 58; 12: 41; 1 Peter 1: 11.

Christ was the Source of all revelation, and the Fountain of all inspiration, before as well as after his incarnation. He was *the Word*. He was *the Life* and *the Light* of men. According to Peter, it was the Spirit of Christ which animated the Hebrew prophets. Their predictions of him were the fore-gleams of his glory, and their promises were foretastes of his grace. Their very waiting for his coming was the fruit of his presence—partial indeed, but altogether real in its character. Thus the consciousness of the pious Hebrew was essentially one with the consciousness of the Christian. For it was the fellowship of his Spirit, though not the clear apprehension of his Person. We find among the Hebrews the essential factors of all Christian experience; namely, the sense of sin, and the sense of redemption. Now, wherever these exist, Christ is present in the affections and will, though He may not be found in the understanding. It must ever be remembered that our apprehension of Christ by no means measures what He does or can do for us. When the pious Hebrew exercised a childlike faith in the mercy of God, he had the soul of a saving faith in Christ Himself.

All the miracles performed by the prophets were wrought by

virtue of Christ's power, since the miracle itself is a theophany. The ancient miracles were preludes—preludes in a sensuous and ignorant age, and so partaking of that age—of the great miracle of his own appearance in human flesh. Thus there were comings of Christ before his visible assumption of our humanity. Thus there were prophetic voices before the incarnate Word, spiritual lights in human history before the one great Light of Calvary, and divine interruptions in nature and in life before the great intervention.

We must, too, go further than this and affirm that all the profound moral thinking of the Orientals, and all the flashes of wisdom which we find in classical literature, and all the noble characters which have appeared in ancient history, were called forth and moulded by the Spirit of Christ. These souls felt the presence of the Invisible—its impulsions and its restraints, and may have had an implicit faith in the Christ of whom they had not heard.

CHAPTER II.

THE INCARNATION.

SECTION FIRST.

ITS POSSIBILITY.

The Son of God finds the goal of his life in the assumption of humanity. That event was natural to Him. That He should thus appear in this world accords with his character. His universal mediation takes on a special form. God's growing nearness to man culminates in his permanent indwelling in human consciousness.

There is no difficulty in the fact that God is infinite and man is finite. If this were not the case, the incarnation would be impossible. The alleged difficulty is the supreme relief—the one essential condition of the mystery itself. A finite spirit may unite itself in manifold ways to another spirit, but the association of the two never can be an incarnation. They mutually exclude each other. On the other hand, the Finite and the Infinite complete each other.

It belongs to the very nature of the Infinite to impart itself. To be itself, it must enter into time and space, and in this sense the Finite is its completion. The Finite can not be explained by itself, nor by its relations to other finite beings; but has, for its presupposition and its ultimate reality, the Infinite, and thus its completion in that Infinite. Thus the Finite does not exclude, but rather requires the presence of, the Infinite. Each apart from the other is a mere phantom.

This view does, indeed, only show the immanence of God in nature and in life; while the incarnation is the immanence of the divine Person in the human consciousness, in a new and transcendent form. It answers, however, our purpose, in clearing the mystery from needless conceptual difficulty.

The conditions which allow an incarnation are the following:

First. The being assumed must have an affinity with God. Man has this affinity, because he is the image of God. He is nearer his Maker than the crystal, with its laws of accretion, or the plant, with its laws of life, or the animal, with its senses and sense-judgments. These merely reflect some one or more of the divine attributes. The soul, however, knows and determines itself. It is free, rational, and personal. It thus has a kinship with God. Its consciousness of self carries along with it the consciousness of God. Now God can identify Himself with such a nature more fully and completely than with any other creature whatever.

This affinity with God must not be so pressed as to amount to an identity of nature. For such a oneness would make an incarnation superfluous. There must be a difference but that difference must not be exclusive but complementary in its character. Such is the fact in the relation of man to his Maker. His infinite susceptibility for God reveals the incompleteness of his higher nature and points to an absolute perfection of his life which is possible only in God. On the other hand, God glorifies himself in those very human sympathies which distinguish the creature from the Creator.

Second. The being assumed must be a miniature representation of the universe. God imparts Himself in and to the universe which He has created. He will therefore reveal Himself most fully in him in whom the elements of this universe are crystallized. Now man is the focal point, where the material and spiritual

worlds meet together and are reconciled. He is thus the very being where God might fitly erect the throne of his glory.

Third. The humanity assumed must be evolved from our nature by a creative power. The Son of God must create what He assumes. If the humanity starts from its own centre alone, it will then take on a separate and individual personal life; and thus will allow only a conjunction of persons, but not an incarnation—and only a conjunction of one individual person, and not of humanity, with God. The Son of God must personalize the humanity which He assumes—and personalize it from its very beginning. Thus there is the necessity of a miraculous conception—a supernatural birth.

Fourth. The humanity assumed must be centred in an individual person. God could be present more fully in the race—in the totality of its life than in any one of the myriad forms into which that life is divided. But in that case his spirit would be diffused throughout the common life and his presence would be marked merely by its pervasive power. It would be embodied only extensively and not intensively. The centre of the divine consciousness would not gather in the centre of a human consciousness and form with it one divinely human life. There would be no real incarnation as there would be no supreme leader of humanity. God must then incarnate himself in the central man of the race—in the Man of men—the sole Man among the millions of the human family. Such Christ was made to be and to become by having his individuality essentially determined by the indwelling Son of God. This will be made more evident further on.

Fifth. The humanity assumed must be sinless. Sin in any form, whether in the fountain of one's nature, or in act, would preclude even a perfect moral union, and still more would it preclude such a personal indwelling of God in the consciousness as we call an incarnation. There would be not only an independence, but an antagonism between the creature and the Creator, by the fact of human sinfulness, though that was reduced to a minimum. For this reason Christ is said to be conceived of the Holy Ghost, and holiness is ascribed to him from his conception. The humanity of our Lord was, indeed, subject to the penalties of our common sinfulness and guilt, so far as, in his sinlessness, He could bear

them. Thus pain and disease and death fell on Him. Thus, too, while there could not be any personal guilt, nor the consciousness of it, there could be a sense of others' guilt, made all the more keen and painful by the very depth and purity of his own character and life.

SECTION SECOND.

THE FACT OF AN INCARNATION.

The incarnation is the goal of the divine movement. The Revealer and Mediator in the world-life must also reveal and mediate in human life. The broader manifestation must culminate in the richer and fuller revelation in Christ. The work of creation is only the prelude to the work of redemption.

Man needed an incarnate God for the full growth and perfection of his life. When we come to interpret the highest consciousness of the East and of the West, we find in both an aspiration which is realized alone in the incarnation. Souls are everywhere feeling after God, if haply they may find Him. Such is the final lesson which the student gathers from the history of the race. This view has a further support from the nature of the case. As a finite being, aside from his sinfulness, man needs an incarnate God—a God thinking in human thought, feeling in human sympathies, willing in human volitions, and acting in human life. For it is only as He thus conceives of God that he can spiritually grow at all. Now this conception of a human God would be weak indeed, if sustained only by an inward longing, and supported only by formal teaching, and not assured and guaranteed by the fact itself. The impartation, too, of divine life must be richer and fuller when it is through a real and permanent assumption of our nature, than when it is by transient theophanies, or by mere outward symbols. For if the symbols are never to be replaced by the verity, even in this life they lose half their power. It is the reality, as that is found in the past or in the future, that gives them their spiritual value.

The necessity of an incarnation, based on our finite condition, has already been considered under the *Justification of the Representative System*. Our deeper need of such an intervention,

grounded on our sinfulness, will be considered when we treat of the *Atonement*.

Thus it will be seen that modern Socinianism at once vacates Christianity of its proper meaning. If Christ is but a man, however richly endowed or inspired, He can not be the Bearer, and Creator of any new divine life to the race, nor can He alter, in his very person and life, the relations of God and man. And what Socinianism does openly and at once, Arianism does covertly and by degrees. It empties Christ's presence in the world of its peculiar worth and significance. For if He be only a creature, though the first and foremost of them all, then the chasm between God and man is unfilled. He is not able, in the true sense of the word, to actually bring God to man, or man to God. He is on the same plane with the prophets, and can give us only an assurance of the divine favor; but does not embody that favor in his person, and impart it by his Spirit. We have, at most, only a representative of God, but no *God with us*—no immediate divine Presence—no God in familiar loving sympathy with man. The church has followed an unerring instinct in rejecting both heresies.

The fact of the incarnation is shown by the presence of two natures—the divine and the human—united in one living person. We are to notice, then:

First. The Divinity of our Lord. He is recognized in the following passages as divine: John 1: 1; 20: 28; Rom. 9: 5. The indirect proof-texts are numerous. See John 6: 46; 8: 19; Rom. 1: 5; Phil. 2: 10, 3: 21; Col. 1: 15–17; Heb. 1: 2–3.

But the general drift of Scripture teaching is still more convincing. We have the higher aspects of Christ's life brought out in the manifest relations in which He stood both to God and to man. These can only be explained on the ground of his absolute divinity. Thus Christ is more than a teacher, unfolding a written revelation—more than a prophet, interpreting some special thought of God. He is, in his very person, the Revealer of the mind and heart of God. It is an attachment to his person, and not simply a recopation of his ideas, which is to save the sinner.

Let us here restate the Biblical view. Christ is not the outside medium of truth, the organ of communication between God and man; but He is the Truth itself, its Source, its Authority, and its

Substance. He does not merely expound the law of God, but realizes its claims and meets its demands, so that He is both the Revealer and the Revelation itself. He not only proclaims the beauty and the authority of a virtuous and religious life; but personally embodies and glorifies that life, and makes it potential for all men. He does not merely make known the promises of God; but is Himself the ground on which they all rest—the great central Promise, comprehensive of all others which God has given to the race. The Sinless One is also the Saving One—the object of our supreme love and trust and homage—a King in the souls of men. He is not merely a wonder-worker; but He is Himself the miracle of the ages. All his mighty acts, as well as his epoch-making sayings, are the effulgence of his glory. His coming into the world was the turning-point in the world's history; for the course of human advancement would have been essentially the same if any one of the world's great men had never lived. But Christ was not the creature of any age, but the Leader of all the ages—a necessity to society itself. Without Him every form of civilization must, sooner or later, exhaust itself. His teachings have a moral value in and of themselves; but they have an infinitely higher worth as they are realized in his character and life, and so made good to humanity as its permanent possession. Christ is the fulfillment of the past, and the hope of the future. God's revelation of mercy is only his self-announcement and self-sacrifice. On the one hand, Christ stands up, and, looking the heavens in the face, declares in all these ways, directly and indirectly, that He is equal with the Father; and on the other, boldly presents Himself as the pattern of humility. If, then, Christ was not divine, He falls infinitely below the level of an ordinarily good man.

We can not explain these expressed or implied representations of the absolute divinity of our Lord on the supposition of a merely delegated authority. For his essential claims are connected with his very person and character rather than with any official position whatever. Besides these claims involve absolute sovereignty. Now God can not delegate to any creature, however exalted, any such supreme functions without abdicating his very Godhead. Such a procedure would be simply unthinkable.

Second. The humanity of our Lord is affirmed in many places

in the Scriptures. His birth is plainly indicated. He is termed the Son of Mary and the Son of Man. This last expression as plainly denotes his humanity as the correlative term, the Son of God, denotes his divinity. The value of these expressions is not diminished by the fact that both of them are frequently used of the office which He filled, and that sometimes one of them has special reference to the fact of the incarnation.

The humanity of Christ was complete, consisting of the body, soul and spirit. The spirit is ascribed to Him in John 11: 33; 13: 21; 19: 30. Thus the Apollinarian view, in vogue even at the present day, that the Logos took the place of the spirit, is anti-scriptural.

We have a four-fold picture of our Lord, in which acts and attributes plainly human in their character are attributed to Him—human not only in respect to the cravings of the organism, but in respect to the intellections and volitions of the soul. Matthew gives us a rythmical narrative; Mark a terse and graphic outline; Luke a more full and copious memoir; while John is dramatic, and gives us an insight into the higher life of our Lord. They all differ, and yet all agree, thus giving completeness to the record of our Lord's humanity. Christ is represented as born, as an infant, as passing from childhood to youth, and from youth to manhood, subject to the laws of human development. He experiences the vicissitudes and wants of every-day life. He hungers and thirsts, is weary, and has not where to lay his head. He is subject to temptation, rejoices and groans in spirit, and gives Himself up to frequent seasons of prayer. He even grows in knowledge, like other men. Thus there is no reason to doubt the completeness of his humanity. See Matt. 13: 54-55; Luke 2: 52; Heb. 5: 8.

Third. The two natures united in one individual. We are still dealing with the fact of the incarnation, and with the fact alone. The Scriptures represent the divine and human natures as united in one living person. Thus John affirms that He "was made flesh." Paul declares that "in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. Here the pronoun has an emphatic position, and indicates that God dwelt in Him in a pre-eminent sense—dwelt in *Him*, and in no other. Here, too, the verb is in the present tense, and indicates the permanence of this indwelling. Here, again, the

adverb denotes that this fullness abides in the glorified body, as well as in the earthly body. The apostle also declares that "God sent forth from Himself his own Son, born of a woman, born under the law." Here it is affirmed, on the one hand, that the Son issued from the very nature of God, and was consubstantial with Him; and on the other, that He was born of a woman, and so was identified with humanity, and so was the Messiah who fulfilled all the predictions of the prophets. Paul repeats this thought, in another form, when he declares that God sent his own Son "in the likeness of the flesh of sin;" that is, sent into the world a Being absolutely divine, to assume a humanity cursed with sin, without assuming personal sinfulness. With all these declarations accords the expression, "The glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ."

This one person is never divided in the Scriptures. However diverse, or even apparently contradictory, the predicates may seem to be, they are all made to belong to the God-man. These diverse aspects and activities of Christ's life are often brought close together, and are predicated of one and the same individual Person. Thus we have the mother watching her infant, and the Magi paying adoration to the virgin's child; the flight into Egypt, and the intervention of the angels; the Messianic temptation, and the leading of the Spirit into the wilderness; the act of baptism by John, and the recognition from heaven; the prayer on the mountain, and the walking on the sea; the teaching in the courts of the temple, and the transfiguration, the weeping at the grave of Lazarus, and the raising of the dead man to life; the crucifixion and the resurrection; the last farewell of our Lord, and his final ascension into glory. The natural and the supernatural do not stand side by side in our Lord's life, but blend together. All these acts and events are theandric in their character, and belong to one and the same individual person. Thus it is hardly sufficient to say that this passage refers to the deity of our Lord and that to his humanity, unless, as in rare cases, the context plainly indicates this reference. The truth is that almost all the passages refer to the one God-man—the one theanthropic Person—in either his personal or official character.

The consciousness of the church witnesses to the wonderful union of these two natures in one Person. The church has out-

lived, as it has conquered, two opposing heretical tendencies. It has rejected those views which either ignored the divinity of our Lord, or subordinated his deity to his humanity. Thus it has discarded Ebionitism, Arianism, and Semi-Arianism. It has also thrown off the opposite forms of error. Thus it has rejected Docetism, which absorbed the human element; and Sabellianism, which allowed of only an apparent or, at most, a transient union of the two natures; and Apollinarianism, which allowed only an imperfect assumption, since humanity was robbed of its highest attribute. Thus the Christian consciousness demanded that both factors be united in their integrity, without being confused or confounded together. It has thus rejected Nestorianism, which loosened the bond of this union by merely adding these two natures mechanically together. It has also repudiated Monophysitism, because it confounded the two natures by the absorption of humanity. Moreover it has discarded Monothelitism, which presented the same heresy in a softened form, for it insisted that the will, as well as the intelligence and the sensibility, was an essential part of human nature. Finally, it rejected Adoptionism, which was a milder form of Nestorianism. Whether justice has in all cases been done to the men whose names have been given to many of these heresies, may well be doubted; but the church was doubtless right in rejecting the heresies themselves. The first is a question of historical criticism; while the second alone is a matter of dogmatic interest. Thus the universal church, with insignificant exceptions, echoes the voices of the prophets and the apostles. It will and must have a whole Christ—one Being who is both human divine.

SECTION THIRD.

THE STATEMENT OF THE MYSTERY.

The mystery of the incarnation can only be stated, and not solved. A solution would be its destruction. Even the statement can at best be only partial and tentative.

The Son of God enters into a living union with our nature. He assumes that nature, and forms with it one Person—the theanthropic Christ. He enters into our nature by one creative act, at

the very beginning of its existence. He enters into our life by a continuous movement—a movement which determines and fills that life, as that life freely moves onward to its goal. In the first the divine and the human coexist only as potencies in the very inception of life and coexist in the unity of that life; in the second they unfold themselves together in the growth of that one life.

The incarnation is not, then, a mere ethical union, involving only a oneness of sympathy and of purpose—it is not merely a local and physical union, as though the Son of God had thereby separated his life from the universe—it is not an outward mechanical union, as though two natures merely co-operated together—but it is rather an assumption—creative, vital, personal, and permanent—of our nature, so that both the deity and the humanity of our Lord are perfect and complete, and form in their union one theanthropic Person. Thus the humanity is not lost in the deity, nor the deity lost in the humanity; nor are the two natures confounded, so as to generate a being unlike either. The person of our Lord is at once both human and divine—divine in its underlying essence, and human in its free vital form. But the essence and the form are kindred in character.

The church has ever insisted on one person in Christ, and that Person it has ever regarded as divine. But the term person has denoted a rational individual—an individual separate and independent, but still only an individual. The word, as anciently used, did not denote mind in its self-consciousness and self-determination, but only a concrete mode of existence. We find this view everywhere held by the Fathers, and supported by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologicae*, and supported also by the ablest modern Catholic theologians, as Knoll and Perrone. There can be no doubt but that the church is right, and that Christ is one rational and moral individual, and one alone, undivided and indivisible. Such is the impression which must be made on every candid and honest reader of the Word of God.

But when we give to the word person the meaning it has in modern literature, and make it denote the soul in its self-consciousness and self-determination, then we must affirm that human personality is essential to the completion of human nature. Such a view undoubtedly entered into the consciousness of the church,

for it insisted on the human will as an integral part of the nature of man. Now the human will is the essence of self-determination, and so of personality, as defined in the light of modern thought. Thus the church does accept the fact that there was a human person, as well as a Divine Person, in the incarnate Son of God.

The Son of God assumes our nature, and individualizes and personalizes it. He does so by the law of his life, as that law appears in his entire redemptive agency. It is not simply human nature, that is born into the world, that teaches and preaches and works miracles, that lives and dies and rises from the dead, but a central living personage embodying that nature, and glorifying it in his life and death and resurrection. The idea of human nature moving about men, living and working for them—human nature simply as such, abstractly conceived—is monstrously absurd—purely unmeaning. Christ was human nature, but human nature differentiated by the highest law of moral living. Besides, otherwise Christ would cease to be the Model and the exemplar of the race—the Ideal, and the Magnet of all human souls.

We must, then, accept the truth that the Divine Person identified itself with the human person in the one work of redemption.

The Son of God creates the nature and evolves the consciousness which He fills and directs at every stage of its subsequent growth and free development. The consciousness becomes truly and strictly theanthropic. Christ is a divinely human person.

The contents of the Christ-consciousness cover the sphere of Christ's redemptive agency, as that agency originates in the eternal thought of God, appears in time, and culminates in the issues of the spiritual world. We recognize all the divine attributes: but only as they reveal themselves along the lines of this redemptive work. Thus Christ declares his own eternity, in relation to his own agency, when He says, "Before Abraham was I am." Here he declares that his existence as Redeemer is the explanation of the existence of such a character as that of the patriarch. Again, He reveals his eternity when he prays that the Father would re-invest him "with the glory which He had with him before the world was." Here He identifies the glory of his approaching triumph with his eternal vocation as Redeemer. He intimates that, as the work of Redemption was last in execution, so it was foremost in the divine

conception. He manifests, too, his omnipotence; but only in the direction of his life. He abstains from displays of power of a mere creative character, or even such displays as will gratify mere curiosity, or which will even simply make good his claims as Messiah. As a wonder-worker He will use his power only in the interest of human souls, suffering from sin or guilt. His omniscience, too, is as real as the other divine attributes; but like them, moves along redemptive lines alone. Thus He knows what is in the hearts of all men. The souls of Nathaniel and of Peter and of Judas, are naked and open to his view. He fore-knows the end of the world, as that end is looked at through the epochs which introduce and prepare the way for the great catastrophe. Such knowledge is connected with his work. He does not know—for He will not know, since He limits his knowledge in that direction—the chronology of the universe. He is omniscient, but his omniscience is redemptive in its character. And finally, his omnipresence reveals itself only when and where a redemptive process is going on in human souls; for, as the God-man, he must have a part in that process wherever and whenever it takes place, on earth or in heaven, in time or in eternity.

Thus there is no absolute *kenosis* of the divine nature—no absolute divestiture of any one of the divine attributes. There can be no such abnegation of the essential attributes of the divine character. The *kenosis* is only relative. The divine attributes are limited indeed in Christ, but only because this limitation is essential to the glory of their manifestation. Their very limitation is the result of their very perfection, and issues in their glorification. The Son of God moves the center of his life from the Cosmos to the human soul—from the infinitude of nature to the finiteness of humanity—from the wide realm of cosmical agencies to the richer, but narrower, circle of human affections, wants and woes. He does not abrogate the glory of his world-life, but subordinates that to his life in humanity—gathers the fullness of his life into burning and radiant focus in human consciousness. Thus the divine thought enters into and fills the human thought, and the human thought turns toward and rests in God. Thus the divine feeling lives in human feeling, and the human feeling flows toward God, and empties into his fullness. Thus the divine will centers itself in

the human will, and the human will centers itself in God, and moves toward God as its final goal.

This limitation was a humiliation. Had the Son of God appeared in a nature unaffected by the consequences of human guilt, then the divinity would have always shone through the humanity according to the measure of that humanity. It would have been the highest form of creative love, and so a condescension—beautiful and radiant—but only a condescension. But as he assumed a nature and a life bound up with a guilty race—a nature and a life not merely below his level, but counter to his character—so He humbled Himself. He took on a form of existence which, by reason of the sin of our corporate humanity, was repugnant to his holiness. Thus his attributes must be more or less veiled and limited by his redemptive purposes and redemptive experiences—only shining forth as He gained victories in thought and act over the forces of sin and death. Thus the eternal creative love flashed forth into the eternal redeeming love. This very humiliation was the path—the only path—to the new glorification. Thus we have a theanthropic Person, all whose theandric energies are spent in reconciling God to man and man to God.

Creative love now becomes redeeming love. The same divine power and wisdom which waited on that love in creation, now wait on it in redemption. Divine love ever carries the natural affections of God along with itself, and, in the work of saving the world, subjects them to a new and higher mode of manifestation. For it will know nothing and do nothing but what concerns the restoration of a lost race to God. It will not exercise cosmical prerogatives, but yet it will, in the interest of redemption, subject the forces of nature to its own high purposes. It takes on the form of servitude, and submits itself to manifold disabilities and limitations, and yet it will dispense pardon, as a spiritual sovereign, and enthrone itself in the affections and convictions of the human soul.

All the divine attributes can be attributed, not to human nature, but to the one Christ; and all the human attributes can be attributed, not to the divine nature, but to one and the same Christ. For He is undivided and indivisible. But all of Christ's attributes, both divine and human, are employed in one work—the work of redemption.

We can, then, and must, predicate suffering of the God-man. We can affirm that He suffered by reason of both His nature and his position. We must place the suffering in the anthropic consciousness of God. We are not at liberty to affirm that in Christ the humanity alone suffered, or that the Deity alone suffered, or that the two suffered together, since no one of these views is possible, except on the supposition that the incarnation was a mere outward co-operation of two distinct and separate personalities. God, in his eternal consciousness, knows and can know no limitation, and so can experience no suffering.

We find in the Fathers many illustrations of the union of two natures in one person. We may here state the more striking ones: the soul and body are two distinct natures, and yet both form one person; fire penetrates the iron, and both retain their distinct properties, and yet form one substance; the light of the sun blends with the light it generates, and its heat is not lost in the life which it conditions; the light of day penetrates the air, without destroying its properties, or losing its own, and we have a luminous atmosphere. The ancients used very freely the terms garment, organ, instrument, tabernacle, and temple, to designate the humanity of our Lord. The defects of all these illustrations are obvious. Perhaps we might represent one aspect of the incarnation, if we said it was like a mother's heart and mind taking possession of her loving and obedient child. In this case, the will of the parent incarnates itself in the soul of her offspring, and fills and sways the life of the child.

The divinity of our Lord makes the humanity all the more real, and all the more worth to us; as his humanity makes his divinity more real to us, and of infinitely more worth to our souls. The revelation of each is complete in the other. Thus, without the incarnation, we could not so fully realize the personality of God, nor feel the sympathies of God; nor could we on the other hand, have either an Exemplar or Redeemer of the race.

Thus, while Jesus was the Son of Mary, and so belonged to his nation and to his age; He was also the Son of woman, and so represented, not his own age only, but all the ages—not his own race alone, but the entire human family. He could not have held this position if He had been only a member of the Jewish commu-

nity into which He was born. for the reason that, in that case, He must have been essentially fashioned by the epoch in which He lived. To be a Leader of humanity, the sources of his life must have been outside of and independent of his times. In short, his birth must have been supernatural, and his consciousness of self must have been one with his consciousness of God.

He was thus not only man, and a man, but *the Man*—the complete man—the ideal man, realized in human history. His nature embraced in their fullness all the elements which belong to humanity. There were thus in him possibilities of perfection in each and every sphere of human activity. But He entered into none of the narrow vocations of life. He would not found a school of thought, for He had to do primarily with souls, and not with ideas, and so must be more than a philosopher. He would not present Himself as a national Leader, for He was to be more than the head of a party, or the chief man of a state. All other great souls have had their special aptitudes and tastes, and so have represented only sections and fragments of our common humanity. They have gained a fame for themselves in their special vocations, as inventors, discoverers, artists, poets, orators, mathematicians, scientists, and *literateurs*. But in character they have fallen, one and all, below the level of even their own thought. Neither any one of their pursuits, nor the union of them all, could make, or even tend to make, the perfect man—the man who could translate knowledge into wisdom—who could realize the highest thought, in his character and life. The pursuits of these men are all ideal. But Christ is not an idealist. The virtue He inculcated was the virtue He realized. His life is the world's great lesson, and its grand and exhaustless inspiration. The best men, in the actual world, have taken on their philanthropy from Christ himself, with or without acknowledgment.

We are not to designate Christ as a religious genius, for genius refers to some special endowment, and narrows while it exalts its possessor. The gift of genius puts a man at the head of a school of thought or makes him a leader of society, but does not and can not make him the founder of a religion—least of all of a religion that was designed for humanity. Genius alone may win admiration, but never can command the homage of the human heart—never

can have a great following—never can attract the affections of the mass of mankind.

Christ, then, was not one of many, but *the One* above all. He was separate from all, not by side-studies and partial aims and pursuits, but by the whole plane of his living—a plane, however, which touched all other souls by the breadth and depth of its unselfishness. He was great, not in isolation, but by the fullness of his resources and the richness of their impartation. Our entire nature was in Him; and He was in that nature, to re-create and glorify all its exemplars according to the pattern of his own divinely human life. Thus the two elements which formed his individuality were, his elevation above all, and his identification with all. He was, in the completeness, affluence, and power of his nature, before all; and in the purity and unselfishness of his sympathies, one with all. His vocation answered to his character. It was not narrow, special, temporary, or absorbing but a fractional part of his nature; but was universal, permanent, and possessing his entire being. For his one and sole aim was to reveal God to man and man to Himself—to bring them together in his own nature, and to make effective his redemptive agency in all human souls.

The incarnation of the Son of God on earth and in humanity, may be only one of many which may take place in the universal government of God. It would not be strange if, in many of the stellar worlds, there should be planets which moved in the temperate zones of their systems, and so were suited to rational life; nor would it be surprising if they should witness a fall and a redemption like that which has made so glorious the history of our earth.

CHAPTER III.

CHRIST IN HIS LIFE.

SECTION FIRST.

TIME AND PLACE OF HIS ADVENT.

The purpose of this chapter is not to give any sketch, however brief, of the life of our Lord; but to present the leading facts and features of his advent and career in their moral significance. The aim is theological, and not historical. Such an examination is essential to our mode of conceiving and treating the work of Christ, in the chapters which follow.

Though Christ was the Man of the race, He was also a man of the Jews. The fact that He was born "a Hebrew of the Hebrews" was not a mere incident in his life.

The parentage and nationality of any individual soul are never of trifling moment in its character. Birth is not a simple and absolute beginning. It is an inheritance, and the civilization into which the man is born has a determining influence on his development. The accidents of birth relate alone to its chance accompaniments and surroundings, and not to the essential relations of the one born. Christ, then, was the Son of Mary, as well as of woman; and so must inherit all there was in Judaism, as He must gather up in Himself all there was in humanity.

He must, according to the general course of Providence, and according to the laws of human development, appear among the Jews. Had He appeared elsewhere, He would have been born out of his place in the history of the world. Apart from the fact that symbol and type, promise and prophecy, pointed to a Jewish Messiah, the distinctive life of the Hebrew race had its culmination in Jesus of Nazareth. This great Gift of God had, and must have had its connections with other lesser gifts, of which it was the crown and goal. Otherwise, the supra-natural becomes contra-natural.

Had Christ been born at Athens—the ancient centre of Greek life—He would have shared in her special culture, and would have embodied whatever was true and beautiful in her philosophy and

in her art. He would have been the foremost of all her thinkers, the wisest of her sages, and the most creative of her artists. He might have founded an academy for the few, but He could not have established a church for the many. Had He appeared among the Greeks with his own proper ideals, He would have had to revolutionize their entire thought and feeling, and so have put Himself in absolute antagonism with their national life in its best form. For He could not seek to found a philosophy, reformed or unreformed, but a religion that could redeem the ignorant and the lost. Thus the law of moral congruity points to Judea, and not to Greece, as the place of our Savior's birth.

Had Christ appeared among the Romans, He would have been connected with their distinctive civilization, and would have embodied all that was great and good in the old Roman life. We should have witnessed in Him the living spirit of law—the great organizer and administrator of the forces of society. His religion would have been an establishment, in which the individual would count for nothing, and the organization for everything—a visible institution which should be the very source and sent of all divine life. According to all the laws of human progress, He would have founded his Kingdom after the Roman pattern, and in conformity with the highest Roman thought. The very contradiction between this conception and the entire spirit of Christ's character, shows that we are to look for his nativity, not in the neighborhood of Rome, but under the shadow of Jerusalem—not in the land of great jurists, but in the home of the old Hebrew prophets.

The place of his advent was on the confines of the eastern and western world. For He was to unite and to reconcile in his own person their opposing tendencies. He must be an oriental in order to feel the waters of a common life flooding his own soul; and He must also be an occidental in order to assert fully his own independent individuality. His advent, too, must be away from the great social centres for a new religion must have its origin in that solitude where God alone is the only society. Thus He was to be born not in Alexandria, not even in Jerusalem, but among the hills of Judea.

Christ must come in the fullness of times. The epoch of his advent had a Messianic significance. The polytheistic antagonism

of races had given place to the feeling of a common life; the best results of the ancient civilization had been gathered into one vast empire; and the old society, in reaching the pinnacle of its grandeur, had experienced, along with its conscious greatness, the utter hopelessness of its moral condition. All this was but the ethnic preparation for the coming of Christ.

But if this was all—if He had not been heralded by forerunners, and if the Gentile world had not been prepared by the educative influences of a missionary people, his appearance would have been, from a human point of view, a complete failure. The truth and the life imparted to the elect nation of the world made them the depositaries, and the organs, and the propagandists of a supernatural revelation. Christ was at once able to organize a free church in a world-wide community, and to commission chosen heralds of a new spiritual economy as preachers of his Gospel. They found their countrymen scattered everywhere along the shores of the great sea, and so they gained at once a foothold in all the great centres of the empire. Thus the new religion had a chance for itself, escaping, as it did, the antagonism of race; supported, as it was, by the authority of the great past; and gathering about itself, as it was sure to do, in its onward course, the most earnest souls of the entire community. [See *Evidences of Christianity*, Chapter VII.

That the incarnation should have taken place at all on this earth, in view of the fact of its physical insignificance, is to be justified on the ground, to modify a remark of Hegel, that it is one of the Bethlehems of the universe. The coming of Christ was not determined by the size or the position or the orbit of the earth. For it was not the visit of a king to inspect the resources of his empire or to advance its material power; but it was the advent of a spiritual sovereign to found a spiritual kingdom. It is not, then, the insignificance of the earth, but the significance of human souls and their infinite peril which justifies the incarnation of the Son of God, and that, too, on our planet.

SECTION SECOND.

THE CHARACTER OF HIS BIRTH.

The natural and supernatural blend together in the birth of our Lord. Neither of these elements is to be sacrificed to the other. He was born of Mary, while she was a virgin. His conception was at once real and miraculous. From out of our corporate humanity a new life was evoked, by the creative power and presence of God Himself. He thus embodied in his very being, from its very outset, the life of humanity, and the life of divinity. Time and eternity, earth and heaven, met in Him. His conception in Mary by the Holy Ghost, made him the Bearer of all our sins, by freeing Him from all sins of his own. He inherited the penalties of human sin, without inheriting depravity. He was made to bear the burdens of human guilt, without being made a sharer in human sinfulness. He is thus a sinless link, welded into a sinful chain, and bearing the whole weight of that chain. As Paul affirms, "He who knew no sin was made sin for us."

But Christ had no fountain of sinfulness in his nature, poisoning his affections and weakening his will. There was no germinant tendency to sin, kept in restraint by his dominant holy choices and volitions. His inheritance of death was balanced, and more than balanced by the inheritance of eternal life. He had disorders of soul, as well as of body, but no moral defilement. He bore within Himself the seeds of disease and of death, and endured all the pains and disabilities of our fallen human life; but experienced no inward moral bias, and partook of no guilt, either of will or of nature. In brief, He bore the consequences of others' sins, without having any personal share in their sinfulness. Had there been a fountain of moral corruption in his being, even if it was only in a minimum form, and even if mastered by his will, the incarnation would have been impossible, and the absolute holiness of our Lord would have been precluded.

Christ's birth was also an advent. His appearance in the world was not independent of his own agency, but a free, voluntary act of humiliation. His coming was, therefore, an act of self-surrender, and so his whole life was meritorious throughout. This view holds true, though He was bound to fulfill all the obligations He had

assumed. His birth was thus unique and singular, in being also a free and voluntary act of his own. It was the union of these factors in his one life that brought Him into perfect sympathy both with God and with man.

But this birth, creative though it was, had behind it a past, of which it was the consummation. It was foreshadowed by types, and foretold by prophets. Christ was not only descended from theocratic kings, and priests, and prophets, but He was the Desire of all nations. This event, as we have shown in the previous section, must have fixed historical connections; for Christ is the only Explanation of the past, as He is the only Hope of the future. He is the sole Key of Providence.

He was not only born but *sent* into the world. His coming was the result of a divine appointment. It was Gods way of approaching men, and of making effective his offer of pardon and justification. God carried his own invitation through the trials of a mortal life, and urged in person that invitation in tears and in blood. The view that the Sender and the Sent are essentially one and the same God, is justified by what we elsewhere find in the Scriptures. The meaning of the term *sent*, in reference to the relation of the higher nature of the Son to the Father, is best explained by analogous phrases which we use when we say that we put ourselves in such a position or submit ourselves to such conditions. It was thus illustrative of the divine character, as it was also the regulative event in the divine administration. Thus we see that the birth of our Lord has to do with his work, as truly as his death.

SECTION THIRD.

HIS DEVELOPMENT.

Christ must first be a youth, in order to become a man. He could not have been created a full and perfect man at once. For the experience of youth is essential to the perfection of one's humanity. Manhood only unfolds what is wrapped up in childhood. The soul, on reaching maturity, must have a past and a present, both in its life and in its consciousness. As, then, a real growth is an essential element in human life, so Christ must have experienced a real development.

Christ did not need to go through the formal trials incident to any special calling in order that he might have sympathy with men in exceptional circumstances. He did need, however, to experience that which is common to all human pursuits and lives. This He gains by passing from infancy to childhood, from childhood to youth, and from youth to full manhood. It was by virtue of this universal element in Christ's experience, that He was able to find some point of contact with every human soul whatever. For the power to sympathize with others depends on the depth and breadth of our natures, as these natures have felt and thought profoundly from their earliest days to their full maturity. It does not depend on agreement in merely outward conditions and trials.

In the Child there was, we may believe, a dim and vague presentiment of what He was to be and do. This inward sense of destiny—this growing theanthropic consciousness—first found an open, public, and decisive expression, in the twelfth year of his age. He had, no doubt, often used in his prayers the same exclusive formula, "My Father;" but its depth and fullness of meaning did not break upon his soul until He reached the borders of early manhood—the period when one's inmost life-purpose begins to assert its supremacy. This expression, "My Father," was not an incidental or casual one, for He retained it through his whole life, in preference to the one He gave to his disciples as best suited to their relation to God; namely, "Our Father." It plainly vindicated his divine Sonship.

The occasion, too, served to bring out the consciousness of his high calling. He visited for the first time the Holy City, looked for the first time on the splendid ceremonial of the temple-worship—a ceremonial alive with meaning to a religious mind—and gazed with holy rapture on the spot hallowed for so many centuries by the presence of the wisest and best of his people—the prophets and priests of Israel. It was natural that then and there the growing presentiment of what He was and was to be, should take form and find a clear utterance.

But his divinely human self-consciousness had not yet fully reached perfection, and so the sacred writers preserve a silence on his subsequent life. Christ remains with his parents for eighteen years, waiting for the Forerunner to appear, who was to give the

signal for his entrance on his public mission. Thus, on the brow of one of the hills of Nazareth, away from the allurements of court-life and from the jars of opposing sects, amid the quiet scenes of nature, in converse with the prophets, and in deeper and closer communion with his Father, his divinely human life grew to perfection. His mother seems to have seen only the human development—the beauty and symmetry of his youth and early manhood. His brothers, too, saw at first only one like themselves, except of a finer mould, and of a purer character, and possessed with loftier ideas.

Full thirty years passed away before He publicly announced Himself as the Messiah. There can be no doubt that, during all this time, the preparation for the work of his public life was quietly going on. In solitude, or in the busy walks of unofficial life, and amid a thousand cares and anxieties, He was doing and suffering God's will. His deep and broad sympathies with all men found a natural outlet and expression in his daily contact with them, in the common intercourse of life. He was true to his mission, not merely on great occasions, when temptation gathered for a decided blow, but also in the thousand little trials which beset man in the varied pursuits of private life. It was not God's plan that Christ should die before his maturity, because only when He had reached that period could He have sounded the depth of human woe, and experience, in his death, God's curse on humanity.

As Christ was a real man, with local associations and domestic and real ties, so these elements must have entered into and helped to mould his character. They add to his power, for the reason that He is thereby made more distinctively human. But though lineage and nationality and climate had their influence upon him, yet they were all subordinated to the master-principle of his character—the regnant spirit of his life. His growth was thus predominantly determined by his redemptive purpose and work. The grand style of his character was thus fixed by the law of his own life. He became the architypal man, generating the loftiest ideal of human life and realizing that ideal in his own person, and forming by the might of his own character a new humanity out of the wreck and ruin of the old.

SECTION FOURTH.

HIS SINLESSNESS.

Christ must be holy in his conception and at his birth. The inheritance of the burdens and woes of human sin must not morally poison the fountains of his life, nor weaken the moral springs of his action. Christ is holy, not because He repressed rising sinful tendencies; but because, through all the trials of his life, He uniformly preferred the right and the good—because all affections, and all his thoughts, and all his volitions were from the first holy. He had no sinful tendencies to master. See Luke 1:35. But his sinlessness was more than the mere outgrowth of a pure nature. It was his life choice of God rather than of self or the world—an act of supreme self-determination. The holiness of his life was positive, not negative, personal and not merely natural.

He must, too, be perfect in every stage of his growth—a pure child—a spotless youth—as well as a complete man. Any other excellence than that which is congruous with such a development would have marred the beauty of his humanity. It is, then, no purpose to affirm that sinlessness cannot belong to Jesus, because human nature implies growth, and growth implies imperfections. The very reverse of this is the truth. This very development not only is no defect, but makes up, in great part, the glory of a genuinely human life. A fixed state of existence, or a premature growth, in a rational being, would be unnatural, and so below the highest type of perfection. All that we need to insist on, is that Christ's moral perfection was truly human in its character.

It has been said that the sinlessness of Jesus was inconsistent with his temptation. Now these are the two grand characteristics in the earthly life of our Lord, and are to be accepted as such. There are difficulties in reconciling them; but these ought not to lead us to ignore either of them, or to sacrifice one for the other. Temptation converts sinlessness into positive holiness, and sinlessness gives to temptation an heroic and saintly character—makes it potential and redemptive in its influence. Without the one, Christ is in Himself less than nothing; and without the other, He is nothing at all to us. For if, with his claims, He was not holy, He then falls below the level of an ordinarily good man, and if his

virtue was untried, He is no example for us. How far we may be able to realize the fact of his temptation, will be seen in a subsequent section.

The sinlessness of Christ is essential to the integrity of Christian truth. Without it the entire fabric falls to pieces and the very pieces themselves perish utterly and forever. For Christianity itself issues out of the character of our Lord and depends directly and immediately, on his person and life and not on any position he may hold or any exterior work he may perform. Christ indeed teaches a religion, but a religion that is constituted by his very person and character. In examining the Scripture we find that our Lord rests his holiness on his identity with the Father. See John 7:18, 28-29; 8:29; and that he declares that his absolute rectitude is an evidence of his truth and truthfulness. John 7:18; 8:45-47. The apostles connect Christ's mastery over our sins with his own sinlessness. I Cor. 5:31. Heb. 2:10; 7:26. I John 2:1; 3:5. They also make him our exemplar and the source of our sanctification, and ground them both on the righteousness of his character I Peter 2:21-23; I John 3:6. Christ taught that one of the chief objects for which the Spirit should come into the world was to convince it of his own righteousness, the evidence of which was to be found in his own resurrection and ascension.

The proof of the holiness of our Lord may be drawn from his very professions themselves. He claims to be sinless, and his followers admit that claim, and rest their hopes upon it. Now, in this unique self-assertion he cannot be deceived; for, *first*, he had a clear and exalted view of the moral law, the clearest and most exalted ever given to mortal. In fact, he was pre-eminently a moral and religious Teacher. All this tends very strongly to preclude any grave self-deception. In the *second* place, he was accustomed to look at the hidden and inward springs of action. Thus his own consciousness could not well have escaped the searching scrutiny of his own introspection. This, too, would stand in the way of any self-imposition. In the *third* place, it was his wont to give himself up to private prayer and to self-reflection. This, also, would have opened to himself his own spiritual condition. In the *fourth* place, he was placed in the midst of special and varied trials, in which the latent evils of his own heart—if there were

any—would have been certain to show themselves, at least to himself, if not to the world. It was this temptation which converted his sinlessness into positive holiness. The very struggle to keep the moral law, and to discharge faithfully the high trust committed to him, would have stirred the fountain of evil in his nature, had any such fountain existed. Besides, does the theory of self-deception accord with the loftiness of his mission; does it harmonize with the grounding of a church? Can we construct history on any such hypothesis? Should we not be giving up the supra-natural for the contra-natural?

Shall we say, then, that Jesus was a deceiver? Here we must make our choice between two opposite views. We must believe that he was either a miracle of goodness, or a marvel of wickedness; for, if he was a hypocrite, his hypocrisy was of the most subtle and insinuating character possible, bearing all the marks and having all the potency of truth itself. It was, too, a deception in the highest and holiest sphere of one's life. It was, then, a false coin, but with all the appearance and weight, and even value, of the genuine one, and that, too, after having been used for many centuries, and after having endured not only the popular tests, but the more scientific ones, by which the true is distinguished from the false.

On this supposition, what refinement of wickedness there must have been in the character of Jesus! He assumed to be the perfect pattern of holiness, and was received as such by those who knew him best. He even claimed to dwell in the bosom of God, and to be one with him in thought and action; and yet he was, on this theory, a deceiver. He presents himself, notwithstanding this boundless self-assertion, as the model of humility, and is able to take on all its moral power and all its sweet attractive beauty. The testimony of Judas as well as that of Pilate, indeed of men outside of, as well as within the church, shows the general impression made by the character of Jesus on his contemporaries. That impression has been deepened with every succeeding century. What, then, must we say, if Jesus is not the Christ of God? Must we not declare him to be the one great Antichrist of history? But there is no difficulty in accepting the other alternative, that Jesus was the one great transcendent miracle of goodness.

This conclusion accords with the facts in the case. Let us note some of them in the light of the severest test which can be applied to any hypothesis, namely, that it not only shall account for the facts of the case, but that its falsity in view of those facts shall be inconceivable.

In the first place, we have the origin and development of the church grounded on a *personal relation* to its Founder,—a society struggling to be holy and hoping to be sanctified,—a kingdom, however divided in doctrine, or ceremonial, or government, yet agreeing in a personal attachment to Jesus as the sinless Messiah, and accepting his claims not only as a mystery, but as a moral necessity. Such was the simple fact in the case. For the church is not the school of Christ grounded on an agreement in opinion but the society of Jesus formed by a loving trust in his person. Individual souls are Christian because they love him, believe in him, obey him, worship him and expect to join him hereafter in his kingdom of glory. How can such a Christ-like community be accounted for, except on the theory that Jesus is all that he proclaims himself to be,—the holy one of God.

In the second place, we have a civilization which he has created, and which thus rightly bears his name,—a civilization in which the sentiments of religion and of humanity are blended together and made unceasingly dominant. Now, such a civilization necessitates for its starting-point and source just such a person and character as Jesus proclaimed himself to be. The agencies and the institutions which his Presence has created are vast and manifold. They are the great organs which Christianity uses in the regeneration of human society. They are the signs and the pledges of her world power. Thus we have the Christian church with its ministry, its symbols and its worship, and also with its numberless philanthropic as well as missionary organizations. Thus we have the Christian Sabbath with all its associations and traditions and attractions, with all its restraints and all its sanctions. And thus, again, we have the sacred books of our faith translated into all the chief languages of the world. Besides all this, there still remains the leavening influence of the millions of Christian disciples which is felt everywhere in life and in literature, in the marts of business and in the halls of legislation. Now the very soul of all this moral power is the spiritual presence of a sinless Savior.

These two facts would be the enigma of Providence,—unexplained and inexplicable,—if Jesus was not the holy Helper and Healer of humanity. For if Christ is not holy as he proclaimed himself to be, then there is added to the darkness of Providence the blackness of despair forever. Without such a Christ the pall of skepticism would be drawn over our highest beliefs and our dearest hopes. This enigma is still further heightened, when we consider the calmness and the depth of earnestness with which Jesus avows his belief in his own freedom from sin. For this interior calmness, and this freshness and strength of conviction, ever well up from a profoundly truthful nature. The conviction of his own purity had grown with his consciousness, for it was rooted in his conviction that he was one with his Father. A wicked man cannot so assert himself as to become, on account of that very self-assertion, the great moral attracting and governing power of the centuries.

Now, there is no middle ground, as Renan imagines. If Jesus is not absolutely sinless, he is not only sinful, but falls below the level of our common humanity. If he was tainted by the least stain of enthusiasm or of hypocrisy, then that stain is fatal to his character as the ideal of truth and goodness. Let us look at the case. He claimed to stand apart from, and above, all others in his moral character, solitary and alone, and yet he made himself the sinless among the sinful, the model of humility. He gave to others the prayer for forgiveness, but he tacitly assumed that he needed none for himself. Others say "Our Father," for they belong to the community of sinners, while it is for him, standing alone and apart in his purity, to say "My Father." He everywhere taught or implied that his sinlessness had come from his oneness with God,—a oneness which antedated the creation of the world. He offered forgiveness to others; he sought none for himself. He presented himself as the Savior for a lost world, while he himself needed no exterior help. Thus he presented himself as the Representative of God, the Founder of his kingdom, the Teacher of mankind, their perfect Exemplar, their only Redeemer, and their final Judge. Yet, with all these unique and transcendent claims, he added still another, namely, that of personal humility, and yet he did not destroy the matchless symmetry of his character.

If now, by reason of any defect, however slight, he falls from

The moral elevation he has assumed,—the loftiest position possible,—if he falls, we affirm, from that altitude, he falls with a tremendous momentum. The slightest inclination of the well-balanced rock on the mountaintop hurls the entire mass down to the base, and buries it with an awfully crushing force beneath the soil. The very height from which Jesus would thus fall but increases the final velocity, and our Master sinks away forever from our sight; for he falls burdened with the guilt of blasphemous assumption, or stained with the follies of a moral insanity. The condemnation of the high priest is just, and the cry about the cross, "Crucify him!" accords with the highest law of his own people. All his claims to stand on a plane essentially above that occupied by the race now rise up to condemn him, and the higher the claims the greater the condemnation. His religion becomes a superstition, and his plan to save the world the delusion of a fanatic, or the scheme of an apostate.

It would not answer to resort at random to both of these theories, and to make the character of Jesus a blending of fraud and of folly. Its singular moral unity, notwithstanding its great proportions, its wonderful beauty, and its amazing power in the world, are fatal to a shift so childish and so desperate.

Thus, then, we return to the great alternative. Jesus was super-angelic or super-satanic in his character; marvellous beyond expression in goodness, or monstrous beyond all conception in wickedness. Browning has well expressed it:

"If Christ, as thou affirmest, be of man,
Mere man,—the first and best, but nothing more,—
Account him for reward of what he was,
Now and forever wretchedness to all;
Call Christ then the illimitable God,
Or lost."

SECTION FIFTH.

HIS BAPTISM.

In his baptism, Christ entered on his public mission. It constituted his inauguration as Messiah, not by what it was in itself, or in the ordinary application of its meaning. The baptism of John simply denoted repentance of sin. It was not a rite of consecra-

tion or of dedication, except so far as these ideas may be involved in a renovation of heart and a reform of life. The simple rite, then, as administered by the Baptist, did not formally introduce Him into his office. There was, however, another Presence than that of the Forerunner—another visible symbol besides the waters of the Jordan—and another formula than that which fell from the lips of the human administrator. It was this supernatural ceremonial which made the baptism of Christ unique, and served as his official inauguration as the Founder of the Kingdom of God. But the baptism of John had, in the case of Jesus, a peculiar significance. It meant, in its ordinary application, repentance on the part of the candidate, and assured to him a remission of his sins.

Jesus did not nullify its meaning; but exalted it. The Sinless One was to take away the sins of the world by being a Substitute for sinners. He enters the waters of the Jordan as their Substitute. He appears as the great Penitent, sorrowing for the sins of the race, and so symbolically securing remission of sins in his baptism, as He actually secured it in the baptism of suffering and death. In this view, we can realize the force of our Redeemer's words when He says, "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished."

Jesus sanctioned the baptism of John, and so in the fullest sense Christianized the rite, and made it the sign of the believer's entrance into the Kingdom of God, and the symbol of a new divine life. The generic idea of a moral renewal now takes on a more specific form: namely, that of a death to sin and a resurrection to holiness. It would thus seem that John's baptism was essentially the same as Christian baptism. Besides, John himself did not so much close the ancient Jewish Economy, as introduce the New Dispensation.

The meaning of the new supernatural accompaniment of the baptism of Jesus, in its several parts, deserves a passing notice. The descent of the Dove was the pledge that the Spirit was now to be manifested in its entire fullness in the person of Christ, and its abiding upon him was a sign of its permanent presence in his character and life. The Spirit was not now for the first time conferred on Christ, but now for the first time to be revealed in its power. The reign of the Spirit was now to begin, though its gifts

and graces were not to be generally dispensed till after the ascension of our Lord. The Economy of the Spirit would date from that period. The words, "Thou art my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," give clearness and point to his public recognition as Messiah.

We must not suppose that any part of this scene was a vision, in which the consciousness of Christ was cut off from all connection with the sensible world. In fact, our Lord never had a trance, such as prophets before Him and apostles after Him were wont to experience. He entered the spiritual world at will. It was his original and proper home and dwelling-place. All these signs addressed his senses while He was in the full possession of all his faculties.

SECTION SIXTH.

HIS TEMPTATION.

Christ experienced temptations through his entire life. They naturally, however, gathered to a center as He entered on his work as Messiah. The crisis in his life occurred just after his baptism, and the temptations He then endured were decisive in their consequences.

This was according to the divine plan—the providential procedure—by which Christ was to be prepared for his great work. For this reason He was led by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the Devil. The plan was not arbitrary, nor were the promptings of the spirit unnatural. Jesus, as subject to human conditions, and as appointed to lead a truly human life, was called to self-searchings and to supreme self-decisions. He stood forth solitary and alone. His countrymen were looking for a world-Messiah to establish a world-kingdom, and He must determine beforehand how He would adjust Himself to these expectations. Besides He was to scrutinize his own heart, and to decide once and forever, in the coming emergencies, He would and could make the will of his Heavenly Fathers absolutely his own. It was, then, alone in the wilderness, in company with him who represented the selfishness of this world, that Jesus was to make his governing life-decisions.

These temptations suggested by Satan, were presented in the following forms, and perhaps in the following order:

First. The temptation to use his power for an un-Christlike purpose—to use it in behalf of his personal needs—and not for the furtherance of the Kingdom of God.

To gratify his natural appetites, under ordinary circumstances and in the ordinary way, would have been innocent, and might have been a duty. More than this is true. Christ might, consistently with his character, have used his supernatural power to satisfy his natural wants, provided that this satisfaction was only incidental in itself, and only tributary to the advancement of his mission. The appeal, then, to the cravings of his nature, in disregard of the higher principles of action, constituted the first temptation in the wilderness.

If Christ had yielded He would have done violence to the very law of his life—the principle of self-abnegation and self-surrender to God. For he had given up his omnipotence to be used in the interest of redeeming love, and not for the satisfaction of his personal wants. The proposal of Satan was at once rejected, and Christ remained victor.

In this moral victory, He settled the entire course of his life. Thus, in harmony with his governing purpose, He declares that He can do nothing of Himself—that his meat and drink are not to do his own will, but the will of his Father in heaven. Thus, weary at the well, He asked water of the Samaritan woman, though He might have created a new fountain at his pleasure. Thus, though Lord of all, He had not where to lay his head, and seems to have been dependent for his support on the charities of his friends. Thus He allowed Himself to be taken and crucified, though legions of angels were ready to do his bidding.

Second. The temptation to make a mere display of power in proof of his mission—such a display as would be both inconsistent with his vocation and unwarranted by the promises of God. It was a temptation to work a miracle out of harmony with his character and in a spirit of presumption, in order to master the unbelief of the world. The sources of the temptation were the consciousness of power and the desire to convince the world of the divinity of his mission. But a mere dazzling display of power

without love, was un-Messianic and presumptuous in the extreme. Here, too, He remains true to his calling.

Had He yielded, He would have abandoned the principles of his life, and, instead of being the meek and lowly Redeemer, would have become the self-willed enthusiast and fanatic. No imaginary or real incidental gain could atone for poisoning the springs of his moral action. Duty, not display—humility, not ostentation—a child-like trust, not a bold presumption—faith as warranted by God's promises, and justified by the very nature of his mission, is to be the sole law of his life.

This law He ever makes good, from his baptism to his ascension. All his miracles are miracles, not of mere power, but of love. He performs them, not for his own reputation as the great Wonder-worker, seeking to glorify Himself, but solely for the good of his creatures. Thus He would not allow any report of his miracles to be noised abroad, when there was danger that men would be led to false conceptions of his mission, or to think of him merely as a great Magician. He would teach everywhere, not only by word, but by deed, that "the Kingdom of God cometh not with observation."

Third. The temptation to extend his Kingdom through un-Messianic means and measures. The tempter appealed to Christ's absorbing desire for the triumph of that kingdom—for the spread of that cause with which his whole life and being were identified. He would cover the unworthiness of the means in the promised splendor of the success.

Christ must make his election between founding his church on his allegiance to God or on his allegiance to Satan. If He surrenders Himself to his great adversary, He will advance his kingdom suddenly, and with the show of a grand success, though at a fatal expense. If He gives Himself up to his Father, He will advance that cause, slowly indeed, and with many temporary reverses, but at last completely and triumphantly.

Our Lord did not hesitate for a moment, but instantly repelled the solicitation as utterly abhorrent to the whole intent and purpose of his life. Peter threw out essentially the same suggestion, though in a different form, when he repudiated the idea that his Master must needs experience a baptism of suffering—that the

Messianic kingdom could only be founded by the death of the Messiah. The implication of the apostle was that the kingdom of God might be built up without any vicarious suffering—on the principle of self-security, and not on that of supreme self-surrender. It was this thought that drew from Jesus the severe rebuke, "Get thee behind me, Satan." Here then, He settled another of those fundamental principles which were to guide him throughout his public life. In fact, Jesus never sacrificed truth to success, or principle to mere expediency. At the last moment He would not save his life by lowering his claims by explaining away aught of the depth and fulness of their meaning.

How rich in lessons of practical wisdom these Messianic temptations are, is obvious on the very surface of the sacred record.

Besides these crucial temptations of our Lord which occurred at the opening of his public life and which were to settle its governing principles, we have others which were to test not his purposes for the future, but his every day life and living. The first were ideal in character; that is, they were in the region of thought and not of action. The second were real in character; that is, occurring in the midst of actual sufferings and in reference to pressing duties and dangers. The first were presented in fixed and concentrated forms; the second came unformulated and without any signs of the tempters' presence. The first were mastered once and forever, while the second recurred in varying forms at every little or great crisis in our Lord's life. These last may be classed as the natural incentives to abandon the high work of his life—to escape the inward and outward difficulties of his position and his work. The sense of unrequited love—the consciousness that He was not appreciated even by the best of his countrymen—the knowledge that even his nearest friends and most devoted followers, not only would not stand by him in emergencies, but did not even understand Him—the passing misgiving that such souls may not deserve such a sacrifice as he was making—the instinctive shrinking from contact with human sin, as the depth of its enormity opened itself to his view—and the appalling spectacles of that final penalty of sin in which He, too, must be involved, all the more fully from his very sinlessness—all these created temptations to abate his zeal or to give up altogether his redemptive agency.

Still, though He had to struggle and to learn obedience by the things which He suffered, and thus to sanctify his public character, yet the great central temptations which He had already encountered and mastered, made the subsequent ones all the easier. This view must not be overstated. For a temptation based on the issues of life as these issues are realized only in thought is some what different from the same temptation re-entering with life's numberless crushing cares and duties. And we must not formally separate Christ's private life from his public career, especially after that career has been fully entered upon—that is, after his baptism. For he never wore a mask—never acted a part. His public presentations of himself sprung from the very spirit and principles of his private personal character. What he was when alone, or with his more intimate friends, just that he was in the presence of the multitude. The revelations of his character vary indeed with a change of circumstances, but only in form, but never in substance.

We must now seek to realize the possibility and the actuality of these temptations. In Heb. 4:15 we are assured that Christ was "in all points tempted like we are, apart from sin." The passage does not mean that He was tempted in all respects, except in those which could lead to sin. This would require a change in the original, which would appear in the translation thus: "He was in all points, except sin, tempted as we are." Such is the view of De Wette, Lunemann, and Alford. The idea of the passage, then, is that Christ shared in our temptations; but that sin is to be taken from them all, both in their origin and in their development and in their final results—both in word and in deed. But notwithstanding the fact that all of Christ's temptations were those of a sinless being, they were yet as real and as severe as his life was profound and self-sacrificing. We are to account for them all on the following generic facts:

A. Christ was human. He not only had the usual susceptibilities of a man, but they were all alive to his surroundings. His nature and his will were touched on all sides. The objects of sense appealed to his physical appetites, the enjoyments of life addressed his social impulses, the current sentiments and thoughts of his age forced themselves on his intellect, and the aims and purposes common to the men of his day came in ceaseless conflict with the

regnant thought and the entire plan of his life. He was thus on all sides moved and solicited. The tempter, apart from his personal agency in these solicitations, embodied and centered the temptations themselves, and brought them to bear in their full force on the mind and heart of Christ.

B. Christ shared in our fallen humanity. Though Himself sinless, He was conceived of the Holy Ghost, but in the virgin. He was not generated of the Spirit and conceived by Mary alone; for this mode of origin would have necessitated a fountain of sin in his nature. The inheritance itself was affected by the Holy Ghost in such a way as to preclude personal corruption. He thus had the effects of sin without participating in the guilt and pollution of sin. He assumed our condition in assuming our humanity. He thus inherited a dying nature with all its attendant and implied disorders of body and of soul; but yet without any moral bias to sin, such as envy, jealousy, suspicion, and without any form of native depravity, such as lust, covetousness, and malice. He did not have to repress a fountain of evil; but He had to control and regulate his entire nature, and to keep it in harmony with the purpose of his life. The effort to continue holy was analogous to our struggle to become holy. There were no rising alien emotions and sentiments to be restrained on their first appearing, only their possibilities were to be precluded. In the case of the common man there were latent evils to be resisted, while in Christ there were only liabilities to the same to be met and mastered. All the good and all the evil which surrounded him were thus sources of special trial. They invited self-indulgence, they cherished self-will, and they thwarted self-sacrifice by seeming to make it useless and hopeless.

His task was to develop in perfect symmetry. his own proper life, and that, too, in opposition to all the standards of the world, and yet altogether in behalf of the best interests of that world. His life was to be an active forth-putting of all his energies in the midst of increasing difficulties and dangers. His public career was indeed tragic throughout. Each scene prepared for another and each act necessitated its successor until the drama closed in the final catastrophe. Here the constant advance was also a constant trial and a constant victory.

C. Christ bore alone his responsibilities. He did not seek the solitude of retirement, and yet He was the most solitary of men. He gave Himself up to others, but received no sympathy in return. Alone, unsupported in his conflict with the world, He bore his tremendous cares and responsibilities, and carried on the struggle with the forces of evil. In order, however, to do this, He had to summon forth all the resources of his divinely human nature. The completeness of his victory, however, is shown by the fact that the cares which would have broken other souls, did not break his; but He remained inwardly and at bottom calm and serene up to the last hour of his agony.

SECTION SEVENTH.

HIS TEACHING.

The teachings of Christ had two elements—the premanent and the transient, or the essential and the casual. The first grew out of his character and revealed at once his vocation. It embodied whatever was absolute and universal in his governing thought. The second was occasioned by the incidents of his life and related only to the forms of speech suited to his immediate hearers. It was the application of his principles to special circumstances. The bond of union, however, between them can always be easily traced. The enigmas in the teachings of our Lord are the mysteries which are to be unfolded as the church gains a fuller and clearer apprehension of its Founder. But here we need to deal with the first element and with that alone.

The methods of teaching followed by our Lord seem to have come from his character, as the contents seem to have issued from his personal experience. In his case, to know the Man is to know the Teacher. It is from this point of view alone that we can judge of his teachings. To this end the following suggestions may be of help:

Christ was the fountain of inspiration. He was self-inspired, and the source of inspiration to his immediate followers. With Him it was an endowment; and with them it was a gift. The prophets were quickened by dreams and visions, by tokens and signs; but Christ needed no exterior help to feel the presence of the

spiritual world, or to apprehend its mysteries. Its nearness did not surprise Him, nor did its grand verities disturb his consciousness, or cloud in the least his practical judgments. The supernatural was to Him but a familiar form of the natural. He was thus a great Teacher, not by virtue of his formal power of analysis and synthesis, nor simply by a creative imagination, nor by the extent of his acquisitions; but by the profundity of his moral and spiritual intuitions—intuitions which were, in the strict sense of the term, divinely human. It was this fact which made his earlier discourses so free and fresh and creative in their character, and his later utterances so original and so enigmatical.

Christ was the source of authority. Authority belongs to the very office of a teacher. It is personal in just so far as capacity for the work depends on character, and not on formal acquirements. It is absolute only when the teacher has mastered that realm of truth in which he moves and labors. Thus Christ alone had supreme personal authority as a religious teacher. It was not relative, making Him the guide of his own age; but absolute, in that it fitted Him to be the Teacher everywhere and always. The consciousness of Christ has exhausted all there is in human life, and embodied all the elements there are in human experience. It is this fact which makes the New Testament advent the ultimate standard for our faith and practice.

Christ is equally the source of sympathy. He seeks a union with all human souls. He aims to impart Himself to all minds and hearts, and to awaken in them an inward susceptibility for truth. He also opens his soul to all others, and invites them to trust themselves to Him—to impart to Him their cares, their griefs, their needs, and their woes. He will help others by identifying Himself with them. He loves truth for its own sake—not for self's sake, but that He may communicate it to other souls according to the measure of their receptivity. His reserve and his silence are as noteworthy as his freest and fullest self-impartations. They are always condemnatory in character. In them He acts as Judge. But yet the blending of authority and sympathy makes the perfect Teacher.

Christ's teaching was a self-revelation. It related to his person, to his claims, and to his work. These formed the chief

subjects of all his parables, and the main contents of all his discourses. But He interpreted Himself gradually, as the mind of his age was prepared to receive Him. Thus his discourses in Galilee touched only the periphery of his mission, while his discourses in Jerusalem were altogether central in their character. This self-revelation is justified on the ground that Christ was equal to his best thought and feeling—that He did not merely voice that thought, but lived it—that He always and ever rose to the height of his own ideas. Thus He preached Himself, because *He* was the truth—the realization of God in human life.

SECTION EIGHTH.

HIS MIRACLES AND PROPHECIES.

The supernatural in the character and life of our Lord takes on these two essential forms. The one involves the other. As He was the miracle of the ages so He was its great prophecy. There was in him more than appeared—more even than any one apostle or the whole apostolate have given us in the sacred record. It was not possible for Christ to reveal Himself with fullness in the short period of his earthly life or to the few disciples who gathered about him in his earthly career. Nor could He exercise the power of God except as He knew the mind of God. As He was conscious of his superhuman character so He must know his superhuman destiny. Thus his miraculous deeds and his prophetic words mutually explain and complement each other.

Jesus is the permanent miracle of the ages. He enters into humanity to abide there and reign there forever. The great Messianic period to which we belong opened with his visible presence, the Christ of the past; it has advanced and is now advancing under his invisible guidance—the Christ of the present; and it is to culminate with his revelation in glory—the Christ of the future. Take away any one of the great epochs in this life movement and the entire movement itself loses its inner harmony and can have no place in the moral order of the universe. The Christ of history must be followed by the Christ of the church, and the Christ of the church must be glorified in the Christ of heaven.

All the great events in his earthly career are supernatural—the

conception, the resurrection, and the ascension. No one of them can be given up without impairing the completeness of that wonderful, unique life. They mutually support each other. Thus we have a supernatural Christ, or no Christ at all. The common wonders Jesus wrought are but the effulgence of his glory—sparks of light elicited by his contact with suffering humanity. The divine power and love flashed forth whenever and wherever human helplessness or human misery appealed to the sympathy of the one great Wonder-worker. He could not but interpose when disease or death, or any form of human want or woe, tacitly or expressly claimed his intervention. In all this He was but acting according to the law of his nature and the purpose of his mission. Thus every miracle was a triumph over the kingdom of evil, from the first and humblest one at Cana, to the crowning one at the resurrection.

The redemptive character which stamps all these acts of Jesus, so natural to him, but so supernatural to us, will appear from the following classification. They may be grouped under the following heads:

A. His power over the conditions of time and space; *e. g.*, the cure of the nobleman's absent son.

B. His dominion over nature.

1. Over the properties of nature; *e. g.*, turning water into wine. Here was a qualitative change. The increase of the loaves and fishes was a quantitative change.

2. Over the laws of nature; *e. g.*, the walking on the waters of Galilee, and the stilling of the storm.

C. His dominion over physical evil; *e. g.*, supernatural cures, and the instances of the resurrection of the dead.

D. His dominion over psychical evil; *e. g.*, the casting out of devils.

E. His dominion over his own person, over his own destiny, absolute and complete, in which He shapes that destiny in the interests of redemption; *e. g.*, his resurrection and ascension.

Christ is also the Prophet above and apart from all others. His prophecy takes its departure from his self-knowledge. John 8: 14-18; 9: 37; 14: 7-10. He knows his own future and so the future of the religion He founded. He thus assured his disciples

of his spiritual return to advance and to perfect his kingdom on the earth; of his final coming at the end of probation; and of his reunion with them in the new heaven of which He was to be the crown and the glory. This self-knowledge in and by which He fully knows both God and man makes Christ the interpreter of the moral universe. Thus He knows both the mind of the Father and the secrets of the human heart. Thus his prophecies are not partial in character and along narrow and sectional lines of human history, but are comprehensive in their subject matter and radiate in all directions from a central position in the moral government of God. Thus, again, his prophecies as well as his miracles are not the wonders of bare power and of mere knowledge, but are the effulgence of his redeeming love. They are the lines of light which reveal his character and vocation as the sinner's friend—as the Healer of his woes.

SECTION NINTH.

HIS TYPE OF HUMANITY.

The individuality of Christ was not eccentric in its character for the reason that it was not a departure from the normal law of human life, but a return to it, or much rather a new rendering and a glorification of it. That individuality was exceptional simply because it transcended all others. It was not, however, the combination of the actual elements scattered everywhere among men. For Christ was not all men crowded into one. He was not the collective man of the race, nor was his type of manhood formed by the union of those rare gifts allotted to the elect few, for that would make him a supreme genius and nothing more. In either of these cases He would have been monstrously unhuman and so utterly out of place in the order and economy of the universe. Now Christ was not formed by any such synthesis, but issued from the fountain of our humanity as that was opened and purified by the power of the Most High. He was not the final development of the race life, but the idea of humanity evoked and embodied in a separate personality. He was thus the ideal man perfectly realized in human history—the absolutely full and complete man.

This completeness might seem to blot out the very notion of

individuality. But such, in truth, is not the case. Christ was a Jew and had the physiognomy peculiar to his countrymen. His very inheritance and surroundings no doubt gave him distinctive features and manners. These lower marks of his own individual life are not known to us, but of their existence we can have no misgiving whatever. Our ignorance is our protection. There can now be no room for an idolatry that might seem to be orthodox. But there were other and higher features and facts in his life which mark the individuality of our Lord, such as his baptism, his teachings, his miracles, his crucifixion, his resurrection, his appearance and his ascension. All these give his character and life an individuality singular and unique. They would, however, seem wondrously strange were they not all so very natural to such a person engaged in such a mission. The life of Christ, though potentially full from the very outset, was made actually so by having ideals and aims which would call it forth with absolute completeness. For Christ lived out of Himself in behalf of others and thus lived so profoundly, so constantly and so exclusively that He must do as He did, must teach as He did, must suffer as He did and must rise at last, as undoubtedly He did. Now all is natural to him. The miraculous events and the common events harmonize and blend together in the symmetry and the unity of his perfect human life. His weeping at the grave of Lazarus was of as much worth as the resurrection of Mary's brother itself. His attitude before his disciples when washing their feet helps interpret his attitude on the cross. Both were equally Godlike.

Thus we have in Christ not the man for any one class or nation or period, but for all men in all the ages. He is more than the scholar or the scientist or the statesman or the philosopher because his vocation was infinitely broader than any of theirs. If they seem above him in any regard it is because they were below him in their calling. Their greatness was in their exclusiveness. They represented themselves alone. His greatness was in his inclusiveness. He represented humanity. There is no aristocratic element in the goodness of Christ. His soul is open to all and open for all. He loves sinners in proportion to his hatred to sin and in proportion to the possibility of saving them.

SECTION TENTH.

HIS DEATH.

The death of Christ was a necessity—a necessity both physical and moral in its character. This necessity, however, was not absolute but only relative. His advent was a free act, but having freely assumed our nature with all its conditions and limitations, He could not well decline its inevitable issue. His very birth carried in it the seeds of disease and death. He could not escape the common curse except by a miracle—and by a miracle which would falsify his character and his mission. Thus there was a supreme moral reason that the Christ-life should be crowned with the Christ-death. He must experience all there is in a full human life—a human life which has for its termini a birth and a death. For the absence of either is fatal to the completeness of a truly human life.

The time and the manner and the instruments of that death were to be determined by the agents and agencies amid which Christ was to live and labor. We can not absolutely affirm, *a priori*—aside from God's plan, whether his death must come from God's curse on human guilt working from within, or from the violence of human sin working from without. We should confidently expect, however, that the issue of his life would be a violent one. For Christ stood in the sharpest antagonism to all the dominant beliefs and hopes of his countrymen. All classes of Jewish society were against him. The Pharisees and the Saducees, the Jews of Palestine and those of the dispersion, the Herodians and the national opposition, the priests and the people—one and all repudiated his doctrines. This antagonism was gathered and concentrated on his person, for the reason that He not only disseminated ideas subversive of the popular religion and supported them by miracles, but claimed that He Himself—the despised Nazarene and the revolutionary Teacher was the Messiah—the real Christ foretold by prophets and heralded by John the Baptist. He thus charged them with misapprehending the Sacred Scriptures and misconceiving the nature of the new theocracy which they foretold, and finally with rejecting the very One Anointed by Jehovah Himself. These claims of Christ were easily made to appear hostile to Rome as well

as to the Jewish authorities. Thus, a violent death seemed all the more certain. Of old, Plato in his "Republic" declares that a perfectly just man who is accounted unjust is sure to meet such a doom.

The purpose of God is not affected by this view. For the divine plan is carried out and perfected through the medium of the agencies of nature and of life. All is mapped out by God, yet all is free, natural and human. The recurrence of the formula, "This was done, in order that it might be fulfilled," only gives prominence to the divine idea and the divine point of view as these relate to the history of our Lord.

Christ anticipated with increasing clearness his own death as the end drew near. Matt. 12: 39-40; 17: 22-23; 20: 22; Matt. 8: 31-33; Luke 9: 22; 12: 50; John 2: 19-22; 12: 7; 12: 33-34; 13: 31. He was not merely resigned to his death as an inevitable event or as an affliction sent by his Father, but He accepted it as the doom of the sinner whose case He had made his own. He freely assented to it as an essential part and parcel of his supreme self-surrender to God. He thus converted the necessity into a free act of self-devotement to his Father—into an entire self-abandonment in the interests of the race. Thus his death was the consummation of a destiny voluntarily assumed, fully anticipated and, at last, triumphantly accepted. Luke 23: 46; John 10: 18.

The causes of his death were two-fold, physical and mental. The first are not to be overlooked because the second are of primary importance. In fact, they can not be completely separated from each other. Each entered into and aggravated the other. Those of a direct moral and spiritual character are involved in our discussion of the atonement and need not here be restated. We propose only to note the physical causes of our Savior's death. The chief elements of the case are the following: *First*, the organism of Christ was at its full vigor. Its vitality and delicacy were at the time of his death completely developed. *Second*, the mode of that death was disgraceful and torturing in the extreme. *Third*, the accompaniments were also harrowing—the betrayal, the denial and the dispersion—the mockings and the scourgings—the absence of all moral support in the crowd, save the words of the dying penitent thief—and the positive hostility which led the Jewish rabble

to prefer Barnabas to Jesus—all contributed to the agony of his last hours. Whether the heart of Christ was physically ruptured by his intense grief as has been supposed by some, we do not venture to affirm. This only is certain, that his sorrow for human sin must have been one of the factors which hastened his death.

SECTION ELEVENTH.

HIS RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION.

The resurrection stands far above and apart from all other miracles of our Lord in that it was not called forth by the accidents of his mission—the casual appeals to his redeeming mercy—but was occasioned and even necessitated by the fact of his death. Thus, while the resurrection is a striking proof of his divine calling, it has more than an evidential value, even though that value be of the highest possible character. For it was more than the great seal of God—more than the credentials of a divine revelation. It was an essential part of the divine revelation itself—its crown and glory.

The resurrection of Christ might have been invisible, and then He would have risen at once with his spiritual body. The resurrection and the ascension would have been one and the same closing act in the life of our Lord. In such a case the event would not have carried along with itself its own authentication, but would have needed some extraneous testimony. Perhaps the power of his invisible presence would have witnessed to the reality of his mastery over sin and death. But this evidence would not be equal to what we now have. It is certain that the actual resurrection of the body of our Lord, addressing as it did the several senses of his disciples, constituted the chief evidential value of his complete victory over the grave. He seems to have appeared to them for this very purpose—namely, to enable them to act as the proper witnesses of this transcendent fact.

The attempt of the Tübingen school to resolve the actual appearance of our Lord to Paul into a vision must be pronounced a failure. The account in Corinthians can not be thus explained without doing violence to the plainest principles of interpretation. The narrative is a brief and simple historical notice of the appear-

ances of our Lord to the early disciples. Paul recognizes them as the witnesses to the facts in the case. He places Christ's appearances to Himself on the same footing with those which all the other apostles witnessed. He treats them all as the revelations of a fact without which Christianity itself could have no foundation whatever. Besides, whenever Paul would describe any vision of our Lord, he describes it as an internal revelation in and to his soul, and in such a case he uses far different terms and has a far different purpose from that indicated in the 15th chapter of Corinthians.

The resurrection was a necessity alike for Christ and for the world. It was a necessity for Him, because it was the inevitable completion of his earthly life. The supernatural power and grace which were latent in his person, revealing themselves only as humanity called them forth, naturally found their fullest display in his final victory over sin and death. His power to redeem humanity must involve his absolute sway over his own person; for with the destiny of his person is involved the destiny of the race.

It was a necessity for the world; because He who had tasted death for all men must achieve a resurrection for all men. Fellowship with men in one stage and condition of his life involved a union with them in another and higher grade of his existence. It was the goal—the crowning point—of the Redeemer's work on earth. It was not merely an instance, solitary and unique though it may be, of a man's rising from the grave never more to die. This indeed would be something for our race. But Christ was not merely an individual Man; but also the Head of the race, so that his resurrection is in fact also our resurrection. He is more than the pledge of our victory over the grave. He is the actual beginning and the very commencement of our complete redemption, in body as well as in soul. He is thus both the Beginning and the Cause of our resurrection. Thus much, at least, Christ meant when He said: "I am the resurrection and the life." Christ so united Himself to the race as to become its quickening Spirit. He re-moulded and re-constituted in his own person our humanity, and made Himself felt in all the members of that humanity. As all died in Adam according to their share in him, so all are made alive in Christ according to their share in Him. Every one, according to the kind and mode of his connection with the Redeemer,

will have his part and portion in the resurrection. If one has only an unconscious human bond of fellowship with Christ, by virtue of Christ's partaking of our common nature, then the life-process secures to him only a common share in the general resurrection. But if he has a conscious blessed union with Christ, then his portion of Christ will be all the richer, and his body will not merely be raised from the grave, but will be glorified. He shall have a part in the resurrection of the just.

The question has been asked, with what body did Jesus rise from the grave? Three different answers have been given:

First. He rose with precisely the same body He had when He was laid in the tomb. This view is grounded on the statement in Luke 24: 39; "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." Besides, He pointed out the prints of the nails in his hands, and thus gave evidence of his actual physical identity. But, on the other hand, as "flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God;" it is inferred that He could not have had his ascension body. These two phrases both refer to a visible physical organism; but one denotes that organism as exposed to corruption, and the other denotes the same organism as addressed to the senses.

Second. He rose with his glorified body. This view is supported by his peculiar mode of life during the forty days preceding his ascension. It was a life of sudden appearances and sudden withdrawals. Besides, Christ had finished his work, and so must have stood forth with that body, after which the bodies of all believers are to be fashioned.

Third. He rose with a body potentially glorified. It was in a transition state. The process of glorification had commenced; but was not completed until the moment of his ascension. This view seems to harmonize all the facts in the case.

We have already involved two other points in the resurrection of our Lord; namely, that He raised Himself from the grave, and that He rose never to die.

The ascension of Christ naturally follows and interprets his resurrection. It shows that that event was not a mere temporary restoration to life—that the triumph of Christ over death was not a partial conquest; but a final complete victory. The power of death was forever broken.

The ascension was a moral necessity for the person of Jesus. He had done his earthly work and had finished his new creation, as well as perfected through obedience and sufferings his Messianic character. There was, then, no further place for his visible presence in this world, and He must, according to the idea of his life, and the purpose of his mission, return to his proper home in heaven. Besides, the further abode of the Sinless among the sinful, after the state of humiliation had been passed, would have been incongruous. The Savior, with his glorified body, above all trial, and without any visible work suited to a probationary state, could not have found a natural position in a world exposed to temptation and to death. Thus the very idea of a community of life, and the very law of moral fitness, required his return to his Father.

It was a necessity, too, for the church. Christ must not only make his mediation co-extensive with the race, but He must make that very universality apparent to all. This could not well be done while He was bound, by the limitations and conditions of a human body, to one locality, though that locality might be constantly changed. And the church in heaven could not be triumphant without his presence. And the centre of that presence must be where the kingdom of God exists in its glory.

He must, then, ascend to heaven, whence He can make Himself felt in the soul of every believer throughout the world, and whence He can verify his great promise, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst." It is only in this way that the narrow sense of a mere local Christ can give place to the profounder sense of a spiritual indwelling. The whole Christ, body and soul, human and divine, is thus efficiently present wherever there is a human soul to be saved or lost. Christ's ascension to the right hand of God is one and the same thing with his spiritual presence in the souls of men.

Had Christ remained here after his resurrection, his physical presence would have taken precedence, in the minds of his followers, of this spiritual impartation. The tangible and visible in Jesus would have eclipsed the spiritual and invisible. Pilgrimages would have been the order of the day, and the Christ of the eye and the ear would have taken the place of the Christ of the affections and the will.

CHAPTER IV.

THE UNITY OF HIS WORK.

The work of Christ was one with his entire probationary life—his approaches and his visitation—his advent and his incarnation—his life on earth and his reign in the souls of men—his second coming and his final judgment—his life in all its phases, relations, and bearings—his life in the significance and worth of all its manifold aspects. His work, then, was to create a longing for and an expectation of Himself in humanity—to assume humanity, with all its woes—to carry it through all its earthly changes—to experience at last the shock of death—to raise it from that death and present it transfigured in the presence of his Father—to become thus the nucleus of a new humanness, and the center of a new community on earth—to re-appear and to close his probationary work—and finally to enter on his full glorification as the moral center of the universe. His work, then, was to gradually approach nearer to humanity—to human thought and feeling—to be born, to live, to die, to rise, to ascend, to reign spiritually, and finally to re-appear visibly to determine the destinies of all men. To re-state it, the nature of his work was to bring God—the Holy One and the Infinite—into fellowship with man—the finite and sinful creature—and to bring this creature up into fellowship with his Maker. This He does in an actual literal manner, in and by his own person and his own life. For in Him God and man are reconciled. It is there and there alone that the righteous Father comes into friendly contact with his guilty creatures. The work is not apart from and foreign to his entire being and life. On the contrary, it is that very life itself, in the fullness of its meaning, and in the depth and breadth of its significance.

We must not break the unity of this work into fragments, and assign to the isolated parts isolated values. There is a bond of union between them all, and the significance of the whole is more or less distinctly pronounced in each and every part. The various aspects and relations of that one life are held together by its all-pervading mediatorial spirit and purpose. Mediation is, in fact, the underlying characteristic of that life, from its dawning to its birth, from its

birth to its baptism, from its baptism to its death, from its death to its resurrection, from its resurrection to its ascension, from its ascension to its reign, and from its reign on earth to its exaltation in glory.

The unity of Christ's work is evident, if we take a more concrete view of the various relations in which He stands to us, as Revealer, Exemplar, Teacher, Brother, Wonder-worker, Intercessor, Redeemer, and Judge. The same divinely human life is in the every one of these characters, and each of them is involved in the other. Christ could not be any one of them without being or becoming the other. He could not be our Exemplar without being also our Redeemer. For if He had appeared in the midst of human sin and misery without putting forth his full power to remove them, He would not have been the Ideal Man—the Model and the Attraction of the world. See John 12:32. We cannot subtract from his life its redeeming features, and have anything left worthy of our admiration, or of our imitation. See Phil. 2:5-9. The victory in temptation must culminate in the victory over death. Again, He could not be our Redeemer if He did not interpret Himself as such by words, and reveal Himself as such by deeds. It is only thus that He is Teacher and Wonder-worker. He could not have redeemed us unless he had assumed human life, and such an assumption would have been a self-revelation; and this self-revelation was the subject of his teaching as well as the worth and meaning of his miracles. Thus as the Teacher and the Revealer of God He spoke from the center of his own experience also as Redeemer. As the Wonder-worker, separate and distinct from all others, He had simply to reveal Himself as the Helper and the Healer of humanity. Again, only the teacher who possesses the best thought and purpose, and lives up to them both can be our perfect exemplar. And only the exemplar who voices himself in thought and life can be our perfect teacher. Still further, He could not be our elder Brother—our nearest and truest Friend except as he entered into all our sympathies and shared in all our temptations. But this would give to his life a vicarious value and make Him our advocate with the Father. The enigmas of his words and the glory of his deeds, the crown of his miracles, the holiness of his life and the tenderness and depth of his sympathy are all to be explained by the mystery of redemption.

This one work of our Lord—this one redeeming agency of Christ—has three successive periods, termed Atonement, Intercession, and Judgment. The order is natural and inevitable. The Christ of the senses must become the Christ of the soul. He that separates souls in time according to their receptivity—He that is the great moral divider among men—must at last be their final Judge in eternity. As Judge Christ decides on the relation of each and every man to Himself alone. He thus acts as a spiritual sovereign in a spiritual kingdom, and accepts or rejects souls according as they are attracted or repelled by his character and his claims. See John 5:22-27; 9:39.

CHAPTER V.

THE ATONEMENT.

SECTION FIRST.

THE EVIDENCE OF AN ATONEMENT.

The atonement is the entire earthly life of Christ, viewed in its bearing on God's relation to man and man's relation to God. It is the actual re-union of God and man in the person of Christ. It is the literal reconciliation of both parties, in the living and dying and risen Redeemer. This mediating reconciling agency, extending from the birth of Christ to his ascension, constitutes the objective atonement—the atonement properly so-called. The evidence that such an atonement has been made rests primarily on the question whether such an interpretation of the life and character of Christ is warranted by the Scriptures; and secondly, whether such an interpretation is seconded by the consciousness of the universal church. In order to determine all this, we must gather, first and foremost, the general drift of Scriptural teaching. Here we must begin at the beginning.

We have, in the primeval revelation of grace, the symbolic representation of the way in which the sinner was to approach Jehovah. Here were shadowed forth all those great principles of the divine

government which were to receive a fuller expression in the Mosaic Dispensation, and which were to be finally realized in the Christian Economy.

We find this initial symbolic cultus in the Theophany, both in the fixed and in the transition forms of that primitive dispensation. The dividing line between them was the deluge. Before that event there was one spot where the children of Adam were wont to bring their offerings; namely, the seat of the Jehovah-worship. After the flood, during the interval in which the chosen family was growing into a theocratic nation, we have still the sanctuary of Jehovah under the open heavens—not now confined to any one fixed locality—but recognized whenever and wherever the patriarch should build his altar, and offer his sacrifice. In this Theophany two points are to be noticed:

First. The divine origin of the institution of sacrifice. This appears, from the fact, that the idea of sacrifice was inwrought in that early worship, and that we naturally refer its origin to God, rather than to man. It is apparent also from the fact that such a service would not have suggested itself to the worshiper, though, when authorized, it would most fully satisfy his needs and aspirations. It is doubtful if he would, without authority, have ventured to act on any mere prompting of his own nature. Again, the fact that it is contrary to God's principles of government to accept unauthorized worship, or to adopt mere human rites and to make them central in his worship, shows that the institution of sacrifice could not have been of mere human origin. In all cases where God seems to appropriate existing rites, He re-enacts them and re-baptizes them, and gives them thus a new significance in harmony with the economy into which they are incorporated. Now as Jehovah did at once accept Abel's offering, so this acceptance is a proof of a divine appointment. Abel is said to have offered it in faith, grounded on a divine promise; and so it was not an act of presumption, unwarranted by God, nor an act of mere superstition, but an act of right religious knowledge. In the purpose, then, of the Theophany, the patriarch, as the priest of the family, responded to God's claims upon him and them as sinful and guilty creatures.

Second. The institution of sacrifice dates as far back as the fall. The work of redemption begins with the apostasy, and runs

parallel with human sin to the end of probation. We cannot, then, well over-estimate the value of the truth which lies wrapped up in the earliest ritual. There was in the sacrifice a great need and a promise most clearly expressed—the need of forgiveness and the promise of redemption. Here were the rudiments of the divine method and process in the recovery of the race.

The Theophany now passes into the Theocracy. The transient, symbolic presence of Jehovah gives place to his permanent symbolic dwelling in the tabernacle and temple. The one simple altar in the open air now makes way for the series of altars in the visible sanctuary of Jehovah. The ancient rudimental cultus is now fully developed in the Moosaic ceremonial. Its object was to renew the family covenant, and to re-adjust it to the wants of a growing nation. Thus it was made to address the religious nature of the Jew, and to arouse and keep alive in him both the sense of sin and the consciousness of redemption. This end was reached by such a system of types and symbols as was suited to the childhood of the race. This ritual, then, demands our special attention.

The tabernacle or the temple was the symbol of God's dwelling with his people. The three apartments—the fore-court, the Holy Place, and the Holy of Holies—represent the successive steps by which Jehovah might be approached—the ever-advancing degrees of nearness to his gracious presence. The altar of sacrifice in the first is succeeded by the altar of incense in the second, and this is again followed by the high altar—the mercy-seat—in the presence-chamber of Jehovah Himself. Thus every approach to Jehovah must be mediated by a propitiatory offering. The worshiper advances from altar to altar until he reaches the audience-room of God—the Holy of Holies.

The two-fold idea of a separation by sin, and of an approach by sacrifice, is still further illustrated in the functions of the priesthood. The priest alone, as the mediator between Jehovah and the Jew can enter the Holy Place, and he only because he bears the blood of the substitute; and the high-priest alone, who represents most fully the idea of intercession, can enter the Holy of Holies, and restore the fellowship between God and man, by sprinkling the blood of his victim on the mercy-seat.

The material of the ritual was also significant. The gifts were

taken from the possessions and the goods of the Jews, and the victims from that class of animals which stood nearest and dearest to them—and of these only those which were faultless in their nature. These alone were fit substitutes for the suppliant himself. The blood, however, as the bearer of the life of the victim, was the more specific means of propitiation. For “without the shedding of blood there is no remission.”

The ritual itself, however, brings out most fully the need of atonement, to enable the sinner to approach Jehovah, and to consecrate himself to his service. The chief symbolic acts in this ritual were the following: The imposition of the hands of the offerer himself, the application of the blood of the victim, and the ascending in flame and smoke of a part or the whole of the sacrifice.

On the first point, it is to be noticed, that the hand is viewed as the organ of transmission, and that the imposition of hands denotes the symbolic transfer of whatever one has to impart, either of one's indebtedness as a creature, or of one's guilt as a sinner. If the hands are laid on a gift, then it is the bearer of the creature's gratitude to God, and contains a prayer that God would accept the offering. If the hands are laid on a victim, then it is the bearer of his guilt, and contains a prayer that God would grant a pardon to the offender. The sinner confesses his sin, and thus recognizes the animal as his substitute.

The second point in this symbolic transaction brings out the essential element of the ritual. The sprinkling of the blood about the altar, or on its horns, or on the mercy-seat—as the idea of expiation rises in intensity—was the symbol of the removal of guilt. In this transaction, we see the full significance of vicarious sacrifice. The blood of the offering, as the representative of the very life, is the substitute for the sinner himself. The altar—whether the brazen one, or the golden one, or the high altar in the Holy of Holies—is the seat of Jehovah's gracious presence—the sphere in which alone his mercy is made operative; and the blood of the victim, offered in the room of the guilty, comes within that sphere, and under the gracious influence of that Presence. Jehovah is pleased to accept the offering as a substitute for the sinner.

The third point to be noted is, that the sacrifice ascends in fire and flame to heaven itself. This is the symbol, on the one hand,

of absolute devotion, and on the other hand, of full and free acceptance on the part of Jehovah. The burning of the victim is termed by the prophet, "A sweet savor unto God." Where a part of the victim is burned on the altar, and a part is eaten by the priest, we have two kindred ideas placed side by side; namely, the idea of devotement, and the idea of fellowship—or the idea of substitution with its blessed results.

The meaning of each class of offerings may be stated thus: the sin offering expressed the idea of expiation—the trespass offering, the idea of satisfaction—the peace offering, the idea of reconciliation—the burnt offering, the idea of absolute self-surrender. These forms give us the atonement in its nature and in its effects. The one grand sacrifice on the great day of atonement expressed—positively by the goat offered for the sins of the people, and negatively by the goat which bears them away to oblivion—the idea of expiation.

The general view we have here present'ed of the truths which underlie the ancient cultus, was accepted by the Jews in the days of our Savior. Thus Josephus, in his *Antiquities*, frequently calls the sacrifice an expiation of sins. The *Talmud*, too, has preserved the old rabbinical maxim, "There is no expiation except by blood."

The sense of guilt and the demand for redemption, which entered so deeply into the Hebrew consciousness, appears in a lower and looser form in the Gentile world. Among the ethnic nations it was only the feeling of an all-pervading evil—only a vague and restless longing for deliverance—which found expression in their self-appointed rites and sacrifices. It was the sense of misery, rather than the sense of guilt, that pervaded the heathen consciousness. Still the idea of propitiating Deity was common among all classes, except where an exclusive intellectual culture had blunted the conscience, or where an exaltation of the individual had effaced the sense of dependence on a Supreme Being.

Now, if we have interpreted aright the growing consciousness of humanity—the current feeling among both Jews and Gentiles in the apostolic age—what, we ask, must have been the meaning attached to the teaching of Jesus and his apostles? How must such statements and expressions as the following have been understood by their contemporaries: "The Son of Man came to give

his life a ransom for many;" "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sins of the world;" "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us;" "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood;" "Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many?" Such passages as these abound everywhere in the New Testament. No resort can be had here to the theory of accommodation. Christ and his apostles might indeed have used language that sanctioned the current superstitions of the day, provided that these superstitions touched only the surface of religion, and provided, too, that the governing principles of their scheme would be sure to throw off these excrescences, so that the religious growth should be genuine and pure. But they could not encourage an error which was at the very heart of their faith. He and his disciples must have known how they would be understood, and unless we mean to impeach his character we must affirm that He did teach the fact of an atonement—that He did warrant the essential meaning which the church of all ages, as well as his contemporaries, has put upon his own appearance in human history. They sanction, not any definite theory of the atonement, but most certainly the reality of a redemptive agency in the life of our Lord. Thus it seems impossible to escape the meaning of the general drift of Scriptural teaching on this subject.

These modes of conception, warranted by the ancient Hebrew ritual, indicate the formal public way in which the soul was to approach Jehovah—the way in which a guilty people could worship God. They must not, however, be so interpreted as to exclude or to subordinate the moral elements in the old economy. The dominance of the spiritual over the ritual—of the moral over the legal is implied in the free expression of religious life which we find in Psalms. Ps. XL:6; L:8-10; LI:17; in the positive warnings against ritualistic formalism so frequent in the Prophets: Is. I:1-107; Micah VI:6, 8; and even in the omission of all sacrificial elements from the summary of Jewish law which we have in the decalogue. All this shows that the legal features in the atonement of our Lord must be balanced and tempered by the gracious and spiritual elements in the moral government of God.

There is another proof confirmatory in its character to the one

drawn from the Scriptures. The general consciousness of the Christian church has always accepted the atonement as satisfying its deepest wants and yearnings. This general heartfelt reception of Christ as the Atouer and the Redeemer of a lost world is a valid testimony to the truth of the doctrine. We do not refer to the authority of the theologian, which may support some favorite theory of the atonement, but to the concurrent agreement of believers in all ages, in accepting Jesus Christ as the sole ground of hope for sinful humanity. We do not even rely on mere doctrinal statements, fashioned in general councils, as much as we do on the hymns and the doxologies and the confessions of the great body of Christians in all nations and in all ages and in all the branches of Christendom under heaven.

SECTION SECOND.

THE NECESSITY OF THE ATONEMENT.

The plan of redemption originated in divine love, and so is a free act of the divine will. But as God must be true to his own nature, and as that nature is love, so the purpose of redemption was an act of necessity as well as of freedom. These attributes are, in fact, one and the same principle in God, considered as an Infinite Cause or as an Absolute Person. But we never can affirm, before revelation, what God must or will do. The human reason is not competent to pronounce, *a priori*, how God will deal with his creatures. We do not know, then, that there was on God's part any necessity of instituting a remedial agency, aside from the fact that He has done so, though it remains true that such a procedure seems most in harmony with the divine character.

We are to remember, also, that God can never be under obligations to his creatures, except as He has been pleased to freely assume them. This He may do tacitly, in their very creation. The governing principles of their original natures are indices and pledges of what they may expect at his hand. They are at once silent directions and silent promises of the Creator Himself. God may go further than this, and give in a supernatural revelation a promise of what He will do. Any other view would take from Him his authority and sovereignty, and undermine the entire fabric

And so to
negotiations.

of the religious consciousness. God, then, is under obligations ultimately to Himself alone. He is free in his own determinations and his own plans.

God could not interpose to save any who were not the possible objects of forgiveness. This possibility is to be found not directly in the character of their guilt, but in their moral susceptibilities. It is not the degree of sinfulness which precludes all intervention, but the deadness of conscience and heart which shuts out the love of God. Thus God could not interpose to save fallen angels. Whenever and wherever moral and rational beings loved sin for its own sake, their case is hopeless. There is no appeal to the compassion of God, no motive for his intervention and no reason for his remedial interposition. But the case of men is different, for with all their depravity they still have a susceptibility for God.

The necessity of the atonement, then, is relative in its character. It was necessary for the recovery of man—for his restoration to the love and favor of God. The Son of God must become incarnate; and his redemptive agency is essential for the salvation of a lost world.

Duns Scotus taught that the coming of Christ was not essential to redemption, since God in his sovereign freedom, might have pardoned whomsoever He pleased. This idea reappears often in the Semi-Pelagian views of many of the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. In fact, the secular clergy of the Roman church are inclined to follow Scotus rather than Aquinas. The Socinians and the Rationalists admit only the utility of Christ's mission. They affirm that all that men needed was a pledge of God's favor, and that other pledges besides that given in and by Christ might have been vouchsafed to the race. Their denial of the necessity of the atonement is a natural result of their denial of the fact in its worth and significance. As, in their view, it was not a unique work, so it need not be performed by a unique person and character. Such a view is, in the language of Dörner, "glaringly in opposition to the sentiments of the universal Christian church."

Now the law of God, in its simple, legal methods, provided for no remission of the penalty. The moral law, as such, can never allow of any transfer of punishment or of any commutation of the penalty. Such a provision would be inconsistent with the idea of a perfect

law. It would be a relaxation of its sanctions, grounded on some inherent defect in the law itself, or on the unsuitableness of its application. On the principle of pure law, then, as a mere legal procedure, repentance is both impossible and ineffectual. It is impossible, because mere law neither invites nor incites to repentance. As a rule for human conduct, it has no place for repentance. It may enlighten and alarm, but it can never quicken. It may awaken remorse, but can never inspire a genuine sorrow for sin. In fact, law, as such, seems to preclude reconciliation. It demands the execution of the penalty—nothing more nor less—and that, too, on the criminal. It is ineffectual, because the past is left unrectified, and the claims of the law unadjusted. The accidents of a revealed law may be changed, but not its essentials. Its ritual may be given up. Many of its positive statutes, grounded on what is local or individual, may be set aside—in fact, must ultimately be annulled. But the principles of the moral law, as law, can not be abrogated. If it is violated by the criminal, then the criminal must bear the penalty. Law, as such, has only one sanction; namely, the punishment of the criminal himself.

Besides, the future could not be secured, unless this repentance changed the entire moral character, and rendered the after-life in all respects sinless. If, however, the sinner could, self-moved, without any special aid from God, return penitent and believing to his Heavenly Father, and gain in his own heart evidence of his acceptance, then his guilt must have been that of an erring child, and not that of an unreconciled sinner; or it would demonstrate that sin itself, in its worst form, was only a venial error—a mistake of the head rather than a corruption of the heart. On this view, the atonement is not necessary, because there can be no real radical estrangement between God and man. If, then, pardon is offered to man—if he is invited to a fellowship with God—if, notwithstanding his guilt, he is to be urged and entreated to return to his Heavenly Father, it must be outside of strict legal methods and procedures.

But, it may be asked, could not God—the author of the law itself—its very source and ground—could not He, in the absolute sovereignty of his love, freely pardon a sinner, without any redemptive method whatever? Could He not, in his own independent

right, depart from the legal procedure, and in the perfect freeness of his mercy, offer forgiveness to all on their return to him? Or, as this condition would be a mockery, could He not urge and invite them to return—in short, help them to return? Could He not so change his own attitude as, without any redemptive intervention whatever, to draw the sinner to Himself and receive him up into his love and favor forever?

We answer: God could seek to pardon the sinner and to justify the guilty. He was able to depart from the methods of law. That was his aim. It was his Fatherly nature that prompted him to send his Son and to bestow his Spirit. The atonement originated in the yearnings of his heart. The coming of Christ did not alter the divine character, but only changed the divine procedure. And the old question returns in a new form: Could God accomplish his designs of mercy in any other way than through a divine interposition—a redemptive agency? Could He have done so by a voice from heaven, offering pardon and giving a pledge of that offer by some wonderful theophany? Or could He accomplish all this through the ministry of angels and by the labors of inspired priests and prophets? The answer is obvious. God could not thus satisfy Himself, nor thus best secure the weal of the universe. He could not thus honor the old righteousness which is of the law, nor secure the new righteousness which is of faith. He could not be satisfied with such an ignoring of the past, nor could He be content with the mere forgiveness of the sinner. He seeks to raise him to a higher state than that which he lost—to introduce him into his family and to make a friend and companion of him forever. To do this, He must Himself go to the sinner, and must reach him, if reaching him at all, through his sins, and in thus reaching him must bear the consequences of human guilt—consequences which are also inflictions in the very nature of the case, and by the law of a community of life. God must thus maintain his own infinite worth in revealing at one and the same time and in one and the same way both his holiness and his love. In Christ He honors the old righteousness of the law by his suffering obedience, and realizes the new righteousness of faith by the unique and transcendent character of that obedience.

The necessity of such a procedure is equally evident if we con-

sider its bearing on the guilty and the lost. If the mere offer of pardon had constituted the glad tidings it might have been extended through any ordinary messenger. But God was more than willing for the sinner to return. He was anxious and urgent for that return. He must thus come with his own invitation, for the invitation is a direct personal entreaty. It can not be given by proxy. He must present it in person, though in carrying it to the very heart of humanity He has to go through the woes and miseries of human sin. In order to touch human sympathies, to engage the human affections, to sway the human will, and to break man's life-long habits, God must incarnate his own promise—breathe it in his own words—make it good and real in his own sufferings—and thus bear it right home to the conscience and the heart of the sinner. In order to raise him to a higher life, God must stand before him as the Incarnate One—the Pleader for his return—the Sufferer for his sins—the Author of his faith—and the Rewarder of his hopes. It is only in some such way that the life of God can be united to the life of man and the mediation between them both become an actual, living, and perpetual reality.

If it be said that God is a Father, and so can pardon the sinner, as an earthly parent can pardon his children on repentance, we answer: The analogy is too imperfect to be made the basis of a theory so broad and and sweeping as this. God is the Absolute Lord over his creatures, and forgiveness with Him is therefore a more radical thing than pardon with an earthly parent. The sovereignty of the parent is narrow, superficial, and temporary in its character; and the forgiveness on his part is comparatively a light and easy affair. Besides, the will of the parent may be arbitrary; while that of God is grounded in eternal reason. Again, the parent may be in the wrong, and the child in the right; while in the case of the sinner the wrong is all his side and the right all on God's side. Again, the sins of the child, as before intimated, are of a different character from those of God's rebellious creatures. The child disobeys some injunction or prohibition of his parent, but he does not violate the essential principle of parental authority, nor does he renounce his allegiance and seek to overthrow the authority of his parent, and to usurp his place in the family. He is still, in the core of his nature, a trusting and loving child, though

an erring one. His sins are like those of a Christian, and his return to full allegiance is like the return of the child of God to his first love. But in the case of the unrenewed sinner all is different. His sin is a break with his Maker. His self-engendered repentance is only a selfish sentiment—the offspring of fear and self-interest,—and wholly inadequate as the basis of such a forgiveness.

But the analogy is false in what it implies; namely, that God in the atonement does not reveal a Father's love. God could receive men, though not on the principle of law, if they would repent and return to Him, for a real repentance and absolute return involves such a reception. He never puts barriers in the way of the sinner's return, which the sinner himself does not erect. But a self-engendered repentance is delusive in its nature, in its aims, and in its results. God is too fatherly to mock men with vain hopes. He goes further than the earthly parent, for He does not ignore the past; but seeks to remove the difficulties and the obstacles which that past has created. He does more than this. He seeks the sinner. He lays aside the form of sovereignty and takes on the form of servitude. He humbles Himself and enters into the sad conditions of the sinner. He pours out from the affluence of his sympathy the fullness and the tenderness of his love. He would thus awaken in the sinner a longing to return. He avails Himself of the slightest leaning on the part of the sinner toward the right and the good, and helps that leaning with his omnipotent power. For when the sinner is a great way off, He goes forth to meet him. And He will finally make the sinner his favorite in all the hosts of heaven.

The necessity, then, of the atonement is a sweet and blessed necessity. The redemptive method satisfies the moral character of God. It secures and exalts the moral order of the universe. It approves the conscience and fills to the full the heart of the sinner himself.

SECTION THIRD.

THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT.

Here we must follow carefully the representations of the Scriptures. But even these have only a partial value. They do not and they can not contain an exhaustive statement of the mystery. The relations of an Infinite God to his rational creatures find no exact parallels in human affairs. This is especially the case when He seeks to maintain the integrity of his character and yet to recover the lost and to exalt them by a redemptive process. The supernatural elements in the character and life of our Lord can not be fully comprehended by us, nor be compressed into any logical system, nor be exhaustively given in any theory whatever. Still we must briefly and reverently consider whatever God has revealed to us of the meaning and the scope and the intent of the entire earthly life of our Lord, as that life affects his own character and government.

First. Let us notice the specific figurative language of the Scriptures.

A. Christ is a Sacrifice. See Rom. 3:25; 1 John, 2:2, and elsewhere. The idea of a sacrifice is that of a self-surrender for the good of others. Its highest form is that of an absolute surrender to God in behalf of the guilty. Thus it is not the mere abandonment of the lesser for the greater good, for this would be a species of refined selfishness. The sufferer who makes the sacrifice has indeed his reward, but it is found in the well-being of the saved. The joy of the Redeemer is the bliss of the redeemed. See Heb. 12:2. Nor is it found in voluntary self torture, for this is a social isolation arrogant and satanic in its character. Christ did not withdraw from human society, but spent his life-force in its very midst and in its very behalf. In the sacrifice—in its appointment and acceptance—God changes his mode of dealing with the sinner. He satisfies his own character in extending to the guilty the promise of eternal life, simply on condition of his acceptance of the offer of forgiveness.

This sacrifice involves an expiation or a removal of the penal consequences of guilt, and a propitiation or the securing of the divine favor. The effect is to remove condemnation and to secure

justification. This condemnation and this justification concern the person and not the character of the sinner—change his relations to the divine government and not his state or condition. These results are primarily secured to the race viewed in its totality. The sacrifice of our Lord has this fixed, objective value. Christ assumed human nature and human life, and so gives them a share in his person and work. In this sense He saves the entire human family. Such is the import of the pregnant words of John the Baptist "Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world." And a free justification is likewise secured to each and every soul as these souls have a share in Him and He in them.

B. Christ is a Ransom-price. Man is ransomed from the captivity and bondage of sin. The death of Christ or the blood of Christ or the whole person and life of Christ is viewed as the price paid for this deliverance. This price may be viewed as paid to God as the one who sent his Son and approved his mission; or as paid to Christ Himself in that it cost Him such an expenditure of tears and toils and pains of body and soul to achieve our ransom. This aspect of the work of Christ brings into prominence its blessed consequences. It frees the sinner from his sin just so far as, and just in the way in which, he is united to Christ Himself.

C. Christ is a Purchase-price. Christ is not only the price paid for our ransom but also the price paid for his possession and ownership of our souls. He not only frees us from condemnation and from bondage, but makes us his own by what He does for us and in us. He thus gains a right to our exclusive service. We belong to him alone, and find our highest joy in loving and serving him.

The idea of the payment of a debt seems not to have been one of the Scriptural analogies by which the work of christ was illustrated. We have the price of purchase, but not the cancelling of debt. Sin is indeed a debt, but a debt—a guilt—an obligation to punishment—which can be removed by pardon alone, and that, too, obtained by virtue of a redemptive agency. It is not a fine which a third party can pay, but a liability which is graciously removed—a criminality which is freely forgiven. For sin is a crime, and not a trespass. This act of free favor shows that the redemptive scheme is supra-legal in its character. The benefit

of Christ's person and life is charged to the believer's credit, and pardon comes as an act of grace, and not as an act of justice.

Second. Let us notice the general anthropomorphic conceptions of the atonement. 2

A. Christ is our Representative. He is not an individual, acting for Himself alone or for any section of the race. He has summed up humanity in Himself. He is the new Head of the race. See Rom. 5:12-19; 1 Cor. 15:22, 45. He has a living organic connection with us, and gathers up in Himself all the elements of our life, and exhausts all there is in human living. Thus his life is our life, his obedience and sufferings ours also, his death our death, and his resurrection and ascension ours as well. Thus the benefits of all there was in his entire career are secured to the race. Thus He represents each one of us according to the share we have in him, either as partaking of his common humanity and so having a pledge of his common resurrection, or as each has a conscious union with him and so the pledge of a glorification with Him. Thus Christ acts both for our corporate humanity, in securing an objective redemption, and for every separate human soul, in securing a subjective reconciliation, in so far as such a soul may be vitally and consciously united to Him.

B. Christ is our Substitute. This view is only a more definite conception of the one just given. He is our Representative, not by an election on our part, but by his own identification with us—not by being passively born into the race, but by his own free entrance into humanity, and by his realizing the very perfection of that humanity after a new redemptive type. He is thus our Representative by being our Substitute. He acts in our place. His death, as the final outcome of his birth, and as the goal of all his living, is represented as having a vicarious efficacy. This is denoted by the Greek preposition *ἀντί*, "instead of," irrespective of benefit or injury. See Matt. 20:28; 1 Tim. 2:6. The Greek preposition *ὕπερ* denotes "substitution for the benefit of." Very often, however, the idea of substitution falls away, and leaves only the idea "for the benefit of." Meyer denies indeed that the word ever denotes substitution. But See 2 Cor. 5:14-15. On the other hand, DeWette, Winer, Alford, and Ellicott admit that the word does frequently mean "instead of." There are two passages which

bring out this view in a striking manner. One is 2 Cor. 5:21; "For He hath made Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him." Here the contrast between the two clauses shows that the term sin can not mean sin-offering. The abstract term is used to give intensity to the concrete idea. Jesus Christ the righteous was made, by his very incorporation into a sinful humanity, the chief bearer of human sin. He experienced, though sinless, the sin of a lost race. He suffered the penalties of human sin without having any personal share in its corruption and its guilt. He suffered its condemnation, though He did not incur any personal blameworthiness. He endured the evils of its corruption, though not in the least personally polluted. He took into his consciousness the terrible doom of the lost, though not lost himself. He thus bore the human penalty, and bore it all the more fully by virtue of his sinlessness, and bore it in its concentrated form, as the Substitute alone could bear it. The human penalty in Christ's case was unique and transcendent in its character.

The other passage is Gal. 3:13; "Christ freed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." Christ bore the curse in his experience of the sinner's death. This fact was symbolized by Christ's being publicly exposed as a condemned criminal, as though He were under a curse.

Substitution is, however, not by displacement, but by incorporation. Christ ever avails for us by union with us. Without this union, there is no redemption, either objective or subjective in its character. Christ joins humanity in its bankrupt condition, and furnishes all the new capital and bears all the old liabilities. The passage, already referred to, in II Cor. 5:14-15; confirms this view. Our version is faulty. The import, however, of the Greek is plain and significant. "We thus judge that one died on behalf of all, therefore all died." Here we have the objective nature of this substitution. His death was the death of all by virtue of his actual union with all—actual participation in their common humanity. He alone realized, in all its import, the curse of human sin and human guilt. He alone exhausted its woes. Such was the fact—the supreme act of our Lord with its supreme worth independent of all human agency whatever. The design of this

substitution in relation to individual souls in their conscious personal relations is given in the next verse. "That He died on behalf of all in order that they who live might no longer live to themselves, but unto Him who died and rose on their behalf." Here all are to personally participate in the benefits both of that death and of that resurrection just in the way and just to the degree in which they enter into a conscious fellowship with Christ and live a Christ-like life. In Rom. 6 : 8-10 we have our identity with Christ insisted on as the ground of our hopes and the source of our blessedness. For the very reason that Christ has borne, once for all, the curse of death, and triumphed over it, all who are consciously in Him shall personally share in that victory and find in it the grand incentive to a new and better life.

C. Christ is our Reconciliation. God is viewed as already reconciled in Christ—in the coming, the life, the death, and the resurrection of our Lord. God moved toward a reconciliation in sending his Son, and completed that movement in the close of his Son's earthly life. God thus actually reconciled himself to the race in and through Jesus Christ. The reconciliation was not really produced in God, as an effect wrought on his mind and heart by anything which Christ did or suffered; but God reconciled Himself immediately in and within the entire life of our Lord. In that life He changed his attitude toward man and his mode of dealing with him. This is the objective reconciliation. God is not subjectively reconciled to the person of the sinner until the sinner is reconciled to him by a full acceptance of the offer of mercy. God ever loves the sinner, but He can not open the fountain of that love till the sinner is ready to receive his grace. Again, God is not subjectively reconciled to the character of the sinner until that character is perfected in glory. But still this objective reconciliation secures a probation for all—even an actual redemption for those who are mere links in the chain of humanity, without personal responsibility—and so makes it possible for every human soul to be saved.

The general terms, Mediator, Savior, need not be here considered, from the fact of their general character. The first expresses the idea that God and man have met in Christ, and that all who are united to Him shall share in the blessedness of that meeting, and shall share according to the nature of that union. The second

term gives us the grand result of Christ's intervention, and is equivalent to Redeemer.

7 *Third.* Let us notice the more strictly literal statements of Christ's redemptive work.

A. *His Earthly Intercession.* The intercession of Christ began during his earthly life and went on with increasing fullness by his presence in the spiritual world. Heb. 5:7; 7:27; 9:24. He was not merely or chiefly a victim slain for our redemption, but a great personage working for his fellows all the way through his entire life from his baptism to his ascension. Thus He was Priest as well as Sacrifice. The business of his entire life was to intercede for the sinner. His whole earthly career was a prolonged litany in which his death was a supreme prayer and his resurrection a triumphant song of praise. Thus his work on earth was a plea for forgiveness. Luke 23:24; John 17:9, 20, 24; Hebrews 5:7. Here his character stood behind his thought and his deeds behind his words and his person behind them all, and thus his real life gave a supreme positive efficacy to his prayers of intercession—in fact, made his whole work from beginning to end intercessory in character.

B. *His Obedience.* In Rom. 5:12-20, Paul contrasts the obedience of Christ with the disobedience of Adam. The one brought the race into a state of condemnation; while the other brought it into a state of justification. This obedience of our Lord covered his entire life, which is viewed as one act of self-surrender to God. In Phil. 2:8, it is said; "Christ became obedient unto death—even the death of the cross." Here Christ's death is the goal and the seal of his obedience. He was not under obligation to appear in our behalf, though He *was* under obligation to accomplish what He had undertaken. Thus there was virtue in this supreme act of self-surrender.

The obedience of Christ was without a parallel in human life. If we measure it by any outward standard—as by the absence of any formal claims upon Him, or by the responsibility freely assumed by himself, or by the utter unselfishness of his aim, or by the temptations He mastered and the difficulties He overcame—we can not but regard the holiness and virtue of Christ as transcendent beyond expression. If we gauge the inward contents of that

obedience, the results will be equally marvellous. Our Lord united Himself most closely with that which was most repugnant to his morally sensitive nature. It was an obedience bearing in its bosom our disobedience—a loyalty bearing the curse and mastering the spirit of our disloyalty. His love must move in an atmosphere of its own creation; for around it on all sides were the chilling currents of unbelief, ingratitude, indifference, and malice. His sympathy reached not only to the sinner's consciousness; but to the sinner's condition. He felt not only with, but for the sinner. His sympathy with the sinner was as deep and tender as his sympathy with God was profound and all-engrossing.

The world had not yet seen a human life perfectly conformed to the moral law in its ordinary manifestations. But here was a new obedience to a new form of that law which Christ has established for Himself and for his followers—the law of redeeming love. God was glorified in such an obedience, as He could not have been glorified by the obedience of a merely sinless human soul.

C. His Sufferings. Christ's life was a life of sufferings. These present themselves most fully, however, in his public life, as they certainly culminate in his death. It is for this reason that the Scriptures lay especial stress on this last event, as gathering into itself the entire value of his birth and of his life. The very heart of all his sufferings—that which gave them their stress and their painful character—was the sin and the guilt of a lost world. All the suffering of Christ was condemnatory of sin, for it was not the misery of man as man, but his wretchedness as a sinner that constituted the heart and core of his grief. His very sympathy with the sinner involved his antipathy to sin. His grief was but the impress of the world's woe on his soul. It was the human penalty of sin, taken up and intensified by the great Substitute. Christ's redeeming love constantly found a check and a limitation in human sin. It was met and baffled and repudiated by those whose highest good it sought. The non-requital of this love was both the source of Christ's woe and the measure of human guilt. It was not the sum of the special penalties which any given number of individuals had incurred, that weighed on his soul; but the one great penalty of human sinfulness. His sorrow was determined rather by the nature of sin than by the number of sinners. But obedience and

suffering blend together in the unity of Christ's unbroken life. Thus, in Heb. 5:8, it is said; "Though He was a Son, yet learned He obedience by the things which He suffered." His obedience appeared in His sufferings. He was ever surrounded with temptations, and must ever put forth all his resources in order to overcome and master death. The record of his obedient life was the history of his passion. It was both a suffering obedience and an obedient suffering. His obedience showed his sympathy with God, and his sufferings revealed his sympathy with man. In fact, this active and passive obedience of Christ are but different sides of one and the same atoning agency.

D. His Revelation. No one had so revealed the Father as the Son, and revealed Him, too, in his attitude toward both sin and the sinner. The whole aim of his teaching was to show both the holiness and the love of God. He proclaimed in awful tones the criminality and the doom of the sinner, as He unfolded in all its sweetness and beauty the tenderness of divine compassion. But his words were the incarnations of absolute truth. See John 6:63. He believed all that He taught, He lived his own teachings. He was Himself the Soul and Substance of them. See John 14:6. His words were thus a self-revelation, as well as a revelation of Father. See John 1:18. He presented Himself as the Redeemer who realized, in thought and in feeling, in word and in deed, the divine character. All his acts both natural and supernatural were the manifestations of divine goodness and divine rectitude. His miracles were works of redeeming mercy revealing the antagonism of God to human sin. His death was the judgment of God on human guilt, and his resurrection was the revelation and the justification of the new humanity restored and reconciled to God. In fact, Christ's revelation of the Father was God's revelation of Himself. Thus God satisfied Himself in his dealings with the sinner. In the offer of mercy, He revealed his love; and in carrying that offer through the sinner's sin to the sinner's heart, He bore the sinner's penalty, and so revealed his own holiness.

E. His Humiliation. Paul affirms that the Son of God "emptied Himself" of the form of God; that is, laid aside the glory of his sovereignty. He thus ceased to present Himself in the attitude of a Sovereign over his creatures; but "took upon Himself the form

of a servant," that is, subjected Himself to the laws of nature and of life; "and was made in the likeness of men," that is, in the form of human servitude; "and being found in fashion as a man," that is, living a real human life; "He humbled Himself," that is, He still further subjected Himself to man's condition; "and became obedient unto death," that is, carried his humiliation to the lowest depths of human experience; "even the death of the cross."

There are here two stages in the humiliation of our Lord; namely, the assuming of our nature, with its infirmities and liabilities, and the assuming of our life, with all its penalties. Now the assumption of a sinless humanity would have been only a condescension; for here Christ would have taken a position only lower than that which was natural to Him, and not a position which was the very opposite of that which was natural to Him. This last was his humiliation. Still the revelation of the divine character shines beneath the veil of humiliation, in which both obedience and suffering blend together. This humiliation is not a divestiture of the divine attributes; but a new direction and a new manifestation of them. The form in which they present themselves is a lowly and humble form and not that of the grandeur in which they display themselves in the great Cosmos. Still the humiliation can not stand alone, as an isolated act or state; for it necessarily points to some person and must rest its essential worth on the dignity of that person. This leads to the last point.

F. The Worth of the Person of Christ. It is the worth of the person and character of Christ, as the holy God-man, that gives unity and value to his entire life. The sufferings can not be separated from the Sufferer, nor the work from the Worker. His vocation is determined by his character. He could not have been sent into the world on such an errand if He had not been the Son of God. Take away the person of our Lord, and you empty the redemptive agency and process of all its contents. The atonement without the Atoner is a dead abstraction—an ideal conception—without any support or reality of its own in the spiritual world. The great High-priest constitutes the great Sacrifice. The atonement itself is the self-offering of the Son of God. It is God satisfying Himself in saving the sinner.

G. The Meritoriousness of His Entire Character and Life. Christ

gained for Himself a transcendent merit—the merit of a free self-surrender in behalf of the human race, and the merit of an actual conformity to all the conditions involved in this redeeming agency. He became man for the sake of men. He freely put Himself on this trial and went through his probation triumphantly. He satisfied the mind and heart of God. The ideal of man was more than restored—it was transfigured. Human nature was glorified in the midst of human sin, and by virtue of its very contact with and victory over our sinfulness. God was satisfied with his Son. His own purpose of love was carried out in the sending of that Son. The life and labor of Christ sprung from divine love and had a reflex influence on that love itself. It made the attitude of God, as a God of holy love, more striking and significant than it was before. It gave a full and rich flow to the grace of God, and was, in fact, that flow itself. The merit of Christ availed for Himself as one found in fashion as a man before the bar of divine justice. Humanity in Him—in his own individual person—was justified by works. He could claim for Himself a reward of perfect obedience—the desert of a transcendentally good and holy life. Now this merit avails for others, not by a legal process but by the grace of God. As Calvin affirms, “Only by the good pleasure of God could Christ merit anything,” that is, for others.

Thus Christ deserved a resurrection, and gained it; thus He earned an exaltation, and secured it. He makes the human race, conceived in its unity and totality, sharers in this resurrection and exaltation. God puts Himself in friendly relations to that race. None are to be condemned for mere disobedience to law, and none are required to obey the law for this justification. All in heathendom as in Christendom are invited and urged simply to exercise a filial disposition toward God in order to be saved. All are thus put on a new probation, and the destiny of each and every soul is to be determined by the principle of faith and faith alone. All whom Christ personally unites to Himself He makes heirs of God and his own joint-heirs to the eternities beyond. This heirship, though mediated by Himself, yet rests on the free grace of God. For God’s grace, beginning in the sending of his Son, gathered force and freedom all through the life of that love. At baptism God solemnly declared his satisfaction with Christ’s entrance on his

public mission, at the transfiguration He repeated that declaration; and in the presence of the last hour He gave new emphasis to it in the assurance of a glorious resurrection.

Christ rendered a moral satisfaction for us, and not a penal one, before the bar of God. And the imputation of his righteousness was gracious rather than legal in its character. It is not justice alone which secures our forgiveness, but love revealing itself in the entire life of our Lord, and satisfying not only the rectitude of God but his character.

We have thus far given the various Scriptural aspects of the atonement. We are now to combine them into one consistent theory. In doing this, we must find some one constitutive element and regulative principle, which shall determine their scientific expression. This element is undoubtedly the principle of vicariousness. The entire earthly life of our Lord, as interpreted by Himself and his apostles and accepted by the common Christian consciousness, was vicarious in its nature. He appeared and suffered and died, not for Himself, but for others. His whole thought and feeling and action was in the place of, and for the benefit of, others. A lost race drew Him to earth, and transmitted to Him all its infirmities and liabilities; and He incorporated Himself into this very race, and carried the nature He had assumed, with all its penalties, through all the stages of human life, and thus acted in its room and in its behalf. In assuming our life He took our position, and thus was, and thus professed to be, our Substitute. This substitution, however, was not so much by displacement as by identification. Thus the whole character and life of our Lord was throughout vicarious.

This vicariousness of Christ is not without its analogies in human life. All suffering comes ultimately from sin, and is the revelation of God's curse on human guilt. The penalties of transgression fall, on the one hand, on those who are directly and personally implicated, and, on the other hand, on those who are identified with them, through a community of life. The evils that flow from human sin are often more fully revealed in the second case than in the first. By virtue of an organic, or by reason of a moral identification, or by both, the innocent are made to suffer for the guilty. This vicariousness is seen in the sufferings of the innocent child for

the sin of its parent, or in the sorrows of a mother for her erring and guilty son, or in the death of the philanthropist or the physician, incurred in ministering to the wants of the poor and the helpless. But all such cases are very imperfect representations of the law of substitution. The reasons for this imperfection are obvious:

First. Man acts chiefly for himself. He enters on life, not with the view of helping others, irrespective of himself. He appears for himself on the theatre of human action.

Second. He is involved in a common sinfulness, so that his power to take on the life of others is limited.

Third. The very limit of his consciousness precludes his feeling fully the ills others are called to bear. The consequences of human sin do not always enter his consciousness as penalties of human guilt.

Fourth. His very selfishness precludes his entering fully and deeply into the life of others, and so narrows in all directions his acting in their place and in their behalf.

Fifth. The finite bounds of his vision prevent his taking in the measureless depths of the sinner's doom. Now in all these respects Christ's vicarious agency was unique and peculiar. It was the highest type of a vicariousness—the standard and the law of all others.

This vicariousness of Christ was grounded, first and foremost, on a living organic unity with the race. A new humanity is incorporated into the old, and is made to bear all its disabilities. Freed from personal penalties of its own by virtue of its personal sinlessness, it can all the more fully bear the penalties of the guilty and the lost. Christ was more than an ordinary link in our fallen humanity, and so his share in the common woe was more than that of an ordinary mortal. In his divinely human birth He inherited the infirmities of our nature and entered into the consequences of our guilt. In the very beginning of his earthly life He experienced the curse of the sinner's death. Thus his very birth was the beginning of his surrender to death. As He took human nature, and not that of any individual person, so He assumed the Headship of the race and the essential liabilities of that race.

This vicarious agency, entered on at birth, is carried out through all the stages and changes of his earthly existence. The forces of

his own divinely human nature had to encounter the powers of sin and death all along his career. Carrying within himself the principle of the resurrection, He had to enter into the current of death and experience its increasing bitterness all the way from Bethlehem to Golgotha. The death process which He endured could have but one issue, and the antagonism of his character and life to the world in which He was placed and for which He was working, must make that issue a violent one. Thus He must die the sinner's death by the sinner's hands. Circumstances might change the accidents of that death. There need not be, in itself considered, a Judas, or even a crucifixion; but there must be, according to the very laws of society, a violent death. This issue was relatively natural and necessary; but absolutely was altogether free and voluntary. For when he came into the world He came both to be born and to die.

This vicarious agency was recognized in his public position—a position to which He was appointed by the Father, and which He had freely accepted for Himself. It was a position which grew naturally out of his person and character. The introduction of this new holy human life naturally made a new standard of living in the world, and Christ thereby acted in his obedience and in his suffering in our place and in our behalf. With this life he had stepped into the lot and condition of sinners. Taking the corporate evil of a world's guilt into his very nature, He, too, must feel its woe. Inheriting the penalty of the divine displeasure, He, too, must pass under its awful shadow. Entering the lot of the criminal, Christ too, must experience that condemnation which belongs to his position. In the language of Paul "He who knew no sin is made sin for us." He must thus in his representative character bear the pain of our common nature—the dishonor and the penalty of our guilt. He must bear all this by virtue of his public attitude and position, though in his personal character He is the Beloved to the Father. For his entire life is love seeking the guilty, and in the search bearing all their griefs and all their woes. This divinely human love, incorporating itself with an apostate race, must of necessity bear the dreadful penalty of this very incorporation.

This vicarious agency is still further seen in his conscious realization of the sin and guilt of a lost world. This realization came

from his double sympathy with God and man. This divinely human sympathy enabled Him to take in the interests of both the Sovereign and the subject, and to bear the awful agony of a double sorrow. He was one both with God and with the sinner. He identified Himself with the Father's yearning love toward his own image. He is alive to the holiness of God. He sees the difficulty of bringing the love of God into saving contact with the sinner. He is oppressed with the sense of wrong done to the Father, and of the moral injury inflicted on the universe, by the apathy and aversion of the sinner's character and life. This fellow-feeling with the Father was the root and spring of all his interest in man. It was thus that his sympathy with the sinner was deep and profound; for it was only thus that He could fully apprehend his guilt and his doom. It was only by entering into the divine life that He could enter profoundly into the currents of human woe, without hopelessly passing on to a common ruin. It was only thus that he could endure, without breaking under the burden, the full view of a world's guilt and condemnation. It was this interior union with God which made the great ocean-current of his life so calm and profound in its movement. An ordinary man, with mere human sympathies, could have had no such vision as He had; and could not have realized in thought and feeling the sinner's condition, without breaking in pieces.

Thus the evils of human guilt rested upon the heart of Jesus in a far greater degree than upon the guilty ones themselves. In the very narrowness and callousness which sin had engendered they escaped in part the proper penalty of their own transgression; while Jesus, through the very sensitiveness of his moral nature, realized fully the curse and woe of a lost world. He alone appreciated their moral condition as sinners. He saw in its length and breadth the enormity of their guilt, the justice of their condemnation, the pollution of their sinfulness, the helplessness of their condition, the folly of their rebellion, the awfulness of their doom, and yet He felt as profoundly the possibility of their recovery and even of their being raised, in union with Himself, to the right hand of the Father. He entered into every aspiration for a better life, every compunction of conscience, every resolve to return to God and every sad misgiving that came from life's failures. Every

throb of penitence thrilled his own heart, and every sigh for a holy life awakened in his own soul a prayer for the sinner's deliverance. Thus amid fear and hope He made Himself the supreme penitent pleading the cause of these before the mercy seat of God. Thus He appeared for them. He tremblingly hoped for them, He prayed for them, He wept for them, and He struggled to carry the nature they bore through all this baptism of sufferings up to God. His conflicts and his temptations were necessitated by his clear and full consciousness of the condition of our fallen humanity. He knew and felt that the sinner was all wrong and God was all right, and the very completeness of this conviction only made his anguish all the greater. The sufferings which they deserved to bear were thus borne by Himself. The evils of sin, which pressed so lightly on the consciousness of the guiltily, fell with their full force on the loving sinless Redeemer. Thus it was that, as the Substitute for the sinful race, He took the penalty realized alone by Him by virtue of the depth and breadth of his divinely human consciousness.

This sympathy with man, springing as it did from divine fellowship with God, was redeeming in its very nature. It was not the sympathy of mere pity, looking on human misery as a misfortune; but the sympathy of a real love, looking on misery as the result of guilt. It was love imparting itself to the sinner, to make the sinner feel his sinfulness and to save him from his sins. It was the offer of forgiveness seeking to awaken the sense of its need in the sinner's heart—and so seeking to win him to a true and good life. For Jesus never palliated or mitigated the wretchedness of humanity. He united Himself to the conscience, as well as to the heart, of the sinner. He felt not only with the sinner, but for the sinner; and felt with infinitely more keenness than the sinner could possibly feel, the sorrow and wickedness of a guilty life. In short, He made Himself the Bearer of the world's miseries, by this very identification both with God and with man.

The sympathy of our Lord was not only divinely human in its nature, and so redeeming in its character; but was absolutely all-pervading and all-engrossing. It possessed and ruled the inmost life of Christ. It was the governing principle and passion of his character. He emptied his soul of all individual self-seeking, in order to make room in that soul for the self of the sinner. He

abandoned all private ends and aims, so as to absorb his entire thought and feeling in the interests of others. He abandoned Himself to this one all-engrossing purpose, that he might take into his heart, in all their length and breadth and height and depth, the sad condition and yet the grand possibilities of our fallen humanity. Thus He took up a sinful race into his affection and confidence, and devoted to its salvation the exhaustless resources of his own nature. All his inward struggles, all his solitudes, all his harrowing fears and trembling hopes, all his experiences of human sin—all these sprung from his identification with God and man. His life was a self-surrender to God for man.

The personal wrongs which Christ endured were only so many channels through which Christ could feel the sad condition of the race. His very efforts in behalf of the race had called them forth, and they were the signs of its lost condition. In this view it is worth our while to notice the closing scenes of his life, and to see in how many ways the misery of sin touched and pierced His heart. It will be found that the agony in the garden and on the cross was not the agony of a mere martyr, testifying to the truth; for had that alone been his character He would have fallen far behind many of his followers, who have met death only with joy and thankfulness. The scenes which preceded and attended his crucifixion bore witness to Him as the Redeemer, rather than as the martyr. Jesus does not look upon the affronts to his person and dignity in their individual, personal character; but as the indices of a world's guilt and woe. All his private individual feelings were swallowed up in the sense of his public relations. Thus all his personal ill-treatment only displaced the mask over human sin and disclosed its real character. They brought home to his heart the sinfulness of sin. They were the outlets of all that sin had grown to be, and the vistas of all its future revelations.

Let us, then, begin with the opening act in the dark tragedy—Christ's entrance into the garden. Here note his agony at the prospect of death, for death meant God's curse on humanity. Mark his isolation in the solitude of the evening when, more strikingly than ever before, He is cut off from all human sympathy. Hear the sad words, "Could ye not watch with me one hour?" relieved by that touch of compassion; "Sleep on now and take your

rest." Watch the traitor as he stealthily approaches by the dim light of torches, and salutes his Master with a kiss; and see how the disciples, one and all, turn and abandon their Lord. Join now the crowd that gather at the nightly examination before Annas, and witness the brutal blow of the servant, and hear the repeated and profane denial of our Lord by the foremost of his disciples. Attend now the formal trial of Jesus at early dawn before the Sanhedrim and listen to the charge of blasphemy and to the condemnation which followed. Note the brutal and contemptuous treatment of the great Sufferer, the smiting, the spitting, the scoffing, and the purple robe thrown in derision on his shoulders. Attend also the further examination before Pilate, on the charge of treason. Observe the vacillation and the state-craft of the Roman governor. Notice, too, his utter want of faith in truth, and his weak attempts to save Jesus, and mark the cold and heartless curiosity of Herod. Listen to the response of the rabble to the proposition to release Jesus, and hear their demoniac cry for the dismissal of Barabbas, instead of the lowly and innocent Sufferer. Mark the final condemnation, the scourging, the common red cloak of the soldier, and the crown of thorns—the mock emblems at once of royalty and of Jewish hate. Hear how the infuriate cry of the multitude; "Crucify him, crucify him," drowning what little remains of Pilate's sense of justice. Follow now the crowd as it sweeps away from Pilate's judgement-seat on to Calvary, and behold Jesus bearing his cross amid the surging throng till nature fails. Join this crowd as it gathers on Golgotha, and mark how they strip Jesus of his garments, and see how they drive the nails into each hand and foot, and thus fasten Him to the cross of his agony and shame, and see how they rudely and roughly raise Him aloft on this instrument of his torture. Hear the railings of the hardened soldiers, mingled with the jeers of the fanatical priests. See how amid all these scenes Jesus forgets all that is individual and personal, and commends his mother to his favorite disciple, and offers the great prayer of forgiveness in behalf of his persecutors. Hear the cry of distress in view of the sinner's death, so appalling to the sinner's Substitute; and hear also, a moment after, the serene words of conscious triumph; "It is finished."

Let us rest for a moment here. The actors in this tragedy were

for Christ representative men. Judas and Peter and Pilate and Herod, the penitent thief and the penitent one, the Roman soldier, and the priest and his followers, each and all represented like characters which were to reappear in human history. Christ felt the sorrow of sin as it came home to Him in human indifference, treachery, denial, malice, skepticism.

The sufferings in the garden and those on the cross, though separated by a night, yet were logically and morally one and the same. What was anticipated in Gethsemane was experienced on Calvary. The cup from which Christ shrunk, and yet whose contents He fully and freely drank, was the agony of the death He was to die. Then He saw more fully than ever before that the race with which He was identified was under the curse of God. He knew that He must carry humanity up through that curse to God. He felt the solemnity of his position. A lost world passed between his soul and the face of the Father, and He suffered for the moment the darkness of a total eclipse. But only for a moment; for He mastered in thought and feeling the great foe, and entered, with the confidence of a triumph already gained, into the dark realms of death. Here culminated Christ's experience of the sinner's sin.

Let us now compare the penalty of the Substitute with the penalty of the sinner. They are both human penalties; for they are both the consequences of human guilt, and both enter as penalties into the consciousness of the soul. They both come in the order of nature. There is no arbitrariness about the one more than the other. The sinner, by the immutable laws of his life, suffers his penalty; and the Substitute, too, by the changeless law of the life He has assumed, suffers his penalty. The substitution will remove or enhance the penalty of the sinner, according as he accepts or rejects the Substitute. For Substitution is by identification alone. Christ stands in the place of the sinner by uniting Himself with the sinner, and the sinner with Him.

These penalties differ in the following respects:

First. They differ in kind. The penalty of the sinner comes from his own personal guilt; while that of the Substitute comes from the guilt of others. The one issues from the sinner's own sinfulness; the other from the union of Christ's holiness with the

sinner. The one endures a sense of his own ill-desert, shame, loss, folly, remorse, and final doom. The other takes into his nature and consciousness all the fearful results of human transgression. Remorse pre-eminently marks the sinner in his isolation from God and from his fellows. A divine and holy sorrow for human sin pre-eminently characterizes Christ in his union with both God and the sinner. The pain of each is peculiar, and each comes from sin. Christ could not experience remorse, because remorse is destructive of sympathy; but He could experience a sense of others' sin, and that experience could be all his own and could be wonderfully unique and transcendent. In the case of the guilty a sinful nature is made remorseful by contact with a holiness not its own, while in the case of Christ a holy nature is agonized by a contact with a sinfulness not its own.

Second. They also differ in degree. The sinner suffers just what his individual sins bring upon himself. The Substitute endures just what the essential evil of a world's guilt brings upon Him. One endures continually the woe he can not exhaust. The other exhaustively realizes in his one life the world of guilt and shame.

Third. They differ in their ultimate purposes. The penalty which falls on the sinner only serves to vindicate the character of the law and to annul the power of sin—while the penalty which falls on the Substitute exalts Him and all who are assimilated to Him to the special love and favor of God. The one is retributive; the other redemptive. The one glorifies the character of God, but only by the perfection of punishment; while the other glorifies the character of God both in a higher heaven and in a deeper hell.

This general conclusion then, may be reached; namely, that the penalty borne by the Substitute was the generic penalty of human sin and guilt—the generic human penalty, enhanced by the character of Christ's person and life, and exalted by the position He held as the new Head of our fallen humanity. Christ secures an objective redemption for the race. Thus God in Christ puts Himself in friendly relations to the race. He places every member of the race on a new probation, and seeks to make the objective redemption subjective. He invites the sinner to meet Him in Christ. He demands of him only an acceptance of the offer of life. Thus every individual person shares in this redemption according

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to the share he has in Christ. The infant, dying in infancy, is made a partaker, fully and completely of the benefit of Christ's life and death. It has the pledge in Christ of a new regenerated life. And every soul has a new chance for itself, in that it is no longer called upon to obey the law of God for its acceptance; but only to accept the appointed Redeemer. If it accepts Christ, it not only escapes the consequences of its sins, but is raised to a higher life than that which it lost in Adam.

The atonement, then, was not a purely legal measure. For the law demands a penalty, and demands it solely at the hands of the guilty party himself. Sin is a crime, and in criminal cases the law knows of no legal substitute or purely legal equivalent. The relaxation in regard to the person suffering the penalty, is fatal to the theory based on the bare idea of law, pure and simple. On the other hand, we can not term it an illegal procedure, since it originated in the Law-giver Himself, and was made in the interests of the divine government. While, then, it does not conform to the idea of legality, it does conform to the more comprehensive idea of morality. It is, then, supra-legal in its character. It does not rest on the forms of law, and is not carried out according to the letter of the law; but it rests on the will and love of Him who is the source of the law. It is a mode of dealing not contrary to the law; but transcending the methods of law, and securing along its own lines the results of law, and securing them in a richer and fuller measure than under any legal procedure whatever. Such seems to be the Scriptural view. The Son issues from the love of the Father. He is the incarnation of that love. His atonement is only God's way of satisfying his own mind and heart in the proffer of forgiveness. While judicial terms are often used to illustrate some special effects of Christ's work, yet that entire work is as true a revelation of divine love as of divine holiness; and we are said to be not under law but under grace. The atonement, then, is a gracious agency, securing the ends of law by supra-legal methods, and securing them in a far higher degree and in a far richer measure than by merely legal processes. Law is maintained more fully because of the grace, and the grace is all the more transcendent because the spirit of law is secured. There is no mechanical or magical, and, in truth, no legal transfer of guilt or of penalty to

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Christ; nor, on the other hand, is there any such transfer of his righteousness to the believer. The transfer in both cases is moral—and moral alone. Christ is our substitute by taking a share in our bankrupt condition and making that share a supreme one, and making it available through God's grace for all who are united to Him. He thus secures God's favor in our behalf. He thus procures pardon and realizes that pardon in the souls of all who receive Him. He cancelled our obligation to the moral law, but only as the ground of our justification. He enhanced that obligation as the principle and rule of our living. He freed us from the penalty of disobedience under the law of works, but increased that penalty under the law of grace.

SECTION FOURTH.

THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE ATONEMENT.

Christ experienced human sin and wrought out a human righteousness. He carried humanity through all its stages from birth to death, and thus exhausted all its experiences and raised it up from the bonds of death, and presented it triumphant and glorified before the presence of his Father in the spiritual world. The incarnation and life of our Lord is an evidence of the reality of his work. The resurrection and the new humanity thereby generated, are the proofs of its sufficiency. They show that this new human life was not a failure, as in the case of Adam; but a glorious success—that the work was sufficient for the ends proposed. Such is the meaning of the facts in the case. See John 17: 4; Rom. 4: 25.

To secure these ends several conditions must be fulfilled. Though some of these have already been involved in the discussion in the last section, yet a more formal statement is essential in considering the sufficiency of the atonement.

First. The remedial agency must have been appointed by God Himself. The Sovereign alone can institute a supra-legal procedure. He alone can decide whether or not it is sufficient for the ends proposed. It required a new and special exercise of his prerogative, to authorize such an intervention. It is for God alone to appoint the Redeemer, and to accept the redemption. In fact, the relation of the Son to the Father is such that his work may be con-

sidered as God's work. The satisfaction offered by Christ may be viewed as only God's mode of satisfying his own character, in his offer of pardon and eternal life to the penitent and believing soul. Paul so viewed it when he declared that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself."

Second. The person who undertakes this redemptive agency must do it freely. Otherwise it would be an immoral proceeding. Besides, the atonement is an actual living agency and process, rather than an abstract and dead provision, and so must involve the worth of the agent himself. One great element in that worth is freedom, and freedom, above all, in the very work he would undertake—in the life he would live, with all its burdens and all wide-spread and eternal issues. For this freedom concerns the death as well as the birth of our Lord, since, in freely coming into the world, He surrendered Himself to all the liabilities and all the issues of our earthly human life.

Third. No injustice in the providence of God must be done to the one who thus freely suffers with and for the guilty. There must be a moral compensation for all that he suffers in our stead and in our behalf. The compensation must be in proportion to those sufferings. It must, indeed, be in keeping with his character and in harmony with the purpose of his mission; but it must nevertheless be a supreme reward for his merit. The Scriptures assure us that Christ is to be glorified, and we know that his glorification has already commenced in the reign of Christ in the souls of men. Virtue, in Christ's case, as in all other cases, must be its own reward; and must have a career in proportion to its character.

Fourth. The atonement must be made on the earth. Christ must appear in this world—in this scene of human apostasy and in humanity—just where the law had been dishonored. No transaction in the spiritual and eternal world alone is adequate. The Epistle to the Hebrews does indeed make prominent the continuation and the consummation of the atonement in heaven, but it also teaches that the propitiation was by means of the death of Christ. See Heb. 2: 14-17. The author of the epistle only sought to give prominence to the intercession of our Lord. The efficacy of the whole work of Christ is, as we have stated, in each and every part.

The view that the atonement was really made in heaven, is the old Socinian theory, though held here and there by individual orthodox thinkers.

Fifth. The agent himself must really partake of the fullness of divinity and humanity. It is only in this way that the chasm between the two, made by human sin, can be crossed or filled up. It is thus that He unites Himself with God's holiness and at the same time with our sinfulness. He is one with God, and one with us; and we are one with Him. This oneness on our part with Him is according to the measure of our receptivity, and according to the kind and degree of our participation in Him. Thus his humanity becomes our humanity, and acts in our place and for our interest. In this way alone can He bring God into sympathizing relations with us, and us into filial relations with Him. It must be remembered that the soul of the atonement is a fact, and not a dogma.

Now all these conditions were fulfilled in the character, person, and destiny of the God-man, and the question returns for consideration: was, after all, the work of Christ adequate for the ends proposed?

The question might be answered in the way suggested; namely, that the fact of the resurrection and ascension of Christ is an historical proof of the sufficiency of the atonement. But there are also dogmatic reasons why we should be led to the same conclusion. These ought not to be left out of the account. We are, then, to compare the ordinary revelation of the divine character out of Christ with the extraordinary revelation of that character in Christ.

We are also to contrast the legal modes and methods of government, with all their grand and solemn sanctions and all their lofty exhibitions of truth and duty, with the super-legal economy, grounded on the remedial agency of our Lord Jesus Christ. We are to see whether or not the latter secures like ends with the former, but yet grander in their reach and more comprehensive in their bearings. There is, however, a difficulty in making a comparison. We are ignorant of a purely legal economy, carried out in any single community or any single individual. Adam was not under such an economy, though at first only the legal elements were revealed to his consciousness. For had he been so, he would have been cut off at once, unless, indeed, the penalty was connected

with its very delay. But, so far as we can judge, law, as such, according to its fixed methods, would have required the immediate execution of the penalty, and no posterity would have followed. We might, then, consider God's relation to the legal system as illustrated in Adam's case alone, in contrast with God's relation to the remedial system, as illustrated in the case of the entire race. And such a discussion would be more nearly within the limits of our knowledge than any other form in which it could be presented—only that it would be superfluous. We must rather compare an ideal state under law with the real condition under redemption, as both might be illustrated in the same race, as that is conceived as having the issues of its life in another world. In this ideal state—realized in thought only so far as concerns our purpose—there is supposed to be a trial under law, with a certainty of either a grand incentive or a grand sanction—an obedience culminating in heaven or a disobedience issuing in hell. Accepting all these difficulties, let us compare these two modes of divine procedure.

A. In regard to the vindication of the divine character. The law, in its nature, method, and process, does most certainly vindicate the character of God. In its ideals and its imperatives, in its incentives and its sanctions, it does reveal the glory of God. The holiness and the love of God are plainly illustrated and magnified. The legal rewards and penalties of the divine government reveal both the goodness and justice of the supreme Law-giver. Such a system, for the very reason that it is simply a system of law, needs no Christ—no form of the incarnation whatever. A revealed law, written in the conscience, or re-confirmed by some miracle, or given in a set of formulas, would answer the purpose. And just here it is to be noted that in the redemptive agency alone we have the living and abiding manifestation of the divine glory. The great attributes of God are no longer mere abstract notions, echoed in the human soul or voiced from heaven or displayed in nature and in life; but are incarnated in the very person of the God-man Himself. God reveals Himself to us as He could not do in any legal code, or in any symbols, or in any mere oral or written instruction, or in any providential dealings with us whatever. We have not over-stated the case. Is not Christ's life a condemnation of sin? Do not all its sufferings testify to the criminality of sin?

Does not the holiness of God reveal itself in the character and life of our Savior—in his words and deeds—in the higher incentives and the higher sanctions of the new righteousness which He introduced and offered to mankind? And does not the tenderness and depth of the divine love show itself in the entire work of Christ as it could not do in any legal scheme whatever? Was God glorified in those elements of law which formed only the back-ground of a remedial agency as He was in that agency itself? See John 17:4. Does not, in fact, the coming of our Lord open a new theatre for the display of all the divine perfections which any scheme of mere law would shut out forever? And the final issues of the redemptive process show that justice is by no means sacrificed to love, but has its own awful revelation in that retribution which John designates as "the wrath of the Lamb."

B. In regard to the vindication of the divine government. This view and the last can not, in fact, be separated without doing injustice to both. God is not a private person. It is his essential character as God that makes Him the moral governor of the rational universe. That universe has its source and its goal in him, and its moral order is one with the absoluteness of his authority and the perfection of his rectitude. Whatever supports the one maintains the other. Still the aspects of the two may be viewed apart.

The legal probation is of necessity gathered in a single point, as the creature passes from a sinless condition to one of confirmed sinfulness or of fixed holiness. One single conscious choice of the good over the evil, or *vice versa*, is and must be a life-choice. It determines the destiny of the soul, according to its supreme preference of God or of the world. Now humanity has a new and gracious probation in Christ. He takes the burdens of its sins—their condemnation and their curse—and endures a life-long test and trial. Humanity emerges from this second trial transfigured and glorified. The second Adam has chosen God alone as the source of his joy and the goal of his life. He has gained the supreme and final victory over self and the world. We all have a share in that probation, and in the blessed consequences of its effects and issues. This is the objective redemption.

There is, too, another individual and personal relation, dependent on the universal one in Christ, by which the free conscious

John 17:4
B. C. 17:4.

Not more!
Guilt removed.

relation of the soul to Him is to be determined. If the soul under this probation enters into union with Him, then it gains a richer share in all that He has done and suffered in behalf of the race. Thus in the economy of law, and also in that of redemption, we see that holy love is everywhere revealed, and that the moral order of the universe is everywhere maintained. But it is not evident that the supra legal agency glorifies that order in a way that is impossible under a dispensation of mere law? The same great governmental ends are secured; but in a far higher degree and on a higher plane and by a grander agency. The heaven is higher and the hell is deeper than under any legal economy.

C. In regard to the new life it imparts. One aim of Christ is to master human sin, and to master it either by the completeness of the redemptive process or by the perfection of the penalty. It thus introduces and imparts a new divine life. It satisfies and allays the individual conscience. It touches the heart of the sinner. It awakens his penitence. It originates his faith. It gives him the joy of pardon and the assurance of acceptance with God. It makes him patient and submissive in affliction, and heroic and self-sacrificing in his devotion to his fellows and to his Creator. Besides, it generates new sympathies, it presents new motives, it imposes new responsibilities, it necessitates new pursuits and new temptations, it imparts new truths and new ideas, and forms new connections with the spiritual world. It thus opens in the very soul of the sinner himself the fountain of a new and richer and broader life, and lays the foundation of a new character—a character beautiful or sublime according to the vocation of the individual.

It is true that under such a redemptive agency and process thousands on thousands fail to avail themselves of its promised blessings. But an actual blessing does come to them, outside of and in spite of their hostile character and attitude. As sinners they have a chance for themselves. The offer of life is made, not on obedience, but simply and solely on a penitent and filial state of mind and heart. This offer is supported in Christendom by manifold remedial and helpful agencies, and in heathendom by the workings of the natural conscience and by all the yearnings that are natural to humanity, as well as by the common experiences of life; and is brought home everywhere by a great unseen Presence

making good the promises of grace, as these promises are wrought into human nature or given supernaturally. If still there is a failure the fault is the creature's alone. He has the power, by virtue of the image he bears, of resisting his Maker. God will revere that image. We may be sure that the issues of eternity illustrate the holiness and love of God both in hell and in heaven.

We thus see the sufficiency of the supra-legal economy. It presupposes law, and glorifies all its incentives and sanctions; and adds new ones of its own, of a transcendent nature. The character of God is vindicated, the harmony of the moral universe secured, the conscience of the sinner satisfied, and a new and higher spiritual life awakened.

The atonement is not sufficient merely because of its effect on the attitude of God toward the sinner. Such a view is inadequate, because superficial. It makes what is secondary primary in its character. God had long ago given intimations in the ritual of the temple service and in the teachings of his prophets that He had in his mercy departed from a legal mode and method of dealing with the sinner and had established an economy of grace—an economy to be justified in the fullness of time by the intervention of the promised Messiah. It was then that God began formally to change his own attitude in the sending of his Son, and carried on that change throughout the divinely human life of our Lord, and completed it in his resurrection and exaltation. But this change of attitude is grounded in the unchangeableness of his love, and is called forth by the fact of human guilt. In and through Christ God alters his own procedure with the sinner, removes his own difficulties in treating with the guilty, and satisfies and glorifies his own character in the offers and issues of redemption. The redeeming life and death of our Lord does, indeed, produce an effect on God; but only as a divine expression re-acts on the divine Thinker. God's highest thought was fully expressed in the person and life of Christ. He reconciled Himself to pardon in the very mode of his approach an appeal to the sinner. Such a realization of his own mind and will did re-act upon his own heart. God satisfied Himself in sending his Son, and in the work which that Son achieved; and was satisfied by the free coming of that Son, and by the free redemption that He accomplished for the race.

SECTION FIFTH.

THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

Two opposing views are held of the extent of the atonement. They may be reduced to the following statements: according to one representation the atonement was sufficient for all, and consequently can be offered to all; but, since it redeemed only the elect, it must have been intended solely for them: according to the other view, the atonement was not only sufficient for all; but was designed for all, since it did actually secure an objective redemption for all. The objective character of the work of Christ is seen in the fact that all have a probation, independent of their own agency. All have an opportunity—a possibility—of salvation. Christ affects all in time and in eternity. He, and He alone, is the pivot on which hangs the destiny of all souls. In the first statement, the design by which individual men are actually saved is placed exclusively in the atonement. In the second, it is placed in the application and acceptance of the atonement, or ultimately in the electing love of God.

The design, however, of the atonement proper—the design which belongs to that work, viewed apart from all others—irrespective of an election to life on the part of the Father, or of an application on the part of the Spirit, or of appropriation on the part of the sinner, is here to be considered. Now the design of any work whatever is to be seen in what it distinctly and properly and solely effects—in what it actually accomplished by virtue of its own proper agency alone. Now the atonement secures a reconciliation for the race, in that it freely offers pardon to all, and enables God to accept the sinner on his accepting Christ. It actually reaches all, either in their justification or in their condemnation. Souls are condemned not by virtue of their relation to the law, but by virtue alone of their relation to Christ. Even the heathen will be condemned, solely because of their lack of the spirit of faith—because they do not stand where the mercy of God can reach them. The very adequacy or sufficiency of the work, in itself considered, is a sure means of determining the design of that work, though not always an available means. Now, in the case before us, we have the authority of God's Word that the atonement is sufficient for all,

and is offered to all. Now the first shows its design, and the second makes a formal proclamation of that design.

If it is simply sufficient for all, and yet not designed for all, it would seem to follow that the sinner suffers indeed a loss, but incurs no guilt, in the rejection of Christ. For though there may be a tremendous injury done to ourselves, yet there can be no moral wrong incurred in not appropriating what was not intended for us. But do not the Scriptures teach us that the rejection of Christ is our great decisive sin—the guilt which, if persisted in, dooms us forever? See John 3:19; 15:22.

If the atonement is only sufficient for all, but not intended for all, then the invitations of mercy lose somewhat of their simple, natural force, and God's urgency and entreaty in the case seem to be somewhat weakened. Besides, the sincerity of God ought not to rest for its defense on any apparently ingenious evasions of the plain teachings of his Word. Should our logic allow of no proper place for this view in our theological system, it would still remain a plain Scriptural truth. It is better to hold the whole truth, even if we cannot systematize it.

There is, then, a general atonement, but a particular redemption; for Christ died for all, but especially for those who believe. See I Tim. 4: 10. The relative design of the atonement and the absolute design of God in its application, are different things.

The New Testament clearly supports the view here presented. Christ Himself declares that He was sent *in order that* the world through Him might be saved. See John 3: 17. Here God's intention is plainly revealed. The term *Cosmos*, or world, here means the human race in its sinfulness, or the lost family of man. It never, in the discourses of Jesus, means the world of the elect. This is evident from the fact that the world is contrasted with the people of God, and the disciples of Christ are spoken of as chosen out of the world. See John 14: 16-17; 17: 17-19. Besides, it is noteworthy throughout the New Testament that the *Cosmos* is contrasted with the church, the elect, and the saints. In one passage, Rom. 11: 12, the term world seems to be exegetical of Gentiles. But the prevailing import of the word is as we have indicated. The common contrast throughout the Scriptures is between Jews and Gentiles, and not between the Jews and the world. The

doctrine of a general atonement is taught in Tim. 2: 4-7; where the universality of the design is grounded on the unity of God. Ellicott says, *in loco*: "All attempted restrictions of this vital text are as much to be reprehended, on the one hand, as that perilous universalism, on the other, which ignores or explains away the clear declarations of Scripture." The attempt to explain the phrases "all" and "all men" as denoting all sorts and races of men, is futile. It is not simply a universality of classes, but a universality of individuals, which is here insisted on. This appears from Heb. 2: 9, where it is said, "In order that He might by the grace of God taste death for every man." Here the conjunction, used with the subjunctive, is telic and not ecclatic; that is, denotes, in the strictest sense of the term, design; and the phrase "every man" is stronger than the plural "all men," and precludes the above interpretation. The word "taste" does not refer to the extent of participation, as though Christ but touched his lips to the bitterness of death; because the reality, and not the transitoriness, of Christ's death, is the point in view. It can only denote Christ's actual experience of the sinner's death. II Peter 2: 1 involves in a striking manner the idea of a general atonement, since a class of persons are described as "denying the Lord who bought them." I John 2: 2 is perhaps the strongest proof-text for the view we are insisting on. "He is the Propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world." Our view of this last passage is the one taken by Bengel, De Wette, Luecke, Neander, Meyer, Alford, and perhaps the ablest critic of all on John, Dueserdieck.

SECTION SIXTH.

THE BEARING OF THE ATONEMENT ON MAN.

The atonement primarily changes not God's character but his attitude towards the sinner; or rather, God changes his own attitude in and through the life and death and resurrection of our Lord. Now this change of dealing on the part of the Sovereign carries along with it a change of relations on this part of the subject. As God puts Himself in a friendly attitude towards the sinner He thereby warrants and welcomes the return of the penitent

back to-Himself. Such is the import of the parable of the prodigal son. This view has been affirmed or implied in the whole preceding Christological discussion. It is so fundamental, however, as to claim a distinct restatement.

The change wrought by the remedial agency of the Son of God is from a purely legal economy to a dispensation of grace. This method of divine dealing was initiated at the failure of the first trial in Adam, and completed at the success of the second trial in Christ. The justice of God was not sacrificed to his love, nor his love subordinated to his justice; but both were harmonized and satisfied in his plan of redemption. Thus God in the wisdom of his jurisprudence changes the terms of salvation. In receiving souls into his love and favor He makes no account of their good works, and insists that they too must renounce all confidence in their own self-righteousness. He invites and urges sinners to come with all their sins and to trust alone in his mercy. They are to make a full surrender of themselves to God. They are in a child-like spirit to recognize the interposition of Christ in their behalf, and lovingly and penitently to accept Him as their advocate with the Father. Only in this way can their renunciation of all merit be genuine and real, and only in this way can they be admitted into the favor of God. No number of sins however great, and no state of sinfulness however aggravated, unless it destroys all moral susceptibility, can exclude any soul from the mercy of God. The destiny of each and every sinner hinges on faith and not on obedience. This is the pivot on which turns the weal or woe of human souls. Men will be accepted of God as they have in a filial disposition accepted Him. One's ignorance of this new relation, by which grace takes the place of law and faith of obedience, does not alter this grand fact. It only takes away the comfort and the encouragement of formally knowing all that God has done for the race; and in this way, and in this way only, makes the work of Christ less available to the sinner. It remains true that the faith disposition avails everywhere and always for all souls whether they have heard of Christ or not. For it is the spirit and not the form of faith—the heart trust and not the intellectual apprehension which constitutes its essential worth and weight with God.

The work of Christ reaches not only to all who belong to the

Messianic age—the great period between his first and second coming—but also to all who lived in the pre-Messianic age—the period which preceded his incarnation. For the advent of Christ has its place in the centre of the remedial economy and not at its beginning. The incarnation of Christ was preceded by his theophanies, and followed by his regnant spiritual presence in the souls of men. Christ availed in the past, for the reason that He was present in the past, and for the reason, too, that that partial presence was the earnest of his future full and permanent incorporation into human life. In all this we have the objective worth of the atonement in its bearing on mankind.

The atonement has also a value in its relations to the individual soul. Christ embodied in his very character and life the moral law, and He embodied that law in its highest conceivable form—that of redeeming love. The ideal was transmuted into the real. The abstract conception of an unselfish became a concrete and personal reality. Here was that one grand abiding human possession in which each one's share but enhances his brother's portion. Here was the basis of belief, the ground of hope, the source of life. The glow of enthusiasm which the mere ideal awakens soon fades away. The sentiment which it enkindles burns for a moment and then goes out in the tides of passion and self-interest. But the Exemplar of love and truth has an inspiration whose sources can never dry up. A fountain has been opened in human history whose hidden springs flow from the life of God Himself. The example of Christ was not formed outside and apart from our actual life, else it would have been merely judicial in its influence upon us. It might have awakened a sense of sin, but it could not have called into life a longing for redemption. The exemplary character of our Lord was developed by the sad and desperate condition of the race, and was directed and enriched by making their case his own. As our supreme Friend, working for us and in sympathy with us, He touches human life on all sides, and draws it upward and Godward. Thus He was more than a reformer, changing our outward vicious habits; more than an oracle, solving our doubts and difficulties; more than a teacher, enlarging our ideas of truth, and correcting our beliefs; He was our Life-Giver just because He was our Sin-Bearer. In our sense of weakness we naturally rely on Him

for help, and in our sense of ignorance we turn to Him for light. In Him we recognize the verity of a spiritual life, and in his resurrection we witness the everlasting triumph of that life over the powers of sin and death. We have here only suggested some of the natural bearings of Christ's remedial agency on human character and destiny.

SECTION SEVENTH.

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

We have in justification a judicial act of the Sovereign Judge and a personal act of the penitent believer as these are mediated by the atonement. But while we retain the abstract term atonement, its meaning must be kept clearly and distinctly in mind. It does not denote a dogma, apart from an historical fact and a real life. The atonement here, as elsewhere, means Christ in his redemptive power and agency.

The application of that redeeming agency and friendly intercession must be taken in connection with its appropriation, because they are only different sides of the one and the same transaction. The divine and the human acts interpenetrate each other, and blend together. The one is eternal in its origin; while the other has its source in time. The one is original and independent; while the other is derived and dependent. But the mystery of their inter-action is found in the fact that here is still a relative independence in both. Thus the factors in the result—the spiritual agencies in the effect—are not of equal significance, nor are they mechanically united, nor is there any outward co-operation. They vitally fuse together in one undivided and indivisible movement. It is not the sign of addition, but that of multiplication, which expresses their relation to each other. Justification presents God in the attitude of a supreme but gracious judge. He acquits the sinner of all his past sins, accepts his person so that the way of return is ever open for him in the future; and treats him as just, and makes him a son and an heir of all he has to give. The sinner does not justify himself even by his faith, but heartily and gratefully accepts this justifying grace offered in Jesus Christ his Lord. The condition of the believer is termed in the Scriptures

righteousness. This righteousness is characterized by Paul as a righteousness mediated by faith, and so issuing from and resting on faith: Rom. 3:22; 4:11-13; 9:30; Phil. 3:9. It is thus contrasted with the righteousness which comes from a mere legal obedience. Col. 2:16; 3:11. It is described more fundamentally as the righteousness of God, as opposed to that which the sinner can claim as his own, and as indicating the decisive fact that it is appointed and bestowed,—originated and accepted by God alone. It is also termed a gift, Rom. 5:17. It is said to be imputed by faith, Rom. 4. Christ is also spoken of as our righteousness, I Cor. 1:30. This moral condition of the believer is also treated as his permanent characteristic, as his abiding attribute, Rom. 6:18; Rom. 8. Finally the new economy is distinguished by the apostle as the law of righteousness, Rom. 9:31; II. Cor. 3:9.

Justification is the gracious acceptance of the believer. It relates directly and primarily to his person, and only in a secondary and indirect manner to his character. It is the removal of his condemnation. It is the free and full remission of the penalty of his guilt. As soon as the soul is alive to the fact of its justification, the sense of guilt also disappears. The believer knows that he is guilty; but he knows also that his guilt is absolutely forgiven. He not only receives pardon for the guilt of his whole past life, but he has for himself a free access to the grace of God, and he has it all through his life; Rom. 5:2. I John 2:1. For the act of faith precedes from the principle of faith which abides in the soul forever; I John 3:9. The believer may lose the consciousness of his acceptance with God, but only for a time. The new relation cannot be broken, and sooner or later a sense of his son-ship will reawaken the peace and joy of his salvation.

Justification not only secures pardon; but introduces the criminal into the love and favor of God. God makes a friend of him—adopts him into his family, and bestows upon him the richest of his gifts. Justification thus has its positive and negative aspects. These involve each other because the acquittal proceeds from divine love and not simply from divine justice, and so the grace that forgives is the grace that blesses the forgiven. It opens a fountain that flows forever.

The originating ground of justification is the love of God. It is

the act of God in his character as Judge. The ends of law, even before the bar of justice, are fully met in Christ, so far as He Himself is personally concerned, and they are met in a transcendent manner. But the ends of law in the case of a believer, by virtue of his union with Christ, are only met and satisfied before the bar of mercy. The claims that he can put forth are grounded on his relations to Christ. The power of a great friendship helps him in the court of heaven. It is that friendship that touches the heart of the Father. It is the love of God, rather than his justice, that secures his acceptance. The believer is warranted in coming to a mercy-seat; because Christ's atonement is a great promise, and Christ's intercession a great plea for forgiveness. The term justification is indeed a judicial one, because the act is forensic in form. The believer is not innocent, but guilty; though freed from a sense of his guilt and from all exposure to penalty, and graciously admitted as a favorite in the great family of God.

The objective meritorious ground of justification is Christ Himself—his person and his work, in their transcendent worth and far-reaching influence. Paul insists on a new righteousness not revealed in the law, but in the Gospel. It originates, not in man, but in God. It is his gift and his appointment. See Rom 1:17. It is realized in Christ alone—in his living person—and not in any code of morals. See Rom. 5:16-17; 10:4; I Cor. 1:30. The sinner now must turn away from the law to Christ. He must unite himself to Christ—rely on him, conform to him, and live on him. He must make Christ his Friend; for in that friendship alone can he gain the friendship of the Father. This alone is the new and living way by which he approaches God. To call faith the instrumental cause of justification is to treat the act of receiving pardon through Christ as a mere assent of the understanding, and not as an inward vital appropriation of Christ. This view would, too, break the necessary bond between forgiveness and growth in holiness. For by faith the sinner is so united with Christ that at one and the same time he finds Him to be both the ground of acceptance and the source of sanctification.

The subjective mediating ground of justification is faith. See Rom. 4:3, 22; Gal. 5:6; Phil. 3:9. The sufficiency of faith is found in its object. But the object must be appropriated. By virtue of

this union, all that there is in Christ—his life, his death, and his resurrection—his power on earth and in heaven—avails for the sinner. This righteousness of faith is not of his own origination, nor does it supplement the law, nor does it, apart from Christ, answer and more than answer the ends of obedience. It is what of Christ there is in it that makes it acceptable to God.

Justification and sanctification are, thus, united in the exercise of faith. Faith lays hold on and appropriates Christ; and in doing so becomes the source of a new divine life. Justification is not a part of sanctification, but only its condition. By faith the soul enters into union with Christ, and by the same faith Christ enters into union with the soul. Faith is in both cases the point of departure and the point of contact. Our union with Christ gives us justification, and his union with us gives us sanctification. The one has to do with the standing of the believer before God; the other with his inward condition. The one affects his person; the other his character. The one removes condemnation; the other corruption. The one makes the criminal a friend of God; the other fits him for the enjoyment of that friendship. The one is an act finished and complete at once; the other is continuous through life. The believer is freed from the law *as such*, both as a ground of acceptance, and as a rule of life. He is both under grace, in relation to his acceptance, and under the new living law—under Christ—in relation to his new obedience. He is called on not so much to obey any outward code of morals as to obey that code as realized in the life of our Lord.

The person of the believer stands justified, and justified for life. Thus justification covers the sins of the past, of the present, and of the future. This central regnant act of faith may be followed by many such acts, whenever the believer needs to re-appropriate Christ afresh to his soul. Why justification should be by faith rather than by love or by hope or by any other Christian grace will appear when we come to discuss the subject of conversion.

SECTION EIGHTH.

MODERN THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT.

It concerns us to note the theories of the atonement only so far as they may give clearness to our conception of the doctrine.

All the modern theories may be grouped under two general classes—the idealistic and the realistic.

The idealistic theories are based on abstract conceptions, such as the idea of the divine justice or divine government. The method of treatment, too, is altogether determined by these pre-conceived abstract notions. Thus the atonement is conceived as exerting an effect of God, rather than as expressive of a change already determined upon in the sending of his Son, and already carried out in the life and death of our Lord. It is viewed as altering God's attitude toward the sinner, rather than as revealing God's own change of procedure. A satisfaction is conceived as being made to some single attribute in the divine character, instead of the view that God satisfies his entire character in dealing with the sinner through the intervention of the Son.

The realistic theories are based on the view that the atonement is essentially a fact—a fact like other facts, only of infinite worth and of infinite reach in its results. All the sufferings of Christ were natural to Him in his condition and in his relations to God and to man. They are not arbitrarily inflicted upon our Lord. God in Christ changes his own attitude toward the sinner and reveals that change of attitude more and more fully from his birth to his death and resurrection. For He “was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself.” God does not simply satisfy any one of his attributes, but rather his whole character, in its undivided unity. While the force of the idealistic view is admitted, so far as it illustrates certain features in the atonement, yet the realistic scheme and the realistic method of treatment are more fundamental in their character.

Under the idealistic theories we have to note the following:

First. The juridical vicarious scheme. Christ endured the penalty, and satisfied the justice of God. This satisfaction was sufficient for all, but intended only for the elect. The believer can in justice claim forgiveness through the merits of Christ. That

forgiveness is due to Christ. The atonement is thus a purely forensic transaction. As the sins of the elect were imputed to Christ, though He did not share them, so the righteousness of Christ was imputed to the believer though he did not partake of it. This last statement is objectionable for two reasons. Justice must regulate the imputation of sin; while its non-imputation can only be regulated by the free grace of God. And, again, no imputation can be admitted of any kind except by virtue of an identity of life between the parties, and only in the way and to the degree in which that identity is realized. In regard to the entire view here presented, we may safely affirm: first, that such a legal transfer is inconceivable, and second, that it would annul the grace of God in the transaction.

Second. The rectoral vicarious scheme. Here satisfaction is rendered to the government of God. Christ endured a moral equivalent for the penalty, or a substitute for the penalty, accepted as an equivalent by the Law-giver of the universe. Such a view is right in so far as this, that sin must be viewed as a violation of public law, and not merely as a private wrong. But Grotius pushed this idea altogether too far when he claimed that crime might be punished without the penalty falling on the criminal. The whole theory, too, is defected in that it separates the character of God as absolute and sovereign from his character as moral Governor of the universe. We must, however admit that this theory was right in insisting that the satisfaction was a moral and not a legal one, and that the equivalents of the penalty endured by Christ was not in itself intrinsic, but was determined by the grace of God. The atonement was not only sufficient for all, but intended for all, though its application depends either on the foresight of faith or on the inscrutable choice of God Himself. In these two last statements we see respectively the Calvinistic and the Arminian tendencies of thought.

Under the realistic theories we have the following:

First. The theory of example. This is fatally defective in its interpretation of the worth and significancy of the appearance of our Lord in human history. According to this Socinian conception, Christ is simply the manifestation and the pledge of the Father's love. The theory of Grotius, that Christ's death was a

penal example—a solemn warning against sin,—accords neither with the churchly consciousness nor with the Scriptures. Besides, as a deterrent against future sins, it left the sins of the past wholly uncared for.

Second. The life theory. According to this view, Christ comes to impart life to depraved human nature. It was supported by Schleiermacher, and is now defended by Bushnell. It ignores or fails duly to estimate the fact of guilt. Both of these realistic theories are, however, true, as far as they go.

Third. The realistic vicarious theory. This seeks to interpret the life and death of our Lord in the light of human guilt. Christ's entire appearance is viewed as a self-surrender to God. God is viewed as reconciling Himself to the sinful race in thus sending his Son to die for it. All the sufferings which Christ endured were natural to Him; and yet were judicial in their character, and expressed God's estimate of human sin, and revealed the penalty of that sin in its fullness. That penalty was moral and not legal in its nature, since it arose from the position of Christ, and not at all from any personal guiltiness. but how?

CHAPTER VI.

THE INTERCESSION OF CHRIST.

Christ mastered death not simply by his resurrection, but also by his spiritual return to life with regenerating power. His resurrection, cut off from this real presence in human history, would only show his victory on the physical side alone, or, at most, a victory for his own isolated personality and not a triumph for humanity—the first fruits of its future glorification. He might still be excluded from the life he had left, and might have no power to draw any soul up to the higher life into which He had entered. It was only, then, his mastery over the limits of his earthly life, affected by his return to it, as its invisible Leader and Regenerator, that his victory over death seems wondrously fruitful in blessed results both to the church and to the world. Thus the doctrine of

the intercession is the doctrine of the risen Redeemer—of the real living presence of Christ in human history.

The intercession of Christ is the continued efficacy of the atonement. It is the actual prolongation of his redeeming agency. Christ entered the spiritual and eternal world at his ascension. In that world He is, at one and the same time, at the right hand of the Father and with the souls of all men. He is, as an Advocate, really present both with his Father and with the sinner—both with the Judge and with his client. His advocacy avails for the race and secures an objective reconciliation for all; but avails pre-eminently for the believer, as the believer consciously avails himself of his services. Thus Christ is still a real Presence in the world, though invisible and spiritual—a presence uniting in itself God and man, and mediating between the finite and sinful creature and the infinite and holy Creator. It is not an ideal presence which the Scriptures affirm and insist on. Such a presence is dependent on the imagination, and touches our life not at its centre, but only on its circumference. It is a creation of our own; and though that creation may be conformed to the Scriptures, it is yet only a creation dependent on our volition. But the real presence does not come and go with our changing moods of mind, nor does it depend on our distinct consciousness of its workings. It has its home in the latencies of the soul—in its hidden yearnings and possibilities—in the secret springs of human thought and feeling. All our better living, whether in sympathy or in the conscience, whether in our struggles with our sinful propensities or in our victory over them, whether in suffering God's will or in doing it for others, springs from and witnesses to this great spiritual presence. This fact of the common life—obscure in the common consciousness, but clear in Christian experience, can not well be denied without destroying the objective ground of human virtue—without blotting out the law of goodness and the imperative of holiness. For the sense of the true, of the good, and of the right, which is both human and Christian, is the consciousness, not of subjective fancies, but of spiritual realities independent both of our imagination and of our volition. We are drawn by an attraction from without and from above, and we are commanded by an authority absolute and infinite. The belief in these ideals is a belief in their real existence.

These objective verities are placed by the philosopher in the bosom of God, but they may well be placed by the Christian in the Christ-presence, in the heart of humanity.

It may be noted here that the working of Christ and the working of the Spirit is essentially one and the same, only that the Christ-presence has more of an objective significance than that of the Spirit, and has to do with our state and prospects as guilty creatures. The Spirit has a subjective significance, and has to do with our condition as depraved beings. We are now invited to come to Christ—to consciously approach Him of whose presence we have hitherto remained so unconscious. See Rom. 10: 6-9. We are called on to let our affections move toward and centre in Christ. We are assured that where two or three are gathered in Christ's name He is consciously present with them. Thus, in the great commission, the disciples are assured of the reality of his presence. Thus the Apostle affirms that Christian souls "sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus." We see, then, that Christ can be with the Majesty on high, and at the same time be with the lowliest of his disciples. God's throne is the heart of his child. The efficiency of the Intercessor is indicated by the figurative expression "Seated at the right hand of the Father," and his spiritual sympathy is expressed by the words "Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them."

This intercession is not, then, one of prayers and petitions. These are but the outlets of life—fragmentary and intermittent in their character. Christ's presence is the memorial of a great sacrifice, and is thus a continued supplication for the sinner—a prolonged prayer and plea for the guilty and the lost. Thus He reached the heart of God, as by his present sympathy He reaches the heart of humanity.

The spiritual body which our Lord fully possessed at the moment of his disappearance in the clouds of heaven has its place determined by his spirit. We can form no distinct conception of it or of its locality. That Presence is to be found wherever there is a human soul to be saved or a penitent believer to be helped and comforted. This mastery over time and space is indicated in the declaration that his second coming should be like the lightning of heaven, flashing at once from east to west, and insphoring in one

instant the millions that cover the earth. The difficulty in reconciling the local position of the risen Redeemer with this ubiquity of his presence will be noticed again in the next chapter.

The intercession, then, is the extension of the atonement. It is just as sufficient and just as general as the atonement itself. The value of the atonement is in the intercession, and the value of the intercession is in the atonement. They must be viewed together.

CHAPTER VII.

THE EXALTATION OF CHRIST.

The visible presence of Christ ceased with his ascension. All the sensible modes and forms and lines of his activity also ceased with his entrance into heaven. This earthly dwelling of our Lord among men marked the state of his humiliation. His birth-place and his home were obscure, and his early youth was spent far away from the centres of culture. Having assumed our nature He submitted to a human birth and accepted all its humiliating conditions. Having entered human life without the stain of sin, He accepted the lot of sinners. Having incorporated Himself into our sinful humanity, He must experience, in all its fullness, the bitterness of its doom. Sinless though He was, He must die the death of the sinner. But this state of humiliation is the path to exaltation—the very process in and by which He is glorified. It was in this way, and in this way alone, that the divinely human character was formed, and when formed was made to appear what it was—glorified. Thus his mortal life was a humiliation, because of its contact with human sin and all its woes; and a glorification, because it was also a mastery over sin in behalf of sinners.

This two-fold aspect of our Lord's life belongs solely to his earthly career. As soon as the end of his work is reached, humiliation gives place to his exaltation. One side and aspect of his life falls away and the glorified form alone appears. This exaltation has two stages, the probational and the final. The first is introduced by his ascension, and the second is opened with the close of the great day of judgment.

In the first stage Christ is forming and enlarging his church on earth, and widening and enriching his kingdom in heaven. These make up, in fact, one and the same community at different periods of its development. The divine life began here in weakness and in sorrow, is finished hereafter in power and in joy. The reign of Christ in the hearts of his people begins in faith and ends in vision. All through this probationary stage Christ devotes Himself to the human race, for it is the period of his intercession. This first stage will end when the race has worked out all its results, and when all the fruits of human living have been gathered, and probation shall have ended.

In the second period we have the grand consummation. "Then cometh the end when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father." Mediation will have done its full work for the race, and every soul will have come face to face with God. God then shall be, as the apostle declares, "All in All."

The wider reign of Christ now opens more and more fully. He now becomes the new moral centre of the universe, and his people share with Him in this universal dominion. For their fellowship with Him is complete. See Matt. 19: 28; Luke 22: 29-30; Rev. 8: 21. And we have the declaration of the apostle that "All things are yours, ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's." Thus the Christ-character is the great character of the spiritual world, and the Christ-presence the great power in that world, and all who are like Him share in his glorification. For in heaven character determines position, erects its throne, creates its empire and sways its sceptre.

We can not think that such a power is to remain idle in all the coming ages of the future; nor can we think that there will be no further occasion for its exercise. For there is no reason to think that we are the only order of free rational beings in the universe of God, or, if there are such beings, that we are exceptional in the course of our development. The history of our fall and recovery may be but a single instance in God's plan and method of government in the highest realm of his activity. It may be but one event in an endless series, which would justify the intervention of the Son of God. One thing is certain; if other worlds are to be redeemed, Christ must be the Redeemer, and all who possess the Christ-character must share with Him in his redemption. These successive

2 incarnations may make up the order of the supernatural in the moral economy of the universe. This order may constitute that higher law under which a miracle can be wrought. All lower wonders may be only the flashings forth of this Christ-presence and power in the history of free moral beings. The objection often raised, and oftener felt, to man's being such an exclusive object of divine regard as our theology makes him, may be answered by the supposition that such a regard is only one instance among many in a world which is potentially infinite in time and space.

There are two modes of Christ's presence—the local and the illocal. The illocal presence is the spirit of his divinely human life making itself felt in human souls. The local presence is determined by the illocal. The glorified body of our Lord has no independence of its own bringing Him to any one place, or determining Him in the mode of his activity. It is but the instrument of his will, formed and filled by his spirit. His own character thus determines his own body, and his own will controls it as He pleases. Thus He is, in his entire nature and on every side of that nature, above both time and space, but with power to enter into time and space at his own good pleasure. As illustrative of this entire view, we have in our very selves a kindred mystery. For the soul, as such, in its distinctive life, has no relation to place whatever. It has indeed a position in the world by virtue of its organism, but this position is not material or spacial in its character. It acts in space, but it does not occupy space. The fact we know, but the how of the fact baffles human reason. Thus the mode of Christ's divinely human life is utterly above and beyond our comprehension.

PART FOURTH.

PNEUMATOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE PERSONALITY OF THE SPIRIT.

SECTION FIRST.

HIS INTER-TRINITARIAN RELATIONS.

By the term Spirit we mean the principle of life in its highest movement. As applied to the Supreme Being, it denotes God in the completeness of his infinite life—a life that absolutely knows and determines itself. For the reason that God is spirit, there is no latency in his nature. See I Cor. 2: 10-11.

The Spirit has a relative personality—a personality arising from its inter-trinitarian relations to the Father and to the Son. These relations are grounded in the very nature of the Godhead Itself, and thus are eternal. The term generation marks the relation between the Father and the Son as one of likeness; while the term procession indicates the relation which the Spirit holds to the Father and to the Son as that of resulting unity—the realization of their life. If instead of viewing God as Life, we view Him as Love, we shall reach a like conception of the Spirit's relation to the Father and to the Son. Love reveals itself in the Son and perfects itself in the Spirit. For it is only when love is mutual and equal that it can be perfect. The Father and the Son are one in the Spirit because Love reaches its perfection in their identity. The term person, as applied to the Godhead, only means that the soul, in its free rational life, is the best sign and symbol we have of God's mode of existence. It involves the fact that God is responsive to our cries, and that we can really enter into fellowship with Him. It implies that God's nature must be such as will account

for the nature of man in its highest development. But God's personality is infinitely higher than our own. For every self-conscious act in the universe proclaims the telic character of the Cosmical Intelligence, and has for its pre-supposition a mind which is alive along the entire line of thought and being. The infinite circle embraces an infinite number of vanishing points. When we apply this term to the Father, Son, or Spirit, we merely denote a separate mode of divine subsistence, which is conscious of itself. But these three centres of consciousness, though relatively distinct, are yet absolutely one and the same. They have their separate spheres of activity, but these spheres necessarily involve each other. A like relation appears in what the church has termed the trinity of revelation; that is, in the revelation of God in time and space. Here while the Son reveals the Father, the Spirit communicates his life; while the Son interprets the thought of the Father, the Spirit realizes that thought in and to the creature. The Spirit does not impart truth from without, but from within; that is, it opens the soul to the revelation already given. The subject-matter with which it deals is the word and the work of Christ; the Spirit makes good the revelation of Christ in human souls. Thus it is the enlightening, quickening, inspiring and sanctifying agent in the economy of redemption.

The order of operation even in the physical world follows the order of subsistence in the Godhead. As the Spirit is ever the goal of the inner life-process in the divine consciousness, so his office is to complete the work of creation in time and space. Thus there is a harmony between the mode of his existence and that of his operation. In Gen. 1:2, the Spirit is represented as imparting life to the universe, and so as completing the creative movement and process. For in creation the Father is the primal cause, the Son the mediating cause, and the Spirit the vital cause, in every physical and psychical phenomenon. It is the Spirit which animates nature, and is the Source of her immanent life.

SECTION SECOND.

HIS PERSONALITY IN REVELATION.

If the evidence for the personality of the Spirit is not so striking and so conclusive as for the personality of the Son, the main reasons are obvious. In fact, it could not be otherwise. The incarnation and the earthly life of our Lord precluded all doubts about the personality of the Son. On the other hand, it did not belong to the Spirit to visibly assume our nature and life, but only to penetrate that nature by his presence, and to inwardly transform it. The sphere of its agency was the invisible world of thought, feeling, and volition. The evidence, however, that the Spirit is a Person and not a mere Principle or a mere energy seems to be satisfactory. It rests on the following considerations:

First. Very many personal acts and attributes are ascribed to the Spirit, as teaching, enlightening, inspiring, convincing and regenerating. Now these and many other like attributes might be explained as figurative expressions, as when Paul personifies charity and ascribes to it many personal acts, were it not for other passages which show that this explanation is inadequate. Besides many personal relations are attributed to Him. For example, "He comes," "He is sent," "He bears witness," "He is grieved" and the like.

Second. The baptismal formula would seem to settle the doubt as to whether the Spirit is to be considered as an energy or as a person. In the formula the Father and Son are spoken of as persons, and so we naturally conclude that the Spirit is spoken of in the same way. We must remember that passages are to be weighed as well as numbered; and this passage, being in the commission, and being also a formula for our faith, must have great weight.

Third. The apostolic benediction, which is ever one of the highest expressions of religious thought, represents God as triune. This is generally gathered up into a prayer for the grace of Christ, because the sinner always emphasizes this thought. But in II Cor. 13:14 it is brought out fully, and here the Spirit's relation to the believer is similar to that of the Father and of the Son. The Spirit, then, is not an influence, but a person—a permanent centre of influence.

Fourth. He is distinguished from the Father and the Son. See I Cor. 2:10-11; I Cor. 3:16. Here the Spirit is the inner Worker of divine graces, in distinction from Christ as the Ordainer of the gospel ministries, and from the Father as the Fountain of all spiritual life. The sin against the Holy Ghost, too, is represented as something more aggravated than sin against the Son. For here the Father makes the final manifestation of his character, and just here the resistance of the sinner is the most persistent and sinful.

The difficulties, however, deserve to be noticed. It is said that the designations of the Spirit as the Spirit of God and the Spirit of truth are inconsistent with the view here defended. To this we may reply, the more formal and definite statement that the Spirit proceeds forth from God ought in fairness to explain the more vague expressions of His nature or of his office: See John 15:26. He who comes from God must in essence be one with Him, and he whose very vocation it is to inwardly impart the truth—to transfer its life to the human soul may properly be termed the Spirit of truth. For truth in its deepest import must be imparted rather than taught. The outward revelation of the Son must be accompanied by the inward revelation of the Spirit. It is also objected that Jesus after his resurrection breathed on his apostles and promised them the Holy Ghost. But in the same connection He also promised to send them another Comforter to take the place of his visible fellowship and to abide with them forever. Thus the symbolic act of our Lord was only an assurance that this Comforter would confer on them his gifts and graces. Now this Advocate seems to be a different personage from the Lord Himself. It is still further objected, that the Spirit is spoken of as a gift, but our Lord speaks of Himself in the same way; for he describes Himself both as the great Gift of God and the Supreme and the Sovereign Giver: see John 4:10. If the Spirit is never prayed to, yet He is the inspirer of all true prayer; and in the full doxologies, the object of equal praise with the Father and the Son. And the expression “poured out” applied to Him involves no more difficulty than the phrase “put on” as applied to Christ.

It is true the work of the Spirit is also ascribed now to the Son and now to the Father. This accords with their order of subsistence in the Godhead, by which the Son is subordinated to the

Father and the Spirit to the Son as well as to the Father. This order of origin and subsistence is indicated by the terms first, second and third as applied to the essential modes of divine existence—as designating those personal correlations which constitute the absolute personality of God. In this terminology the church has apprehended, as by a spiritual instinct, the general drift of Scripture teaching. For everywhere in the Old Testament and the New, the Father appears as representing, not alone Himself, but also the Son and the Spirit. And the Son, too, has ascribed to Himself, not only his own proper work, but also that of the Spirit, though never that of the Father. And, again, the Spirit is always represented as simply performing his own exclusive office work, and never that of the First or of the Second Persons in the Trinity.

CHAPTER II.

THE PRESENCE OF THE SPIRIT.

SECTION FIRST.

ITS NECESSITY.

The necessity of the Spirit is grounded on the nature of man and the character of his depravity. Man is not complete in himself, nor can he ever be himself apart from the Spirit of God. As a free being he must live and move in the free presence of that Spirit. He is not merely a natural force, but also a supernatural agency, and so must be in contact and in union with the powers of the world to come. But man is now by sin less than himself, and so has a weaker hold on the spiritual world than he was destined to have by creation, and so stands in need of a new and special incoming of the divine Spirit. It is in and through Christ that the Spirit has re-entered human life.

It is not enough that we have the historical Christ. If our Lord carried back with Him all that He brought, and left behind Him only the memorials of his presence, then his coming was a failure.

The race had a great promise, but no fulfillment. It would have light, but no life. But the light itself would be only intermittent flashings along the ages, to make the darkness more visible. Christianity becomes a thing of the past. Without a living and present Christ it is dead.

Nor is it sufficient to have the records of the wonderful life of our Lord, and an interpretation of that life by apostolic men. The Scriptures, thus viewed, would indeed be of untold value. They alone give us the mind and heart of Christ—the contents of his consciousness. No other book so touches life in its changing moods and activities as the Scriptures. But it does this in great part because Christ reigned in the heart of its writers. The Bible can not be the substitute for the Spirit, but only its chief accompaniment and its great agency. The soul needs both. Without the Word of God it mistakes fancy for faith, and without the Spirit of God it becomes an idolater, though the idolatry be baptized with the Christian name of orthodoxy.

Nor can a living church take the place of the living Spirit. Such a church could not exist without such a presence. But though it does exist, it only expresses the more articulate and pronounced form of that presence. It does not embody in itself all spiritual influences, nor is it the ultimate source of divine life. It has its grand functions as the general interpreter of the truth—as the perpetual witness to the great facts of redemption, and as the earthly home and resting-place for all souls. But it may become divided, and may degenerate so that the sinner cannot find life within its folds. Besides, the church presupposes the worth and the rights of the individual himself. The soul counts for something, even apart from the community to which it belongs. It is not the mere repetition, on an infinitely small scale, of the common life, nor is it the mere echo of a common human utterance. The solitary sinner, outside of any organization, must be able to find a great spiritual Presence to whom he can turn, and in whom he can rest. The tokens of that presence, both in its attractions and its repulsions, both in its incentives and its sanctions, are found in each and every soul at different periods of its life with more or less distinctness. Besides the common consciousness witnesses to the divine agency in human history.

God can act on the soul as a nature, independent of truth, because nature in all its forms and ways is unfree. But He can not act on the soul as a person—as having a moral and rational character—except in harmony with that character. For He can not contradict Himself. He may, as He often does, act beneath the consciousness, because the soul so acts. But all the higher influences of the Spirit are free and rational, and through the agency of the truth.

SECTION SECOND.

ITS SUFFICIENCY.

By the sufficiency of grace we mean such grace as will make human probation real in its character. The Spirit must be present everywhere. Its work must be co-extensive with the work of Christ. This universality is plainly indicated in the last discourses of our Lord. See John 16:9-11. But while the Spirit is everywhere present in heathendom, as in Christendom, the kind and degree of his manifestation is connected with the kind and degree of human receptivity, and this last is measured by the nature and the extent of the truth apprehended. We can not affirm, however, that the Spirit of God and the spirit of man stand in such outward and mechanical relations that the one is simply determined by the other. God does not merely wait on the good pleasure of his creatures, nor do they merely act as they are acted upon. The soul is not the mere passive recipient of divine grace. The agency of each appears in the other, as is seen in spiritual illumination and in the conviction of sin. Grace has both an intrinsic and an extrinsic efficiency. The Augustinians, both Catholic and Protestant, have given undue prominence to the first; while the Jesuits and the Arminians have unduly emphasized the last. It is impossible, however, to judge of the efficacy of spiritual influences, apart from the effect, and it is equally impossible by any analysis whatever to separate the human and the divine elements in any actual religious movement of the soul. Life, in its essence, can not be analyzed. The difficulty is not removed by holding, with Suarez, that efficacious grace is congruous with the state and surroundings of the soul; for this very congruity carries along with it something

of human worth, so that the Creator seems to wait on the creature. Besides, the view itself is superficial.

That men have all the light they need for their salvation, is evident from the Scriptures. That they are guilty for not believing on Christ and that this unbelief is the crowning act of their criminality—and in fact the only form of sin which necessitates their final condemnation—is everywhere revealed in the Bible. If the question be asked, why do not all accept Christ, the proximate answer must be, because they resist the light they have. See Is. 5:4; Matt. 11:20-23; 23:37; Acts 7:51; Rom. 10:21; II Cor. 6:1; Rev. 3:20; 22:17. The ultimate reason, however, is the sovereignty of divine grace. See Rom. 9:13; Eph. 2:10; I John 4:10. We may say, then, that all are saved that can be saved in consistency with human freedom, and all are saved that can be saved in consistency with the plans of Infinite Love. Both are true when taken together, and each is partial when taken apart from the other. The awakening of the soul, as well as its conversion, indicates a movement not merely human nor merely divine, but strictly divinely human in its character. These elements are inseparably blended in the new life of the soul.

God in his sovereignty gives place for a time to the sovereignty of the sinner. The divine Spirit limits its activity by the agency of the human spirit. Thus He revealed Himself to souls according to their receptivities. Yet the divine light is in all men, and is adequate for each and every member of the human family. It is sufficient to make all responsible, but responsible only for the knowledge they have or might have had. Every soul must have an actual chance for itself—a real opportunity to reach the goal for which it was created and for which it was redeemed. Without such a probation the irrevocable doom of the sinner could not be vindicated before the mercy seat of God.

SECTION THIRD.

ITS ENLIGHTENMENT.

The call of God is not merely nominal, but real and sincere. This call is contained in the Word of God, whether that Word is written or unwritten, whether presented in the teachings of Provi-

dence or brought home in the experiences of the individual soul. It matters not whether the sinner listen to the silent admonitions of his conscience, or to the exhortations of the pulpit, or to the language of inspiration; for they, one and all, embody the voice of God to his soul. Truth, in its thousand forms and aspects and bearings, is the great organ of the Spirit of God. Calvin in his *Institutes* makes the following declaration: "Many He certainly has called and endued with true knowledge of Himself by internal means, by the illumination of his Spirit without the intervention of preaching."

In this call God addresses not only the conscience and the reason of the sinner, but his sensibilities. He appeals to his hopes and to his fears, and, in short, to all his interests, as they pertain to time and to eternity. There is no side of human nature which is not addressed by the Spirit of God. The charge of sin and guilt is pressed home on the soul, not merely to secure self-condemnation; but through this experience to break the soul from self, and to bring it back again to God. Repentance is sought only as a stepping-stone to faith, and as thus initiating a return to holiness. The Spirit of God thus appears in the world, not simply as a Judge, but as the great Enlightener and inward Helper of humanity. It exercises judicial functions in the conviction of sin, but only with the view of conversion.

God is earnest and urgent in his call. His whole mind and heart is in the invitation. Prophets and apostles are his representatives, and their lamentations and their entreaties embody the divine longing for the salvation of men. Christ Himself, as the perfect expression of the divine compassion, reveals the anxiety of God for the recovery of the sinner.

The soul is ever more or less, at some time in its life, responsive to such invitations. But even when, from age, and from the growing hardness of the human heart, it has lost its receptivity, even then the outward call remains. But the response may fall short of the submission of the will—of a full self-surrender—and so of conversion. For a man may be converted to God in his imagination and in his conscience and in his reason, but not in his governing affections and will, and so not in his real life. The response which the soul makes is determined in part by the temperament, the education, the habits, the age of the individual, and his sur-

roundings. This environment is the life of the age—the moral and spiritual atmosphere which the individual breathes from his birth to his death. And as the world in its governing tendencies approaches nearer and nearer to the Christian ideal, the moral change in his character will be less and less remarkable or noteworthy. When, however, it involves a marked conviction of sin, it has certain common characteristics.

First. The soul gains a clearer intellectual perception of divine truth. The conscience is aroused. Heaven and hell are no longer far off and vague abstractions, but near and definite realities. The claims of God are admitted, and the futility of all excuses is freely acknowledged, though the excuses may not be abandoned. Some one truth may be made prominent, or some one sin may open to the soul the depth of its sinfulness. But in all this there is no surrender and no joyous trust. The sinner may show a stubborn and sullen resistance to the claims of his Maker, or he may resort to all kinds of shifts to stifle his convictions, or he may indulge in bitter aversion to the truth. God has gained everything but what He most prizes; namely, the affections of the heart.

Second. There may be a sense of shame and self-loathing, grounded in human pride. Here it is the form of sin, rather than the sin itself, which troubles the conscience, as in the case of drunkenness or lust. One's self-complacency is offended, and one's pride of character is touched. But in all this there is no real divine life.

Third. There may be a consciousness of a present loss and the sense of a present penalty. The sinner shrinks from the results of his sin. He dreads the pains and penalties of a violated conscience. He regrets the consequences of his own transgressions. But the repentance is purely legal in its character. The sinner would make his own atonement, reform his own character, and achieve his own redemption.

Fourth. The sinner often dreads the future—the unknown retributions of a hereafter. Here, repentance is not simply legal, but often cold and dry and hard, grounded as it is on his slavish fears of a future penalty. In natures more sympathetic, it is merely sentimental in its character. The essential elements of this state may be found in the convictions of children and youth. Their fears

have been aroused, but their affections have not been enlisted, nor their wills subdued.

Such a consciousness of sin could not, however, be awakened except in Christian countries, and then only under the influence of evangelical ideas. Even under such circumstances souls which are naturally weak or immature only experience vague feelings of insecurity and indefinite longings for a better life; or it may be, simply transient emotions of alarm and terror.

But all along this spiritual enlightenment there is hope, not only because it is preliminary to conversion; but because there is very often a weak but real element of divine life working amidst selfish hopes and slavish fears.

We are also to remember that enlightenment follows, as well as precedes, conversion. In fact, it accompanies the Christian through his whole life, and is one of the marks of his growth in holiness.

CHAPTER III.

REGENERATION.

SECTION FIRST.

PREDESTINATION.

Divine life must have its origin in God. It is the loving fellowship of the believer with his Maker. It does not spring up simply by virtue of his creaturely nature, nor is it born of his independent self-determination. Its ultimate source is the eternal love of God. All Christian souls, in their daily acts of prayer and praise, recognize their utter dependence on the divine compassion.

Predestination is not the sovereignty of power alone. According to the Scriptural view, it involves a moral goal and a network of spiritual agencies. See Eph. 1: 4-6. Here we should read: "In love having predestinated us to the adoption of children." The notable passage in Rom. 9, constitutes only an apparent exception. Here Paul exalts pure sovereignty, but only over against the arrogant pretensions of the Jews, that they had by virtue of their

nationality exclusive claims to the divin^e favor. It is a special view, brought out as a corrective of their assumptions. Power is not, however, the central and unifying principle in the divine character. It ever waits on love.

Nor is predestination the sovereignty of mere intellect. God is indeed wise, but love determines the goal of his wisdom. All representations of predestination as based on the necessity of a formal plan on the part of the Governor of the universe, and that plan an eternal one, are radically false. Their defect is in regarding God as Intelligence, rather than as Love. Starting from such a conception, our logic will lead us to the heathen idea of fate and not to the Christian idea of predestination. It is equally true that if we start from the will of the creature, we annihilate the sovereignty of God, and our logic lands us in the chaos of chance. It is, then, the sovereignty of love, to which both power and wisdom minister, that constitutes the soul of predestination.

God immediately determines only his own agency, and not the agency of the creature—only what He will do, and not what his subject shall do. But He does mediate and directly and indirectly, and in this sense conditionally, fore-ordain the destiny of his creatures, and especially the salvation of his people. This indirectness involves and includes the inheritance of the creature, his free choice, all his surroundings, and all the complex influences which enter in to mould his character and to sway his decisions. Thus predestination has respect to the totality of the individual life, as that totality is gathered in some great crisis and looks towards its true and proper goal.

Predestination never has for its end the ruin of the soul. There is no divine efficiency in the sinful choice of the creature, though there is in the penal consequences of his guilt. The sinner is his own destroyer. His rejection of Christ is his own act of unbelief. Condemnation does indeed come from God, and the law by which the sinner is hardened is of divine appointment; but God exerts no efficiency in the hardening process, except in securing to the sinner the result of his own obduracy. Thus reprobation is God's abandonment of the soul which has abandoned Him. Reprobation is the sinner's own decree. He makes himself a reprobate, and God simply treats him as he is.

God's purpose as revealed in his own agency alone is ever wise and good. We see it in the very creation of the soul. We see it in the guilt of the sinner. We see it in the coming of the Spirit. We see it in the laws even of the spiritual world. We shall see it still more fully in the issues of another life. It is simply impious to affirm that God created any soul to be damned. ✓

Predestination has its eternal and temporal aspects. The first transcends all human agency; see Acts 13: 48; while the last synchronizes with human action. God's election of the sinner in time always involves the sinner's election of God. God's choice of the believer is one with the believer's choice of God. They never exist apart. This choice, as an actual fact revealed in the individual soul, is inconceivable except as involving a corresponding choice on the part of the soul itself. Thus election eventuates in justification, and justification involves at one and the same time both an act of the Creator and an act of the creature.

The view that men are elected merely to church privileges, or, more definitely, to baptism, is consistent neither with the absence of any allusion to that ordinance, nor with the express mention of the spiritual condition to which, and the spiritual means by which, the election is realized. Had such a view been entertained by the apostles we should have had an explicit statement of the fact. Baptism would have been directly associated with predestination. That nations are also elected to fill a certain place in God's general providence, is apparent both from Scriptures and from history; for nations are great personages, and so have their vocations in the education of the race.

Predestination is not founded on foresight of what man would do alone and unaided, for then it would have no adequate foundation at all. Nor can it be founded on foresight of what man would do aided by the grace of God, for then it would be founded on something still more ultimate than predestination itself; that is on a purpose anterior to the decree of election. As Lurretin remarks "If election depends upon foreseeing faith, God can not elect man, but man chooses God, and so predestination should rather be called post-predestination. The first cause becomes the second, and God becomes dependent upon man, which is false and contrary to the nature of things; and Christ Himself testifies "Ye have not

chosen me, but I have chosen you." The ground of election is the loving will of God which is at once eternal and unsearchable. We are sure that these are the wisest and best reasons for God's purpose, but what these are we do not and can not know.

The Hyper-Calvinistic theory of supralapsarianism is now generally abandoned. It interpreted the order of divine decrees on the principle that what was last in execution was first in intention. Now, speaking reverently, as the damnation of the lost was the last of the decrees executed, so it was, on this theory, the first in the divine mind. It preceded the decree of creation and of the fall. But the principle is altogether a false one except as the intention necessarily involves all the steps by which it is executed; or, stated in other terms, except as the final execution is the simple and sole evolution of the first purpose. If any secondary cause or agency intervenes, in the nature of a free human will it is not and can not be true. The maxim then ceases to be a postulate of the reason. Thus the order of execution can alone determine the order of decrees in the divine mind, as apprehended by the mind of the creature.

SECTION SECOND.

THE ORIGIN OF SPIRITUAL LIFE.

Regeneration points back to the loving purpose of God; that purpose was primal and central in the divine mind and heart and so was fixed and eternal. Thus it is represented in the Scriptures as antedating creation.

Regeneration as an act of God is the origination of this new life. As a state it is that life itself in its origin and permanence. It must be ascribed to God, rather than to man, because, though the divine and the human agencies and elements blend together in its generation, yet the divine, in the order of thought, precedes and transcends the human. This regenerating agency has its spring and source in the eternity of God. In its last analysis it is independent and absolute. The Scriptures everywhere represent the soul as absolutely dependent on God, because both of its finiteness and of its sinfulness. Thus, too, the renewed soul in its profoundest spiritual experiences, recognizes the absoluteness of this dependence. This act of God, however, precedes only in the order of

thought, and not in that of time, the agency of the soul itself. In the actual movement within the soul itself the divine efficiency is one with the human. The terms "new birth" and "new creature" indicate the radical character of this change. They were used in addressing both the Jew and the Gentile, and so must indicate more than a change of opinion and of profession. It was a change in the very fountain of moral thought and feeling. It was thus no mere enlargement of one's apprehensions—no mere increase of knowledge—no mere submission to any rite—nor any transient mood of mind, whether emotional or volitional; but a new spiritual state, involving a surrender of the will to God. But we are not to push the figurative language of the Scriptures beyond the points which it was designed to illustrate. No new faculty is added to our nature. The new birth is only a re-creation after a new and higher type of life. The natural constitution of the soul, with its dominant mood and temperaments, remains essentially the same. But yet this constitution itself is quickened and made alive, and thus is the pre-ordained channel along which the waters of the divine life must flow. Regeneration is, however, hardly a radical change of character; but rather radical changes in character.

The movement begins beneath the consciousness, often years before it is recognized by ourselves or by our friends. For the Spirit does not simply front us from without; presenting motives to our consciences and our hearts, and presenting them in a more solemn and affecting light than any earthly agent whatever; but it works also in the depths of our natures, whence all our moral living flows. We are not conscious of its approaches, any more than we are of the common electric currents which are ever passing from the earth into our organism. In fact, we are never fully aware of the more subtle and decisive influences which society itself exerts on our characters and over our destinies. Not to admit, then, such a spiritual agency, working beneath our consciousness, is to exclude the Creator's influence from the very sphere where the creature's power is so subtle and dominant. It does not follow, because this influence begins below the consciousness, that it is therefore independent of and outside of any personal agency whatever, for what we do determines in a great measure what we are. All our conscious thinking, feeling and living is ever passing from

the surface of the soul into its depths, and there forming its mental and moral state. Our unconscious receptivities are found in this spiritual condition which we ourselves in great part have made.

Just at the points where God comes in contact with our interior moral conditions, we have the mystery of the new life. We may term it the implanting of a new principle, or the creation of a new moral taste, or the quickening of paralyzed affections, or a new and permanent direction of the will toward God; but all such representations lay emphasis only on one side of the mystery. It is the meeting of the Spirit of God with the spirit of man which leads to the quickening of the soul. All that we can say is that regeneration is spiritual life, imparted by God, and received by the soul. Thus the soul is only passive with reference to the activity of God, as God Himself is passive in reference to the activity of man. In the actual regenerative process the soul is receptive and not passive.

These radical changes are at first only incipient. They are surrounded by opposing habits of a life-long duration. It is in the final issue alone that we recognize a radical and complete change of character.

We must, then, conceive of no mechanical relation between the human and the divine factors in this new life-process. We must not suppose that God's agency precedes, and goes on for a long time apart from the agency of the soul itself, and that the human agency simply works as it is led to do by the Spirit of God. Such a view would abolish the mystery, or at least reduce it to the level of the common mysteries of life. For it would simply place it under the law of cause and effect, and so give no adequate explanation of it. The mystery would then differ only in form from the mysteries which throng us and press us on every side of our common life. God, then, imparts, a new life in the fact of its reception on the part of the soul, and the soul receives the new life in the fact of its impartation. The act of God does not so much cause the act of man, as it involves it. Nor, on the other hand, does the act of man so much determine the act of God as it enters into and coalesces with that act. The two agencies are, in their real operation, one and the same spiritual process and movement. Naturally

and logically considered, the divine agency must precede the human. Yet in fact, and for us, there is no priority of time.

We cannot give a more definite analysis of the process, simply because it is a life movement—and a life movement springing up from the depths of the soul, and one too of the profoundest character. If it was a mere advance in religious knowledge, or any outside reform, we could then give the elements or factors with tolerable accuracy and fulness. As, however, it results from a decisive contact of the soul with God, and not from a merely formal apprehension of Him—as it belongs to the sphere of Christian mysticism, it eludes all analysis whatever. This, however, does not make it a magical process; since such a process excludes all knowledge and ignores all susceptibility on the part of the human soul.

It is the truth which forms the meeting-place of God and the soul—that is the great audience-chamber where the sinner seeks God, and God receives the sinner. Hence it is that regeneration is frequently ascribed to the truth. But the more specific statements of the Scriptures are that truth is the instrumentality and agency in and through which the Spirit awakens a new life. The truth is represented as the light which enlightens, or as the seed which germinates; and special forms of the truth are described as a sword or a hammer which pierces or breaks the heart of the sinner. Regeneration cannot take place aside from and independent of the truth, for the very reason that it is a moral change and not a physical or constitutional one. Now a moral change must follow the laws of moral life, and all moral life draws its sustenance from the truth.

The first step in the new life must have a beginning, and in this sense it is instantaneous. But its commencement is not usually apparent. It does not at first reveal itself in the consciousness or show itself in outward action. The new life is always preceded by an inward process which initiates and fixes the decisive bent of the soul, so that the entire moral change reveals itself as gradual and progressive. In individual cases there is a very marked moral crisis in character and life, and this crisis involves a change that is as instantaneous as it is permanent and paramount.

Regeneration is made by many to depend on baptism. This is grounded on such a statement as the following: "Except a man

be born of water and the Spirit he cannot enter the kingdom of God." But Christ immediately in the same connection drops the expression "Born of water," and retains only the idea of a birth by the Spirit of God. It is also supported by such a declaration as the "Washing of regeneration" and such a command as "Arise and be baptized and wash away thy sins." The interpretation given to these passages by churchmen is certainly possible, but it as certainly involves a like interpretation of the words applied to the communion. If we accept baptismal regeneration because of such expressions, we must accept for a like reason the dogma of transubstantiation. Now the other principle of interpretation is far the simpler one—namely, that the symbol and the thing symbolized may be identified, and by virtue of such an identification may be placed on the same level, have the same predicates, and be endowed with the same efficacy. But every one understands that the outward act is simply a symbol of an inward presence and power. Does not Paul's own declaration that he was sent not to baptize, but to preach the gospel harmonize with this view; and does it not show how we are to interpret such expressions as these? Again, does not the exaltation of the spiritual over the ritual and the ceremonial, which everywhere presents itself in the New Testament, absolutely require that the symbolic and not the literal import of these terms should be adopted? To make any rite whatever a source of life is to paganize the religion of Jesus, and to make its acceptance by men of culture outside of the hierarchy a sheer impossibility.

SECTION THIRD.

CONVERSION.

Regeneration is a change beneath consciousness; while conversion is a change in the consciousness. In regeneration the divine Spirit appears as dominant; while in conversion the free self-determination of the believer is the more obvious factor. Conversion is the outgrowth of the regenerate state. It reveals itself primarily in the essential graces of the new divine life. These graces are especially to be noted:

First. Repentance. This naturally comes first. The new life

begins where the old life wanes. Union with Christ must be preceded by a break with the world. The soul that would draw toward God must move away from self. Repentance is thus a change of mind and purpose. It is an abandonment of sin—a shrinking from its pollution and its guilt—and a craving for forgiveness. But this general statement must be resolved into something more specific.

It is a sense of guilt, a feeling of ill-desert and of exposure to a just penalty. This is something more than a sense of shame, which may result from one's pride, or from a publicity given to one's sins. It is a sorrowful conviction that we are sinful—that not this or that act merely is wrong, but that our whole characters and lives are radically at fault—are formed after a selfish plan and governed by a selfish principle. The soul feels that it is not simply guilty now and then, amid trying temptations, but ever and always, in the way of omission as well as of commission—by virtue not only of wrong aims and motives and passions, but by reason of the prevailing disposition of the heart, and the general drift of the life. There is in this sense of guilt not merely a fear of penalty, but a dread of sin itself and a sorrow for having wronged God. There is also a longing for a reconciliation with Him—a desire to return to Him.

True repentance is no proud wish for self-reform and self-recovery. It is no asceticism, resorted to to strifle or quiet the feeling of self-reproach. It is rather an abandonment of self. The penitent soul makes no apology for itself and has no concealments; but in helplessness prostrates itself before the mercy of God. It does not fall back on itself and rest in despair; but looks up from the depths of its wretchedness and cries to the Savior for help. The conviction is a radical and central one—a revulsion of the entire nature from sin and a sinful life. It is not a passing regret for some individual sin, nor a change in the form of selfishness, as when one ceases to be licentious to become the more self-righteous. It is rather an inner life-movement—a new generic act of the will, creating a new tendency, inaugurating a new habit, and pre-determining a new state and a new character.

Thus repentance is not sentimental but practical in its character. It is not a mere emotion of grief or of dread, without any purpose

to reform, that makes up this fundamental grace of religion. Its root is in the love of a better life, and its very hatred of sin is deepened by a sense of forgiveness. There is a radical change of disposition—a break with one's former bondage, a fixed determination to serve the new Master.

It is not an outward condition of salvation arbitrarily enjoined by God, but the prerequisite to eternal life both inward and necessary. For there must be an abandonment of the world, and a renunciation of one's sins in order to have an honest desire for forgiveness, or to be able to appreciate and to appropriate that grace, or to enjoy it when given. God requires only that condition which is involved in the very reception of the proffered pardon, and which is absolutely essential to the new life. Under a legal system repentance would be only a duty, but under the redemptive system it is both a duty and a grace—a duty enhanced by the offer of life and the sin of unbelief, and a grace which opens the soul for the indwelling of the Spirit of God.

Second. Faith. In repentance the soul ceases to believe in itself—in its own rectitude and resources. This is the negative aspect of the new life. See Rom. 7:9. In faith the soul believes alone in Christ—in his righteousness and in the resources of his grace. This is the positive aspect of the new life. Holy fear dominates in repentance; free and joyous love in faith.

Faith is the assent of the understanding, and the reliance of the heart. It is the synthesis of the affections, the will, and the intellect, as these are centred in Christ. These three elements are always involved in Christian faith. They blend together. There is a love for Christ, a preference for Him, a knowledge of Him. Christ touches all sides of our nature. The relation between Him and us, as indicated by faith, is a personal one. There is a life-communion between the soul and its Savior. Thus we see that faith precedes formal knowledge. Thus we see, too, that this grace is not a simple intellection. Otherwise it would not enlist the will and bind the soul, and pledge them to a Christian activity.

Repentance is retrospective, and has sin for its object; while faith is prospective, and has Christ for its object. In the former the heart is broken; in the latter it is healed. Faith is the uniting, the appropriating, and the receiving grace. It is the free and joy-

ous and full surrender of one's very self, once for all, to God. It may show itself in a serene trust in his promises, or in an exultant confidence in his power and his grace. While the generic object of all religious faith is the revelation of God, the special object is Christ Himself, as the centre, the ground, and the goal of that revelation. Thus faith is the positive seminal principle of all growth in holiness.

There can be no doubt that faith carries with it, according to the purity and strength of its exercise, the evidence of its own existence. When it expresses itself most clearly and most fully, it excludes doubt. The soul is then sure of divine acceptance. It is, however, only the assurance of faith, and not of sight. It is not proper to say that we are sure of our election, or that we are sure we shall persevere to the end. We can only be certain of God's present favor, grounded objectively on the person and work of Christ, and subjectively on the testimony of his Spirit in our hearts. The characteristics of this assurance are humility, spiritual power, aspiration and joy.

Faith, then, is naturally the inward condition of justification, for it is the grace that receives the offer of life and binds the soul to a new obedience. Thus as the condition of salvation, it is not arbitrary, but altogether natural and necessary.

Third. Hope. Faith has reference to all the revelations of divine grace, whether in the past, the present, or the future; while hope is more specific in its character, and pertains to the realities of the future life. Faith realizes the promises—gives to them a present worth and makes them a present possession. But hope accepts these very promises only as the earnest of an inheritance yet to come. The one is the grace that appropriates and realizes; while the other is the grace that watches and waits. In this sense it is an offshoot of faith. Patience and fortitude are born of hope. In hope two elements are always present; namely, the desire and the expectation of a future good. The unregenerate man does not desire holiness, and so does not possess the Christian's hope. In the nature of things, he can have no such grace. If Christ had not died there might possibly be a desire for heaven, but there could be no expectation of it. In human experience we often desire what we can not expect, as we expect what we can not desire. Now

hope has some good for its object. Its present fluctuating character shows that our earthly life is incomplete—that the redemptive process is a gradual one. For the profounder our present enjoyment of spiritual goods is, the profounder is our hope of something better yet to come. Hope has for its specific object, not so much Christ crucified, as Christ glorified. It rests pre-eminently on the fact of the resurrection of our Lord.

Hope dissipates all doubt of the triumph of God's justice. It imparts a spring to all human aims, and gives direction to all our higher aspirations. It is thus the mother of many of our active as well as passive virtues.

Fourth. Love. This is the primal and fountal affection of the human heart. There is a semblance of it in animal life. It is a mark of our common creaturely make and condition—primitive in its character. It is thus deeper and more fundamental than any other Christian grace whatever. For it is the life of them all. Repentance is love abandoning its prison-house, and returning from its false ways, and abandoning its unnatural practices. Faith is love springing up in the heart of the sinner and rising through the mists of sin into the clear light of day. Thus faith is a form of love, and love is the soul of faith. Hope is love waiting and watching for the consummation of its blessedness; holy fear is love moving amidst dangers, and burdened with great cares and great duties: humility is love forgetting itself: sympathy is love uniting itself with its fellows—harmonizing itself with the spirit of universal love: peace is the serenity and repose of love: joy is the satisfaction found in its activities and its receptivities: patience is love bearing the ills of life: fortitude is love meeting the cares and mastering the difficulties of life: gentleness is love pervading one's opinions and convictions: meekness is love bearing the criticisms of others: forgiveness is love overlooking all personal wrongs: charity is love putting the best construction on the character and conduct of others: wisdom is love seeking the highest ends by the best means: temperance is love constraining and regulating all human desires and impulses: benevolence is love seeking the good of others: zeal is love working in the cause of virtue and religion: obedience is love fulfilling the duties of life; resignation is love enduring the griefs and sorrows of life: truth is love holding to its

idea's, and truthfulness is love holding to its experiences and its promises: holiness is love asserting itself—insisting on its prerogatives and its privileges: self-sacrifice is love surrendering itself and emptying itself of its goods in behalf of others.

These graces never exist alone. They blend together in every Christian life according to the make of the individual, to the character of his vocation and to his position in society. Thus his piety is the union of graces as they are directed towards God; and his morality is a corresponding group as they move towards man. These, however, are the same except as they are affected by a change of objects working a change of sentiment in the mind and heart of the believer. When the soul is right, the spring of action is absolutely the same in piety as in morality. The sole difference is in their direction and in their immediate goal. The graces may be also classified as active and passive according as they represent inward states or promote outward changes—according as their objects are our own individual good or the good of others. Neither class can exist alone in its purity without the other. They react on each other, and each is healthier by virtue of the other. Passive virtues without the active degenerate into an idle and barren sentimentalism. Active virtues without the passive pass into a hard and cold legalism.

Conversion completes itself in good works. Evangelical obedience is the free, spontaneous conformity to the law of God as revealed anew in the life of Christ. The Christian is not so much a creature of God or his subject, or the minister of his providence, as he is a child of God, co-living and co-working with his heavenly Father. He lives no introspective life, makes no account of his goodness, takes on no self-complacency; but lives in God and for his fellows. Thus his good works are not the works of the law, but the fruits of faith. They are not wrought to secure his justification, but because he is justified. All idea of meritoriousness is foreign to evangelical obedience.

Christian love has two sides—the receptive and the communicative. The last is seen when the soul enters into fellowship with God, and joins itself to all who bear his name. It is self-surrender and self-impartment. Its receptive side is the appropriation of all that God has to give, and of all that his children have to impart.

It is thus a sweet and holy complacency in all that is pure and true and good. These are, however, the complements of each other. For love is perfect only when it is mutual. The Mystics erred in making love consist of delight in good. They exalted the receptive side of this virtue. But love, to be real, must go forth and manifest itself by ministering in manifold ways to the wants of others. The ascetic and the contemplative saint are incarnations of a baptized selfishness.

CHAPTER IV.

SANCTIFICATION.

SECTION FIRST.

CHRISTIAN PERFECTION.

The moral law is, in its principles and essence, as changeless as God. It rests on his nature. It is his essential will. Its presentations, however, change with new revelations, and its applications vary with human conditions. Thus it was re-enacted in a new and glorified form in the life of our Lord. It took on special incentives and sanctions in the plan and process of redemption, and it is now applied to man, not in a state of purity, but of sin and probation. Thus the moral law, as given in the example of our Lord, has new motives, new duties, new joys, and new and transcendent issues.

Christian perfection, then, is absolute conformity to the law of God, as revealed in our great Exemplar. When the Christian becomes like Christ, according to the measure of his capacity and to the sphere of his life, he is then perfect in his character. He is required to be thus conformed to his Lord—to have like springs of action, and like ideals in life. His daily life, in thought, word, and deed, is to be perfectly Christ-like. He is thus to lead a divinely human life, according to the prayer of Christ. See John 17: 22.

The aim after Christian perfection is warranted by the fact that it can be reached only through the spiritual strivings of the soul. For sanctification is as truly a human acquisition as it is a divine bestowment. A spiritual struggle and conflict is one

of the conditions without which personal holiness is impossible. This purpose is also justified by the ample provisions made for our spiritual growth and for our final perfection. The work of Christ removes the first obstacle and invites the sinner to the fountain whence all help and blessing flow. The promise and the work of the Spirit impart life and power to the soul. The means of grace are appointed as aids to the furtherance of this purpose. Providence gives support to faith, and finally death itself hastens the completion of the work of sanctification.

But though we are required to be perfect at once; that is, to meet all our duties as they appear at any given stage of progress, yet in this life such a perfection is, in fact, never reached. The generic duty implies a corresponding ability—such an ability as sanctions the generic obligation. For the command to be perfect is certainly generic in its character, since either it has reference to the complete symmetry of the Christian life, or it merely sets before us the ideal of that life. Thus the duty can not be discharged by any simple act whatever; but only by a generic life-movement, acting in all directions. This generic duty has to be resolved, then, into definite and specific duties—as many as our moods of mind and our changes of circumstances, and as oft-recurring as the number of our days. Now we are able to meet, with the help of divine grace, any one of these several duties as it may present itself in our daily living. Whenever and wherever we fail, we can not say that our failure was owing to our inability, but to our corruption. But has man the practical ability to be always right in every particular and on every occasion—an ability which is determined by his surroundings, as these address the weakness of his nature? Or, to state it in other words, can any man reasonably hope to have a perfect moral character before he enters heaven? We must answer this question in the negative. We find no such instances of perfection recorded in either sacred or secular history. Men may, in certain lines of life, and at certain moments, reach this state; but they do not thereby attain to the all-sided perfection of the Christian character. The theory of perfection advocated by Romanists, Methodists, and many members of the Reformed churches involves two radically false impressions.

First. The idea that the standard of duty is lowered by the

coming of Christ. The Catholics hold that the indwelling grace of God enables man to keep the divine law just so far as it is suited to his condition and so binding on him. The Council of Trent affirms the following: "As a constant power flows from Christ the Head on the justified, who are his members, as from the vine to its branches, a power which precedes their good works, accompanies the same and follows them—a power without which they can be in no wise agreeable to God and meritorious, so we are bound to believe that the justified are enabled through works performed in God to satisfy the divine law according to the condition of this present life, and to merit eternal life when they depart in a state of grace." They also hold that he can do more than this; and can acquire merit, and so fill the treasury of the church with spiritual graces, and thus lay up a spiritual capital to be used in behalf of the weaker saints. In making the distinction between the counsels of God which require the highest form of human life and his commands which only demand a lower form of the same life, they do, in fact, lower the standard of human duty. It is true that they insist that all human merit derives its ultimate worth from what Christ has done, and that alone. But yet they insist on the merit *de congruo*, that is of fitness according to the Scotists, or on the merit *de condigno*, [that is, of positive worth according to the Thomists.

The Methodists hold that we are free from the law given to unfallen man, even as a rule of duty; and that we have in its place a new law, namely, the law of faith and of love. Obedience to this law is perfection. Dr. Peck says that perfect faith and perfect love is Christian perfection. It is certainly the spring and pledge of it. The Oberlin school insists that the original law must of right and of necessity accommodate itself to the ability of the subject. Perfection is, according to Dr. Finney, perfect and disinterested benevolence. Certainly the spirit of such a life would lead to perfection. Now in all this we see how the divine law is lowered—is brought down to human infirmity.

Second. Advocates of this theory have a low view of human sin and guilt. The idea common to them all is that sin is a transient act; rather than radically and essentially a state of the soul—a state which has been in part created by the oft-repeated conscious

acts of the soul itself. They affirm that depraved desires and impure thoughts and feelings, unless deliberately harbored, are not sinful. They all admit that the infirmities that belong to one's character are consistent with their idea of perfection. Wesley thus expresses himself: "I believe that there is no such perfection in this life as excludes these involuntary transgressions which I apprehend to be naturally consequent on the ignorance and mistakes inseparably from mortality."

They defend their views chiefly by appeals to the Scriptures. Thus they rely on the command to be perfect. Now, admitting that they make a proper use of the text, we remark that this perfection must concern the unuttered thoughts, that seem to come to us unbidden, as well as the deliberate acts of the soul itself, because Christ Himself declares that "Out of the heart proceedeth evil thoughts," etc. They refer to Acts 13: 22 as giving an example of perfection. Here, however, the perfection is only relative; that is, of David as compared with Saul. They rely on the provisions that have been made for our complete sanctification in the coming of the Son and in the sending of the Spirit. This provision is indeed ample; but it is extended through life, and perfection does not seem to be reached until the provision is exhausted at the point of death. The last installment of grace is given as the soul passes unto eternity. Without referring to the numerous passages of Scripture which directly or indirectly militate against the idea of perfection, and so against the moral possibility of attaining it till after death, we will simply refer to the Lord's prayer. This prayer is given by Christ as a model of prayer for all men in all time, and shows that a petition for forgiveness will always be legitimate. Here we have Christ's foresight. He did not expect that any one of his followers would reach perfection on this side of the grave. The Scriptures elsewhere sanction this idea. The Christian life is presented under a two-fold aspect. It is a life of peace and joy and labor in God, or it is a life of conflict with sin. The power of sin is broken, but not annihilated. A new life is implanted; but the old habits of sin still contend for the mastery. The Christian has, however, the assurance of hope—a confidence that God will carry him safely through to the end. There is no limit in any one direction to the conquest which he may gain over self and the world.

Still there is no point of rest, and no place for congratulation until he meets his Savior in heaven.

SECTION SECOND.

THE LAW OF GROWTH.

The great lines of possible growth are predetermined at birth. The constitutional tendencies are the results of the law of nature and of life. They are the outward channels along which the waters of a new and higher life may flow. But these very tendencies can often be awakened by the presence of the Spirit alone. The real man is brought out by the powers of the world to come. The Spirit of God not only calls forth what is latent in the soul; but secures new combinations, and so creates practically a new character. It effects this by presenting new and lofty ideas, and quickening dormant energies of the soul itself. Illustrations of this fact are seen in the lives of Augustine and Bunyan and other eminent saints.

But God works in harmony with Himself. The law of inheritance and the law of development are as truly his own as the efficacy of divine grace. No constitutional tendency is ever eradicated; but is simply stimulated and regulated and directed under the new impulse given to the soul. Thus the gifts of the Christian character are built up on gifts of nature, though by a grace that transcends nature. Thus the original type and style of life is not destroyed, but glorified. In this way the symmetry of the individual character is secured. The soul is developed according to the idea and law of its life. The individuality, however, never degenerates into isolation. It is of value not chiefly for itself, but for others. The society of heaven, as of earth, is made up of unlike units—but of units that complement each other. Thus individuality itself is essential to a community of life.

Divine grace must not only re-create, but energize, the entire natural character. That character must become an origination and productive spiritual force. The new life must interpenetrate and vitalize all one's original susceptibilities and capacities. The process of growth is defective and the development weak and sickly, if the Christian confines himself to the narrow circle of self-introspec-

tion. The gloom of the prison-house—be its solitary luxuries what they may—is always unhealthy. Nor must the Christian exhaust his energies in the closet or conference-room; but he must make himself felt in the thousand activities of daily life. All sides of one's nature must have a free and harmonious development. It will not do to crush out our instincts, or repress our social cravings, under the delusive idea of becoming thereby more religious. Religion is not to be confined to any act of prayer or any form of worship. The whole life of the Christian, in its joyousness or seriousness, is a continual act of devotion, whether that devotion be of prayer or praise. It is religious throughout, both in its free and joyous hours, and in its seasons of prayer or public worship.

True sanctification is the growing realization of a full Christ-like life. It is not the mere appropriation of the goods of earth or of heaven. The first is mere self-indulgence, and the second is a mere mystic sentimentalism. Both are forms of selfishness, though the second is more subtle and more dangerous in its character. Yet the appropriation of the gifts of Providence, under the spirit of spontaneous, grateful love to the Giver, is, without doubt, one of the constitutive and regulative principles of Christian life. We are not to treat slightly what God in his providence has done for us. Life has its joyous side, as well as its disciplinary value. Self-restraint has its place only when our impulses are sinful in kind or in degree. It is a duty also when special difficulties are to be overcome and special work to be done. Nor does the whole of Christian living consist in suffering and in doing the will of God. For the first seems to exclude all heroic endeavors to master the ills of life, and the second points to law as a standard of duty, and not to love as the source of life. What is here meant is simply this, that life should not be viewed as either simply a discipline or a duty. Besides all these principles there remain the thousand aspirations, centreing in a supreme yearning for God, and the free impartation of all that we are and have to the souls of our fellows, and the free assumption of their sorrows and griefs and woes. Such are the constitutive principles which determine the growth of the believer.

The special principle in the development of a good life is the power of a sanctified will. One's lot in this world is largely determined by causes acting outside and independent of any self-

decision whatever. Thus the time and place of one's birth, his surroundings, his family connections and his early associates are largely fixed by Providence. These give him his language, his early education and the associations of his childhood. And these again determine in part his earthly occupation and his position in society. Such are the necessities in and amidst which the Christian must live and labor. His spiritual growth will depend on the manner in which he accepts and seeks to improve his lot in life; on the steadiness and constancy with which he holds on to his ideal; on the fellowship he keeps up with his God, on the mastery he wins over himself; on the way in which he meets and discharges the varied duties of life both public and private; on the spirit with which he bears the ills and sorrows of life; and on the fullness and richness of his Christian sympathies. The final and decisive test of character, and the sure criterion of growth is the surrender of the will to God.

The conflicts of life imply temptation, and these make the formation of habits possible. For habit is the result of repetition under difficulties. In this spiritual process, before the habit is fully formed, there is a necessary loss of the beauty of spontaneous virtue, because there must be deliberation, hesitation, and doubt. Yet even here there is often a dramatic grandeur in the struggle, and a nobility in the achievement. But after the habit has been formed and the character fixed, then a spontaneous life is developed, and we have the freshness and beauty of virtue, without the taint and drawback of a conscious effort. Thus, though the Christian character is of slow growth, yet when it is formed we have not only the beauty of spontaneity, but also the strength of habit. The soul is thus rendered measurably secure in its rectitude, and that, too, without the loss of any element which makes up the grace and the glory of virtue. Until this goal is reached, all is uncertain; and the Christian is in danger of going astray, and, that, too, fatally, from the paths of morality and virtue.

The natural sources of our corruption are often found in our organism. The will enters into these and they thus become fountains of personal sinfulness. Hence it is that our special sins may be rooted in our bodily infirmities as well as in the soul itself. We are then called on to subject ourselves to a physical, as well as

spiritual, discipline. We can master our organic sins not alone by prayer, but by physical aïls. We are to regulate our diet, or engage in severe physical labor, or resort to proper exercise, or to avail ourselves of proper medicinal antidotes. For vice is a disease, as well as a sin, and must be treated accordingly. Spiritual means alone will avail only against the sins of the spirit, such as hate, pride, vanity, envy, jealousy, ambition.

In our sanctification, the germinant power is the union of the Spirit of God with our own spirits—their interpenetration and their reciprocal influence.

SECTION THIRD.

THE MEANS OF GRACE.

Every institution and every rite and every formal act of worship may be regarded as a means to a spiritual end, and so may be denominated a means of grace. The expression often has a still wider application. It can be applied to any event or occasion in the providence of God which the soul can utilize for its own good. But nothing, whatever, independent of the recipient or agent, in other words, aside from the inward condition of the soul, can be the channel or the organ of divine life. Such a view would materialize Christianity—transform what is mystical in the religion of Jesus into a magical power—subordinate the spiritual to the formal and so heathenize the religion of Christ. We are here to note only those means of grace which affect most deeply the Christian life.

First. Prayer. Prayer is the fruit of grace as well as the means of grace. We are, however, to view it in the latter aspect. The act of worship is the most immediate and direct expression of spiritual life. Prayer consists of adoration, confession, supplication, intercession, and thanksgiving; or, more briefly, of praise, petition, and thanksgiving. Worship belongs to all rational creatures—angels as well as men. But with holy beings it is free at once from both the burden and the taint of sin and guilt. We need here to consider prayer simply as petition, and are to note:

A. The Medium of Prayer. Christ alone is the Mediator, who brings God down to the sinner and the sinner up to God. There

is no allusion in the Scriptures to any other mediation than that of our Lord Jesus Christ. Our friends are only the satellites of Christ, deriving from Him all their light and all their worth and significance. Their intercession is dependent and accessory in its nature. Christ alone enables the sinner to offer his prayers to God. He is not only allowed to do so; but is invited and urged to make known all his wants to his Heavenly Father. The way is open. He can think of God as compassionate and forgiving, and he can be free and trusting in God's presence. Christ avails even for souls who have no outward or formal acquaintance with Him; but who inwardly belong to Him. For his work has a validity for all who are struggling for a higher life, even though they know not the source of that very struggle. Christ is as truly with the stray souls in heathendom as with his church in Christendom.

B. The Nature of Prayer. All real prayer is born of God—inspired of the Spirit. The request which the true and loving child makes is but an expression of the family life, and the answer of the parent is but the response which he himself has generated. Such a child wants nothing but what his father is ready to grant, and the blessings thus conferred grow in worth because of the very asking; and the family life, too, is made richer and sweeter by such a plan, than by having all the deeper wants of its members anticipated and provided for. So it is with the child of God. Prayer not only springs from God; but moves toward and centres in God. The very soul of every true prayer is, "Thy will be done." The petition must also have a genuine human element. It must be born of the heart, as well as of God. We must not only know it to be right in our reason, and approve it in our conscience; but we must also put our governing affections and will into it. We must thus second God's motion. Thus all untruthfulness and all forms of selfishness must be banished from our prayers. It is only in this way and on such conditions that our prayers can be heard and answered.

C. The Object of Prayer. This can only be God Himself. It may be the Father, as the representative of the Godhead. Such, in fact, is the usual formal direction of our devotional thoughts and feelings. There are times, however, when we instinctively turn to Christ, or to the Spirit, according to the pressure of our special

cares and needs. It remains true that prayer will reach its proper object, in spite of any formal misdirection of its words, provided that the prayer be essentially a true and genuine one. No amount of superincumbent superstition can prevent the outbreak and the escape of genuine aspiration and worship.

The Scriptures, however, are silent on the invocation of saints. The analogy between their life and that of the angels would indicate that they are cognizant of our condition. The transfiguration of Christ, too, implies as much as this. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is plainly taught that they are the witnesses of all our life-struggles. We are called on to run the race with patience, since we are surrounded by this cloud of witnesses. But still their probationary work is ended at death. For this reason we cannot hold communion with them, and cannot summon them to our assistance. The divine plan in this respect is a wise one. The comfort of holding spiritual intercourse with them would lead us deeper into the selfishness of grief, and draw us still farther away from the work of life. We are now called upon to cherish their memories, to believe in their present interest in us, to wait for a re-union with them, and, till that time comes, to labor to carry with us to heaven as many souls as possible. The discipline of such a life is worth more than the joy of inter-communion with the saints, which in most cases is sure to be tainted with selfishness.

D. The Warrant for Prayer. This is given us both in the spirit within us and the promise without us. It is only when these accord, that we are sure we are warranted in our petitions to God. We have, first of all, the one grand invitation, reiterated and repeated in meriad forms in the Scriptures—the invitation addressed to us as sinners to make known our requests to God. And we have the longing desire and the inward impulse to present ourselves as suppliants before the throne of his grace. Christ is the new and the living way of approach to the Father.

This underlying promise of the gospel, responded to by the regnant desire of the soul, involves and implies a justification of all the real petitions which a child of God can offer to his Heavenly Father. But still, our more specific requests must be considered in view of the will of God as that will is revealed in the laws of nature, or as given in the course of Providence, or as formally

announced in his Holy Word. We are never warranted in going beyond or stepping aside from that will; but the subject matter of our prayer must harmonize with the plan and purpose of God. For in prayer we are co-workers with Him. Prayer is an attempt to join ourselves on to Him, and to have Him unite Himself to us, and to give us a share in doing his work, however humble that share may be. That good men should here, as in other relations of life, make mistakes is altogether in harmony with human probation.

E. The Answer of Prayer. Prayer is a force; but a force of a peculiar character, and in a special sphere of life and action. It is the human will in direct converse and contact with the divine will. It is the appeal of a finite person to the infinite personality of God. It is not a petition addressed to any law whatever, but to the Supreme Loving Will that underlies and permeates all law in the universe. The force is thus spiritual and supernatural. It has to do with the natural world only as that world has a bearing on what is spiritual and eternal; namely, on the well-being of human souls.

If its proper working was in the lines of physical force, it would then be the subject of scientific tests and measurements. It would then be one of them, and would be correlative with them. But it stands separate and distinct from them all. To offer prayer for the purpose of testing its validity is to vacate it of its spiritual power, for faith alone makes it such a power. Otherwise it has no real, positive force in human life and destiny. Thus, to pray for any such purpose is to pray in doubt and uncertainty. The result is certain. We have mere words—forms of speech—signs and symbols, but nothing more. In truth, the test kills the prayer. We are quite competent to examine real prayers—to try their efficacy after they have entered into the network of forces which make up the life of the universe. It is, however, idle for us to try experimental prayers, for these are mere figments—they are not of God nor can they reach God.

The request and the answer are both essentially spiritual in their character. If the petition is, in form, for earthly blessings, these are viewed only in reference to the wants of the soul. They are in themselves never an end, but always a means. Earthly blessings are secured by law and under law, and fall on the evil and the

good; but they are made spiritual blessings by prayer alone. Without prayer they are the ruin of society. Sooner or later that ruin must come. It is only when all progress ends and society is stagnant that the social fabric can maintain itself without prayer. The Chinese society approaches such a condition. But even here it is too much to affirm that no prayer has saved it from decay and dissolution. The very nature of prayer, and the very warrant for prayer, and the examples of prayer, all show that the one supreme burden of all our petitions is that the reign of God may come in the souls of his creatures—that the will of God may be done on earth, as it is in heaven. Such is the intent and spirit of every true prayer. As John affirms, “If we ask anything according to his will, He heareth us.” God regards the real desire of his loving child, which He Himself has inspired, and so must always answer it. It is the heart of man, reaching the heart of God, and sharing in the thought and will of God, and so giving expression to that thought and that will.

There are no interventions in the course of physical laws, except when the petition is warranted by a supernatural call, and so is justified by a supernatural promise. The answer to prayer is usually in harmony with law. The answer does not effect the immutability of God, because the prayer, as well as the answer, is a matter of fore-ordination; or, to state it in other and less severe terms, the prayer itself is of divine origin, and so the answer must be; and so God’s immutability is established, rather than impugned, by the doctrine of prayer. The whole course of human life is determined by God; but determined according to an order in which prayer is the higher regulative principle.

There is no more difficulty with prayer as a force in the universe, than there is with free will as a power in human life. Both are supernatural forces working, to a greater or less extent, in conjunction with the powers of nature. Besides, if we give up prayer, we must also, for the like reason, namely, its assumed irreconcilability with law, give up Providence; and so abandon the very pillars of all practical religion whatever.

F. The Forms and Occasions of Prayer. The Scriptural rule is that prayer should be vocal. “When ye pray say, ‘Our Father,’” etc. The spirit of prayer demands and seeks utterance. Words

are its embodiment, as addressed to the ear; and the posture and the attitude of the body are its embodiment, as addressed to the eye. These two make up, so to speak, the body of prayer. Here, as elsewhere, the body re-acts on the soul. Other things being equal, a man prays better and more truly when he takes the right attitude and uses the right words, than when he silently and negligently offers up his petitions to God. But the reflex influence of prayer amounts to nothing, except as a result of a belief in its direct influence. In fact, it is itself a part of that direct influence.

But silent prayer may be allowable, not only when we are in society, and can not be alone, but even on public occasions. There may be a profit in having every worshiper offer up silently his own prayer to God. Sometimes a union in prayer is better secured in this way than by having any one represent the whole body of worshipers. In such exceptional cases, each one must of course offer his own petition on his own responsibility. The Friends have made the exception take the place of the rule.

There will be times when the spirit of prayer and of praise will take on an ecstatic form and will fail to find full and free utterance—occasions of sorrow, of conviction, of depression, of anguish, and so also of ecstatic rapture, which stifle the voice and break away the soul from the ordinary forms of speech. In ancient times this spirit of prayer created a new language of its own, called the "gift of tongues."

Secret prayer, in order to secure an enduring influence and to answer its proper end, must be habitual. The habit can best be formed by having a fixed place and a fixed time for the discharge of this duty. It does not much matter when and where the prayer is offered, provided that the when and the where be fixed, and of frequent occurrence. Where the habit is not thus formed, the religious life is sure to be weak and superficial. For every man has his own sins and follies to pray and mourn over—sins and follies which it would be unwise to unfold to the public. Now he can go to God and present all his secret faults before Him alone. So every man has special trials and griefs, the presentation of which would be unedifying to a public assembly. But he can be perfectly open with God—reverently familiar with Him.

Second. The Word of God. The Bible, as its name imports,

stands out apart from and above all other religious works, as a means of spiritual advancement.

It is the only authoritative book in religion that we possess. All others rest their claims upon the intrinsic weight and worth of the truths they unfold or defend. They support these truths by an appeal to testimony, or to experience, or to logic, or to our native intuitions, or to an authority not their own. Even works of science have only a relative authority among scientific men. Every author must submit his views to the bar of human reason, and must abide by its verdict. The Bible alone is unique in its claims. It does not maintain itself simply by referring to the excellence of its teachings; but also by the fact that it is the Word of God. The reader is at liberty to appropriate and to realize, and even to supplement its teachings, from the light of nature and of science; but not to reject the truths it communicates. The influence of the Scriptures, as a fixed standard of truth and of duty, is in the highest degree useful. Submission to authority for its own sake, and above all to God's authority, chastens the pride of the intellect, and takes from educated men the idol they so love to worship.

The Bible is also a record of the supernatural, and shares in the supernatural by virtue of the identity of thought and expression. This element runs through the whole book. The laws of nature are, for the most part, treated as God's mode of working. Secondary causes are lost sight of, in the presence of an infinite Personality. Thus the supernatural and the miraculous are the keys by which the secrets of nature and of life—of the past, present, and future—are unlocked and revealed.

The Bible is also the Book of man. It is the revelation of man to himself—both of his actual condition and of his transcendent possibilities. It is thus accepted by men outside of the Christian church as well as within its folds. The common consciousness of the centuries bear witness to its marvelous and permanent power. Besides, it reveals men as well as man. It is the record of numberless human experiences covering more than twenty centuries. It touches human character and human life in its inmost depths without disguise and without apology. It holds up everywhere an ideal of manhood partially realized in the old saints but made actual alone in the character of the Son of God. It is the record

of virtue and of religion in concrete living forms, and so must ever remain the chief book of devotion as well as of moral instruction for all mankind.

But all truth, wherever found, whether it comes from the Scriptures or not, must be considered as a part of the Word of God, and as having a like moral value with the words of inspiration, though inferior in character. Scientific truth, like all other forms of truth, must be religious. For they all must have a religious bearing and aspect. That aspect is sure to reveal itself to all souls who have any sense of the divine whatever.

Third. The Sabbath. The patriarchal Sabbath, of the observance of which we have, however, only the very faintest traces, was designed to commemorate God's rest from creation. The Mosaic Sabbath was the ancient Sabbath, modified by the Mosaic economy. It was designed to commemorate, in addition to God's rest from creation, the national rest from the bondage of Egypt. See Deu. 5:15. The Christian Sabbath was designed to commemorate Christ's rest from his redemptive work.

The Jewish Sabbath thus commemorated the great fact of creation and of national deliverance; while the Christian Sabbath commemorates the fact of a new creation and a new redemption—the resurrection of our Lord. The Sabbath is thus a great historic day. It is, in fact, the greatest of days, marking the great acts of God in human history, and pointing to the great act yet to come, when human history shall have reached its conclusion. The Sabbath was thus, in all economies, a religious season—a day belonging to God, in which his great deeds were to be celebrated. The joy, however, is to be essentially religious in its character, and not to partake of the noisy demonstrations that belong to the worldly festivals.

This is the divine objective aspect of the Sabbath. It has, however, a human subjective side. It is this which we are here to consider. It has been said that all time is holy—and said with perfect truth. But it is for this very reason, among others, that the Sabbath was instituted. It closes the religious week with a religious rest, and so sanctifies the week. God, in that creation of which man is the centre, is said to have worked six days, and then to have rested. We also are to work with God, so that we may

rest also with Him. If a man has kept the six days by doing his work in love and faith, he is best prepared to observe the Sabbath, and to keep that by a spiritual rest. If he has not labored well during the week, then he must begin anew, and so redeem the time on the day of redemption. Thus the Sabbath is not only the crown and the goal of the past six days, but also the starting-point for a week. It is to make itself felt until the little circle closes again, and a new Sabbath takes its place. Thus the ideal view that all time is holy is best realized when a man keeps the Lord's day. We can not believe that God, in despair of doing more, saves only one day for Himself, and lets the others go as time inevitably lost; but we must hold the view that God sets apart one day in seven in order to make holy the entire life of man.

The old Sabbath brought out most fully the passive side of life, for it was the commemoration of something done and accomplished; while the new Sabbath makes prominent the active side of life, since it commemorates not only something done, but something yet to be realized. This view harmonizes with the manner in which the two Sabbaths were observed by the devout Jew, on the one hand, and by the Christian, on the other. The Jew simply abstained from labor; while the Christian engaged in spiritual work. We may here add that every man must determine for himself how he will keep the Sabbath. He can not, however, keep it out of harmony with the free spiritual economy to which it belongs. One principle which should govern him is that he was not made for the Sabbath: but the Sabbath for him. He must keep it from love to Christ, and the manner of his keeping it will depend largely on his surroundings. It is a prudential question how far he will accommodate himself to the prejudices of his brethren, or how far he will hold to his own independent judgment.

The change of day is warranted by the change of dispensations. There is a congruity in preaching the doctrine of redemption on the day of the resurrection of our Lord. The Lord's Day emphatically belongs to the Christian Economy. The substitution of the Christian's Sunday for the Jewish Sabbath is not, however, adequately stated by the phrase, a change of day. It is rather a change of the intent and spirit of the institution. It is the enlargement and elevation of its underlying idea. It is the symbolic meaning of the

day and its position in the week as the first rather than the seventh day which is brought out by this substitution. God's day in the old economy gives place to the day in the new. The one is Jehovah's day, the other is Christ's. The one proclaims creation and the other redemption. The one points to the past, and is a day of ritual solemnities, the other points also to the future and is the day of hope and of festive joy and gladness.

This substitution was made in the same way and manner in which the entire Christian economy was made to take the place of the economy of Moses. Now Judaism was abrogated by being fulfilled. It was not brought about suddenly by any formal enactment, but by the coming of our Lord, and the establishment through Him of the new theocracy—the spiritual and universal kingdom of God. This abrogation was thus introduced and, in fact, began in the founding and development of the Christian church, and was practically accomplished when the Holy City, the historical centre of the ancient faith was taken and destroyed.

Thus the sacrifices, the rite of circumcision and the Jewish Sabbath also fall with Judaism by being received up in their spirit and substance into Christianity itself. There are plain allusions to this abrogation in the writings of Paul. See Rom. 14: 5-6; Gal. 4: 10; Col. 2: 16.

As we have said, this abrogation was effected by a fulfillment. This fulfillment was, however, not formal and mechanical, but spiritual in its character. The rites of the earlier dispensation were not to find their antitypes in the mere rites of the final economy. That would make Christianity simply a reproduction of Judaism enlarged and reformed. But Christianity is a realization of what is universal and spiritual in the ancient faith—it is not Judaism reformed, but Judaism re-created after a new and higher religious type. Thus the sacrifices did not point forward to any animal sacrifice, but to the reality in Christ Himself. Thus circumcision looked forward not to baptism but to the idea of purification which underlies that rite. Circumcision and baptism are, as Arnold of Rugby affirmed, co-ordinate types of a common reality. The Christian symbol brings this out more clearly and distinctly than the Jewish sign. One can not then take the place of the other since they are co-ordinate representations of the same verity. Nor is

the pascal supper a type of the Lord's supper, but both are in a like manner the co-ordinate memorials of a great verity. Here, too, the Christian type is more specific than the Jewish, belonging as it does to a higher economy. So, according to the same law, the Sabbath of the Jews is not a type of the Sunday of the Christians. They are also co-ordinate types of the rest which remaineth for the people of God.

Whether a type in the Mosaic economy shall find its antitype in the Christian dispensation depends on whether that antitype appears at the opening of that dispensation. Such was the case with the sacrifices. Such was not the case with the Sabbath day. So we should expect a co-ordinate type—and a type determined by the character of the economy to which it belonged. The antitype is to be found in the consummation of the new dispensation—in the rest of heaven.

We notice marks of this change of day in Acts 20: 7; Heb. 10: 25; I Cor. 16: 1-2; and more especially in Rev. 1: 13.

The authority of the Sabbath thus depends on the prominence which the Jewish Sabbath had in the Mosaic economy, being found in the Decalogue; on its higher relation in the New Dispensation; on the example of Christ and his apostles; and on the interests of society.

We simply remark in passing, that the value of keeping the Sabbath is now admitted by all thoughtful men. The Communist leaders in France insisted on its observance, so far as a cessation from labor is concerned. The neglect of the Sabbath is always attended with social and spiritual degeneration.

Fourth. Church Privileges. The church is an organic, spiritual community, held together and pervaded by the presence of Christ; and every member of the church is a "priest and king unto God." Here are the two radical ideas of the Christian church. They are the constitutive principles which must shape its constitution and control its government. Thus there is a community of life, on the one hand, and a distinct individual personal life, on the other. Thus every member has his duties and his position determined, in part, by his spiritual capacities, and in part by his relation to the body of believers. Thus individual souls are the units in the kingdom of God, and thus the church has the right to determine its

own government, so far as such determination does not interfere with these constitutive principles. Every Christian society is a miniature copy of the kingdom of God, possessing all the rights and enjoying all the privileges of that kingdom. All churches are independent, but are affiliated one with another. Christ alone is the Supreme King and Law-giver.

A. Baptism. It is a symbol, and grows naturally out of the very nature of Christianity itself. With the Lord's Supper, it presents, in sacramental forms and acts, the fixed creed of Christendom. It is Christ's interpretation of his own religion. All the doctrines of Christianity are therein expressed. We can not change any one of the forms or acts without impairing the clearness and fullness of that expression. Baptism as a symbol must necessarily be specific. It is not the general application of water, which would make the symbolic import fluctuating; but a definite application of water, which gives to it a definite and fixed meaning. When, therefore, we speak of the mode of baptism, we can only mean the way in which one is immersed; that is, with the head facing the water, or while kneeling, or in some other way.

Baptism is the seal of a grace already received—the sign of a new birth—the outward pledge of a new life. It is thus more than a sign of dedication—more than a pledge of blessings yet to come—more than a token of what has been done for us, since it is the symbol of something accomplished in us. It is the objective symbolic expression of a great inward reality; namely, of a new creation in Christ—of a dying to sin and of a rising to a new life in Him. Thus it is a part of a spiritual economy, and not a mere addition—an arbitrary rite, added to the religion of Jesus.

A special importance is given to baptism in the Scriptures. The reason of this is indicated in what we have already said. But let us notice, in addition, the completeness of the symbolic act. Like the new birth which it represents, it can occur but once. It gathers up and represents the whole significance of the Christian life, and sets it forth in all its fullness and entirety. It is not the emblem of any moral quality, nor the index of any moral purpose—least of all on the part of another party. Nor is it the sign of any one aspect of divine life, nor the memorial of any one great, but partial, fact in Christianity; but it is the objective presentation in

a visible symbolic form, of the essential nature of the new life, as originating in union with Christ, and as individual and personal in its character—as bringing out in the believer, both the consciousness of sin and the consciousness of redemption. Thus it is not an ordinary isolated act of obedience; but an obedient life-act. It sweeps on in its significancy and worth, through man's entire probationary life. He who refuses to be baptized refuses to take the oath of allegiance to his Master.

Let us also note its publicity. It is a public profession of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. It is an open avowal of one's belief in the adorable Trinity. It is a coronation of the believer before the world; for as a "king unto God," he, too, must be crowned. It is the public anointing of a disciple; for as "a priest unto God" he must be inaugurated into the office. It is the ceremony of naturalization, by which he is made a citizen in the commonwealth of Israel. It is his credentials as the representative of Christ. Thus the candidate stands committed before God and man, to lead a religious life. If, then, the Christian submits to this rite with a clear understanding of the depth of its meaning, and the breadth of its import, he can not fail of the divine blessing.

B. The Lord's Supper. This has a like significance and worth with baptism. The latter points to the new birth as accomplished by union with Christ, the dying and risen Redeemer. The former points to the life which issues from this birth as sustained by a fellowship with the same Redeemer. Thus both have an objective basis; namely, the person and the work of our Lord, and both a subjective condition; namely, a personal faith in and attachment to Christ Himself, and so both grow out of the very nature of Christianity. They are the forms which embody its spirit. One can not be changed without logically changing the other; for spirit and form ever go together, in the sphere of redemption as in the realm of nature.

Communion is not a memorial act alone or chiefly; for that would make Christianity a thing simply of the past; and would destroy the symbolic character of the rite. Besides, it would be out of harmony with baptism, which is also commemorative in its character. Again, Christ is not absent from the soul. We are to recall Him, not only as having once suffered in our behalf, but as actually

present, and dwelling in our souls by faith. Christ is not in the bread and the wine, but Christ is in the transaction—in the souls of the communicants, in the very act of their participation. As in other religious gatherings he is present in the act of oral worship, so in this sacramental meeting he is present in the symbolic worship. Thus the believer in partaking of the elements partakes of Christ. Gill in his commentary on I Cor. 10: 16; has the following: "The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? It is; for not only believers by this act have communion with his mystical body, the church, but with his natural body which was broken for them. Thus in a spiritual sense and by faith they eat his flesh as well as drink his blood." The partaking of the bread and wine expresses our inward partaking of Christ, and so strengthens this very participation. It is true that we are called on to commemorate the death of our Lord; but it is true also that we are called on to discern the Lord's body. For the Christ of Calvary is also the Christ of the soul. Calvin's view was much nearer the truth than that of Zwingle. The idea that we meet at the Supper to find our Lord absent from us in the very symbolic act of communion is an offense to the moral consciousness of Christendom. Of course hereafter we are to know Him face to face, for in heaven signs and symbols have no place.

The Lord's Supper is of the nature of a prayer directed to Christ Himself. It is not an isolated act of worship, because it is not dictated by the wants of the mere hour, and does not take on an expression suited to the changing circumstances of the soul. It is one of those great life-acts of devotion, where the abiding aspirations and permanent needs of the believer are fully expressed. The breaking of the bread and the pouring of the wine have a fixed meaning, and the eating of the one and the drinking of the other symbolize the actual entering into fellowship with the crucified, but present Redeemer.

Thus fellowship with Christ involves a communion with his church. It does not imply, however, a communion with every member of the body; but only a fellowship with the community as a whole.

We see here that the washing of the disciples' feet can not be an ordinance of the Gospel. For it has no objective basis. It is only

emblematic in its character; that is, it points to some trait or some virtue, as humility, and not to any objective fact. It was thus employed by Christ only as a method of teaching. The spirit of his example is always authoritative. U

Fifth. Social Worship and Church Discipline. The value of these as means of grace is obvious; but come so fully under *Pastoral Theology*, that we purposely omit them.

SECTION FOURTH.

THE COMPLETION OF THE DIVINE LIFE.

The formal dogmatic statement that the elect will persevere is simply a self-evident proposition, and needs no discussion and no development. If the doctrine of election be admitted, then the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints is at once conceded. Such a view, however, namely, that the elect soul will persevere, is of no practical value whatever. No one can know of his own election. But though God will carry out his purpose, the question remains: Has God purposed that the soul once renewed should persevere through life and be saved? It is this question that we are to discuss. Divine life, once awakened in the soul, never absolutely dies out. A complete and radical change must lead to a process of sanctification, and that process must culminate in the salvation of the soul. Such seems to be the teaching of Scripture. See Phil. 1:6, where the primary reference is to Christian fellowship, and so the indirect reference to final salvation. We have in I Pet. 1:5 a still stronger proof-text. Here the efficient and ultimate cause of our continuance in the divine life is the grace of God; while the proximate cause is the faith of the believer. The end proposed is the redemption of the soul, as already accomplished, though yet waiting to be fully manifested and realized. The spiritual blessings of this life are called an earnest of our inheritance; that is, the first installment of what has been decreed to us, and are spoken of as God's seal to show that we belong to him as his property. See Rom. 11:29; II Cor. 1:21-23; Eph. 1:14. These passages seem to strongly favor the idea that the regenerate soul can never really apostatize from its Savior. The Apostle John explains the instances of apparent apostasy thus: "If they had been of us they would

have continued with us, but they went out that they might be made manifest that they were not of us;" I John 2: 19. Such was the case of Judas, who "went to his own place." Such, however, was not the case of David, or of Peter, who partially and for a time fell away, but only to return with a deeper sense of their guilt, and a richer experience of God's marvellous grace. In harmony with the general view here presented, those who are finally condemned are those whom the Judge never knew. See Matt. 25: 12.

The Christian consciousness refers the entire Christian life back to the eternal love of God, and to the working out of that love in the soul of the believer. We feel that God will save us, not because we were elected from eternity, but because we have or have had the testimony of his presence and his grace in our hearts. Our sense of security, while we look at God's grace reflected in our hearts and grounded in the person and work of his Son, is full and complete. The soul, standing in the conscious love of God, hedged about by his rich and free promises, united to his dear Son, and filled by his own Spirit, can never finally and forever perish. Such was the conviction of the apostle, as given in the last part of the eighth of Romans. This is the divine side of the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints. It involves the purpose of God, the agency of God through the Son and the Spirit, the promises of God, and the grace of God directly working in the souls of men.

There is, however, a human side. Continuance in the divine life is the result of human striving, as well as of divine inworking. Human souls are not selfless automatons or mere machines, endowed in some way with moral and rational capacities: but are free responsible agents, weak in purpose and liable to err and exposed to temptation, and so always in danger of falling away from God. They are treated in the Scriptures as exposed to this danger and as dependent on their own humble striving and struggles for success in the divine life. They are urged to run the race with patience, and to act the part of a soldier, and are even warned against the danger of apostasy itself. Thus these exhortations, so numerous and so pressing, are not addressed to men as the elect of God; but as creatures and sinners, possessing indeed the grace of God, but yet exposed in themselves to utter ruin. Even Paul himself intimates that he might become a castaway.

On the divine side comfort and encouragement are administered; while on the human side incentives and warnings are brought to bear on the careless and the indifferent. Does not this two-fold representation touch all Christian experience? Do we not feel, in our deepest consciousness, the truthfulness of these divergent Scriptural representations? An absolute solution can only be found in the reconciliation of the divine and human agencies. These appeals, these warnings, and the very supposition of the possibility of falling away and being lost—all these are a part of the very means God uses to secure the completion of the new life. How else can God keep free souls from perishing? He will not efface his own image, nor annul the laws of influence; but He will ever act in harmony with the natures He has made, and the surroundings He has ordained. Thus He allows the Christian to test his own strength, in order to teach him his dependence. Thus he warns him of dangers from within and without, in order that he may form his own habits of virtue and purity. Thus, too, on the same principle, and for a like purpose, He points out to him the dread possibility of a complete apostasy—a possibility real from a the human point of view—in order to save him from the perdition that awaits the ungodly. Thus, while we may feel uncertain in ourselves and insecure in our own strength, we may feel secured in the possession of God's free and sovereign love. The sense of dangers about our path will only increase our sense of security, and of serene and blessed repose in God. Thus the divine and human sides of this doctrine interpenetrate and complement each other.

Perseverance is the test of character. The real character of a man does not consist in the overbalance of the good acts either in quantity or in quality; but in the final moral condition of the soul. This finality is the resultant of all the spiritual forces which have been operating throughout the entire life. What we are at the hour of death determines what we are to be in eternity. This, however, may not be manifest to ourselves—much less to others. But, in fact, the end of life shows what we have been all along since our conversion—that notwithstanding our many wanderings we are unchanged in the root of our nature. Every man has a property in all his acts, and his real final condition depends on what he is spiritually worth as he closes the business of life.

PART FIFTH.

ESCHATOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE CLOSE OF PROBATION.

SECTION FIRST.

CHRISTIANITY A SOCIAL POWER.

The remark of Sir James Mackintosh that constitutions are not made but grow, and the enlargement of the thought by Herbert Spencer in the apothegm that society is a growth and not a manufacture, are now accepted everywhere by educated people. The idea of a social organism with common beliefs, common convictions and common interests, as these are rooted in a common life, enters largely into modern thought. Men and women are not gathered into loose assemblages, nor are they held together by voluntary compacts, but they grow into communities according to the principle and law of an organic life. Thus we have the family, the tribe, the municipality, the nation, the race and humanity itself. In each and all of these groupings there is a unity of nature, and an identity of life. These organisms of society are of God. They are the great personages of history—the *dramatis personae* on the great stage of human life. Their several parts in the drama are predetermined by God, and their respective fortunes are but the judgments of his providence. Christianity recognizes this series of organisms as grounded in human nature, and as revealed in human history; and accordingly presents itself as the kingdom of God—a new and higher organism whose life is to pervade the life of all the others, and ultimately to become their crown and their glory. Thus the religion of Christ is to work on the community as well as on the individual, because it regards man not simply in his

solitariness, but in his vital organic relations—not merely as a sovereign forming his own character and shaping his own destiny, but as the creature of society, sharing in the weal and woe of a common life.

It requires centuries for Christianity to become a social power in the life of a nation. God works no miracles to supersede human agency. In the economy of his providence and of his grace, He finds room for the prayers and for the labors of his people. They are, in both these spheres, co-workers with Him. The progress of the Gospel will be slow for the very reason that while Christianity is a divine force, it is a divine force subjecting itself to the limitations and to the conditions of human life. It must not only find a lodgment in the hearts of men and find it, too, in spite of their prejudices and superstitions, but it must begin its conquests with single souls and work for a long time only through single converts, and feeble churches. This progress must go on until the gift of grace have told on the endowments of nature—until that nature itself has been generated anew and afresh. Grace is not transmitted. Moral and spiritual ideas do not flow in the blood, nor are they crystalized in the constitution. Every child must begin at the beginning, as his father began before him. But while all this is true, it is equally true that spiritual culture in time affects spiritual aptitudes and tendencies, and that the child born in the Christian home inherits higher susceptibilities than the one whose ancestry has been altogether unchristian. For man is a nature as well as a person, and his personal habits of thought and of feeling react on his natural make and mould. These leave their impress on his descendants in an increased susceptibility for a Christian life. Our experiences are thus in the course of generations registered, as it were, in our very constitutions. The natural character is more hopeful and the conversions in childhood and youth are consequently more frequent. Thus the moral aptitudes for the Christian religion are all the stronger by virtue of this very inheritance. Whether these shall eventuate in a personal Christian character will depend on whether the spirit of God shall work in and within the free choice of the soul itself. To state the whole view in a few words, we may say that the law of inheritance, as applied under long continued Christian influences, gives better material for Chris-

tianity to work upon and to utilize. When this point has been reached in the history of any people, then the religion of Christ has rooted itself in the natural life, and is sure to gain an ultimate supremacy. Gradually but inevitably the stamp and character of the community becomes radically modified. The moral growth of a people along the line here indicated illustrates and vindicates the theory of development. For society as an organism is made up of natures and not of persons; and as thus constituted has been well termed a solidarity. For nature in every form and of every kind, whether physical or mental, material or spiritual, is under the law of necessity.

But Christianity appears as a spiritual kingdom in which the units of life and power are not natures nor families, but single individual souls—free sovereign persons. The proximate centres of its influence are found in the organized societies which make up one grand brotherhood of churches—of whom Christ is the sole Head and only Legislator. While these churches often gather what they do not Christianize and Christianize what they do not gather, they are yet the fountains of spiritual power in the life of every people. The great organs of this power are obvious enough. We have the ministers of Christ trained and set apart to his work; the Sabbath, the fixed day of rest and of worship—the witness of the resurrection of our Lord and the pledge of our own; the temple of prayer and praise where the assurance of forgiveness is proclaimed and where souls are helped towards heaven; the Bible, not the work of any individual genius, but the Book both of God and of man; the manifold missionary organizations and the various benevolent societies which the church has created: its many institutions of learning and its numerous establishments for charitable purposes: the agencies of the press with its varied Christian literature: and what must never be overlooked, its heroes of faith and love, known or unknown, inscribed on the roll of fame or written alone in God's book of life—pre-eminently the supporters of the moral order of the world and the saviors and benefactors of human society.

Christianity works largely outside of the church and of the agencies it creates. In fact, it unites itself with every cause and every movement whose object is to remove human ignorance or allay human suffering or to advance, in any respect, human well-being.

Such humanitarian efforts have their permanent and ultimate source in the spirit of Christianity alone. For what is truly human is also truly Christian. And the best impulses and judgments and activities of men find their strongest incentives and their surest support in the facts and the doctrines of the Christian revelation. For in all such cases, that is in all genuine humanitarian movements, the Christ of revelation is in some degree consciously or unconsciously accepted and followed. Men can not help breathing the atmosphere which the religion of Jesus has generated, nor can they help moving along the great currents of thought and feeling which it has opened and has directed. Christianity recognizes, too, the results of philosophic thought and the conclusions of science, and gladly utilizes all their applications in the interests of the human family. For all human discoveries and inventions in the realm of nature and of life take their place in that grand system of truth and method of Providence of which Christianity is the centre and the goal.

This network of agencies exerts everywhere a regenerating influence. They foster and develop the sentiment of humanity. The diverse classes of society are brought nearer to each other. Each learns to appreciate what is good in the other. The interests of one are seen and felt to be in the long run identical with those of the other. A reverence for mankind—for his intrinsic worth and for his great possibilities is felt everywhere throughout the entire community. The equality of all men before the Supreme Judge and in the presence of the finalities of human life, are reiterated on every Lord's day from every pulpit in Christendom. Thus there comes to be awakened in the community a mutual sympathy and a mutual deference. Men of superior character become gentle and kind in their intercourse, and that too without condescension; and men of an inferior mould and fortune return this kindness without envy or hypocrisy. All this social advance in the amenities of manners must depend on the Christian religion. For culture without Christianity is not only aristocratic in its character, but tends strongly towards anarchy. Its nature is to isolate and to separate the few from the many, and thus to break the unity of a common life. It is only the harmony of the Christ-spirit that can master the disharmonies of modern civilization, and give a spiritual

eness to modern society. Again, these influences strengthen, if they do not generate, the principle of authority. The religion of Christ is the reassertion of the moral law—its realization in the life of its Founder—the proclamation, with renewed emphasis, of human rights and human duties in their reciprocal relations. It subordinates the individual to society, and society itself to God. It thus sanctions civil authority and thus supports the agencies and institutions of that authority, whatever they may be and wherever they may be established. It does more than this. It puts into the moral law the right to regulate human belief as well as human action—to control human thought and feeling as well as the mere outward life. It lifts that moral law above the state and the changing opinions of society, and makes it absolutely supreme. It is thus both conservative and revolutionary in its character. It conserves what is good, and destroys what is evil. But it revolutionizes by the silent influence of its own constitutive principles and forces. It is only in great and exceptional emergencies that it can favor a violent procedure. Christianity awakens, too, the public conscience, and so gives its own sanction to the laws of the land. By its secret subtle influence it helps in many ways to arrest the criminal and bring him to justice. For it excites a public indignation against all wrong-doing, makes the magistrate solicitous to perform his whole duty, and the citizen willing to aid him in maintaining public order. A public spirit is thus generated and men of all classes are led to take an unselfish interest in the commonwealth. They give their time and their labor and their thought and their means to further the well-being of society. Thus reforms of every kind spring naturally from such an enlarged conception of the duties which belong to the citizens of a state. There is in all this a sense of a community of life which is exalted and sustained by the Christian religion.

Christianity recognizes both patriotism and the brotherhood of nations. In the classic world the first of these motive springs of action was simply paganized, and the second altogether left out of account. For the love of man was made subordinate to the love of country, and the kindredship of peoples was foreign to the entire thought and feeling of the ancient world except among the later Stoics. Now the religion of Christ recognizes the mission of every

historic nation of the earth. These nations had their election and their vocation from God. And thus there is a place for Christian patriotism as a spring of action and a standard of public duty. Thus, too, there is a larger place for the ideal of humanity—for the love of man as man wherever found. It is evident, then, from the nature of the case that no people can ever become truly Christianized without having done its part in the great work of Christianizing the whole family of man.

The agencies of this evangelization are many and noteworthy. There is the compact of mutual amity and friendship in treaties. There are the resident ministers and the special embassies to secure and maintain peace between the states, and to help them to a better mutual understanding of each other's wants and capabilities. There is the intercourse of travel with its constant interchange of thought and sentiment. There are the mighty streams of commerce and of trade, along which is borne with more or less purity, Christian ideas as well as the products and goods of Christian countries. There is also a growing transfer of a higher literature from Christian to heathen climes. There are, too, the discoveries in science, and the inventions in the arts,—the material outgrowths of Christian civilization. We are not to overlook the governmental occupation of the great heathen centres, partial or complete, with a state education with its numerous teachers; nor are we to leave out of account the military establishments with their many chaplains. The present decade is marked by the education in Christian countries of distinguished Japanese and Chinese youths. Christianity thus comes with an authority—the authority of a higher culture which compensates for the absence of special miracles, since it is itself the miracle of modern history. But in addition to all this and transcending all this, in the quality of its power, is the influence of Christian missions. These consist in thousands of men and women engaged in preaching and teaching, in founding churches, in translating the Scriptures, in establishing schools, in creating a written language and literature, and in introducing those methods and usages and arts which constitute the material glory of Christendom.

But is Christianity, unlike other religions, suited to all nations? Is it, in short, destined to become the religion of humanity? Its history and its present status favors this view. It is to-day the

religion of the foremost nations of the world; and for the last century its progress has been steadily onward. It has lost nowhere, but gained everywhere. If the great Oriental races still resist its sway, we must remember: first, that missions among them are, in the main, of a recent date; and second, for their very type of character, when they do move they will move en masse. For the sense of individualism is weak in the Eastern mind, while the sense of a community of life is overwhelmingly strong. There are unmistakable signs in all the principle missionary stations that this great movement will soon begin. But the very nature of Christianity shows that it is destined to become the universal religion. For the person and the work of Christ is the sum and substance of its objective character. Now Christ was the essential and the full man. The divine touched him not in any single temperament, not in any dominant trait, making him the Chief of a class, or the Head of the Eastern world, or the Leader of the Western nations; but united itself to him in his essential manhood—in those elements which are common to all men, making him the Second Adam of a new humanity. God entered into fellowship with the very kernel and essence of humanity itself, and exalted and glorified that nature in which every human soul has a part and a share. Thus Christ is, by the very constitution of his being, the natural Leader of human kind—the great Helper and Healer of the whole human race.

It is true we are still far from reaching the goal here indicated. But while the consummation is far off, there are signs of its approach. These are found in more comprehensive views of the Christian religion; in a growing unity between the different branches of the church of Christ; in the more intelligent and more pervasive Christian life. When the ideal of a Christian character as delineated in the Scriptures and as realized in Christ Himself—when such an ideal shall be one with our practical Christianity, then, indeed, we shall witness the wonders of its social power—the miracles of its grace. The hinderances from without are temporary. It can never be defeated except from a decay of its very life forces. The work already done, and the work still going on in the world, and the promises of God for the future—all assure us that the divine Spirit will dwell with his church in an increasing measure until the end of probation.

SECTION SECOND.

THE MILLENNIUM.

Christianity, as the final revelation of God, must accomplish its great earthly purpose—the salvation of human society. This it will do, not by any miraculous interventions, but by its own energies, as these shall be exerted and brought out in their unity, their purity, and the comprehensiveness of their character. The partial and temporary failures of Christianity are to be attributed to a violation of these conditions of its power and triumph in the world. A new era is evidently approaching when dissensions shall cease, and when with them the vast waste and perversion of moral force shall come to an end; when the religion of Christ shall emerge from the manifold corruptions of its confessions, and from the gross inconsistencies of its professors; when around this central orb shall be gathered all the lesser lights of God—the truths of history, of philosophy, of science, and of art; when, in short, divine truth shall reach, through love, both a unity and a fullness of divine power.

If Christianity has already gained marvelous triumphs when broken and perverted, what will it not do when it stands forth as the one central spiritual Presence which unites in itself all forms of society, both human and divine.

But the question is still to be answered: What is to be the moral condition of the race in the final epoch of its history? The representations of the Scriptures on this point are diverse and manifold. The dominant conception, however, of Christ and his apostles is that the plan of God must be carried out. Thus we have the oft-recurring phrase, "This was done in order that it might be fulfilled," where the design of the creature is lost sight of in the intention of the Creator; and hence, too, the repeated designation of the closing period of probation as "the last days"—as the period when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and his Christ. This realization is to be heralded or characterized by the following great events in human history:

First. The Gospel is to be preached throughout the world. It is to be brought to the knowledge of every human soul. For the promise must mean as much as this when interpreted in the light of the great commission.

Second. The fullness of the Gentiles must be gathered in, that is, all the Gentile nations must be converted to God. For as nations they all belong to the elect of God. Heathendom, as embracing communities in antagonism with Christendom, must cease to exist. Each and every race will present Christianity under some new aspect, in harmony with its dominant genius and achievements, and so will have mutually something to give and something to receive, one from the other. For every nation will, in its very distinctive peculiarity, become the special organ of the Spirit of God.

Third. At last all Israel is to be saved, and humanity is to gain a higher unity in Christ Himself. The apostle characterizes this state as a "life from the dead." See Rom. 11: 15. Whether every soul will be in heart and life Christian, and, if so, how far Christian, is left unsettled by the Word of God. We are only sure that the race as a race is to be converted to God. The universal conscience is to become Christian. The opinions and sentiments and beliefs and worship of all the nations of the world, and of each and every member of these nations, are also to become Christian. But since probation is to continue, it is more probable that even in such a state there will be found many unregenerate souls. But as the moral atmosphere is to be religious and everywhere present, conversions will generally take place in infancy and youth.

The expression of our Lord in Matt. 7: 14 "and few there be that find it," was meant to characterize the age in which He lived, and that alone. And in Matt. 24: 37-51 Christ treats his final coming as morally connected with the death of the individual Christian—and so as an event which men do not expect and for which they are not prepared. These comings of our Lord are the preludes or rather the actual beginnings of that final advent which shall take on a visible form, and with which the life of the race shall end. Acts 1: 11.

Fourth. This realization of the kingdom of God is not to be reached without a new revelation of Antichrist. There is to arise a hostile persecuting power, which shall really, though not nominally, place itself in direct antagonism to Christ, and which shall precipitate the final catastrophe. We know not what it will be—possibly some form of baptized communism, under some leader,

and with a Satanic spirit and a Satanic worship. See Acts 3: 19-26; II Thess. 2: 3-4.

Will the glorified Redeemer personally and visibly appear during the prophetic thousand years? It is thought by many that the Millennium will mark his visible reign on earth. This faith is generally associated with the belief in two resurrections—one, of the pious dead, at the beginning of the Millennium, and the other of the wicked, at its close. They rest their belief on the well-known passage in Rev. 20: 4-6. To such a view of such a passage we have several objections. The Gospels and the Epistles always unite Christ's second generic coming with one general resurrection, with the final judgment, and with the end of the world. Heb. 9: 28 seems to preclude the pre-millennarian interpretation. Christ is there represented as coming "without sin unto salvation;" that is to secure the salvation of his people. After this event Satan could hardly be loosed even for a season, and so it is evident that the coming itself must be at the close of probation. Now we submit that these passages are stronger than the solitary one in the great symbolic book of the New Testament, where the vision of the resurrection of souls may simply represent the glorious condition of the church of the future. 2

Besides, there does seem a want of fitness and a want of purpose in such a temporary personal reign of Christ on earth. According to the literal interpretation of this Chiliastic proof-text, the earth is unchanged and probation continues. But is this congruous with the idea of a glorified Savior, visibly present with his glorified saints? Is such a community—half heaven, and half earth, blended together—consistent with our idea of probation? And what, we ask, is the aim and the purpose of this anomalous arrangement? One may, indeed, appeal to his ignorance, and cast himself upon the Word of God. This would be legitimate if that Word were clear and decisive in his favor. Such, however, is manifestly not the case.

SECTION THIRD.

THE RESURRECTION.

The idea of an intermediate state finds no place in the consciousness of Christ and his apostles. They recognize two, and only two, essentially different states in the future life. This is generally admitted by those who insist on the propriety of the phrase itself. But the language is far in advance of the thought, and suggests the notion of a Protestant purgatory. It is an intrusion which disturbs all our hopes of an immediate heaven. All souls, penitent or impenitent, are immediately after death in the eternal world, and their incompleteness of organism, or of growth, or of position in the company to which they belong, is as nothing, compared with their completeness of joy or of woe.

The soul is never without an organism—an organism suited to its life. It forms for itself a body from its surroundings. Its organizing power is an essential element of its nature. A soul absolutely disembodied thereby ceases to hold any relation to creation, and is taken back by the Infinite Spirit into its own nature. It is only through an organism of some kind that any finite spirit can maintain any relative independency of God. In harmony with this view, the death of the Christian is made in the Scriptures to synchronize with the second coming of Christ to him. He has at once a body essentially the same as that which he will have when his individual life shall have been completed by the common life of the redeemed. For he is not simply an isolated individual; but also a link in society, and to be determined in part by that society. The incompleteness of this body is the result, as it is the measure, of that incompleteness of his earlier heavenly life. This general view accords with Paul's statement in I Cor. 5: 1-5, where the desire to possess a resurrection-body is one with the desire to be present with the Lord, and where the two events involve each other. Paul speaks in Rom. 8: 23 of the Christian as waiting in this life for the redemption of his body, and seems to imply that that redemption will begin on his entrance into the eternal world.

It is to be remembered that the ideas of time and of space are of account in religion only as they indicate existence, order, method, process, or result in the providence and government of God. The

point of time, or of space, or the length of the one or the reach of the other, are, in themselves considered, without moral significance. Now the days of God measure the revealed life of God. Thus we have the day of creation, the day of salvation, the day of resurrection, the day of judgment, and the day of retribution. Each of these days is a long period. "For a thousand years are with the Lord as one day." The resurrection begins, then, with the reign of death, and closes when that reign is overthrown.

When history shall close, and the quick and the dead shall all appear before God, then the life of each and every one shall be complete. For the results of all human living will then tell upon the individual character. The organism will then take on its final form, and this will be the completion of the resurrection body. This fact justifies the popular representations of the Scriptures. We are to note:

First. The nature of this body. Its general type is the glorified body of our Lord. Paul declares in Phil. 3: 21, that God will "transform the body of our humiliation, so as to be conformed to the body of his glory." The variation of this general model will accord with the variation of individual character. For the glorified organism will perfectly express the glorified character, in all its distinctive peculiarities. The glimpses of this change are indicated in the transfiguration of our Lord. It will be seen that this type is higher than the original one in Adam—as much so as the paradise of God is higher than the garden of Eden.

The general characteristics of this glorified body are briefly indicated by the apostle in II Cor. 5: 1-6. We may express his contrasts thus: Our present bodies are temporary earthly tent-dwellings; while our future ones are heavenly and eternal homes. The one is mediate and human in its origin; while the other is of immediate divine workmanship. The one is the under-garment, marking our fleshly condition, while the other is the upper-garment, marking our kingship and priesthood unto God. The one is to be transmuted and glorified; for Paul here declares that our mortal part is to be swallowed up by the principle of a higher life. The apostle expresses himself more at length in I Cor. 15: 35-54. The one generic mark of the new organism, as given by the apostle, is that it is to be "spiritual." The word can not denote the material

out of which it is made, for this would either convey no idea at all, or would deny the existence of any organism whatever. For in this last case the spirit and the spiritual body would be absolutely identical. It can not mean aerial, because it is opposed to natural, that is, to a body determined by the lower side of our nature, and suited to the lower side of our life. It thus can only denote the body as animated and filled by the *pneuma*, or spirit; that is by the higher side of our nature—in other words, by the moral and rational elements of that nature. It is to be the exclusive organ of the human spirit—constituted and determined by our spiritual affections, thoughts, and volitions. Our natural bodies are predominantly, though not exclusively, the organs and the vehicles of the animal life. They are determined in the main by the instincts and wants of our animal nature, and by our natural sense-perceptions and sense-judgments. The constitutive principle of the resurrection-body—that which shapes and moulds its form—is the human spirit, as that spirit has taken up into itself the results of the soul-life on earth. For the human soul—the dominant principle of our present life—does leave its impress on the human spirit, which is the regnant and seminal principle of our whole future existence. See under *Anthropology*.

This one term spiritual includes all the other characteristics given by Paul. Thus it is termed "incorruptible;" that is, not subject to the law of repair and decay. For it is to be supported from within, and not sustained from without. It is also called "glorious;" that is, it is to be an object of supreme beauty, and to be adapted to the highest purposes of life. "Power" is also attributed to it. No labor and no duration of existence can ever exhaust its energies. The organism is never to hamper the free movements of the spirit, but to be merely and purely the perfect medium of thought, feeling, and action. The new organism is to be absolutely under the control of the Spirit, and is to have no reactionary power of its own; and thus is to be governed purely by the demands of the Spirit alone. We may well believe that the glorified spirit can vary at pleasure the mode and manner of its own exterior revelation. Thus while the soul, by virtue of its resurrection-body, holds a position in time and place, it maintains its mastery over them both.

Second. The identity of the future body with the present one. We are to distinguish between the resurrection of the flesh and of the body. The Bible denies the first, and affirms the second. Again, we are to distinguish between a mere restoration and a resurrection. For the second is infinitely more than the first. It is the transfiguration and glorification of our present organism.

If, then, the resurrection relates not to the matter of our bodies, but to their organism, and not to the organism on its animal, but on its spiritual side, it is clear that the identity between our earthly and heavenly bodies can not consist in having the same constituent elements, nor in having the same physical structure and functions. Paul affirms as much as this when he says that "Flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God." In fact, the identity of an organism is never found in the sameness of its elements. For the ceaseless process of waste and of repair is going on all the time, without impairing in the least our identity. Besides, the elements which enter into our bodies are absolutely indistinguishable from the same elements as they enter into other forms of life.

The identity of the body is determined by the sameness of the organizing principle. The body remains the same under all possible changes, by virtue of the permanence of our individual life. The soul, on its lower side, determines our present organism, and, on its higher side, our future one. The law of the transitory body which we now have, is in the soul, as distinguished for the spirit. The law of our imperishable body is in the spirit, as distinguished from the soul. But spirit and soul are but the two sides of one and the same essence. They together constitute the same spiritual individuality. Thus the spirit ever impresses itself on our present organism, as is seen in the erect form, in the cephalic functions of the hands, in the nobler features of the face, in human speech, and in our general mastery over nature. On the other hand, the soul also impresses itself on the spirit, and through the spirit on the resurrection-body itself. For its desires and its sense-judgments will all be appropriated and assimilated by the spirit itself, and thus the perishable body will affect the essential and eternal body. This process of action and re-action between soul and spirit goes on through our entire living. Thus our life on earth—our life in

these bodies—somewhat determines our life in heaven, and one body, in so far forth, is linked with the other. We may add that there must be the same elements in the future organism as those that we now have, so far as they may be suited to that organism, and to the higher life it is to lead.

Third. The bodies of the wicked. These also shall be raised. We may suppose that they, too, will perfectly reveal the character that animates them. But the Scriptures are here silent, and so it is best for us to be silent also.

SECTION FOURTH.

THE JUDGMENT.

The great Day of Judgment begins immediately after the death of the individual, and closes with the death of the race. See Heb. 9:27. The whole life of the soul, from the moment it enters the eternal world to the moment when the whole human family shall have gathered there, is, in one aspect, a judgment.

The condition of the soul is essentially settled, on its very entrance into that world, by its own individual character. Its life, however, takes on more fullness, as the forces it has left behind in the lives of others, finally return to itself. For then it shall fully know itself, and be itself. It is only when all souls have fully entered the eternal world that the judgment can end; for only then can the full and final result of one's living be reaped and measured. Thus the judgment of each is involved in that of the other. It can not be complete, and yet be single and isolated in its character. Thus, though individual at first, it must advance to a participation in the general and final decisions of the great day.

The judgment is not an arbitrary proceeding. It is the natural result of a change of worlds. Even this transfer is of itself inevitable; for the present order of things, both moral and physical, must come to an end. From necessity, our probation must close. There is no provision for the everlasting existence of the human race upon this earth. Now the change of condition is indicated by death, by the consequent new surroundings, by the regnant elements in our characters, and by the whole crystallized results of our past living. These will constitute the language in which God will utter

his voice—the medium through which He will pronounce his decisions. The conscience will be quickened, the sensibilities awakened, the imagination called into new life; and the memory, acting according to the laws of association, will recall all the past, as that past touches the condition of the saved or of the lost. The delusions of time will have perished, the pursuits of earth will have ended, and all earthly cares and fears and hopes will have ended forever. The entire past life will thus be arrested, and its significance and worth gathered. It will be brought face to face with what it ought to have been and might have been. Thus the soul, in the presence of God, and in the presence of its whole living, and before its own character, can not but act as the viceregent of God, and pass an infallible and final sentence on itself.

This judgment will have an increasing publicity as it goes on to its close. Every soul, by virtue of the light within it, and by reason of the impulse without it, must reveal, with perfect clearness and fullness, its entire thinking and feeling. Whatever it is, as the goal of all the past, that it must express. Such is the necessity of its nature. The new organism is made to hide nothing, but reveal everything. Even the will either yields freely and joyously, or bends under the greater force within and the greater Presence without. "For every knee shall bow." The soul has no escape from itself, no business in which to bury its thinking, and no devices by which to make latent its deepest life. There is but one thing for it to do, and that is to voice itself clearly and fully, everywhere and always. Every mouth will indeed be stopped, so far as any justification is concerned, but yet souls will cry to the mountains to hide them from the presence of the Lord. Thus every soul will reveal itself to every other. Thus every secret sin of thought, feeling, will, and action, in essence or in form, will become apparent.

Now all souls will arrange themselves, by an inward and irresistible impulse, into two great classes, the saved and the lost. These communities will separate and enter into regions spiritually far apart in the eternal world. The one principle which unites each together, and distinguishes them one from the other, is the presence or absence of faith—the existence or lack of a filial affection toward God—of a child-like confidence in Christ. It is not perfection

of character which determines to which class any soul belongs, but simply and solely a loving attachment of Jesus Christ. As the Savior now presents Himself as Judge, all souls will turn to Him or from Him, according to their inward affinities—the longings and leadings of their characters. Thus the one who is sent away freely goes away, for the sending and the going are but the complements of each other. Thus the individual shrinks from the society to which he is inwardly adverse, and the society itself repels him with whom it can not possibly have any communion. The one act involves the other.

The believer does not escape this judgment; but his sins come before him as all forgiven. The sense of condemnation is swallowed up in the feeling of pardon. The knowledge of his criminality is lost in consciousness of the love and favor of God. His sins constitute the foil from which the love of God shines forth all the more richly and sweetly.

Fallen angels, as having had a part in the destiny of human souls, must share in the general judgment. For that judgment is to be a revelation of the rectitude of God's general moral government. See Matt. 13: 41-43; II Pet. 2: 4; Jude 8. Christ, as Judge, merely completes the work He began on earth. See John 5: 22-27. He divides men in this world simply according to their relation to Himself, and hereafter He will simply carry out the division which He has made here.

CHAPTER II.

FUTURE LIFE.

SECTION FIRST.

THE IMMEDIATENESS OF RETRIBUTION.

The title of this section excludes the idea that the soul may remain unconscious until the general judgment. For the term "sleep" in the Bible is not the symbol of a dormant and void life; but of a rest, preparatory to a new and higher life. Besides, that

life is never represented as a loss to the Christian, but ever and always as a gain. But certainly it would be a great loss if the soul were to remain unconscious through an indefinite, but long, period of its existence. Besides, the apostles never speak of a blank period intervening between the death of the believer and his blessed resurrection. See Luke 23:43; II Cor. 5:8; Phil. 1:23.

The purgatory of the Catholics is also inconsistent with the view here maintained. It rests in part on the idea that death leaves many a Christian soul unprepared for heaven, but yet not deserving of hell. In their view, such a soul needs to pass through a purifying process, which must go on until full satisfaction is made by the pains of the soul in purgatory, and by the prayers of the church on earth, and by the merits of the saints transferred to his account, and above all by the frequent celebration of the mass on his behalf. Many suppose that a material fire is the means of this refining process; while others consider the fire a symbol of discipline through suffering.

The following are the objections to this conception of the immediate condition of most believers:

First. There is no clear and general support for it in the Scriptures; but the drift of Scripture teaching is the very reverse of it; namely, that a man, immediately after death, enters into a condition essentially unalterable. Of course this does not exclude the idea of growth. It merely determines the general conditions under which this growth will take place. There are only two passages referred to by Catholic writers which we need to notice. One is I Cor. 3:9-15. This simply discriminates between the Christian teacher and his unchristian teachings, and points out the separate character and destiny of each. The other is Matt. 16:19, with its parallel passages. These must be interpreted according to the commission of the apostles, and according to their mode of dealing with religious inquirers. Thus interpreted they must mean that the apostles had power to declare the terms on which heaven could be opened or shut to the human soul. Ministers at the present day have the same power, according as they approach the apostles in their knowledge of the truth.

Second. The idea of a purgatory weakens the value of Christ's work, since the believer himself renders a kind of satisfaction,

though inferior to the one rendered by the Redeemer.

Third. It implies that our prayers for the dead are not merely the result of an instinctive desire to help the departed, nor simply a privilege, but are also a solemn duty, and have an actual efficacy. Yet if such had been the view of the apostles, we should have found the thought expressed everywhere through their epistles.

Fourth. It makes the church the great practical dispenser of grace, and not Christ alone. The works of supererogation performed by her eminent saints form her spiritual treasury, which she can dispense at will.

SECTION SECOND.

THE CONDITION OF THE WICKED.

I. THE ANTI-SCRIPTURAL THEORIES.—A. Universalism. Its rationalistic form. Its leading idea is that all sin is punished in this life, and that consequently all at death are restored to the love and favor of God. To this view there are many and serious objections.

First. Such does not seem to be the fact. All men do not seem to be fully punished in this life. A solitary exception found anywhere would overthrow the theory. Frequent sudden deaths of men still in sin seem inconsistent with it. Individual experience of the effect of sin in hardening the moral nature, and so precluding punishment by blunting its very instrument, is opposed to this idea. Human observation of the great inequalities of the goods and the ills of life—of the tangled web of joys and sorrows—refutes this notion. History, with its long and dark catalogue of unpunished crimes and unnatural villainies, does not accord with the theory of Universalism.

Second. If human history is in all respects a divine judgment, and not rather a sample and token of something more yet to come, then we should expect that it would everywhere be so acknowledged. It is true that nations are judged in and by their history, and that the history of the race is God's judgment on humanity. But in the case of the individual the judgment here is not the finality, for the reason, if for no other, that it is not everywhere so recognized. Otherwise it exists in name only, and not in fact.

For a penalty, unrecognized, may be a consequence of sin, but can not be its punishment. If the soul does not see and feel the penalty, then it does not touch his consciousness—does not reach his person. He does not stand in and by it in any special personal relation to the divine government. The obvious fact that the world does not see this perfect government realized in human life is the best evidence that it does not exist as thus realized. If it did so exist there would be no doubt about it—no room for envy—and far less any complaint on the part of God's creatures of his non-intervention in the punishment of the wicked. If punishment is a revelation of the divine wrath, then sin does not seem to be fully punished. If the object of penalty is to reform the sinner, or to restrain the vicious, and to protect society, then sin does not seem to be fully punished, for we recognize no such perfect reform, no such perfect restraint, and no such perfect protection of society. As, then, the recognition of a perfect government is essential to its perfection, so its non-recognition is a proof of its incompleteness in this world.

Third. This Universalism is only a species of baptized naturalism. It allows of no supernatural intervention, leaves no room for forgiveness, and has no place for a Savior. There is no decisive value in repentance and faith as the terms of salvation. They are only parts of the natural and inevitable process common alike to all men—stages in the growth of every soul—steps in its necessary movement toward God. The natural pain of conscience completes itself in this life, and death itself, instead of being God's curse on humanity, is the real savior of every man. Thus punishment alone, as it culminates in death, has a regenerating and sanctifying power, so that there is no room in the scheme for a divine Redeemer, or for a divine Regenerator. Thus it is that a species of naturalism takes the place of Christianity.

Fourth. The consciousness of the Christian churches is strongly antagonistic to this theory. Here and there we find pious Restorationists—men, too, of learning and ability—but comparatively few pious Universalists. The conviction of sin is too deep, the experience of life too wide, and the Scriptural teaching too plain, to allow of any such superficial view of the moral government of God.

Fifth. The low Christian life which Universalism seems to

engender militates against its truthfulness. For we may say, in full charity even, that secret prayer and family worship, and actual effort for spiritual good of others, do not characterize this body of Christians.

The Christian form of this doctrine is simply this: Christ saves all souls immediately on their leaving this world. But this view seems to be in the clearest contradiction with the Scriptures, as these are interpreted by our ablest Biblical critics. Besides, the fourth and fifth objections against the rationalistic form hold also against the Christian form of the doctrine.

B. Restorationism. The Christian form of the dogma. This allows of a future punishment, but insists on its limited duration. Let us first examine those passages which seem most strongly to favor this view. The first is Eph. 1: 10; "To gather up again all things in Christ, the things which are in heaven, and the things which are in earth, even in Him." Here we have the last grand purpose of God in the sending of his Son. Here is given the most comprehensive result of the incarnation. The generic idea is that Christ is the new gathering centre of the whole universe—that not God in nature, but God in humanity, is to become the central object of universal attraction. All are to be brought into a closer relation to Christ, and all are to gather about the glorified Redeemer, each in his own sphere and each according to his own character. Even the lost are to recognize now for the first time fully the reality and the glory of the divine Presence. For they are to render to Him the homage of conviction, though not the worship of affection. All are to wait on the Son, and all are to do his bidding. The passage can hardly mean less than this. See Meyer, Alford, Ellicott, and Eadie. The idea is not that there is to be a redemptive restoration, but a re-gathering of the whole universe about a new centre—the recovery of the lost harmony of the world—in the new relations which every creature will hold to the incarnate God. The mediative work of Christ is to be felt to the furthest extent of God's dominions, and God as incarnate is to become the Sovereign of the universe.

The second passage is Col. 1: 20; "And through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace by the blood of the cross, through Him, whether there be things on the earth or in

heaven." The meaning is essentially the same as in the preceding passage. It is not the recovery of lost souls, but the closer union of the created universe about Christ, that is here taught. Angels are now at a comparative distance from God, and the Christian church is still separated in a measure from Him, and the wicked are far from Him, not merely in their affections and their activities, but also in their convictions. All this is to be changed as God's character appears more glorious in Christ, so He will draw all his rational creatures nearer and closer to Himself. In this sense there is to be a reconciliation of all things.

The supposition of the future restoration of lost souls to God is based on the idea of a series of probations, or, at least, of a second probation. But to this last view there are many objections.

First. There is no intimation in the Bible of any such second trial beyond the grave, to which men are to be subjected. The very reverse of this is the truth. The Epistle to the Hebrews is very clear on this point. It dwells at length and with emphasis on the fact that our present earthly condition alone is a day of grace. The writer makes his view still more definite when he affirms that "after death is the judgment." In this life we have probation alone; in the other, retribution alone. Death is always spoken of as closing, not our first probation, but our only one. We have no account of any moral change beyond the grave, and no instance of a sinner exercising repentance and faith in that world. The Scriptures are absolutely silent about any such renewed offer of mercy on the part of God. We have cases which seem to preclude the idea of a recovery for all men, as when it is said of Judas, "It were better if he had never been born," and as when it is said of those who commit the unpardonable sin, that they can be forgiven "neither in this world nor in the world to come." This last statement is a proverbial and emphatic denial of forgiveness. The question of forgiveness is so completely settled that no change or lapse of time can ever secure a reprieve from the divine Governor. If it be true that all sin finally assumes this form and completes itself in the sin against the Holy Ghost, then we see the impossibility of its being pardoned after the close of the present probation. The Bible least of all intimates that Satan himself is to be restored.

Second. Such a second trial would, in the majority of cases, be more unfavorable than the first. Men would enter the other world with fixed characters, or at least with confirmed habits of sin. Whatever favorable circumstances might surround them in the other world would be more than counterbalanced by the unfavorable tendencies within them. The chance of their conversion, humanly speaking, would be less than it was in this life under the first probation. Such is the law of life. Sinful feelings, and thoughts, and actions, lead to fixed sinful habits. The spiritual receptivity of the soul is weakened and the restorative power enfeebled, and a moral paralysis ensues.

Besides, punishment has not, in its own nature, any reformatory character. Duty pressed home on the paralyzed or despairing soul, creates simply a passive resistance. Mere suffering, in its own nature, tends to crush and to cloud the mind. It seems to be designed by God often to be penal in its character. It is a fact in human history that all great calamities by fire, by famine, by war, or by pestilence, exert but little, if any, reformatory influence. They are God's punishments. At such times the passions of men are let loose, and a sense of the value of life is weakened, and so the bonds of society seem to be almost dissolved. Where the reverse of all this takes place it is owing to the state of the individual heart and conscience—ultimately to God's grace. The Bible seems to take the same view. James affirms that "lust," when it has conceived, bringeth forth sin, and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death;" that is, sin can not and does not work its own cure, but only the ruin of the sinner. And John declares, "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still," and affirms that there is a sin unto death.

Third. The idea of a second probation nullifies the value of the present one, and by so much weakens in turn its own worth. It nullifies the worth of the present probation, because it is a practical invitation to the sinner to put off his personal salvation until this second probation comes, which he is sure will be effectual. At any rate, when he is told that he is certain finally to be saved, he is thereby deprived of the motive adequate to lead him to care for his spiritual prospects. He is content with the assurance that allays his serious fears. Thus both probations taken together have

not the same value as one and one only would have, that should gather into this brief life, as in a focus, all human hopes and all human fears, and bring these to bear on the hearts and consciences of men. Human nature is so weak that under the assurance of an ultimate restoration to the love and favor of God it would become more and more practically indifferent to the claims of religion.

The speculative form of this theory is simply this; sin originated in time and so must cease in time. God permitted it to exist for a wise purpose; namely, to reveal more fully his own character, and when He has accomplished this purpose He will banish sin from the universe. All that we can affirm is that sin must be mastered. We can not say speculatively whether it will be mastered solely by redemption, or solely by the perfection of penalty, or by both. Nor can we affirm that sin will ever cease in the universe. The very opposite might with more safety be accepted. It may be that sin will be allowed to appear among other orders of rational and moral beings, as these orders shall appear in different periods in the history of this universe. But sin will never appear for its own sake, but to accomplish God's ends, and to be mastered in their accomplishment.

I Peter 3: 19 is frequently referred to in support of a second probation. If this does teach that Christ went to the world of the lost, no account whatever is made in the Scriptures either of the character of his preaching, or of its results. It is certain that Christianity does not allow us to preach the dogma of Restorationism. It is not in our commission.

C. Annihilationism. The reason—the real reason—why the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked has been adopted by its advocates is the supposed insuperable moral difficulties in the common view. These difficulties concern the character of God, and the shortness of human life. As God is a God of love, so, it is thought, He will not permit the ruin of any of his creatures. In answer, it is enough to affirm that all reasoning from the infinite to the finite is uncertain. One might infer, aside from the fact in the case, that God would not allow sin to enter the world at all—much less allow it to reign so long and so triumphantly as it has. Besides, the ruin of the creature may not be owing to the love of God, but to the dignity of his nature. The very fact that He is so exalted

in his worth may make the sinner's fall all the greater. The very sovereignty of the soul in its break with God may necessitate a hopeless condition. If it be asked why God does not intervene more fully and more energetically than He does, we must answer that we are not competent to give a full explanation of the mystery.

We might ask in return why He has not made man a creature of necessity, and thus sacrificed the character of his virtue to its certainty. Doubtless there is something in this awful attribute of human personality, which precludes God's doing more than He does. It is also asked, how can God punish men forever for the sins of so brief an existence as the present? We reply that the time taken to commit a crime is no measure of its criminality. But a moment is required to originate and to render perpetual the greatest wrong. Tendencies may start in a moment and perpetuate themselves forever. Again, the future life is not the result simply of any act, but is in itself the finality of character. That finality may carry with it no restorative and regenerative elements, and so may be hopeless in its condition. The matter of time, in itself considered, has nothing to do with the case. There is nothing but penalty for the wicked in the eternal world—penalty full and complete. Christianity, or the present system as established by Christ, does not propose to do anything more for the unbeliever. He is left to himself, and so is lost.

No earnest and thoughtful man can deny the greatness and pressure of these difficulties. But it is not to be forgotten that our present state is one of ignorance; and that we are but in the infancy of our being, with faculties limited both by our natures and by our present condition. The theory of annihilation, even if it was in itself an allowable theory, escapes these difficulties only to raise others. One may ask, why does God seem to change his design in putting an end to the life of the soul which He has fitted for immortality? Why does He arrest the growth of a soul so soon and so suddenly? Whence this failure in a Being who is all love and all power? Again, one might ask what revelation of justice there is in the mere extinction of being, and to whom this revelation be made? Not to the sinner, for he ceases to exist; and not to the world at large, for there is no memorial of the divine rectitude, nor hardly a flash of the divine wrath, but a dying out of

life, unnoticed and unnoticeable. Annihilation, then, though it might be an ordinance of God, can not present itself as the penalty of sin. It is rather the abnegation of all punishment.

The advocates of this doctrine affirm that the soul itself is mortal. They insist that there is no such thing as a natural immortality of the soul. Of course the immortality of the soul is relative, and not absolute, because it is the immortality of a creature. But has not God expressed his will in the very constitution of the soul? Has it not a capacity for an endless growth? Is not this guilt an inherent one, and so an endowment? Have we power, and that, too, by an act of sin, or by a series of such acts, to end the very life of the soul itself? Is not the existence of the soul absolutely independent of any agency of our own whatsoever? Besides, is there not in every soul some trace of the natural image of God, which makes it indestructible? Is there not always something in it above nature; so that it is sure of a higher destiny than that of any form of nature? Has not Christ died for every soul, and has not the Spirit wrought in every soul, and is not every soul by this two-fold work brought into everlasting relations to God, whether saved or lost? [See *Evidences of Christianity*, Introduction.]

They also affirm that future existence is promised solely to believers. But this is hardly true. A blessed existence, and not a bare continuance of being, is the content of the divine promise. They contend that it is a conscious union with Christ that alone secures a future life. But this is a partial and one-sided statement. Christ secures a resurrection for all, both just and unjust; but a blessed resurrection for his disciples, and for them alone.

It is affirmed that in the Scriptures death, as the future penalty of sin, means simply extinction of being. But this can not be the case, for the reason that life, as the reward of faith, always means something more than bare existence, and eternal life something more than endless existence. It is life in its fullness and richness—in its blessedness. Thus John declares that "we know that we have passed from death unto life," and Paul affirms that God "hath made us alive together with Christ," and that "to be carnally minded is death, but to be spiritually minded is life and peace." Thus death, as the final penalty of sin, is not non-existence; but a

narrow and empty existence—one of inward misery. All such terms as destruction, perish, etc., have been in like manner misinterpreted by the advocates of Annihilationism. Their real import is obvious both to the critic and to the common reader of the Scriptures.

In fact, the testimony of the Word of God seems to be clear and emphatic on the subject. The wrath of God is said to *abide* on the unbeliever. The punishment of the sinner is said to be the same as that prepared for the devil and his angels. The smoke of his torment is said to ascend forever and ever. The destruction of the wicked is described as an everlasting one. In fact, there seems if possible to be less evidence in the Scriptures for Annihilationism than for Universalism or Restorationism. No theory is allowable simply because we thereby escape real or imaginary difficulties. The theory itself must have some support, either in nature or in revelation.

II. THE SCRIPTURE VIEW.—The state of the wicked is that of condemnation—a condemnation final and complete. It is the result of a life of sin, gathered in the consciousness of the sinner. For he now stands for the first time face to face with himself, as he stands face to face with God. The consciousness of God, as alienated from himself, is immediate, direct, and full. We are able to gain only a partial realization of such a state. There are, however, a few points too important not to be distinctly noticed.

A. The perfection of the penalty. This is not measured by the mere misery of the sinner, nor determined by his mere suffering. The perfection of punishment consists in the complete mastery of sin. The sinner no longer puts forth sinful acts, but simply endures the full penalty of his sins. He recognizes himself simply as a criminal. He does not sin, but suffers. His sinful condition remains, but powerless for evil and hopeless for good. The governing sentiments of his soul are fear, despair, and remorse. Face to face at once with his God and with himself, he is absolutely and always subdued. Impelled by the convictions of his conscience and of his reason, quickened as they are by the Spirit of God, he can not but render the homage of his soul to his Maker. In this way sin is mastered, even in the case of the lost.

Such is the design of future punishment. Its aim is to reveal,

in all its fullness, the criminality of guilt. It seeks to annul, finally and forever, the power of sin to disturb the moral order of the universe. It witnesses to the rectitude of God; it sanctions his law; it supports the moral order of the universe; and it nullifies the antagonism of the sinner to his Maker. Thus it does not in itself tend to regenerate the nature of the sinner. It simply subdues and restrains; and does not inwardly renew. It pours a flood of light on the conscience and on the reason, but does not quicken the affections. Penalty alone is but a part of a judicial process, and can have in itself no regenerative power. Punishment can never exhaust itself, because the character of the criminal has in itself no restorative power. There is no hope in penalty, and penalty alone.

B. Isolation of soul. Fear separates one soul from another, and all souls from the love of God. Remorse cuts one off from the past, and despair from the future, and both unite to isolate the soul. Thus irreligion allows of no bond of union deep and permanent. A society can not be formed except on the principle of mutual love and respect. As vice in this world precludes, as far as it exists, the social state, so irreligion precludes such a state in the world to come. Each soul is alone, but on the side of its conscience compelled to be with God, for that is just where God touches him. He has no resources of joy in himself, and no outlet for the activities of his nature. Whatever contact he may have with others, will but serve to reveal the criminality of his own character.

C. Hopelessness of condition. The passage in Matt. 25:46 seems awfully clear: "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." The same original word is here translated in one clause "eternal," and in the other "everlasting." It describes the fixed condition of one class, as of the other. The meaning seems to be clear. There is here no need of any learned disquisition. The language is simple, the clauses are balanced, and the meaning of one is to be interpreted by the import of the other. Here, as elsewhere, the context determines the meaning of the decisive word. When that context is clear, it is idle to collect passages where the word may have a different meaning. Such a method is unscientific. Nor does the enigmatical declaration, "Let the dead bury their dead," give an instance of the

change of the force of a word in the same ordinary sentence, for the very reason that there is a designed play on the words themselves. The saying itself is simply proverbial. It would be a childish thing to interpret a plain declaration by one which on its very face is paradoxical. We may compare one proverb with another, to aid us in understanding the language of proverbs and paradoxes, but not with a simple and literal statement.

The meaning of the passage in question is, if possible, more evident when we consider the prevailing opinion of the Jews in the days of the Savior. This will show how they must have understood Christ, and how He intended to be understood. Philo, in his work on the Cherubim, declares that the wicked will endure a complete misery as long as eternity endures. Josephus, in his account of the Jewish sects, declares that the Pharisees held the opinion that the bad are assigned to an eternal prison. The Essenes are said by the same writer to have believed that the wicked will suffer eternal punishment after death.

SECTION THIRD.

THE CONDITION OF THE RIGHTEOUS.

The Christian is to be conscious of a full fellowship with God. The consciousness of the world is to give place to the consciousness of God. Such must be the import of the recurring expression of Paul, that the believing soul is to be with Christ—to have its home with its Savior. Such seems to be plainly taught in the words of the apostle when he says: "For now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as I am known." Here Paul contrasts our present mediate knowledge gained through the physical senses, by signs and symbols, with our future immediate knowledge, gained through a direct consciousness of the verities and realities of the spiritual world itself. As God knows by an immediate and direct vision, so we shall know Him by the same process and in the same way.

Sin is to be mastered by the perfection of the redemptive process. The glory of divine grace is to be revealed in the believer. We remain rational, moral, social, and active beings, and in each and all of these forms and lines of life our natures will be perfected.

Each soul will maintain forever its individuality. Whatever our past earthly experience has in it that is heavenly will be recalled with joy; and whatever is sinful in our recollections of the past, will enter the consciousness in the form of thanksgiving and praise for the freedom and fullness of divine grace that pardons and accepts the believer. All else shall be forgotten, as but the accidents and accompaniments of a perished life. The laws of association will not bring them back. Thus the believer has a great past, as he has a greater future. The fellowship with God carries along with it a full fellowship with his people. Each soul maintains its own individuality, and so is suited to the society of heaven. All the diversities of that social state are not antagonistic, but complementary one of another. Thus they all contribute to the general happiness.

All speculation with regard to the employments of heaven seem to be idle and useless. All that we know is that we are to be perfectly happy, and that the perfection of our happiness must consist in finding an adequate sphere for the activities of our nature.

But heaven is a place, and that place is wherever the redeemed soul finds itself. The sinless and the redeemed can not go out of heaven. They carry heaven with them. They are of heaven, and their presence makes a heaven. The state thus makes the place. Thus Paul speaks of Christians, "sitting together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus." The Christian consciousness, in its highest mood, is essentially one with the heavenly consciousness. It is true that there are many passages which refer to heaven as a region above us. But this suggests the idea of universality. Heaven is above the earth from any and every point of the earth; but the physical elevation is only the sign and symbol of a moral elevation; so that, whenever we think of heaven as above us, it is above us spiritually, and not physically.

The question presents itself; will friends know each other hereafter? We answer, why not? If our identity is retained—if we remain ourselves, only transfigured and glorified, what is to prevent a recognition? Is memory to fail us when it would be of special service? Is the power to discern and to recognize to be hereafter weakened? Will not what is good in our friends impress itself on the new organism? Will not that very organism itself help us to

know each other more immediately and directly than we now can know, by virtue of the changes wrought in our physical organism?

A like question presents itself; will our earthly friendships and earthly intimacies be preserved? We answer, all that is spiritual in them will be recovered and retained. Social life and domestic life have helped to form our individuality, and have helped, under the grace of God, to ennoble our characters. We thus carry with us the results of home-training and home-culture. These affections will indeed be purified. There will be no concealment and no exclusiveness in them, but there is no reason whatever why they should not enter into the heavenly life, transmuted and glorified.

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
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
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
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
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3	19	or Finito,	and Finite.	123	18	so can,	so we can.
4	28	but a,	but not a.	126	18	in,	is.
7	4	Corrugations,	Qualifications.	157	4	describ,	describe.
8	28	spirual,	spiritual.	174	31	that,	thau.
18	15	had,	has.	183	32	in,	his.
21	30	to,	by.	192	22	apporpriates,	appropriates.
24	1	ten,	two.	208	27	pesents,	presents.
24	16	apriori,	apriori argu- ment.	208	33	many,	many.
24	23	1716-1693,	1683-1716.	211	28	human,	human and.
25	36	pretistic,	patristic.	212	32	on,	by.
27	11	Fanning,	Finney.	216	3	in,	in the.
27	34	Tranyllin,	Franzelin.	216	28	and all,	and of all
28	6	and his means,	or his needs	224	13	belive,	believe.
28	35	have,	he.	233	26	countryman,	countrymen
29	5	other is,	others are.	233	39	he,	whether he.
29	14	utilizo,	utilizo.	234	16	self-abregation,	self-abnegation.
29	32	sports,	poets.	239	12	premrment,	permanent
29	38	holds,	hold.	248	9	it,	in.
30	1	is,	was.	252	7	in tho,	in.
30	5	seems to have,	seemed to have had.	255	12	Mosasic,	Mosaic.
31	11	fileoguo,	<i>filioque.</i>	257	31	Gentilles,	Gentiles.
33	7	purgotary,	purgatory.	258	30	find in,	find in the.
33	19	Sinaic,	State.	260	23	Pelagin,	Pelagian.
34	35	independenco,	indifference.	263	23	and and,	and.
37	14	Philosopy,	Philosophy.	263	31	all his,	all on his.
40	2	natural,	national.	270	33	under-taker,	undertaken
40	20	recitudo,	rectitude.	272	21	of,	of the.
46	4	logic,	the cause.	277	13	absolutely,	absolutely it.
56	14	answerod,	answer.	277	33	to,	of.
59	8	prevalent,	theocratic.	281	21	how,	now.
67	33	propogate,	propagate.	282	2	penitent one,	impenitent one.
69	6	howover,	however.	283	19	one,	own.
77	27	violition,	volition.	286	12	and all,	and all its.
86	31	contradition,	contradiction.	302	22	delected,	defective.
88	36	Sebra.	Siva.	307	36	to redeemed,	to be redeemed.
103	15	argument,	government.	343	21	effect,	affect.
107	21	sonls,	souls.	350	5	affiliated,	affiliated.
111	35	deformitos,	deformities.	357	17	have,	has.
122	8	E.D.Boecher,	Edw'd Boecher.	357	22	affects,	effects.
				372	14	lost in,	lost in the.
				381	11	have wo,	have we not.

NOTE. A number of errors besides the above have been detected, but on account of their trivial character they have not been noted.











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